British in India 1825-1859: Organisation, Warfare, Dress and Weapons

By John French

Of all the military campaigns fought by the British during the 19th century, no area saw more conflict than the subcontinent of India. Dozens of encounters, both great and small, involved many of its races as either friends or foes of Britain – indeed, it was not unusual for an area to furnish both ally and enemy at the same time! This volume covers the British, Indian and Anglo-Indian troops who fought for The Honourable East India Company and Britain over the varied landscape of what is present day Afghanistan, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, between the years 1826 and 1859.

The vast array of uniforms and dress worn by soldiers serving in India during this period is examined in detail, and extensive information is also provided on regimental Colours. The book’s nine chapters cover the campaign in Bhurtpore (1825–26); the Coorg campaign (1834); the First Afghan War (1839–42); the conquest of Sind (1843); the campaign against Gwalior (1843); the Sikh Wars (1845–46 and 1848–49); actions on the North-West Frontier (1849–58); the Santhal Rebellion (1855–56); and the Indian Mutiny (1857–59).

Each of these chapters includes uniform information specific to the campaign covered, while that on the Indian Mutiny also includes details of Mutineer dress. Many orders of battle and battle-plans are also included. Illustrations comprise 199 drawings of troop types and flags, and 27 other illustrations and maps

• Language: English
• Publisher: Foundry
• Release date: Dec 1, 2006
• ISBN: 9781901543360

Book preview

INTRODUCTION

Of all the military campaigns fought by the British during the 19th century, no area saw more conflict than the subcontinent of India. Dozens of encounters, both great and small, involved many of its races as either friends or foes of Britain. Indeed, it was not unusual for an area to furnish both ally and enemy at the same time.

This book is not intended to be a campaign history, as many have already been written on such subjects as the First Afghan War, the Sikh Wars, and the Indian Mutiny. That is not to say that the course of events is not followed, particularly in the case of less well-known conflicts — where possible orders of battle and battle plans are even included — but such coverage is by no means intended to be exhaustive. Instead, my primary intention is to describe and depict examples of the vast array of uniforms and campaign dress worn by the soldiers of the period, and to provide information on regimental Colours.

This volume covers British, Indian, and Anglo-Indian troops who fought for the Honourable East India Company and Britain in the period 1826 to 1859. They fought over the immense and varied landscape of what are present day Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. At the time, however, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh were not unified countries, but consisted of several hundred states and kingdoms of assorted sizes. Some were under the jurisdiction of Britain (via the Honourable East India Company), whilst others were very much independent, with their own kings and maharajas. Some of these provided support for Britain in its various campaigns, either by allowing passage through their land or by providing allied troops.

I have retained 19th-century spellings for most place-names, but not all — Cabool, for instance, is rendered in the more familiar form Kabul. In addition I have, at times, given some of the alternatives where more than one contemporary spelling existed.

The armies and troop types covered are those that fought on the British side. No disrespect is intended to the many tribes or armies that fought against the British, which will be covered in a companion series, Armies of the Nineteenth Century: Asia. The Indian Mutineers of 1857–59, however, are dealt with here, as they had previously been part of the Honourable East India Company’s army, in some cases for many years.

In order to save space, details of the uniforms covered are often presented in abbreviated form. Whilst I have consulted as many sources as possible, there remain, inevitably, a few gaps where uniform information does not appear to exist, or is at best vague. If anyone is able to contribute further details, I would be pleased to hear from them via Foundry Books.

Finally, thank you to all those people who have helped in one form or another by furnishing ideas, information, or inspiration. They include Bryan Ansell, Mark Copplestone, Peter Rumbelow, Ray Boyles, Ian Heath, and various members of the Victorian Military Society, as well as museum staff across Britain too numerous to mention individually. Finally, thanks to Babar Shah for help with translating inscriptions on various flags.

John French

February 2006

1. BHURTPORE 1825–26

Bhurtpore is situated about 100 miles (160 km) almost due south of Delhi and 40 miles (65 km) west of Agra. Its more substantial buildings at the time were built out of local sandstone, which has a slightly pinkish tinge to it. There are several lakes in the area, and large flat plains stretch away to distant ridges of low hills. Both plains and hills have a covering of scrub, although the British commander, Lord Combermere, describes his men taking up positions in jungle.

Though now spelt Bharatpur, the contemporary spelling has been retained here since it appears in this form in most published accounts of the campaign, as well as in British regimental Battle Honours. ‘Bhurtpoor’ is a variation used in some official dispatches and older books.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Bhurtpore was the only state of any size ruled by the Jats. It owed its origin to a chieftain called Badan Singh, who founded the town in the first half of the 18th century. His adopted son extended the kingdom’s authority into substantial parts of the surrounding district until a powerful kingdom had been established. A strong fort was built at Bhurtpore.

In 1805 the British, under Lord Lake, had failed to capture the fortress of Bhurtpore and suffered considerable losses in the process. As a result it acquired a reputation of impregnability amongst the local people, and it was believed, during the first quarter of the 19th century, that Bhurtpore marked the limit of British influence in India. Its successful defender was Raja Ranjit Singh (not to be confused with the later Ranjit Singh of Lahore, ‘Lion of the Punjab’).

A 20-year peaceful relationship ensued between Bhurtpore and Britain until Ranjit Singh’s death, when internal family feuds surfaced. Ranjit’s successor was his eldest son Buldeo Singh, who was apprehensive about the designs of his younger brother, Doorjun Sal. Buldeo therefore appealed to the British to recognise his own son, Bulwant Singh, as his heir apparent. The British agreed to do this, but shortly afterwards Buldeo Singh died, amidst various rumours that poison may have been involved. Doorjun Sal took the opportunity to seize power and at the same time imprisoned his nephew, the young prince Bulwant Singh.

Sir David Ochterlony, the British Agent in Delhi, began to assemble a force in order to restore Bulwant Singh as the rightful heir. Before a force could be sent, however, the Governor-General intervened. Petty politics obviously came into play, for not only were no troops sent, but Ochterlony was replaced in office by Sir Charles Metcalfe.

Meanwhile, Britain had been involved in the First Burma War (1824–26), and exaggerated stories of failure in this campaign reached the ears of various Indian rulers and chieftains. Some even thought that its alleged ‘defeat’ in Burma would herald the downfall of the Honourable East India Company and British rule. As a result, Metcalfe in turn urged intervention in Bhurtpore in case these stories led to general unrest in other parts of India under British control, as yet untouched. However, the time lapse between Ochterlony’s call for intervention and Metcalfe’s had enabled Doorjun Sal to strengthen his hold on Bhurtpore. It was now thought that a larger force would be needed than had been originally proposed by Ochterlony, and there remained hopes that Bulwant Singh could be restored to power by diplomatic pressure.

In 1825 Bhurtpore was thought to be about eight miles (13 km) in circumference, enclosed by a curtain wall and some 35 semi-circular bastions. These fortifications were built of clay, mixed with straw and cow-dung, composed in layers, each layer being allowed to harden in the sun before another was added. The whole was strengthened by rows of tree-trunks that had been buried upright. With the artillery of the time, it was thought to be almost impossible to breach the city walls. On some of the bastions were cavaliers (extra fortifications to protect artillery pieces and their crews), and the fortress was dominated by a large citadel standing well over 100 ft (30 m) high. Additional improvements had been added to the defences since Lord Lake’s time. Outside the walls lay a strongly-revetted dry ditch 150 ft (45 m) wide and about 60 ft (18 m) deep. It was possible for the defenders to fill this with water by cutting through the embankment which separated it from the Moti Jheel (Pearl Lake). The garrison was estimated at around 25,000 men.

THE BRITISH FORCE

Commander-in-chief of the British expedition was the newly-appointed Lord Combermere, a veteran cavalry commander of the Peninsular War. Brigadier-General Sleigh was in command of the cavalry, Brigadier MacLeod the artillery, and Brigadier Anburey the engineers. (Anburey had been placed in charge of the Corps of Bengal Sappers and Miners when it was first formed at Allahabad on 19 February 1819.) Combermere’s force, in common with all British armies assembled in India at the time, was drawn mainly from troops belonging to the Honourable East India Company (HEIC). The HEIC’s army had originally been raised to protect trade and trade routes in the company’s three main areas of commercial activity — Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras. Each area had its own army and commander-in-chief, but that in Calcutta (the Bengal Army) was considered the senior of the three. Its men were regular soldiers, both Indians and Europeans. There were also locally raised irregular troops, plus regular British Army units attached to the HEIC. The latter, referred to as ‘King’s regiments’, are denoted in the following list by the prefix ‘H.M.’ before the regiment’s number; this referred to ‘His/Her Majesty’, in this case King George I V. (As an aid to recognition, note that the later territorial titles of British Army regiments mentioned in this book can be found in the Appendix.) Regiments composed of Indian troops often have the letters ‘N.I.’ (Native Infantry) following their regimental number. The regiments involved in the Bhurtpore campaign were:

King’s regiments

H.M. 11th Light Dragoons (later 11th Hussars)

H.M. 16th Lancers

H.M. 14th Regiment of Foot

H.M. 59th Regiment of Foot

HEIC regiments

1st Bengal (European) Regiment

Bengal Horse Artillery and Bengal Field Artillery (50 guns: 14 x 12-pdrs, 26 x 6-pdrs, and 10 x 5.5-inch howitzers)

Corps of Bengal Sappers & Miners

1st Regiment of Local Horse (Skinner’s)

8th Regiment of Local Horse

3rd, 4th, 6th, 8th, 9th, and 10th Regiments of Bengal Light Cavalry

4th Local (1st Nasiri) Battalion (Gurkhas)

6th Local (Sirmoor) Battalion (Gurkhas)

6th, 11th, 15th, 18th, 21st, 23rd, 31st, 32nd, 35th, 36th, 37th, 41st, 58th, 60th, and 61st Bengal N.I.

Artillery siege train

There were a total of 112 heavy guns: 16 x 24-pdrs, 20 x 18-pdrs, 4 x 12-pdrs, 12 x 8-inch howitzers, 46 x 8-inch mortars, 12 x 10-inch mortars, and 2 x 13-inch mortars.

THE CAMPAIGN

The army, some 30,000 strong, was gathered together at Agra and Muttra. Major-General Reynell commanded the right wing at Muttra and Major-General Nicholls the left wing at Agra. The expedition waited as Metcalfe tried in vain to persuade Doorjun Sal to relinquish his claims to Bhurtpore. Then, on 8/9 December 1825, Metcalfe ordered the two wings of the army to march towards Bhurtpore and take up positions slightly north-east of the town.

It was hoped that the embankment between the walls and the lake could be secured before it was breached by the defenders to flood the ditch. On 11 December an advance guard of 16th Lancers and Skinner’s Horse, together with a detachment of H.M. 14th Foot, was sent to prevent this from happening and came upon some of the town’s garrison in the very act of cutting through the embankment. Skinner’s Horse charged forward into the Jats and after a sharp skirmish pushed them back towards the town. The 16th Lancers helped to complete the flight and pressed upon the Jats so closely that many of the fugitives were shut outside the gates as the town’s defenders rushed to keep the pursuing cavalry out. Meanwhile Anburey’s engineers were put to work repairing the embankment and constructing a stockade to prevent any further attempt by the defenders to flood the ditch.

There followed a period of 11 days in which engineer officers were sent to inspect every part of the defences and surrounding areas and plans for the assault were made. This not only kept the defenders occupied, but left time for the British troops to make the many fascines and gabions that would be needed during the siege. A letter was also sent into Bhurtpore offering the town’s women and children safe conduct through the British lines. No reply was received, but women and children who were not members of the royal family were eventually allowed to leave by Doorjun Sal some time around 25 December.

On 23 December Lord Combermere was ready, and sent a dispatch to the Governor-General of India, Lord Amherst, stating: ‘I this morning advanced a force into the jungle, and took possession of the small places called Kuddum Kundee and Buldeo Singh’s Garden, which afforded cover for the troops, and on being joined by a covered way will form the first parallel [i.e., trench], at a distance from the fort of about eight hundred yards. I expect that this parallel, with a mortar-battery of twenty pieces at the garden, and a gun-battery of six eighteen-pounders at Kuddum Kundee, will be prepared by tomorrow morning, when we shall return their fire ... Our operations will, in the first instance, be directed against the north-east angle of the town.’¹

The next dispatch revealed that on 24 December a battery of eight (not six) 18-pdr guns was set up in front of Kuddum Kundee (a small village just east of the town) and a total of 15 mortars (not 20) were employed in the garden. In addition to these, five 18-pdr and five 24-pdr guns were positioned about 250 yds (230 m) from the north-east section of the town, enabling the artillery to do a fair amount of damage to projecting bastions on the east wall. The setting up of these batteries had not been without hindrance, and over 50 casualties were suffered on the night of 24 December as matchlockmen from the fortress harried the various working parties. There were in addition various skirmishes with pickets during much of December as additional batteries were set up or advanced and parallels were constructed nearer to the walls.

On the 27th a group of enemy cavalry tried to break out of the town to escape westwards. Brigadier-General Sleigh reported that ‘about two hundred of the enemy’s horse left the Uttell Bund [i.e., the embankment], between eight and nine o’clock last night, and after feeling the picquet on the Arah-road, fell back under the walls of the fort until eleven o’clock, when they endeavoured to force their way by the Koombeer-road, and between the villages of Munswarra and Bussie. They were obliged to retire in the direction of the fort with the loss of thirty or forty men killed, fifteen wounded, and one hundred and seven prisoners; ten or twelve succeeded in forcing their way through the camp.’² A total of 49 casualties was sustained between 26–29 December, but it is not clear how many of them were in this particular skirmish or, indeed, how many men were involved on the British side.

Further siege works were undertaken: more saps were dug, and new battery positions were constructed, including that for a battery of four 8-inch mortars to the west of the town. A gallery for a mine towards the ditch on the north face was started as well. Casualties continued to mount (another 62 by 5 January 1826), but not sufficiently to alarm Combermere. He was convinced that the garrison were saving all their strength for the final defence, or he would have expected far greater losses.

By 2 January the curtain walls had been breached in two places, but it was estimated that, owing to the strength of the walls, another four days or so would be needed to render the breaches suitable for storming parties. In the attackers’ favour, however, was the fact that the ditches remained dry, and that their counterscarps were so rough that they did not present the obstacle they were expected to. A small battery position was started in front of the Juggeenah Gate, situated in the centre of the north-east facing curtain wall. The work on the galleries for the mine was also continuing. On 11 January the breaches were still not deemed practicable for an assault. The galleries for another mine had been started, but it was sprung prematurely and had no real effect upon the curtain walls. Other mining operations took the tunnels below the counterscarps and ditches.

Disposition of British forces prior to the assault on Bhurtpore, from J.W. Fortescue’s A History of the British Army (1923).

Between 5–11 January casualties totalled 90, which included those killed in the vicinity of the old mortar battery position in front of Buldeo Singh’s Garden. A shot from the fort had blown up several tumbrils here, which had set fire to a number of cotton bags, which in their turn had destroyed some 20,000 lbs (9,100 kg) of ammunition. On 6 January troops had been detailed to make an assault on the breaches the following day. These included 600 dismounted men from the various cavalry regiments. However, it was called off at the eleventh hour on the suggestion of Colonel Skinner, who decided that it was not practicable. Closer inspection by an engineer officer confirmed Colonel Skinner’s opinion.

It was now decided that mining offered the best chance of success and work was increased accordingly. After 7 January the story of the siege becomes one of mining and countermining in addition to constant bombardment by the various artillery batteries. Small parties of engineers and sappers or infantry details were given tasks such as destroying enemy saps or obtaining information as to the state of the breaches. One such party was led by a Captain Carmichael of the 59th Regiment and Captain Davidson of the Bengal Engineers. Composed of six grenadiers from the 59th and six Gurkhas, it was to verify information brought in by spies that trenches had been dug behind one of the main breaches and fortifications had been made so as to render its capture by a storming party extremely difficult. The only way the report could be verified was by someone inspecting the breach in broad daylight. By a mixture of audacity and good fortune, they managed to achieve their objective with the loss of only one man. Their report was to be of great value to Combermere when the actual assault took place, as it was found that the breach, although difficult to capture, was not impregnable as had been feared.

On 17 January the engineers informed Comb-ermere that the three mines would be ready that night. The main charge, of 10,000 lbs (4,540 kg) of powder, was to be placed under the north-east bastion (see map). Two smaller charges were to be used to extend the existing breach and to blow part of the counterscarp. Orders were given for the assault to begin on the following day. Two main columns were formed, which were then divided into smaller forces. The two main columns were under the commands of Generals Reynell and Nicholls:

General Reynell’s Column

This was split into two brigades, which were to storm the main breach. The leading brigade, under Brigadier McCombe, consisted of four companies of H.M. 14th Foot (including the grenadier company); a party of artillerymen with spiking equipment which was to follow the grenadiers; the 58th Bengal N.I.; and the Nasiri Gurkhas (100 men). Brigadier Patton’s Brigade, which was to support McCombe’s in the initial rush, consisted of another four companies of H.M. 14th Foot; the 6th Bengal N.I.; and five companies of Nasiri Gurkhas. Once the breach had been gained McCombe’s Brigade was to turn to the right and Patton’s to the left.

To the right of Reynell’s Column was a separate force under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Delamain, which was given the task of storming the breach at the Juggeenah Gate. This comprised two companies of the 1st Bengal (European) Regiment; the 58th Bengal N.I.; and 100 Gurkhas — battalion unspecified, but presumably from the Nasiri Battalion, as most of the Sirmoor Battalion were used as skirmishers.

It may be noted here that the 58th Bengal N.I. appears to be in two places at once. As Delamain was commander of the 58th it is likely that he led his own regiment. It is probable that the other ‘58th’ regiment, with McCombe’s brigade, was actually the 23rd Bengal N.I., as this suffered more casualties (40) than any other Bengal N.I. regiment involved in the attack.

General Nicholls’ Column

This was led by Brigadier Edwards’ Brigade, which was to storm the left breach and consisted of H.M. 59th Foot (seven companies); the 31st Bengal N.I.; and 100 men of the Sirmoor Gurkhas.

Brigadier Fagan’s Brigade, supporting Nicholls, comprised the 15th Bengal N.I.; the 21st Bengal N.I.; and the 35th Bengal N.I. (less its grenadier company, with Wilson — see below).

Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson’s men were to the right of Edwards’ Brigade and were to use scaling ladders against the walls. In the event most men from this force found it easier to enter the fortress by way of the breach. This contingent comprised two companies of the 1st Bengal (European) Regiment; the grenadier company of the 35th Bengal N.I.; and the light company of the 37th Bengal N.I. No other details of its composition have been found to date. Although this was only a small force, it may be complete.

Brigadier Adams commanded the reserves, positioned in the trenches to cover any possible retreat. Their composition is not specified in Combermere’s dispatches, but when looking at casualty returns it is noticeable that the 18th, 33rd, and 36th Bengal N.I. regiments suffered no casualties on the day of the assault and are not mentioned as being amongst the various storming parties. These seem the most likely troops to have manned the trenches. However, the 11th, 32nd, 60th, and 63rd only suffered a grand total of eight casualties, so these, too, could have formed part of the reserves. Alternatively they may just have been where the fighting was less fierce. This leaves the 41st Bengal N.I. (18 casualties). Where this regiment started from is unclear, although one wing (four companies) under Major Hunter is mentioned by Combermere in his dispatches, amongst others, as having distinguished themselves.

The cavalry remained under the command of Brigadier-General Sleigh; the artillery under Brigadier MacLeod; and the engineers under Brigadier Anburey.

As has been mentioned, most of the men in the Sirmoor Battalion were used as skirmishers, to cover the advance. The cavalry were sent to positions where they could cut off any retreating defenders.

At around 4:30 on the morning of 18 January the men were assembled in the trenches ready to charge the breaches once the mines had been blown. The trenches nearest to the walls were not occupied, in order to minimise the risk of casualties caused by the explosions. In the event they were still too near. Shortly after eight o’clock the engineers fired the mines. The first to explode were the two smaller mines, and as the defenders rushed to arms many of them gathered at the point where the largest mine detonated only moments later. However, the defenders were not the only casualties, the force of the explosion being greater than expected. Two sepoys were killed right next to Combermere, and Brigadiers McCombe and Patton were both wounded. About 20 men of the 14th Regiment were also killed or wounded.

The view from Bhurtpore’s citadel. A previously unpublished sketch by an officer of the Engineers. (By kind permission of The Queen’s Royal Lancers Regiment Museum)

The defenders quickly recovered, but despite strong resistance they were still unable to prevent the 14th and 59th Regiments gaining a strong foothold once they were into the breaches. As the remainder of the columns pushed forwards they fanned out into the town, where they became embroiled in fierce hand-to-hand fighting. Many defenders, including most of the artillery crews, chose to die sword in hand.

Lieutenant-Colonel Delamain’s Column, meanwhile, had attacked the Juggeenah Gate. Although they managed to storm through the breach they suffered quite a few casualties when a mine was blown beneath them. As the remainder pushed forward they squeezed the defenders back towards Major Everard’s 14th Regiment (part of Reynell’s Column), coming from the opposite direction. It was here that the defenders suffered most of their casualties, as they were pushed back to what was described as a steep and narrow gorge around 60 ft (18 m) deep. This cannot have been the ditch, as this was inside the walls and if naturally occurring would surely have been incorporated into them. The most likely explanation is that it was some fissure or crater created by the mines. Many men were killed as they fell or jumped into this ‘gorge’ and were unable to climb out. The close proximity of the musket flashes had also set fire to the quilted cotton armour that some Jats were wearing and many were burned to death at the bottom of the pit.

Colonel Wilson’s men had encountered little opposition as they approached the walls, which is why most went through the open breaches rather than using their scaling ladders. As they too spread out into the town, Brigadier Fagan’s reserve troops were given the task of mopping up any remaining pockets of defenders. Street fighting continued for some time, during which Brigadier Edwards was mortally wounded.

There remained the citadel, which at first refused a summons to surrender. By three o’clock, however, some 12-pdr cannons had been dragged into position in front of the gates and the citadel surrendered without any further fighting. The 37th N.I. were sent in to take possession.

Doorjun Sal was captured by the 8th Light Cavalry as he tried to leave by one of the town exits. He had with him his wife, two sons, and about 160 horsemen, together with large amounts of treasure, mostly in the form of gold sewn into saddle linings. He was exiled to Benares and the infant Bulwant Singh was restored to the throne. Combermere estimated that at least 4,000 Bhurtporeans were killed and 6–7,000 taken prisoner. After being disarmed the prisoners were set free.

Casualties among the British and Indian troops during the final assault and the follow-up phase were as follows (k = killed; w = wounded; m = missing):

The 14th Foot also suffered three servants killed and four wounded.

Regiments not listed did not suffer any casualties on 18 January. However, they may well have taken casualties during the operations leading up to the storming of the fortress, which were not always broken down into their individual units. These would be included in the casualty returns for the period 15 December 1825 to 11 January 1826, which totalled 74 men killed, 307 wounded, and two missing (all ranks). These casualties are those resulting from sundry engagements, including various skirmishes and two minor assaults (7 and 11 January), plus those inflicted during the mining and siege operations. It is presumed that further casualties may have been suffered between 11–18 January, but, again, there is no breakdown for these.

HISTORICAL CONSEQUENCES

As a result of the fall of the fortress the military strength of Bhurtpore Raj was destroyed and its other fortresses — Biana, Deeg, Kama, Kombeir, and Weir — surrendered to the British without any opposition.

One of the long-term consequences of the campaign was that henceforth British political agents became involved in trying to guarantee the successions of India’s princely houses. This continued to be the case right up until Indian Independence in 1947.

UNIFORMS AND REGIMENTAL FLAGS

KING’S REGIMENTS

Cavalry

11th Light Dragoons

See Figure 1. This regiment had been stationed at Meerut and Cawnpore prior to being sent to Bhurtpore. Their blue jackets had buff lapels which were usually buttoned over when on active service, so they would not normally be seen. The rear seams were also piped in buff. The men wore a girdle of buff and dark blue, instead of the red and gold used by the officers. Overalls were grey, with buff stripes for men and silver for officers. Officers had gold cap lines and silver cords, lace, etc., the men having white. The broad-topped shako had a white-over-red plume. The shabraque was dark blue, edged in white. It had a crown with ‘XI LD’ (in two rows below the crown) both front and back. Footwear was black.

The light cavalry had almost ceased to carry standards into action by the time of Waterloo, although the General Order abolishing the use of light cavalry standards was not issued until 1834.

16th (The Queen’s) Lancers

This regiment was stationed in India from 1822 to 1846. At Bhurtpore — where they fielded 19 officers, 40 sergeants, and 756 rank and file — they became the first British regiment to use the lance in action. Their lance caps would have had black covers. Officers wore undress stable jackets, although the men wore dress jackets with shoulder scales and girdles. Jackets were blue with scarlet facings. Blue-grey trousers with a scarlet stripe were normally worn. Red trousers were for dress occasions only. Boots were black.

Infantry

Infantry flags or ‘Colours’ were at this time 6 ft (1.83 m) deep and 6 ft 6 ins (1.98 m) wide, and did not have fringes, which were only introduced in 1858, when flag dimensions were reduced. Regiments carried a ‘Royal Colour’, or First Colour, that is often referred to by it’s later title of ‘King’s Colour’ (subsequently ‘Queen’s Colour’). This was a Union Flag with the appropriate regimental numbering in the centre.

A ‘Regimental Colour’ or Second Colour, was also carried, usually a field of the uniform facing colour with a Union Flag in the upper canton near the hoist. In the centre was a wreath surrounding the regimental number, and Battle Honours were displayed on scrolls where appropriate. Not all Battle Honours were awarded soon after the campaigns they commemorated. In some cases 50 years could pass before an award was granted. It is sometimes said that the granting of these honours depended upon the influence that commanding officers had with Whitehall. Up until 1844 Battle Honours were placed on both Colours.

14th Regiment of Foot

Wore red coatees with buff facings, grey trousers, black shakos and boots, and white belts. Figures 3 and 4 show an officer and an other rank in their so-called ‘Regency’ shakos, which were in use from 1816 to 1829.

The regiment’s Second Colour would have had a buff field to match the uniform facings. Honours borne on the Colours were ‘CORUNNA’, ‘JAVA’, and ‘WATERLOO’. The ‘TOURNAY’ honour was not conferred until 1836.

59th Regiment of Foot

See Figure 2. Black covers were worn over the ‘Regency’ shakos. Their red jackets were short-tailed. Facings, plain cuffs, and stand-up collar were white. Regimental lace was white with blue lines. Trousers were grey, with short gaiters just visible beneath them. Crossbelts and musket slings were white, boots black. Chinscales and belt plate, the latter bearing a crown and the regimental number, were in brass. Knapsacks were not in evidence, and are likely to have been left behind at the time of the assault. Officers would have had a crimson sash and wore the sword belt across the right shoulder.

The 59th’s Colours bore the honours ‘CAPE OF GOOD HOPE’, ‘JAVA’, ‘PENINSULA’, ‘VITTORIA’, ‘ST. SEBASTIEN’, and ‘NIVE’. The Battle Honour ‘CORUNNA’ was not conferred until 1908. The Second or Regimental Colour was white.

HEIC REGIMENTS

Cavalry

1st Regiment of Local Horse (Skinner’s Horse)

See Figures 8–13. The British officers wore a light dragoon style uniform that had been replaced in the British army in 1812. A black Tarleton helmet was used with a leopard-skin turban and a bearskin crest. A white plume was attached to the left side. Dolman jackets were dark blue with red facings, heavy silver lacing, and shoulder scales. Breeches were white and boots black. Shabraques were possibly yellow with plenty of embroidery.

Sowars (troopers) wore a yellow alkaluk robe, whence the nickname ‘Yellow Boys’. This was of mid-calf length with red trim on collar, cuffs, and possibly the leading edges. A red and yellow girdle or red cummerbund was tied around the waist. The pyjama trousers in contemporary prints are mostly shown as green, although sometimes long black boots obscure them. One contemporary engraving also shows trousers with a circular patterned design, but no colours are mentioned. Sword belts and scabbards were black. Headgear could consist of flat red turbans (sometimes shown held in place by a white cloth tied under the chin) or Persian-style metal helmets with nose-guards. The native officers at least had a short plume at the front of the helmet. Saddlecloths were of a red and yellow geometric pattern, possibly edged in light blue or white. Native officers had more elaborate saddlecloths with fringes and lots of embroidery. Short red jackets with black trim and designs are shown in several illustrations but may have been more for ceremonial use. Trumpeters had reversed colours in European-fashion, i.e., a red alkaluk and short yellow jacket, although the green trousers would appear to be the same. Horse tack is shown in various colours: red, blue, and black. Sowars were armed with swords and matchlock muskets, often fired from the saddle. Lances were also carried, with either small bunches of ribbons or occasionally with a small red, black, or yellow pennon. The latter may have denoted troop leaders. Dahl shields were slung across their backs. These shields are often shown as black with red ‘pips’.

Standards are shown as about 4–5 ft (1.2–1.5 m) square with a yellow field and union flag in the upper canton. A silver or gold wreath surrounds crossed swords and a crescent. Native script is inside the wreath below the swords. There was a silver or gold fringe to each flag. This information is taken from a picture by a Company artist of a regimental review which shows two such flags for each troop (or rissalah, around 90–100 men); the age of the print renders it difficult to tell if the fringes are gold or silver.

Each standard in the picture is drawn with the same pattern and script. No Battle Honours had been awarded at this time.

8th Regiment of Local Horse

The 8th Bengal Local Horse was raised in 1824 as Skinner’s Horse but was disbanded in 1829. A new 8th Regiment was later raised in 1842 and awarded the Battle Honour for Bhurtpore. As it was raised as Skinner’s Horse it would appear logical to suppose that it was dressed in similar fashion to the parent unit. All regiments of Bengal Local Horse were renamed Bengal Irregular Cavalry in 1840.

3rd, 4th, 6th, 8th, 9th, and 10th Bengal Light Cavalry

All six light cavalry regiments present at Bhurtpore had basically the same uniform, the only real differences being the regimental numbers on officers’ shakos and sabretaches, and details in the silver lace. The facings for all six were orange. Officers in undress had broad-topped caps in dark blue with a black peak. The short stable jacket was in French grey (a sort of blue-grey), with orange collar, pointed cuffs, and piping running up the seams on the back of the jacket and back of the sleeves. This orange is often shown as red. The collar and cuffs were edged with silver lace, as was the front and base of the jacket. Trousers could be white or dark blue (strapped inside the legs with brown leather), with silver stripes edged orange/red. Boots were black. Full dress black shakos were broad-topped, with silver lace. Contem-porary lithographs of the 8th Light Cavalry show these shakos being worn in action by both officers and men. A badge or plate bearing the regimental number was worn above another small plate with the words ‘Native Cavalry’. A black cockade was worn, with a flowing red plume for officers and a shorter upright red-over-white plume for other ranks. Gold shako lines completed the head-dress.

The dress jacket was also French grey but had rows of silver cord and three vertical rows of buttons, i.e., one central and one each on the left and right sides of the cord. Officers had a red and gold girdle. White breeches were worn with high black jackboots, or dark blue trousers with lace stripes. Officers’ sabretaches were faced in blue, bordered by silver lace, with regimental badge and the letters ‘BLC’ embroidered in the centre.

Up till now the sowars had been wearing a bulbous blue turban, almost beehive in shape, with two large pompom-shaped pieces (one on the top and one slightly to the right), white tape bound diagonally across the turban, and white metal chinscales fastened across the front. However, at about this time their headgear was changed to a bell-topped peakless shako with a short plume with cords attached at the rear, as mentioned for the 8th Light Cavalry above. Shakos sometimes had white covers. An aquatint of 1815 shows white breeches being worn and a watercolour of 1825 shows white trousers. Dark blue overalls with double silver stripes were also used up until 1847. Boots were black. Sowars also wore white waist and carbine belts and a buff leather sword knot. A pistol holster was attached to the waist belt on the left, just above the sword. The lithographs of the 8th Light Cavalry show shabraques with a figure ‘8’ (i.e., no lettering), apparently in white, on the point at the rear corner.

Infantry and Artillery

1st Bengal (European) Regiment

These wore a red coat with sky blue facings and silver lace. Trousers were of local manufacture, probably dark blue, or white in hot weather. Headwear possibly consisted of shakos similar to those of British regiments, although black felt caps are recorded as being in use about ten years prior to Bhurtpore, and these may well have continued in use. Leather equipment was white with black pouches. Boots were black.

Of the various Battle Honours eventually awarded to the regiment, none had actually been conferred at this time.

Bengal Native Infantry

See Figure 7. Up until 1824 the Bengal regiments had consisted of two battalions, but at that date they were split into single battalion regiments and renumbered. Headgear was of a shape resembling a peakless shako, which had replaced the so-called ‘sundial’ hat by around 1810. Each regiment had its own facing colour for its red jackets, these being given in Table 1. The grenadier and light companies had shoulder wings. Cummerbunds of dark blue were fastened with two white linen strips, giving a saltire cross look. By the time of Bhurtpore white pantaloons had replaced the earlier janghirs. Buff crossbelts bore a brass plate with the regimental number. Necklaces are commonly shown in pictures, and chapplies (native sandals) were the usual form of footwear.

It is thought that Regimental Colours would have followed a similar system to the British.

4th Local (1st Nasiri) Battalion

This unit later became the 1st KGO Gurkha