Divided Loyalties: Kentucky’s Struggle for Armed Neutrality in the Civil War

By James W. Finck and William C. Davis

On May 16, 1861, the Kentucky state legislature passed an ordinance declaring its neutrality, which the state’s governor, Beriah Magoffin, confirmed four days later. Kentucky’s declaration and ultimate support for the Union stood at odds with the state’s social and cultural heritage. After all, Kentucky was a slave state and enjoyed deep and meaningful connections to the new Confederacy. Much of what has been written to explain this curious choice concludes Kentucky harbored strong Unionist feelings. James Finck’s freshly written and deeply researched Divided Loyalties: Kentucky’s Struggle for Armed Neutrality in the Civil War shatters this conclusion. An in-depth study of the twelve months that decided Kentucky’s fate (November 1860 – November 1861), Divided Loyalties persuasively argues that the Commonwealth did not support neutrality out of its deep Unionist’s sentiment. In fact, it was Kentucky’s equally divided loyalties that brought about its decision to remain neutral. Both Unionists and Secessionists would come to support neutrality at different times when they felt their side would lose. Along the way, Dr. Finck examines the roles of the state legislature, the governor, other leading Kentuckians, and average citizens to understand how Kentuckians felt about the prospects of war and secession, and how bloodshed could be avoided. The finely styled prose is built upon a foundation of primary sources including letters, journals, newspapers, government documents, and published reports. By focusing exclusively on one state, one issue, and one year, Divided Loyalties provides a level of detail that will deeply interest both Kentuckians and Civil War enthusiasts alike. Kentucky’s final decision was the result of intrigue and betrayal within the Commonwealth while armies gathered around its borders waiting for any opportunity to invade. And it was within this heated environment that Kentuckians made the most important decision in their history.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Dec 19, 2012
• ISBN: 9781611211030

Book preview

Introduction

What set Kentucky apart from other states during the Civil War was its interesting relationship with both the North and the South. Although numerous books and articles have been written to explain why states broke their ties with the Union, far fewer have been written to explain why one particular slave state remained loyal. Officially, Kentucky sided with the Union during the Civil War; yet Kentuckians were connected culturally, economically, socially, and through the practice of slavery with the Confederacy. Kentucky sat on the border between the two nations and had loyalties to both.

One reason for the lack of attention to Kentucky’s choice of allies derives from past historians, mainly E. Merton Coulter. He argued that Kentucky’s decision was easy to make: Kentucky remained in the Union simply because it had much stronger loyalties to the Union than the Confederacy. However, an examination of the evidence yields a different conclusion. Kentucky tried to remain apart from the two warring powers by declaring itself neutral. In the beginning of the secession struggle, Unionists fought for neutrality when they believed their state might follow other slave states into the Confederacy; later, a switch occurred as secessionists picked up the banner of neutrality when they saw their own hopes fading. Ultimately, Kentucky made a decision based upon self-preservation rather than loyalty to either side.

This book is an in-depth study of the twelve months that decided Kentucky’s fate, November 1860 to November 1861. By focusing exclusively on one state, one issue, and one year, it uncovers important details that helped lead to Kentucky’s decision. The book looks at the roles of the state legislature, the governor, other leading Kentuckians, and average citizens to understand how Kentuckians felt about the prospects of war and secession, and how—they hoped—bloodshed could be avoided.

The various chapters explore several themes, including the political history of Kentucky from the 1840s to 1860. Kentucky, like most of the other border states, was able to maintain its two-party system during these difficult political years. The Whig Party, founded by Kentuckian Henry Clay, never lost its attractiveness in Kentucky even though it was forced to appear under different names, such as the Know-Nothings. This strong two-party system played an important part in keeping Kentucky in the Union.¹

Yet the emergence of the secession crisis transformed the political landscape of the Commonwealth. Kentuckians divided themselves according to three separate ideological positions: unconditional Unionists, who could not foresee any issue that would justify secession; secessionists, who felt the Union had overstepped its authority and, with the election of Lincoln, saw a necessity to join the Confederacy; and lastly, the largest group in the state, the conditional Unionists. The latter believed the nation could in fact be restored, but did not deem secession to be out of the question if their rights were not protected. These new ideological positions manifested themselves in the realignment of politics into two new parties, the Democratic Unionist Party and the States Rights Party.

Both new parties would come to support Kentucky neutrality. Governor Beriah Magoffin entertained ambassadors from the seceded states, but decided that Kentucky would only consider secession after all possible attempts at reunification and peace had failed. There were three major attempts on the national level to solve the problems: the Corwin Amendment, the Crittenden Compromise, and the Peace Convention. All three had similar elements—the protection of slavery and southern rights—and Kentuckians played a major role in shaping what became of all of them.

However, as compromise efforts began to fail, Kentuckians, knowing their state could become a battleground, began to see the idea of neutrality as their best chance to avoid bloodshed. Adherents of all ideological positions had different reasons to support neutrality. The legislature had rejected calling for a state convention to decide the issue of secession, but secessionists and Unionists still held relatively equal power, so that decision could be overturned with any unforeseen future event. With such close competition in the state, neutrality seemed the only answer that satisfied, or at least propitiated, everyone.

Much of this book focuses on the difficult endeavor of keeping Kentucky neutral, especially after the fall of Fort Sumter. Men with feelings for each side were leaving the state to fight for their cause, and those who remained behind were pushing the limits of neutrality. One of the biggest obstacles in remaining neutral was the Lincoln Guns being delivered in the state by Union supporters. Other causes for concern included the Mayville Convention, at which representatives of the Jackson Purchase section of the state met to decide whether they should sever their ties with Kentucky and join Tennessee. At the same time, the Union created the military department of Kentucky and began actively recruiting troops from the state. The department created military camps just across the Ohio River in Ohio and Indiana to receive and train new recruits. Lincoln also closed down trade into Kentucky of goods that were being sent south to aid the Confederacy.

In the month of July, the situation in the state only worsened. Kentuckians were still trying to remain neutral, but were receiving pressure from within and without the state. The Battle of Manassas and General Fremont’s proclamation in Missouri freeing the slaves worried Unionists. However, the August election for the state legislature resulted in a resounding victory for the Democratic Unionists, causing the States Rights Party to push even harder for neutrality and to call a Peace Convention to try to keep their state out of war. With the victory in the August election, the Union took a bold step by setting up Camp Dick Robinson within the state to raise and train Union troops. Finally, in September, the Confederacy—deeming the operation of Camp Dick Robinson a breach of neutrality, and fearing possible invasion by U. S. Grant to capture the high ground over the Mississippi River—invaded the state. When the Confederacy refused to pull out of Kentucky, the legislature voted to embrace the Union, and neutrality was ended.

Another important aspect of this book is its examination of the evidence used by historians such as Coulter and Thomas Speed to prove their thesis of overwhelming Union support. To make their arguments, they used the voting records from important elections held in 1860 and 1861, including the 1860 presidential election. These historians have suggested that Kentucky’s loyalty can be proven by counting all the votes for Douglas, Lincoln, and Crittenden as a vote for unconditional unionism and a vote for Breckinridge as a vote for secession. According to this theory, four out of every seven Kentuckians favored unconditional unionism. However, an examination of the campaigns run in Kentucky show that both Breckinridge and Crittenden ran on the similar platform of a government without Lincoln and the protection of slaves within the Union. With seven out of every nine Kentuckians voting for either Breckinridge or Crittenden, Kentuckians were not voting for unconditional unionism, but for a nation that guaranteed Southern rights.

Two important state elections took place in Kentucky in 1861. The first, in May, was the election to the Border State Convention being held in Frankfort. Just as with the presidential election, historians have used the Democratic Unionists’ victory as proof of a dominant Unionist sentiment; but once again further examination tells a different story. The Democratic Unionists ran an effective campaign of claiming that a vote for them was a vote for neutrality and peace, while a vote for their opponents meant war. In July, a second vote took place to elect members to a special session of Congress. Again the Democratic Unionists won, and again all the same arguments and disagreement apply.

Lastly, the number of enlistments into the Union army have been used as evidence supporting their thesis of strong unionism. However, if one looks at enlistments before the loss of neutrally, the number of men willing to fight favors the Confederacy. It was only after Kentucky sided with the Union—and was thus subject to the Union draft, as well as having men volunteer out of state loyalty, not national—that more men joined the Union army.

As will be shown, Kentucky’s ultimate decision to remain loyal to the Union was not an easy one to make. The state’s first preference was not to side with the United States, but instead to avoid any conflict with either side and remain neutral. However, maintaining neutrality would prove to be a difficult task, with men on both sides favoring neutrality for their own agendas. Remaining in the Union was never a foregone conclusion; it was Unionists who first suggested neutrality when they believed Kentucky’s membership in the United States was threatened. It was the Democratic Unionists who ran and campaigned on the idea of neutrality. These men would never have done so if they felt Kentucky was firmly in the arms of the Union.

In the end, it was the desire for self-preservation, feelings of state loyalty, geographical location, and the chaos in the state during 1861 (including the breach of neutrality by the Confederacy) that brought reluctant Kentuckians into the Union camp.

Acknowledgments

I have been very fortunate to study under some of the greatest minds in the history world, and in some way they all contributed to helping me get to this point. In each case not only are they gifted writers and historians, but true teachers who cared about my education. They not only supported my learning but pushed me to excel. As an undergraduate at William and Mary, Carol Sheriff helped me see the social side of the Civil War and mentored me as I began my historical journey. As a Master’s student, I sat at the feet of both James I. Robinson and William C. Davis, arguably the greatest historical pairing at any university. Professor Davis has been a great help since I left Virginia Tech, both reading my manuscript and connecting me with Savas Beatie Publishers. I also want to thank him for agreeing to write a Foreword for this book, bringing it more credibility than I ever could. As a Ph.D. student at the University of Arkansas, I continued to learn under an excellent historian, Daniel Sutherland. He guided me through the process of writing this manuscript, reading it several times and giving me constant feedback. All four of these historians started out as my professors, but today I consider them good friends.

Another person I need to thank is Dr. Aaron Crawford. He has been a great friend since our days at grad school and has served as my unofficial editor and sounding board during the writing process. Many other people have read my manuscript over the years, including my grandfather, James Ellis, and my parents, Dan and Connie Finck. With each reading I have been able to improve my work. My parents and in-laws also deserve thanks for supporting me in many ways through my schooling.

When it comes to research, the staffs of the special Collections at the University of Kentucky and Western Kentucky University were very helpful, as well as the staff at the Filson Historical Society and the Kentucky Archives. A special thank you to the staff at the Kentucky Historical Society, especially Lynne Hollingsworth, for their assistance with information as well as for granting me a research fellowship. I want to thank Shayna Woidke for her help with the maps and pictures.

I also want to extend a thank you to Savas Beatie’s managing director, Theodore P. (Ted) Savas, my editor Rob Ayer, and the entire publishing staff at Savas Beatie for all their help in making this book possible.

I need to thank my kids, Jacob, Savannah, and Jackson; they are my inspiration for everything. Most importantly, I need to thank my wife Melissa. She deserves a Ph.D. as much as I do, having been at my side since my freshman year and supported my every decision. She has read each chapter more than once and has learned more about Kentucky and the Civil War than she ever wanted to. Thank you, and I love you very much.

James W. Finck

Chickasha, Oklahoma

1 For more on the importance of the two-party system in the border states, see Daniel W. Crofts, Reluctant Confederates (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989).

Chapter 1

Kentucky’s Political System:

1840 to 1860

In November of 1860, Kentucky, like the rest of the nation, gathered at the polls to elect a new president of the United States. However, this election differed from previous ones in that the very survival of the nation was at stake. Many Southerners saw the possible election of Abraham Lincoln as the ultimate betrayal of their rights and a justification for secession. Unlike the major parties during the antebellum period, the Democrats, Whigs, and Know Nothings, Lincoln and the Republican Party represented only the Northern half of the country. Southerners worried that Lincoln’s sectional views and his party’s free-soil tendencies could threaten the future of slavery. When Illinois Republicans nominated Lincoln as their candidate for the Senate in 1858, he had accepted their nomination with his now famous House Divided Speech. In his speech, Lincoln professed his belief that the nation could not survive half slave and half free, leading Southerners to believe that Lincoln intended to attack slavery once he took office. The platform adopted by the Republicans in 1860 even rejected the Dred Scot decision and called for the outlawing of slavery in new territories.¹

Lincoln, a native-born Kentuckian, was the sixteenth president of the United States. He did not poll well in Kentucky, winning only. 9% of the popular vote. Lincoln understood the importance of keeping Kentucky in the Union and walked a fine line between accepting its neutrality and cultivating Kentuckians’ loyalty. Library of Congress

Kentucky, like every other slave state, had strong concerns about the election of Abraham Lincoln. Although Lincoln was a native son of Kentucky, the majority of the population did not accept his sectionalism and free-soil ideology. Slavery had been an institution in Kentucky since its statehood. In the 1830s, Kentucky had one of the highest ratios of slaves to whites at 24 percent, and the number of slaves within the state grew over the next thirty years. However, the large influx of white immigrants changed the percentage of slaves from nearly one-quarter (24 percent) to about one-fifth (19 percent), with a total slave population of 225,483 by 1860.²

Most Kentuckians in 1860 did not own slaves, and a small population within the state believed slavery to be morally wrong. However, for most people, whether one owned slaves was purely a question of expense. A slave in antebellum Kentucky cost an average wage earner about two years’ salary. Even with the high expense, 28 percent of Kentucky families did own slaves. This was a very high number compared to the rest of the South, with only Virginia and Georgia having a higher percentage of slave owners. The difference between Kentucky and the cotton states was the number of slaves a family owned. Only five families in Kentucky owned more than 100 slaves; most owned around five or six. The number of slaves in Kentucky was smaller mainly due to the fact that the state’s agriculture was not as labor-intensive. The shift in Kentucky’s economy away from labor-intensive crops led to the profitable business of selling Kentucky’s surplus slaves to the cotton states.³

With families owning fewer slaves but more families owning them, slavery tied the state to the rest of the South. The slave trade from Kentucky south only strengthened the bond. With the prominence of slavery and the importance of the slave economy, Kentuckians had no interest in supporting Lincoln or the Republican Party.

While most Kentuckians generally disagreed with Lincoln, they also disagreed with the argument that Lincoln’s election was grounds for secession. The Louisville Daily Journal declared itself full of sorrow and anxiety over Lincoln’s possible election and prayed he would not be successful. However, the paper did not believe in abandoning the Union in its time of crisis, and insisted a legally elected president should be supported. It also maintained that the Congress, being controlled by the South, would be too strong to allow Lincoln to harm slavery in any way. The Journal saw no reason to fear a Republican president. Even one of Kentucky’s most famous and respected statesmen, John J. Crittenden, tried to cool passions raised by the chances of Abraham Lincoln’s election. Crittenden delivered a speech in August of 1860 in which he questioned what would happen if Lincoln won while the South still controlled the Congress and the courts. Crittenden did not agree with Lincoln’s politics, but he knew him and believed him to be a good and decent man—and one smart enough to marry a Kentucky girl. Crittenden’s one complaint was not with Lincoln himself but with the Republican Party. Crittenden feared that Lincoln had to follow the ideology of the Republican Party, leading to more sectional agitation for the country; but this factor alone, he said, did not justify secession.⁴

One positive thing that Lincoln did for Kentucky was to unite the state. Unfortunately for Lincoln, however, it was in opposition to him. When it came to the other three candidates for the presidency, things became much more confusing. Two of the candidates, John C. Breckinridge and Stephen Douglas, considered themselves Democrats, while the third, John Bell, belonged to the Constitutional Union Party, an organization running a candidate for the first time. To better understand the confusion regarding these remaining three candidates, it is necessary to provide a brief history of political parties in Kentucky.

Since the 1830s, the Whig Party had controlled the state of Kentucky. Henry Clay, founder of the Whig Party, was arguably the most famous and respected politician in antebellum Kentucky. Clay was part of the generation that transformed Kentucky from a frontier outpost to something at least similar to tidewater Virginia. He pushed the Bluegrass System within his state that led to government support of industrialization. On the national level, Clay made his name fighting against President Andrew Jackson while Speaker of the House of Representatives. He outlined the policy known as the American System, which grew out of the Bluegrass System. This policy was meant to make America economically stronger by raising tariffs and building a better infrastructure for trade. He ran for the presidency in 1824, only to lose to John Quincy Adams, who then appointed him secretary of state. Between 1832 and 1844, Clay was considered a possible Whig candidate for each presidential election. He received the nomination both times, but lost on both occasions. It was not until the 1850s that the Whigs lost their hold on the state, beginning in 1852 with the death of Clay.⁵

Henry Clay served as a congressman and senator from Kentucky, as well as Secretary of State and Speaker of the House. He was one of the most powerful and influential politicians of his era and became known as the Great Compromiser because of his efforts to save the nation from civil war. Clay was also one of the founders of the Whig Party during the Second American Party System. Library of Congress

In the late 1840s, problems arose within the Whig Party that continued to plague it. The party ran its last presidential candidate, Winfield Scott, in 1852, only to lose to Franklin Pierce. In Kentucky, the decline began in 1848 when Clay (who had professed retirement) threw his hat into the presidential ring when it looked as if the Whigs could win. Clay’s return put Kentucky Whigs in a difficult position; many had given support to Zachary Taylor, but now Clay demanded his state’s allegiance, thus creating a split that never healed.⁶

As for the rest of the Southern Whigs, it was the perceived betrayal of Taylor that led to the party fracture. In 1850, Taylor supported the statehood of California, which wanted to enter the Union as a free state. Southern Whigs feared the admission of another free state and criticized Taylor for not protecting their welfare. They also criticized him for not addressing the issues of the fugitive slave law and the proposed ban of slavery in the capital. To solve the problem and patch up the Whig Party, Clay proposed the Omnibus Bill as a compromise. The bill would admit California as a free state, but the rest of the land gained from Mexico would be organized without restrictions on slavery. The slave trade would be outlawed in Washington, D.C., but slavery itself would be allowed to continue. Clay also called for a stronger fugitive slave law. Taylor, however, wanted California admitted immediately and did not support the compromise efforts of Clay, which caused more Southern Whigs to become frustrated with their party. When President Taylor died suddenly, the new president, Millard Fillmore, supported the compromise plan, but by then it was too late. Stephen Douglas led a movement among the Democrats and some Northern Whigs that took over the efforts to work out a plan; he passed the Compromise of 1850 based on Clay’s original Omnibus Bill.⁷

Kentuckians generally saw the Compromise of 1850 as a success. Order was restored and the fugitive slave law passed. Politically, however, the landscape changed. The Democratic Party accepted credit for the Compromise and claimed its new role as upholder of the Clay legacy of compromise. During the debates over the Compromise and the bickering within the Whig Party, many men had jumped ship and joined the Democrats to see the Compromise pass. The old issues that used to divide the parties, such as banks and internal improvements, had lost their importance to the bigger issues of slavery and states rights, and the Democrats claimed they were the party of Southern rights. After all, it was a Whig president who had created the problem.⁸

After 1852, the Whig Party ceased to play a significant role as a national institution. The Northern and Southern wings of the party could not agree on the issue of slavery, and with Scott’s failed bid for the presidency and the Democrats capturing states-rights Whigs, the party dissolved. The border states, however, never lost their Whig loyalty and attempted to hold on to the party as long as possible, or resurrect it as part of the American Party. In the mid-1850s elections, the former Whigs, in the American Party, stood their ground as best they could against the Democratic onslaught that captured the cotton states. In most of the border states, the Democrats did gain the advantage, but never by large majorities. In Kentucky, the last election with an official Whig candidate was 1853, a good year for the Democrats, who finally pulled even with Whigs. The difference between Kentucky and most other border states, however, was that Kentucky Democrats would have to wait until 1856 to overtake their opponents. In 1853, ten United States Congressional seats were up for grabs, and the two parties won five each. The Whigs kept their majority in both houses of Congress that year, but they lost the most important federal congressional race. The Ashland district, Clay’s old district, was captured by John C. Breckinridge, who tied himself to the legacy of Henry Clay and supported the Compromise of 1850. Even with important wins in 1853, the Democrats would not hold a majority in Kentucky until 1856, and in Kentucky as well as many other border states, the Whigs—under the names of the Opposition and Constitutional Unionists—took back those majorities in 1859 and 1860.⁹

The year 1854 brought new challenges to American politics. During that year, two seminal events occurred: the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act and the formation of the Republican Party. In order to build a new railroad across the country to California, the territory over which it would run had to be organized. In 1853, Congress created the Nebraska Territory, made up of the land between Indian Territory and the Canadian border. The political problem with the new territory was that it sat north of the Missouri Compromise line. In 1820, Congress had decided that all new states created above the 36’ 30" parallel would be free states, while all the new states south of that line would be slave states. Southerners saw the organization of Nebraska and new states that might come from it as a loss of more political power. They had just lost California, and they were determined not to lose Nebraska as well. To solve the new national crisis, Stephen Douglas once again took the mantel of Clay and proposed a compromise. His proposal embraced what had been a key part of the Compromise of 1850, popular sovereignty. Douglas believed that when a territory became a state, the people of the new state should decide whether it would be a slave state or a free state. The second part of his plan divided the land into two territories, Kansas and Nebraska.

Douglas’ Kansas-Nebraska bill caused more of an uproar than the original problem. If passed, the bill would overturn the Missouri Compromise, and Northerners, with a growing population of free-soilers and abolitionists, would fight that possibility every step of the