When Parliaments Ruled the Middle East: Iraq and Syria, 1946–63

By Matthieu Rey

An essential study of parliamentary politics in postwar Iraq and Syria, before the consolidation of authoritarian rule under the Ba’th Party

When Parliaments Ruled the Middle East explores three main interrelated issues to clarify what happened between 1946 and 1963 in Iraq and Syria: how and why a parliamentary system prevailed in both countries in the aftermath of the Second World War; what social effects this system triggered, and, in turn, how these changes affected the system; and finally, why the elites in both countries were unable to overcome the unrest that brought an end to both a liberal era and to a certain kind of political game.

Drawing on a vast array of sources and rich archival research in French, English, and Arabic, Matthieu Rey highlights the processes of the parliamentary system in the modern era, which are very common to post-independence countries and to any representative regime. He tackles the intersection of multifaceted political phenomena that were present in that moment in Iraq and Syria, including regular elections, the implementation of emergency law, the freedom of the press, the open expression of opinions, the formation of new political parties, frequent military coups, and the joint exercise of power by members of the old classes and reformist newcomers.

Treating this period as neither an epilogue of the liberal order nor a prelude to authoritarianism, and stressing the contingent, improvisatory aspects of political history, Rey fundamentally questions the transitional nature of the period and in doing so proposes new ways and tools of examining it.

• Language: English
• Publisher: The American University in Cairo Press
• Release date: Feb 2, 2022
• ISBN: 9781649031174

Matthieu Rey

Matthieu Rey is director of contemporary studies at the Institut français du Proche-Orient (IFPO), Beirut, and a CNRS researcher specializing in contemporary Middle Eastern history, with a special focus on Syria’s and Iraq’s political systems. He is also an associate researcher at the Collège de France and the Wits History Workshop. He obtained his PhD from the École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHSS), Collège de France in 2013. His research interests include state-building and policymaking in the contemporary Middle East and Southern Africa. He is the author of Histoire de la Syrie XIX–XXIe siècle (A History of Syria, 19th–21st centuries, 2018).

Book preview

Cover: When Parliaments Ruled the Middle East by Matthieu Rey

Matthieu Rey

When Parliaments Ruled the Middle East

Iraq and Syria, 1946–63

The American University in Cairo Press

First published in 2022 by

This electronic edition published in 2022 by

The American University in Cairo Press

113 Sharia Kasr el Aini, Cairo, Egypt

One Rockefeller Plaza, 10th Floor, New York, NY 10020

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Copyright © 2022 by Matthieu Rey

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher.

Hardback ISBN 978 1 649 03116 7

eISBN 978 1 649 03117 4

Version 1

To Peter Sluglett

Contents

Acknowledgments

Timeline of Key Events

Introduction

1. The Ottoman and Mandate Roots of the Parliamentary System

The Advent of the Parliamentary System in the Ottoman Empire

1908–18: An Imperial Parliamentary System

Inventing New States (1920–46)

2. Experimenting with the Parliamentary System, 1946–49

Za‘ama and the Parliamentary System

Establishing Real Sovereignty

The 1947 Elections

1948: Calling into Question the Parliamentary Experiment

3. Reform and Change: The Parliamentary System in Iraq and Syria, 1949–54

Rearranging the Parliamentary Systems

The Impact of International Relationships

Reforming the Country

Putting the Authoritarian Pact in Jeopardy

4. Two New Formulas for the Parliamentary System, 1954–58

The Heydays of the Parliaments

Legislative Enterprises: Reshaping Society and the Economy

Adopting Cold War Vocabulary and the Polarization of the Assemblies

5. The Epilogue to the Parliamentary System

Establishing a True Constitutional Order?

The End of the Parliamentary System

6. The End of the Post-Ottoman Era

Appendices

1: Thematic Discussions in the January 1955 Session

2: Parliamentary Activity

Notes

Bibliography

Index

Acknowledgments

I would like, first, to thank my Syrian and Iraqi friends: their comments, help, and encouragement have greatly enhanced the present research.

This book would not have become a reality without the kind supervision of Professors Henry Laurens and Hamit Bozarslan, who have never ceased to give insightful advice and unwavering support. Our discussions expand my understanding of the Middle East and improve my practice in the social sciences. My research could not have been completed without the strong support of the French National Assembly, which provided me with a three-year doctoral research grant. The resulting thesis could not have been turned into a book without the warm and helpful reception I received from the Middle East Institute in Singapore, whose directors, Michael Hudson and Peter Sluglett, made an important contribution by welcoming me into their team and by offering great opportunities to discuss my work. I am also deeply indebted to the French Institute of the Near East and its wonderful research team, who welcomed me during my long period of Syrian fieldwork, between 2009 and 2013. I would like to thank the director, François Burgat, and his colleagues Élisabeth Longuenesse, Caecilia Pieri, and Nadine Méouchy, all of whom reviewed my work and took the time to discuss my project and my ideas. I also received a very warm welcome from the Centre d’Etudes pour le Monde Arabe Moderne at the Université Saint-Joseph in Beirut; I am grateful to the director, Christophe Varin, for his hospitality and our illuminating discussions on a range of issues. The Collège de France supports the edition of the present book, and I would like to warmly thank its members for their trust and help. Finally, the History Workshop at the University of the Witwatersrand welcomed me for the last steps of the publication, and I would like to acknowledge Noor Nieftagodien and his team for their warm support.

I would like to express my greatest thanks to Wladimir Glasman, who shed light on many different aspects of Syrian history, and to Elizabeth Picard, who has been deeply committed to improving my knowledge of the Middle East and has been a source of constant support throughout my research. Her kind review of my doctoral thesis enriched it immeasurably. I would also like to warmly thank Myriam Ababsa, Ali Allawi, Mohammad Ali Attassi, Nicolas Barreyre, Orit Bashkin, Claire Beaugrand, Philippe Bourmaud, Myriam Catusse, Géraldine Chatelard, Alain Chatriot, Leyla Dakhli, Nicolas Delalande, Kamel Doraï, Saad Eskander, Georgette Elgey, Hala Fattah, Jean-Pierre Filiu, Vincent Geisser, Vanessa Guéno, Bernard Herberger, Steven Heydemann, Christian Ingrao, Abd al-Falih Jabbar, Hana Jaber, Sammy Ketz, Pierre-Jean Luizard, Édouard Méténier, Daniel Neep, Malika Rahal, Eugene Rogan, Pierre Rosanvallon, Ammar Ali al-Samar, Stephen Sawyer, Aline Schlaepfer, Jihane Sfeir, Jordi Tejel, Elizabeth Thompson, Massimiliano Trentin, Charles Tripp, Max Weiss, Olivier Wieviorka, and Sami Zubaida for their insights and comments. This work would not have been possible without the unfailing support of my good friends Gurval Baron, Robin Beaumont, Barbara Couturaud, Paule Fahmé-Thiéry, Amélie de las Héras, Juliette Dumont, Juliette Floderer, Guillaume Gobin, Marc Guillou, Rodolphe Keller, Nassima Néguaz, Olivier Piard, Aurélien Quignon, Antoine Roullet, Laura Ruiz de Elvira Carrascal, Valérie Stiegler, and Manon Nour Tannous. Finally, I would not have been able to pursue this research without the kind help, patience, and support of Chaymaa Hassabo and the constant encouragement of my family.

Timeline of Key Events

1789: Start of Selim III’s reign

1826: Mahmud II erases Janissaries from the Ottoman Empire

1830: Ibrahim Pasha, son of Muhammad ‘Ali, invades Syria; the end of the Mamluk dynasty in Iraq

1838: Establishment of two assemblies, dar i shura and meclis i vala

1839: Proclamation of Edict of Gulhane

1840: Ibrahim Pasha withdraws from Syria

1856: Proclamation of hatt-i humayun

1858: New land code promulgated

1860: Massacre of Damascus

1876

23 December: A constitution is promulgated

1877: War between the Ottoman Empire and Russia

1878: Abdülhamid II disbands parliament

1890: Reuters obtains a concession in Persia

1892: Massive protests against Reuters’ concessions

1908

3 July: Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) organizes a coup; the 1877 constitution is reestablished

1909

April: Failed attempt at a counter-coup

April: Opening of the new parliament

1912

July: Parliament is disbanded after a coup

1913

23 January: A triumvirate assumes power over the Ottoman Empire

1914

October: The Ottoman Empire enters the First World War

1915: Battle of Kut in Iraq

1916: The last Ottoman parliament is dissolved

1917

23 March: General Maud enters Baghdad

1918

1 October: Faisal, son of Husayn, the Sharif of Mecca, enters Damascus alongside Anzac soldiers

1919–20

7 June 1919 to 24 July 1920: The Syrian Congress rules in Bilad al-Sham

1920: Revolt in Iraq

1924–26: Revolt in Jebel Druze and then throughout Syria

1926: League of Nations recognizes Mosul wilaya as part of Iraq

1928: The French promulgate a new constitution in Syria

1932: Iraq becomes independent; legislative elections take place in Syria

1935: Major strike against the French in Syria

1936: The National Bloc (al-Kutla al-Wataniya) wins the elections in Syria

1 October: Bakr Sidqi stages the first coup in Iraq

1937

August: Bakr Sidqi is killed; further coups take place in Iraq

1941

May: The regent and ministers flee Iraq after a coup; a government of national union is formed

1 June: The British reoccupy Iraq and reestablish the regent

11 July: Defeat of Vichy forces in Syria

1943: Free French authorities reestablish the Syrian constitution and launch legislative elections. Shukri al-Quwatli becomes president.

1945

29 May: Damascus uprising against the French

25 October: First government of Sa‘d Allah al-Jabri in Syria

1946

5 March: Tawfiq al-Suwaydi forms a new government in Iraq

March: Five political parties are licensed in Iraq

27 April: Second government of Sa‘d Allah al-Jabri in Syria

April–May: In Bludan (Syria), the second Pan Arab conference condemns Zionist enterprise; Iraqi ministers argue in favor of an oil blockade

June: al-Suwaydi fails to pass his budget in the Iraqi Senate

18 June: New government of Arshad al-‘Umari in Iraq

19 July: Strike in Kirkuk

October: Nuri al-Sa‘id forms a new government

16 December: Syrian authorities execute Sulayman Murshid, an Alawite leader

1947

19 January: Arrest of Comrade Fahd

10 March: Elections in Iraq

30 March: Salih Jabr, first Shia prime minister of Iraq, forms a new government

7 April: Birth of the Ba‘th Party in Damascus

31 May: New electoral law in Syria; women are able to vote but not to run for office

June: Creation of the National Party in Syria

10 June: Friendship agreement signed between Turkey and Iraq

20 July: Legislative elections in Syria

1948

15 January: British and Iraqi ministers sign a new treaty in Portsmouth

18–27 January: The Wathba; massive demonstrations erupt in Baghdad

15 May: Israel declares independence

16 May: Iraq and Syria declare war on Israel

2–3 December: Major demonstrations erupt in Damascus

1949

16 January: Nuri al-Sa‘id forms a new government

30 March: Husni al-Za‘im stages a coup in Syria

16 May: Syrian government ratifies the Tapline agreement

26 June: New constitution written in Syria

14 August: A second coup is staged in Syria

October: Failure of the national charter proposed by Nuri al-Sa‘id to the other Iraqi political parties

31 October: Taha al-Hashimi supervises a mission to unify Iraq and Syria

24 November: Legislative elections in Syria

10 December: ‘Ali Jawda al-Ayyubi forms a government

14 December: Third coup in Syria

26 December: Khalid al-‘Azm forms a new government in Syria

1950

1 February: ‘Ali Jawda al-Ayyubi declares himself to be against foreign involvement in Syria. He has to resign after this declaration.

February: Adib al-Shishakli obtains a loan from the Saudi government

5 February: Tawfiq al-Suwaydi forms a new government

6 March: The Iraqi minister of interior, Salih Jabr, issues a law that strips all Jews of Iraqi nationality

13 March: Lebanon and Syria break the economic union

May: The Tripartite Declaration from western powers prohibits weapons exports to the Middle East

25 June: Outbreak of the Korean War

8 July: Ba‘th Party claims "Neutrality, the natural way toward Arabness [al-‘uruba]."

December: Foundation of the Development Board

1951

2 January: Nuri al-Sa‘id delivers a speech in the House of Representatives denouncing feudalism (al-nizam al-iqta‘i)

August: Nuri al-Sa‘id reaches a new oil agreement with the Iraq Petroleum Company

2 December: Fourth coup in Syria by Adib al-Shishakli

1952

4 April: al-Shishakli bans all political parties in Syria

23 July: The Free Officers take power in Egypt

October: A series of demonstrations lead to the resignation of the president of the Lebanese Republic, Bishara al-Khuri

22–25 November: Intifada in Iraq

1953

22 May: Faisal II is crowned king

21 June: al-Shishakli becomes president of the republic and a new constitution is established

29 September: Representatives of most of the Syrian parties attend a congress in Homs and announce a pact denouncing the new constitution and committing to fighting the regime until its collapse

September: Muhammad Fadil al-Jamali forms his first government

October: The Arab Liberation Movement wins the legislative elections in Syria

1954

February: Uprising in Jebel Druze

25 February: al-Shishakli is overthrown

April: al-Jamali resigns after failing to pass his budget

April: Massive flood in Baghdad

6 June: Legislative elections in Iraq

August: Nuri al-Sa‘id forms a government and launches policies against communists and constitutional freedom

September: New legislative elections in Iraq overseen by Nuri al-Sa‘id

24 September–6 October: Legislative elections in Syria

1955

6–13 January: ‘Adnan Menderes negotiates the Baghdad Pact with al-Sa‘id

1 February: Resignation of Bishara al-Khuri, prime minister of Syria

28 February: Israel launches an attack on Gaza

16 April: Bandung Conference

25 April: ‘Adnan al-Malki, Ba‘thist officer, is killed in Damascus

May: The British withdraw from the Hannabiya and Shayba airbases

4 August: al-Quwatli becomes president of the reinstated Syrian republic

1956

February: al-Quwatli calls for a national pact to ease political tensions

13 August: Arab lawyers meet and denounce western powers’ attacks against Egypt; following the meeting, Kamil al-Jadirji is arrested

5 July: Parliament unanimously approves plans for a committee to negotiate with Egypt for a federal union of Egypt and Syria

26 July: Nationalization of the Suez Canal in Egypt

10 October: Four Iraqi communists who had recanted are pardoned by royal decree

29 October: Israel invades Egyptian Sinai; beginning of the Suez War

3 November: The USSR pledges its assistance to Syria to reinforce Syrian independence; the pledge is made during a reception in Moscow honoring President al-Quwatli prior to his departure from the USSR

1957

8 January: The trial of 47 Syrians on charges of treason opens

26 February: Eleven Syrians and a Lebanese are sentenced to death in Damascus for conspiracy and treason; three are acquitted and thirty others draw prison sentences ranging from three months to twenty years

7 May: Syria protests to Turkey that military concentrations on the Turko-Syrian frontier are harming relations between the two countries

13 August: The Syrian authorities request that the United States recall three members of its consulate; beginning of the Syrian crisis

13 October: Egyptian troops land in Lattakia

10 November: Premier ‘Ali Jawda announces the establishment of a $40m five-year social development program in Iraq

19 September: Partial legislative elections in Damascus, opposing ‘Adnan al-Malki against Mustafa al-Siba‘i

18 November: In a joint session with the Syrian parliament, an Egyptian parliamentary delegation votes for the federal union of Syria and Egypt

1958

2 February: Egypt and Syria merge into the United Arab Republic (UAR)

14 February: Jordan and Iraq form the Arab Federation

24 February: Dissolution of all political parties in the UAR

14 March: Yemen joins the UAR

April: Nasser’s visit to the northern province (former Syria) greeted with huge popular support

14 July: Revolution in Iraq, assassination of King Faisal II and the Iraqi royal family

20 July: ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim, head of the Revolutionary Council, agrees to receive help from the USSR ahead of Iraq’s withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact

12 September: ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif is relieved of his post

27 September: First agrarian reform in Syria

29 September: Iraq launches its first agrarian reform

1959

8–14 March: Failed attempt to overthrow the government after the uprising in Mosul

14 July: Massacre in Kirkuk

7 October: Assassination attempt against Qasim

31 December: Akram al-Hawrani resigns as vice president of UAR

1960

14 September: Creation of OPEC

6 October: Iraqi newspaper al-Bayan calls for a permanent constitution

1961

September: Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in Belgrade

28 September: Dissolution of UAR

December: Legislative elections in Syria

1962

28 March–2 April: Coup and counter-coup in Syria

20 September: The Syrian government dissolves parliament

15 October: Negotiation over Euphrates Dam in Syria completed

16 October: Iraq announces it is not cooperating with Arab League after the League admits Kuwait

3 December: Qasim announces discussions with Syrian authorities to unify Syria and Iraq

9 December: Syrian prime minister announces the next elections to be held before next July

1963

27 January: Serious clashes between students and police in Damascus

28 January: Syrian government takes drastic measures to ensure order

8 February: Ba‘thist and Iraqi officers stage a coup; a new revolutionary government assumes power

14 February: An Iraqi delegation meets Arab delegates to resume Iraq’s participation in the Arab League

19 February: Peace negotiations start between the new Iraqi government and Kurdish rebels

15 March: Hassan Bakr, Iraqi prime minister, outlines the policy of the Revolutionary Council

Introduction

17 April 1946. Damascus. On the balcony of his residence, the Syrian president, Shukri al-Quwatli, wearing a frock coat and tarboosh, stands in front of the crowd gathered to listen to his speech.¹ His posture and clothes are part of his performance as representative of the Syrians and defender of the renaissance of modern Syria. He delivers a speech to launch the festivities: the last French soldier has left Syrian territory, symbolically heralding the independence of the former mandate. In his speech, al-Quwatli recalls his country’s long struggle against colonial powers, drawing parallels between the Ottoman and French occupations in order to condemn any encroachment on national sovereignty. He commends the authorities—the parliament, and himself as the newly elected president of Syria since 1943—for their role during the final stages of the struggle against the French. Finally, he describes the new challenges ahead, including the need to assert national sovereignty in the economic and diplomatic fields and to fulfil the true promise of independence by giving the people the right to live and to exercise their prerogatives as citizens. Thus he gives birth to the new nation under his command.

In 1946, Shukri al-Quwatli was already well-known as a First World War activist against the Ottoman authorities and as a member of the major nationalist group al-Kutla al-Wataniya (the National Bloc). He rose to the top of the party by taking a strong stance against any negotiations with the French. Thanks to his political maneuverings both inside the party and in the parliament, he managed to get himself elected as president at the end of the Second World War. He symbolized the elite, who had campaigned for the establishment of a constitutional order to achieve independence, and who argued that a parliamentary system could resolve the divisions within the nation witnessed during the Ottoman period and subsequently help build a modern and independent country. Their commitment to the constitutional ideals that emerged during the late nineteenth century saw them ascribe a high value to economic freedom and political rights. 1946 marked a turning point: representatives in the assembly could now assume power and rule the country without any foreign supervision.

25 February 1946. Baghdad. Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, often seen in a suit and tie and wearing small glasses, has not waited for his confirmation as president of the council of ministers to put forth his ideas for reform. He has written an article for the national daily newspaper, al-Zaman,² in which he argues for the necessary amendment of the emergency law in order to reestablish constitutional order. This initiative comes a few days before his appointment as president of the council, a position he had occupied two decades earlier. On 5 March, he stands up in the House of Representatives (Majlis al-Nuwwab al-‘Iraqi), confident of the assembly’s support for his program. The regent, who is in charge of the country until the young King Faisal II comes of age, agrees to al-Suwaydi’s initiative, which will put an end to the particular cirumstances created in the aftermath of the Second World War. Since 1941, the British have reoccupied the country, and successive Iraqi governments have implemented emergency laws. Hamdi al-Bashahshi, the previous president of the council, has tried to shift away from this position. Eventually, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi announces a new era in which the Iraqi constitution will overtly structure the political game: all Iraqi men will have the right and the opportunity to compete for power.

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi had already been president of the council once, the youngest ever, in 1929.³ After studying law, he joined the new Iraqi bureaucracy formed in the wake of the First World War. He distinguished himself in the service of King Faisal I and soon rose to be president of the council when Iraq became a member of the League of Nations. He embodied the new elite that supported the Iraqi monarchy, and ascribed a high value to the law as a tool for changing the social, cultural, economic, and political orders, whilst also upholding the social order prevailing in Iraq. He therefore fought for the spirit of the constitution, proclaiming Iraq as a constitutional liberal monarchy. His campaign against the emergency law highlighted his commitment to this and opened a new era. In the coming months, political parties emerged and competed with one another. In 1946, events took place in Iraq that emphasized the need for a true parliamentary system.

Both leaders represented the new elite who had assumed power on the eve of independence. Their general attitude toward the institutional system was reflected both in their posture—adopting clearly western standards not only in terms of attire but also in terms of the constitution—and their practices. Al-Quwatli led the National Bloc, trusting this party to be the right vehicle to fight against the French and then to establish his dominion over parliament. Al-Suwaydi went through several new political groups before forming and leading the government, and advocated strongly in favor of the full implementation of constitutional freedoms. Both belonged to families of the established classes who had become involved in politics during the interwar period, endorsing constitutionalist values as the true way to build modern nations on the ashes of the Ottoman Empire.

8 February 1963. Baghdad. In the early morning, officers and soldiers first assassinate Jalal al-Awqati, the communist air force chief, and then occupy the Abu Ghraib radio station. In the following hours, ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif and his supporters will manage to take control of the majority of the centers of power and besiege the Ministry of Defense, where the prime minister and head of state, ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim, has taken refuge. The attackers finally seize the building and execute Qasim. The coup staged by ‘Arif and his followers establishes the first Ba‘thist regime in Iraq, which is to witness massive bloodshed in the coming months. This event also ends all discussion of the reestablishment of certain constitutional elements and former political parties.⁴ Those remaining politicians who played a role during the monarchy and Qasim’s regime are sidelined. A new era has begun. A month later, the event is mirrored in Damascus. Officers stage a coup against Khalid al-‘Azm’s government despite the fact that he had introduced emergency law a few weeks earlier. Soon thereafter, the new leaders call on the Ba‘thist activists to assume power and govern. As in Iraq, a new historical sequence has been set in motion.

Both regimes employed the same rhetoric and practices of power—even if in the case of Iraq they were far more brutal. As a last resort, in both countries a revolutionary council appointed a government, whose policies and administrative appointments framed general state discourse. The two Ba‘thist coups did not put an end to military unrest. On the contrary, leadership turnover accelerated during the 1960s. Something new emerged from these coups and counter-coups, marking a period that has been identified as an age of revolution.⁵ The core principles of this period put all aspects of the parliamentary system, liberal ideas, and constitutional regulations in jeopardy. The circumstances—including the rural crisis, the betrayal of the old elites, and imperialist threats—legitimized authoritarian rule from the perspective of the new authorities. In 1963, something snapped.

These two initially separate national paths illustrate how in the aftermath of the Second World War, each country’s elite endorsed a parliamentary system as the right way to build sovereignty. They believed that elected assemblies would allow their countries to modernize to Western standards while at the same time reinforcing their own power as the true and legitimate representatives of the nation. Representatives in 1946 shared broadly liberal convictions such as the need to defend and expand constitutional rights, to establish a standard procedure for ensuring a balance of powers, and to guarantee individuals’ ownership rights. These elites belonged to a tradition stretching back to the last decades of the Ottoman Empire,⁶ a period during which reforms eventually framed a new form of political representation based on councils and the delegation of power. These institutions were then reorganized during the mandate period: the French and the British replicated European models, strengthening parliament as the core institution of the two newly established states. From 1946 onwards, this new institutional and political form permitted new elites to rule. Although there were struggles between different groups and different ideologies, the parliaments retained power by and large until 1963, when the military wings of the Ba‘th Party staged coups, first in Iraq and then in Syria, that swiftly destroyed this system. How and why did this political system, which in many respects provided the framework for a specific period (1946–63), fall apart? Should these years be considered an extension of the mandate period or were they rather a prelude to the authoritarian regimes that followed? Did the elites emerging at the end of the Second World War fail to achieve genuine independence? This book aims to answer these questions and others. It emphasizes the importance and impact of a representative system on the conduct of political affairs and scrutinizes how, in two non-European and non-American settings, the authorities adopted a system of assembly, and how they managed it and its inherent tensions.

Answers to all these questions have been suggested in the historiography constructed in the wake of the Ba‘thist coups. Three major issues have been addressed by the rare studies on this period.⁷ For a long time, two main approaches dominated this very limited research: the long 1950s (1946–63) were either incorporated into a broader narrative that set the stage for the advent of the authoritarian regime, or they were represented as the final years of colonial rule.⁸ These views underlined certain characteristics, such as the predominance of the old classes or initial attempts to establish personal rule, but they failed to recognize the specificity of this time period. These analyses did not tackle the intersection of multifaceted political phenomena present in this moment, including regular elections, the implementation of emergency law, the freedom of the press, the open expression of opinions, the formation of new political parties, frequent military coups, and the joint exercise of power by members of the old classes and reformist newcomers.

Others highlighted the close links between internal and external actors. Patrick Seale has argued that the constant unrest in Syria was the result of the permanent struggle between Iraq and Egypt to control the Syrian stage through local politicians, thus placing events within the broader context of the advent of the Cold War.⁹ Matthew Elliot has interpreted Iraqi political games in terms of British actions to promote new parliamentary processes in which two major groups would compete but both remain closely allied with Great Britain.¹⁰ These perspectives underscore an important factor of instability: the interplay between national and foreign partners that fueled radicalization. However, they dismiss parliaments as irrelevant, while remaining unable to show how the Hashemite court ruled over the system, or how the British controlled public opinion and the main political outcomes during this period. Moreover, these explanations do not adequately address the foundation of either regime or the question of its sustainability. If we compare Jordan and Syria, for example, it is clear that both were under pressure, but only the former regime survived.¹¹ External events cannot, therefore, fully explain the functioning of these regimes, and all these aspects beg further examination. Similarly, focusing on important figures in Iraq such as Nuri al-Sa‘id, and external influences such as the British, overshadows the concrete and daily functioning of two innovative political systems. Newcomers and new political parties were able to compete for access to power and, more importantly, to frame the general public debate.

Previous scholarship does not, therefore, provide an adequate framework for these two systems. This book opens a new investigation into this crucial period of Iraqi and Syrian history to understand how and why a specific system was formed at the end of the Second World War that then survived until the beginning of the 1960s.

Another historiographical trend emerged during the 1970s and 1980s, inspired by Hanna Batatu’s impressive work on the social evolution of Iraq. In his seminal study,¹² Batatu provides an overview of two aspects of Iraq’s socio-political history. His first concern is the social composition of Iraqi society, based on peasant communities and tribal groups. He adopts a neo-Weberian approach and tries to refine our understanding of the class system in the Middle East. He then turns his attention to the political dynamics initiated by the progressive parties, predominantly the communists and Ba‘thists.

This comprehensive view yielded some very important observations on Iraq during the modern period. However, it opposed two universes: on the one hand, the old classes, those elite groups that emerged during the nineteenth century who, according to Batatu, remained static and largely unaffected by events; and on the other, certain revolutionary movements—the Wathba, the massive 1948 uprising, and the Intifada in 1952—that shaped political opposition and provided the necessary momentum to struggle against the old classes. In this regard, the political narrative seems legitimate only when it allows the author to shed light on the revolutionary period and its outcomes. Moreover, without taking into consideration the different political sequences, Batatu neglects to account for certain major actors. For example, he underestimates the importance of the Shia ulama at the beginning of the century,¹³ whose injection of liberal and constitutionalist ideas into public debate staved off British pretensions to domination in Iraq for some years. Similarly, in his consideration of Syria, Batatu provides important insights into the peasant movement but neglects to connect it to the broader political and institutional field. Why did he refuse to narrate the political activities of the old classes? Did the actors decline to commit themselves? Moreover, how did his analysis undermine the very legitimacy of Arab parliaments and elevate revolutionary positions?

Batatu’s works exemplify the nationalist and revolutionary bias in Middle Eastern historiography. From this perspective, the old classes and their political system belonged to a colonial legacy that had to be erased in order to establish true sovereignty. The Egyptian model—the Free Officers Movement and Nasser’s leadership—was held up as an example. In so doing, historians such as Jacques Berque followed the official position of leading parties of the time,¹⁴ overlooking certain time periods, and condemning the attempts of a liberal age to damnatio memoriae. Other social and political mechanisms played a role: writing contemporary history remained a challenge in most countries when their authorities gained independence. Even Albert Hourani, a staunch defender of liberal thought,¹⁵ ended his study on the eve of the Second World War. Certainly, he introduced the concept of liberalism into Arabic studies by examining how thinkers and activists changed Arabic political vocabulary to match the need to reform the Ottoman Empire and fight colonialism. However, he did not link this long struggle to its social and political background. He refused to look at the post-war period as a further liberal sequence. Naturally, the meaning of liberalism changed, but it was a constituent part of the political realm. Consequently, close attention to internal mechanisms will help us to understand the complexity of what I qualify as a liberal order based on parliamentary systems.

More recently, Joshua Landis and Steven Heydemann have aimed to draw attention to key processes that emerged during the post-war period in Syria.¹⁶ Landis has analyzed how minorities—mostly sectarian groups—interacted with the new regime and how the regime’s leader, Shukri al-Quwatli, crushed any expression of otherness that implied regional autonomy or the decentralization of decision-making processes. Landis clearly shows how the concept of za‘ama still defined power relationships in the late 1940s. This concept is central to the present study as it refers to a specific relationship with several facets:¹⁷ a sense of honor and its recognition by a given community, the economic ability of its holder to respond to the social needs of their fellows, the means to capitalize on resources, and finally the capacity to stand for a broader community. However, as Landis ends his study in 1949 and avoids discussing the relationship between the form taken by the regime and the nature of the political game, he is unable to expand his conclusions in order to highlight one of the contradictions of the political system: the tension between the modern and the traditional manifested in the conflict between the opening and closing of these representative institutions. This study intends to build on Landis’s conclusions: when institutionalized through parliamentary procedures, the za‘ama reinforced the role of political leaders from the great families.

Heydemann sought to explain how and why an authoritarian formula emerged during the 1950s, arguing that division amongst the ranks of the bourgeoisie and demands for the establishment of a social contract undermined the system. His main focus was public policies and their supporters in the parliament. However, without considering the parliamentary debates, his conclusions fail to take into account the distinction between the eras of assemblies and of the military. By referring to documentation from these parliaments, I intend to observe how the parliamentary system produced and implemented these policies and created divisions between activists amongst the representatives.

Two other major scholarly contributions have testified to the thriving cultural milieu that developed under the Iraqi monarchy and in mid-1950s Syria. Orit Bashkin has highlighted the major developments in the journalistic and artistic fields from the late 1920s onwards, connecting these developments with the political struggle led by major forces.¹⁸ Communist groups in particular fueled protest through art. Bashkin demonstrates the vibrant nature of civil society, pointing out that despite significant political constraints, the parliamentary system allowed new associations to create an artistic environment that framed public opinion. Similarly, Martin Kevin has pinpointed the crucial importance of the years 1954–58 to the establishment of a civil society based on clubs, newspapers, magazines, and other cultural forms, through which different social groups participated in political debate.¹⁹ These two studies highlight the richness of the period. By expanding both arguments, I would like to show how a particular political system and its inherent tensions allowed this rich cultural life to flourish and, conversely, how civil society affected debates, political figures, and representatives in the institutions.

This book aims to understand three main interrelated issues to clarify what happened between 1946 and 1963 in Iraq and Syria: how and why a parliamentary system prevailed in both countries in the aftermath of the Second World War; what social effects this system triggered and, in return, how these changes affected the system; and finally, why the elites in both countries were unable to overcome the unrest that brought an end to both a liberal era and to a certain kind of political game. Studying Iraq and Syria between 1946 and 1963 allows us to highlight the fundamental processes of the parliamentary system in the modern era, which are very common to post-independence countries and almost certainly to any representative regime. These dynamics deal with the systemic effect of elections, the meaning of political representation and hegemony, and the consequences of public policies. Based on a state-in-society and comparative approach,²⁰ this book explores parliamentary dynamics in relation to their impacts on society (through elections, policymaking, demonstrations, coups, and so on) to understand how these systems changed Iraq and Syria.

The principal contention I wish to put forward is that because Iraq and Syria were ruled by parliamentary systems between 1946 and 1963, this political form requires further investigation to understand its contemporary significance. From its emergence in the nineteenth century as a combination of old and new political patterns, this political form triggered permanent tensions in its desire to reinstate new aristocracies or to create a body politic from the people in order to secure true state sovereignty. Certain mechanisms—elections, demonstrations, and so on—helped manage the tensions and contain them within certain parameters, but they did not put a stop to outbreaks of unrest. In the context of the intense social transformations and urgent demands for the establishment of true sovereignty that characterized the post-independence period, this unrest became unmanageable. Providing evidence for these assertions requires an in-depth examination of the daily work of the assemblies and a consideration of that work in its social and political context.

In order to study the processes of institutional engineering, I adopt Chatriot’s approach.²¹ Alain Chatriot, an historian specializing in the history of the state and state administration, has shown that narrowing the focus to a specific institution allows us to investigate in depth the extent to which any given institution is forged through internal game playing and the processes triggered by that body in a broader institutional network. By selecting one institution and analysing all the processes triggered by it, it is possible to understand institutional dialogues and policy-building in all their complexity. The parliament can therefore be analysed as an arena in transition, in which those involved initiated and participated in new sequences of actions and responded to different demands, and as providing a point of view from which to survey the institutional network. Studying a single institution does not consequently mean bypassing the complexity of the institutional network, nor does it mean denying the roles of other actors. It is rather the only way to concentrate on everyday practices and their consequences on the political stage.

The comparative approach helps to determine the general framework of these parliamentary systems. As Marc Bloch argued, the only way to pinpoint the common patterns that have animated historical processes is to compare contexts from different time periods or geographical areas, otherwise these patterns disappear within the national narrative.²² This approach provides the basis for the historical scope of this work, as well as the two case studies. Certainly, Iraq and Syria went through different evolutions. Iraq achieved independence from Britain in 1932, while France announced Syrian independence in 1941. Whereas French troops left Syrian territory, the British maintained control over air bases in Iraq until 1955, although they reduced their military presence from 1944 onwards. However, both countries shared a common Ottoman heritage. During the last century of the Ottoman Empire, imperial reforms (the Tanzimat) profoundly affected local and provincial political games by restructuring political institutions and modifying the composition of the elites. By the same token, the process of devolution of powers ended in 1946, and the Iraqi and Syrian authorities, emerging from the disruptions caused by the Second World War, were able to seriously tackle the issues of sovereignty and liberal order. Finally, in 1963, the Ba‘th Party coups broke with the surviving liberal traditions and the political system. Comparing the Iraqi and Syrian parliamentary systems sheds light on a decisive stage in their history—the post-independence period—and on representative institutions in the global south.

Between 1946 and 1963, the Iraqi and Syrian political stages offered an illuminating window onto several phenomena. In both cases, those politicians invested with power after the Second World War had to reconcile their own interests—defending the private ownership of large areas of land, for example—with their attempts to strengthen both an egalitarian constitutional order—thereby giving rights to all citizens—and national sovereignty, which included reinforcing state control over the economy. All politicians thus ascribed a high value to the law as the proper tool for changing and amending the status quo. They therefore committed themselves to promoting constitutional regimes based on parliament as the seat of legislation. The authorities of both the Iraqi monarchy and the Syrian republic experimented with representative institutions. I will argue that most of the achievements and tensions that arose in the 1950s resulted from the very nature of the political representation implemented. Contrary to many of the changes in the late Ottoman period inherited by the elites at the moment of independence, elections, parliamentary negotiations, and the implementation of public policies did not fulfil