Committed to Victory: The Kentucky Home Front during World War II

By Richard Holl

“Deeply researched and clearly written . . . a wide-ranging and detailed account of Kentucky’s society, economy, and politics during World War II.” —John W. Jeffries, author of Wartime America

When World War II broke out in Europe in September 1939, Kentucky was still plagued by the Great Depression. Even though the inevitably of war had become increasingly apparent earlier that year, the citizens of the Commonwealth continued to view foreign affairs as a lesser concern compared to issues such as the lingering economic depression, the approaching planting season, and the upcoming gubernatorial race. It was only the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that destroyed any lingering illusions of peace.

In Committed to Victory: The Kentucky Home Front During World War II, author Richard Holl offers the first comprehensive examination of the Commonwealth’s civilian sector during this pivotal era in the state’s history. National mobilization efforts rapidly created centers of war production and activity in Louisville, Paducah, and Richmond, producing new economic prosperity in the struggling region. The war effort also spurred significant societal changes, including the emergence of female and minority workforces in the state. In the Bluegrass, this trend found its face in Pulaski County native Rose Will Monroe, who was discovered as she assembled B-24 and B-29 bombers and was cast as Rosie the Riveter in films supporting the war effort.

Revealing the struggles and triumphs of civilians during World War II, Holl illuminates the personal costs of the war, the black market for rationed foods and products, and even the inspiration that coach Adolph Rupp and the University of Kentucky basketball team offered to a struggling state.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Oct 9, 2015
• ISBN: 9780813165646

Book preview

Praise for

Committed to Victory:

The Kentucky Home Front during World War II

"Thoroughly researched and employing a wealth of sources from across the Commonwealth, Committed to Victory offers a comprehensive examination of Kentucky’s World War II home front. Offering an impressive array of economic and demographic detail as well as personal stories, this work charts the remarkable effects of the war on Kentucky. Arising from the devastation of the Great Depression, the World War II home front offered new opportunities for all Kentuckians regardless of race or gender. Committed to Victory, however, also recognizes that not every development was purely positive. Consensus was not automatic. Despite the demands for labor that allowed for the economic advancement of blacks and women, for example, they both felt the strains of gender and racial discrimination. Price controls, rationing, and wage levels caused their share of conflicts. Further, while the state may have experienced ‘politics as usual,’ many Kentuckians—both as families and as individuals—felt the strains of global conflict. Fortunately, however, Kentucky’s home front mobilization contributed significantly to the country’s success in World War II. In the end, given its balance, its inclusiveness, and its comprehensiveness, this work makes a tremendous contribution to Kentucky’s twentieth-century story."

—Thomas Kiffmeyer, associate professor of history, Morehead State University

Richard Holl’s work is an important addition to the existing literature on the state-level home front during World War II that weaves complex issues into a cohesive story of how Kentucky contributed to the United States war effort. His careful analysis of the economic, political, and social developments that affected Kentucky during the early 1940s adds to our national understanding of how the war affected the lives of people on the home front and how they adjusted to the stress and change of wartime experiences.

—Jerry Sanson, Louisiana State University at Alexandria

"Deeply researched and clearly written, Committed to Victory provides a wide-ranging and detailed account of Kentucky’s society, economy, and politics during World War II, one that effectively includes national perspectives and illuminating individual stories. The book is a valuable addition to the literature on the World War II home front and thus to our understanding of the war’s impact on the United States."

—John W. Jeffries, author of Wartime America: The World War II Home Front

A very informative and interesting look at a fascinating yet frightening era in the history of the state, nation, and world. Holl has produced an interesting, well-written, well-researched, and detailed account of the traumatic years of World War II on the American home front, and most especially in the Bluegrass State.

—Nancy Baird, professor emerita, special collections library, Western Kentucky University

Committed to Victory

COMMITTED TO

VICTORY

The Kentucky Home Front

during World War II

RICHARD E. HOLL

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Copyright © 2015 by The University Press of Kentucky

Scholarly publisher for the Commonwealth,

serving Bellarmine University, Berea College, Centre College of Kentucky, Eastern Kentucky University, The Filson Historical Society, Georgetown College, Kentucky Historical Society, Kentucky State University, Morehead State University, Murray State University, Northern Kentucky University, Transylvania University, University of Kentucky, University of Louisville, and Western Kentucky University.

All rights reserved.

Editorial and Sales Offices: The University Press of Kentucky

663 South Limestone Street, Lexington, Kentucky 40508-4008

www.kentuckypress.com

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Holl, Richard E., 1960-

Committed to victory : the Kentucky home front in World War II / Richard E. Holl.

pages cm. — (Topics in Kentucky history)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-8131-6563-9 (hardcover : alk. paper) —

ISBN 978-0-8131-6565-3 (pdf) — ISBN 978-0-8131-6564-6 (epub)

1. World War, 1939-1945—Kentucky. 2. Kentucky—Social conditions—20th century. 3. Kentucky—History—20th century. 4. United States—Social conditions—1933-1945. I. Title.

D769.85.K4H65 2015

940.53'769—dc23                                      2015020383

This book is printed on acid-free paper meeting the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence in Paper for Printed Library Materials.

Manufactured in the United States of America.

To Jody,

with love

Contents

Introduction

1. Kentucky War Plants and Weapons

2. Ralph, Rosie, and Labor-Management Relations

3. Food for Freedom

4. Rationing, Price Controls, and the Black Market

5. Politics as Usual

6. Kentucky on Guard

7. A Black Man’s Place and a New Place for Blacks

8. Choosing to Go: Migration, Identity, and Social Change

9. Loved Ones

10. Rupp on the Rise and Rubinstein’s Wine: Entertainment in a Barbaric Age

Conclusion

Acknowledgments

Notes

Bibliography

Index

Introduction

In 1997, Lowell H. Harrison and James C. Klotter published A New History of Kentucky. Since then, this book has become the standard account of Kentucky’s past. One part of Harrison and Klotter’s extensive bibliography, on sources related to the comings and goings inside the commonwealth during World War II, concludes with the observation that a full study of the Kentucky home front remains much needed. Committed to Victory is intended both to fill this gap and to serve as a new starting point for additional work on the history of modern Kentucky.¹

In 1939, Kentucky remained a place that was largely rural and agricultural. Farms and hamlets dotted the countryside. Prices for tobacco, cows, and other agricultural commodities interested most Kentuckians, as did news about meetings of farm organizations and better ways to raise crops and livestock. Except for Louisville and a few much smaller towns, little industry existed in the Bluegrass State, and even in the Falls City economic activity was scant compared to earlier, flush times.²

By then almost a decade long, the Great Depression lingered in Kentucky. The ongoing struggle to find jobs and better incomes took priority over other matters for many thousands of Kentuckians. The January 5, 1939, edition of the Jackson Times noted that in spite of . . . vast (federal government) spending for relief, in spite of improvement in business, little if any dent has been made in the number of the unemployed. A mix of frustration and apathy gripped the commonwealth, because it appeared that there was no end in sight to the economic slump.³

Kentuckians endorsed President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal. The unprecedented severity of the Great Depression convinced them that government assistance was both needed and acceptable. Emergency relief payments helped many Kentuckians after the Depression started; agricultural subsidies supported the crucial tobacco industry; the Works Progress Administration gave some unemployed Kentuckians jobs; and old age pensions covered their retirement. Most Kentuckians supported big government before World War II broke out.⁴

On the eve of World War II, Kentucky politics was known for its boisterousness. Democrats held the upper hand over the Republicans in the commonwealth. Normally the winner of the Democratic party primary captured the general election, which in many cases was a mere formality. Under these circumstances, factionalism within the Democratic party was both pronounced and heated. Governor Albert Benjamin Chandler, whose nickname was Happy, headed the dominant part of the Democratic party in 1939, but he always faced opposition. Chandlerites battled anti-Chandlerites to the finish. Sometimes Republicans won office, though often this happened only because the enmity between various Democrats created an opening. Liberal doses of patronage and out-and-out corruption seasoned the mixture. Politicians rewarded supporters with jobs, while nepotism, vote buying, ballot box stuffing, and other illegal practices thrived.⁵

Before World War II, Kentucky society expected that women would be wives and mothers. Married women catered to their husbands and raised the children. Though a small minority of females worked outside the home, this was not the Kentucky ideal. Necessity most often forced women into the labor force, where they held such traditionally female jobs as maids, secretaries, and teachers. A small number worked in Kentucky industry, but they made less money than men in the same positions and were true pioneers. A woman’s place was still small, with forays into college and new vocations frowned upon.⁶

African Americans fared less well than white women. Blacks suffered under segregation in Kentucky, forced by the system to attend separate but inferior schools while they were barred from public parks and many stores and restaurants. African Americans—like white women—worked in traditional areas (performing general labor and domestic service) and knew that better-paying jobs were closed off to them. Kentucky whites subordinated blacks and treated them as inferiors. Blacks chafed under white supremacy; groups like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the Kentucky Negro Education Association challenged the racial status quo but had not yet made much progress prior to World War II.⁷

In February 1939, Kentuckians viewed foreign affairs as a lesser concern than the Depression, the approaching spring planting season, and the upcoming gubernatorial race. Though many knew that Germany had taken over Austria and Czechoslovakia, and Japan had swallowed a part of China, Kentuckians remained optimistic about America’s chances to avoid European and Asian hostilities. The Park City Daily News of south central Kentucky captured the prevailing sentiment well when it observed that war is still hated and despised in this country as in no other.⁸

Then German dictator Adolf Hitler struck, sending German tanks crashing into Poland on September 1, 1939. Some minor, ineffectual diplomacy ensued. On September 3, Britain and France declared war against Germany. Having violated an earlier promise not to seize more land, Hitler’s aggression had led to war in Europe. The Jackson Times reacted to the armed conflict in Poland by reemphasizing its position that peace was far better than war and noting the tragedy of another world war only a quarter-century after the first began.⁹

Surprised by the sudden outbreak of European war, Kentuckians clung to their belief that the United States should stay out of the conflict. Kentucky representatives in Washington, DC, as well as the people at home supported President Roosevelt’s cash-and-carry and lend-lease programs. This way Britain could obtain American arms and munitions to fight Germany without the involvement of U.S. troops. Roosevelt also recalled the old World War I National Defense Advisory Commission (NDAC), which was dominated by industrial interests. FDR wanted NDAC to work with the military to see that the nation had troops, machines, and weapons ready should the United States become an active participant in the war. Kentuckians backed Roosevelt’s aid short of war program and prudent war preparedness measures but did not want to put American soldiers and sailors in places where they might be harmed.¹⁰

Meanwhile, the trouble between the United States and Japan grew more serious. The crux of the dispute was China. Japan had invaded that country in 1937, and the United States wanted the Japanese to withdraw. When Japan refused to leave, the Roosevelt administration applied additional pressure by shutting off the flow of American oil to Japan. Even after the embargo, Kentuckians thought that the United States would sidestep war. Diplomacy could be counted upon to resolve tensions between the United States and the Empire of the Rising Sun.

The oil cutoff left Japan with only eighteen months of oil in reserve. The Japanese leadership found itself facing an unpalatable choice: give up Chinese territory to get back American oil or take additional oil land in east Asia to make up for the loss of the American supply. Japan chose the latter course, with a strike at Pearl Harbor designed to buy time should the United States retaliate.¹¹

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor destroyed any illusions of peace Kentuckians may have still held. At dawn on December 7, 1941, 183 Japanese torpedo and dive-bombers, escorted by fighter planes, descended on Battleship Row, dropping their deadly weapons. Unprepared American servicemen returned fire, but to little avail. The Japanese sunk five U.S. battleships and damaged others. Lesser vessels went down. Two thousand five hundred sailors and civilians perished. The days of American neutrality and isolationist strength ended in a most emphatic way, as the United States plunged head over heels into the global conflict.¹²

Kentuckians demanded retribution. Many noted that the Japanese pounced while peace negotiations were underway. Lizzie Watts of Leatherwood, in the eastern Kentucky mountains, said that many people in her hollow hated the Japanese while others merely wished to teach them a lesson. The Herald News of Hodgenville, in central Kentucky, opined that the United States must become the workshop, supply arsenal, and food store of the Allies. If we do that well all will be well. Victory took precedence over everything else at this point, not least of all because Kentuckians knew that ours is a just cause.¹³

World War II changed the Kentucky economy dramatically. Manufacture of wartime goods took precedence over the making of peacetime goods, since the American Army and Navy required all manner of arms and munitions to defeat the enemy. While Kentucky did not produce nearly as many war goods as Michigan, Texas, or even Tennessee, it did make critical goods, such as industrial alcohol and synthetic rubber, which the United States desperately needed. The Bluegrass State was therefore a valuable cog in the American war machine. So much new military production along with the draft and maintenance of the essential civilian economy restored economic health to the commonwealth after ten years of depression. The state unemployment rate fell from 1940 to 1944, by which time everybody who wanted a job could find one. In a very real sense, the return of prosperity represented an unintended but immensely welcome by-product of the war effort.¹⁴

A related point is worth making. Although Kentucky certainly made great headway in absolute economic terms from 1939 to 1945, it only managed to tread water compared to other Southern states. Kentucky left World War II in approximately the same economic position that it entered the conflict relative to the South as a whole: namely, just above Arkansas and Mississippi but below the rest. Indeed, Florida, Texas, and Louisiana (among others) pulled further ahead of Kentucky when it came to overall economic activity and personal income.¹⁵

Like plant and equipment used to fashion weapons, labor proved indispensable to the construction of FDR’s arsenal of democracy. Kentucky workers of both genders and all races benefited from the creation of a plethora of wartime jobs. Though the movement of many females into wartime industrial work has attracted great attention, and rightfully so, it must be remembered that Ralph the Riveter contributed far more hours and products to the overall war effort than Rosie the Riveter. Ralph is an unsung hero of the Kentucky and American home fronts.

World War II recast Kentucky society, unleashing forces of change that only became more apparent over ensuing decades. Having secured better jobs during the war, and a taste of the good life, many women and African Americans resisted giving these things up, and some actively began the pursuit of social advancement. Black servicemen came home from fighting the enemies of life and liberty determined to see that the race reap its share of the freedoms that American public relations men extolled throughout the conflict. Segregation and inequality would no longer do; newly militant African American veterans lent their considerable energies to the burgeoning effort to dismantle Jim Crow. Many women, too, decided to keep their jobs once the war ended. Some of them possessed a keener appreciation of the lack of economic and educational opportunities available to Kentucky women before the war. If they did not organize to combat sexism themselves, the examples they set inspired their daughters and granddaughters to speak up, step out, and win a fairer share of American abundance. The war influenced both the Kentucky civil rights movement and the Kentucky women’s liberation movement.

Massive wartime migration contributed to the new postwar face of Kentucky, as did the loss of thousands of servicemen in the various European and Asian battles of this most ruinous of all wars. Hundreds of thousands of persons moved from the Kentucky countryside to cities inside and outside Kentucky. The cities and towns were the usual location of war production centers; the jobs were there, and the people followed. Louisville welcomed the most newcomers among all Kentucky locales, but people also traveled to places like Richmond, Ashland, Paducah, Elizabethtown, and Lexington. Other Kentuckians left the state entirely for the airplane and tank assembly lines of Detroit, Michigan; the shipyards of Newport News, Virginia; the machine shops of Cincinnati, Ohio; and other destinations. As combat deaths increased, pockets of grief spread across all regions of the commonwealth and relatives and friends mourned. World War II may still have been the good war for some folks, but not for those who lost loved ones. The war left Kentucky a more urban, industrial place while it accelerated the chronic loss of human capital.

Kentucky politics carried on pretty much as usual through World War II into the postwar period. No elections were postponed due to the emergency. Successful Democratic party politicians and successful Republican party politicians distributed patronage in the old tried-and-true manner. Party factionalism remained a constant, as did the use of corrupt methods to achieve electoral triumphs. The Chandlerites ran the State House from 1939 to 1943. A rare Republican victory in a gubernatorial contest followed as well as substantial Republican gains in both houses of the state legislature in 1944, but the Democrats quickly reasserted themselves and ended up in an even stronger position than customary. Anti-Chandlerite Democrats took control of the governor’s mansion in 1947, but Happy himself returned to power in 1955.

Although wartime conditions brought little change to state politics, Kentuckians thought more highly of the federal government after the war than before it. While the New Deal helped Kentuckians mitigate the problems of unemployment and poverty, the wartime American state achieved victory over barbaric and deceitful foes who challenged the American way of life and the restoration of prosperity. Nothing could be better than those results, and the credibility of the federal government with most Kentuckians reached new heights by 1945. Big government moved into the postwar period with added strength and confidence, and its opponents in the Bluegrass State found it impossible to roll back.

In about half a decade, World War II transformed Kentucky. Victory over the Axis brought Kentuckians immense satisfaction and reinforced the notion that America was a force for good in the world. Production of the various implements of war lifted a feeble economy to unprecedented heights, generating full employment and higher incomes for the people of the commonwealth. Urban areas of Kentucky gained population and skilled workers at the expense of rural areas due to wartime migration patterns. Since federal government orchestration of the war effort yielded salutary results, Kentuckians reaffirmed their support for a large, activist state capable of regulating the national economy and brokering deals between powerful special interests. African Americans and women registered significant economic gains during the war and made greater social progress later. All in all, World War II propelled Kentucky along new historical pathways, leaving the state a fundamentally different place, but one that would not have to wait long before confronting fresh challenges.

1

Kentucky War Plants

and Weapons

Axis aggression during the late 1930s profoundly affected the thinking of Kentuckians. Kentuckians grew to despise German leader Adolf Hitler, viewing him as a growing threat to the peace they enjoyed. Given Hitler’s misbehavior, most particularly the use of force against weaker nations, the people of the commonwealth embraced the official American policy of preparedness for the possibility of war even as they hoped that war would not engulf the United States. When war did come, thrust on Americans by the Japanese bombing of U.S. vessels docked at Pearl Harbor, Kentucky businesses and workers committed themselves wholeheartedly to construction of war plants and mass production of war goods. Victory over the Axis and the return of peace could not be achieved without a myriad of weapons.

Hitler’s rise to power in Germany went against all the odds. A corporal during the First World War, Hitler headed a fringe political party in the early 1920s called the National Socialists (or Nazis). After the failure of the Beer Hall Putsch, an effort by the National Socialists to overthrow the Weimar Republic, Hitler ended up in jail. Released in 1924, he rebuilt the National Socialist party over the next half-dozen years and made it a force in German politics. Hitler’s ultranationalism, attacks on the Versailles Treaty, and mesmerizing oratory earned him the support of many Germans. In 1933, he ascended to the chancellorship of Germany. Shortly thereafter, he crushed his political opposition, establishing a dictatorship. Secure now as der Fuehrer, Hitler eyed European land that he intended to incorporate into a greater Germany.

If Kentuckians were not concerned about Hitler in the beginning, he got their attention soon enough. Remilitarization of the Rhineland by the German army in violation of the Versailles Treaty did not bother Kentuckians much. The Rhineland was German territory, after all, and it was an ocean away. German absorption of Austria in March 1939 may have turned a few more heads, but a deep desire for peace overshadowed the Anschluss. The Munich conference and the subsequent cession of a part of Czechoslovakia called the Sudetenland to Germany made Hitler’s lust for land clear to Kentuckians, though many shared British prime minister Neville Chamberlain’s faith that Germany now possessed all the land it wanted and would go no further.

Czechoslovakia’s ultimate fate and events surrounding Poland proved to Kentuckians that Hitler could never be trusted and that American involvement in another European war could not be ruled out. In March 1939, Germany swallowed what remained of Czechoslovakia. In September 1939, Hitler launched a massive military strike against Poland, resulting in British and French declarations of war against the Third Reich. Only a little more than twenty years after World War I ended, World War II began.

Newspapers across the commonwealth reported these momentous events, and their editorials captured the sentiments of the people of Kentucky. The Jackson Times responded to the German seizure of Moravia and Bohemia by noting that the ex–house painter had deliberately violated every promise and guarantee, written and verbal, he had made [at Munich]. The Times characterized the feelings in this country as ones of anger and disgust. The Richmond Daily Register insisted that the German takeover of every bit of Czechoslovakia proved that Hitler will never be appeased, and will continue to covet the territory and property of other nations until death lays him low or the armies of other nations stop him. According to the Madisonville Messenger, Hitler’s decision to hurl tanks, planes, and infantry against Poland, along with continuation of the Asian war, revealed that maddogs [are] again loose in the world.¹

Under these circumstances, Kentuckian endorsed both U.S. neutrality and military-industrial preparedness. In late 1939, Kentuckians most emphatically did not want to send their sons overseas to fight and die, even though sympathies for the British and French ran strong. Kentuckians hoped against hope that the United States would stay out of the global fracas and that it would end quickly. Realities being what they were, however, the people supported sensible measures to ready industry and the military for whatever might come. The prevailing belief was that it would be foolish to sit back and do nothing until the enemy stands at our borders. As the Richmond Daily Register asserted, the moment for self-defense is here, now.²

President Franklin D. Roosevelt responded to the unsettled circumstances of the day by setting up the War Resources Board (WRB) in August 1939, between Germany’s acquisition of Czechoslovakia and its invasion of Poland. FDR wanted an assessment of earlier plans related to industrial mobilization of the United States for war, and improved communication between government and business. Hostilities between the New Deal administration and big business over such matters as collective bargaining, welfare, and taxation had been pronounced just a few short years earlier, and the president did not want lingering ill feelings to get in the way of contingency planning for war. Roosevelt had to mend fences with the economic royalists to better prepare the country should the worst come to pass. The establishment of the WRB let Roosevelt double-check earlier industrial mobilization planning and court an important segment of the business community. Edward R. Stettinius Jr., Roosevelt’s pick for WRB chairman, came from General Motors and United States Steel Corporation. A liberal businessman, with sympathy for New Deal social goals, Stettinius also possessed a wide array of friendships and acquaintances throughout American business. FDR knew he could count on Stett and a few others like him to appease key industrialists and ultimately bring them on board for the weapons push, should it be vital to do so.³

The WRB issued its final report in October 1939. Stettinius and the other corporate liberals on the board had scrutinized the World War I War Industries Board and studied the various Industrial Mobilization Plans of the 1920s and 1930s. They praised the Industrial Mobilization Plan of 1939, the latest in the line, characterizing it as a decided advance in the field of national preparedness and adequate plans for defense. They accepted the need, during an emergency, for a War Resources Administration (WRA), one-man leadership, and the commodity committee–war service committee interlock, all reminiscent of the 1917–1918 War Industries Board experience. Without doubt, the commodity committee–war service committee interface would permit the WRA to provide point of contact between government and industry. This connection was essential because only industry possessed the managerial skills and intricate hands-on production expertise required to meet monumental military demand in the midst of a modern, global conflict.⁴

Roosevelt’s reaction to the War Resources Board report can best be described as circumspect. FDR thanked board members for exceedingly good work. His confidence in Stettinius increased. Nevertheless, Roosevelt decided not to act on the WRB report quickly or even to make it public. After all, the United States was still at peace, and the War Resources Administration was to be called into service only after the issuance of a declaration of war. More to the point, labor and agriculture did not like the influence of big business on the report, and isolationists were leery of it. Believing it to be too controversial in nature, FDR made the expedient decision to shelve the WRB report; but that did not mean that it was forgotten.⁵

The War Resources Administration was never established. The WRB recommendation, however, did not go for naught. In late May 1940 Roosevelt announced the recall of the Great War’s National Defense Advisory Commission (NDAC) and in succeeding years created the Office of Production Management (OPM) and the War Production Board (WPB). Each new agency more closely resembled the War Resources Administration than the last. The WPB, which took form just after the attack on Pearl Harbor, was essentially the WRA by another name. Each organizational overhaul brought the country closer to the old War Industries Board (WIB) until an equivalent came into being. The WPB (like the WIB) functioned as a temporary, ends-oriented federal agency with overarching economic power, a single chief, and the requisite linkages between federal commodity committees and semiprivate war service committees. The War Production Board furthered wartime planning and production by providing a conduit between federal supervisory personnel, who had the tax money to construct massive war plants, and big business managers, who operated these plants. The military brass participated, too, pressing their point of view on total arms and munitions requirements, distribution of scarce materials, and profits for business. The fact that the NDAC, the OPM, and the WPB played vital roles from the preparedness period through the war itself is indicative of the ultimate triumph of the state-building approach of the corporate liberals and military planners. Roosevelt buried the War Resources Board report only to unearth it later, brush it off, and implement it. Small business, big labor, and agricultural interests were not pleased by this development, but could not stop it.⁶

The War Department acted swiftly to get a better handle on national defense supplies, dispatching sealed envelopes to businesses in all states to be opened only in case of emergency. Ninety manufacturing plants throughout Kentucky received such letters—fifty-four in the Louisville area and thirty-six throughout the rest of the state. The Army accounted for eighty-eight of the letters and the Navy for two. The War Department sent the orders to Kentucky firms that it believed could fill them promptly and efficiently with the least disturbance to private industry. X-ray apparatus, radio tubes, machine tools, ammunition components, and powder and explosives were known to be items the government wanted from Kentucky if the time came.⁷

Though the Kentucky companies selected for the possibility of defense work were not known at the time, speculation centered on two firms. The Kelley-Koett Manufacturing Company of Covington had supplied all the portable x-ray equipment that was put to such good use by American Army medical personnel in France during World War I, so it was the natural choice to perform that job again should the call come. Ken-Rad Company of Owensboro specialized in vacuum tubes for radio sets; it also seemed to be a good bet. If the United States ever became involved in the expanding European and Asian wars, these kinds of products and many, many others would be required. War Department officials behaved in a proactive manner to see to it that the needs of soldiers and sailors would be satisfied.⁸

European hostilities ignited an economic boomlet in Kentucky. In September and October 1939, various industries began to surge, including transportation, coal, steel, clothing, shipbuilding, aircraft, and automobiles. The Louisville & Nashville (L&N) Railroad added 2,100 workers across its system from September 12 to October 1, many of them in Louisville and other Kentucky locations. The Illinois Central Railroad, which ran through far western Kentucky, declared that it would spend $8 million on new equipment, such as diesel electric and switching locomotives, box cars, and coal cars. The Baltimore & Ohio, Chesapeake & Ohio, and Southern Railroads announced expansion plans. Anticipating increased demand for their product from Europe, coal companies rehired old employees and brought on new ones. Coal mining surged in the Elkhorn, Harlan, and Hazard areas, as well as in western Kentucky, and hundreds of men returned to the fields. In Ashland, the American Rolling Mill Company (ARMCO) upped its production of steel. Textile factories received new orders. Heavy backlogs developed for ships and airplanes. Increases in employment became inevitable in those areas. Even the Ford Motor Company plant in Louisville benefited from war-induced stimulus, seeing its staff catapult from 150 in August 1939 to 714 by September 5. From the very inception of the European war, Kentucky’s economy grew. The Great Depression continued, but its grip on the state weakened and better days lay ahead.⁹

Kentucky’s economic recovery actually began before the European war, but news of the fighting accelerated it. Expansion of the railroad, coal, and steel industries continued through the remainder of 1939 into 1940 and beyond. The L&N registered gross earnings of just above $88 million in 1939. This figure increased to $98 million in 1940 and $119 million in 1941. Over the same period, the freight carried by the railroad jumped from just above 42 million tons to over 58 million tons. The L&N made its gains in large part because defense plants and military installations opened near its lines and established forts and camps grew. With expectations high for increased demand and prices for coal following the attack on Poland, coal production ratcheted upward, as did employment. The amount of coal mined in Kentucky increased from 42.3 million tons in 1939 to 54 million tons in 1941. Employment in state coal mines passed 52,000 men and kept rising. By 1941, ARMCO started construction of a new blast furnace to meet the growing clamor for steel. Responding to war in Europe and Asia, as well as to Roosevelt’s industrial and military preparedness program, Kentucky’s transportation network became more extensive, and the output of raw materials burgeoned. These developments helped pave the way for additional Kentucky war production before Pearl Harbor and a much larger volume after it.¹⁰

Given events abroad and at home, the military bases of Kentucky expanded. Located south of Louisville, Fort Knox received word in late June 1940 from the War Department that it would become the home of the nation’s Army Armor Center. The center included an armor school and the staff and equipment necessary to form new armored divisions and tank battalions. By early 1942, the armor school possessed the capability of graduating 1,440 officers and 22,000 enlisted men annually. The number of graduates only rose thereafter. From its origin at Fort Knox, the armored force mushroomed from almost nothing to sixteen armored divisions and over 100 separate tank battalions and mechanized cavalry squadrons by 1945. As officers, enlisted men, tanks, and the rest arrived at the base, the number of buildings multiplied. Fort Knox had 864 buildings in 1940 and 3,820 by 1943. Land acquisitions during the war doubled the size of the base to almost 107,000 acres in parts of Hardin, Meade, and Bullitt counties. Bowman Field in Louisville became an Army Air Corps training base by August 1940. Fort Thomas in northern Kentucky, which overlooked the Ohio River, served as an army induction center from September 1940 to June 1944. At its height, the installation processed approximately 3,000 recruits per week.¹¹

As Kentucky’s economy gradually regained strength, and the first steps were taken to put the American military on a war-ready footing, the success of Germany’s spring 1940 blitzkrieg compelled President Roosevelt to resuscitate the National Defense Advisory Commission. On May 26, 1940, while Allied forces in France still reeled under heavy Nazi assault, Roosevelt informed Americans that he intended calling on men now engaged in private industry to help . . . in carrying out the defense program, and that the public would hear more of this in a few days. On May 28, the president activated the NDAC with a mission to expedite the provision of supplies and munitions to the armed forces. A temporary, emergency agency, sure to be retired once any war was won, the NDAC attacked the federal government’s lack of capacity to gear the economy for war by harnessing corporate liberal expertise and connections to carry out private production of weapons and other war-related items, which would then be purchased by the Army and Navy. An experiment in public-private planning and intelligent collaboration, the NDAC prepared the way for similar but larger and more meaningful efforts after 1940.¹²

The structure of the National Defense Advisory Commission was unique. Seven members sat on the NDAC, one each for raw materials, production, labor, agriculture, consumers, transportation, and prices. In June 1940, Roosevelt appointed a Coordinator of National Defense Purchases, putting him on par with the various commissioners. Although these eight people came from many walks of life and represented diverse interests, three were most significant because they were best positioned to make use of the assets of corporate America: Industrial Materials Commissioner Edward Stettinius Jr., Production Commissioner William Knudsen, and Coordinator of National Defense Purchases Donald Nelson. Stettinius, who had done good service for Roosevelt as head of the War Resources Board seven months earlier, returned. A handsome, affable, white-haired fellow, he continued to use his many connections throughout American business to good effect. Stettinius’s job was to amass essential raw materials so that the finished defense products could be made. Industrialists nationwide considered General Motors president Knudsen the top production man in the nation. Once the chief assistant to Henry Ford at Ford Motor Company, he now ran the day-to-day affairs of GM. As a member of the NDAC, he planned for future defense production and sought ways to eliminate any bottlenecks that arose. Knudsen envisioned construction of wholly new defense plants, expansion of some existing plants, and conversion of plants not engaged in peace work to war work. Nelson, executive vice president of Sears, Roebuck, and Company in civilian life, would see to the purchase and distribution of defense goods. A perfectionist who, it was said, pursued information like a dentist after an ailing tooth, Nelson preferred the use of patience, tact, and diplomacy rather than brute force to get results. Stettinius, Knudsen, and Nelson worked together to better coordinate the national economy so that the military would get all the weapons and other goods it needed to meet any challenge.¹³

Photograph taken by a Japanese bomber pilot of the devastation inflicted on American naval ships at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. (Courtesy of the Library of Congress.)

The National Defense Advisory Commission issued various public pronouncements. Every American citizen was encouraged to think about preparedness and to do what they could to help. Scrap drives designed to increase stockpiles of valuable metals such as aluminum were encouraged. The NDAC’s Production Department stressed again the need for businesses to convert peacetime plants to war work where feasible. Some Kentucky companies responded to this emphasis by devoting thought to the kinds of war goods they might manufacture. Roosevelt delegated the authority to clear defense contracts of $500,000 or more to Knudsen and Nelson, who took into account site location before granting approval. Given this power, firms often consulted with the two businessmen-bureaucrats about good places to establish arms and munitions plants, and their orders sometimes affected Kentucky.¹⁴

Kentucky was well situated geographically to get war work. At the beginning of the conflict, the federal government required that defense plants be located at least two hundred miles from any coastline or international boundary. Additional advantages would be taken into account, but this stipulation was a must, and Kentucky met it. Senators Alben Barkley and Albert B. Happy Chandler and the various U.S. representatives from the commonwealth immediately lobbied Roosevelt, the War Department, the NDAC, and Congress for a fair share of defense contracts and facilities.¹⁵

Louisville’s attractions for defense work far surpassed those of any other place in Kentucky. Louisville’s advantages included an abundance of land, greater availability of labor than any other place in the commonwealth, ready availability of managerial talent, a fine railroad network, and copious amounts of water. Its signal distinction, however, may well have been close proximity to the greatest concentration of distilleries in the country. Bourbon whiskey was no prerequisite for war work, but the conversion of such plants to production of industrial alcohol would be a huge plus. Both smokeless powder and synthetic rubber (immensely important war goods) required a certain amount of industrial alcohol to make, and Louisville could get that ingredient more easily and more cheaply than any big city in the United States.

From mid-1940 forward, signs of war industry in the Louisville area multiplied. Groundbreaking took place for a huge smokeless powder plant, followed by a naval gun plant and a bag-loading plant. This activity only started the ball rolling. Ranked twenty-fourth in the United States in terms of population according to the 1940 census, Louisville ultimately became the eighteenth largest center of war production in the country while generating well over one-half of all war-related output in the state. As time passed, other parts of the commonwealth experienced defense construction and the eventual appearance of many types of war-related facilities. New plants generally appeared first, since they took so long to build and were so crucial to meeting the most pressing needs of the nation should it be drawn into the world war. Conversion of established Kentucky plants to war work usually occurred later—often after the United States declared war on Japan. Factory conversion generally took less time than building an industrial facility from scratch.¹⁶

Rumors about an E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company defense facility to be located near Louisville began to circulate sometime during the spring of 1940. Locals noticed C. V. Atwell, a Wilmington, Delaware, real estate operator, taking options on land in the Indiana suburbs of Louisville. Louisvillians guessed that DuPont wanted to open a nylon factory there. Soon thereafter everyone learned that a DuPont plant was indeed coming and that it would actually make smokeless powder, a brown, granular substance that the military employed as a propellant charge to hurl projectiles such as bullets, shells, and rockets.¹⁷

A small part of the Charlestown, Indiana, smokeless powder plant operating through the night. (Courtesy of the Hagley Museum and Library.)