‘Fair Play’ or Poisoned Chalice: The Last Years of Britain's Presence and Policy in Southern Arabia

By Sultan Ghalib bin ‘Awadh al-Qua‘iti II

The region of South Arabia (including the vast region of Hadhramaut) has been a part of the Yemen since 1990 due to a shot-gun marriage of an arrangement following the perestroika, leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of its protecting presence. Since then it has been in a regular state of ever-increasing political turmoil and instability. This is due to the United Nations' failure to implement its Resolutions concerning the region's political future prior to British withdrawal in 1967, with Southern Arabia's strategic location at the doorstep of the world's major oil resources and its constant insecurity adding fuel to fire, the latest case being the current crisis and the launch of Operation Decisive Storm in 2015. This study may be deemed authoritarian for the period it covers from many aspects due to the pen from which its authorship flows and the high and sensitive position held by its wielder at the time of the events it covers. It should certainly prove a revealing and illuminating eye-opener about the recent political history of a region that continues to suffer from grave paucity of material for the purpose of scholarship, and about which, regardless of its past greatness and current significance and strategic importance to the world at large, so little is known.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Darf Publishers
• Release date: Nov 9, 2021
• ISBN: 9781850773320

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17a

Commentator’s (Author’s) Introduction

The genesis of this book rests primarily in a Commentary on Jonathan Walker’s Aden Insurgency, a book by a writer, highly knowledgeable and au fait with military affairs, as well as proud of the heritage, traditions and feats of British arms. It is undoubtedly the best book to emerge on the subject since Lietenant-Colonel Julian Paget’s Last Post: Aden 1964–67 and may indeed be treated as a sort of sequel to it.

However, Walker would have done greater justice to himself and his laudable effort, if he had remained satisfied with the book’s main title by itself, a subject with which he appears to be well-acquainted and at home, without adding the subtitle referring to the War in South Arabia. For this makes it incumbent on him to cover developments and events during the same period and in a like manner in some 20 other states in the Federation of South Arabia and the Eastern Aden Protectorate (Hadhramaut and Mahrah), besides Aden. This, even if the sources were available and accessible to him, would have made his goal rather ambitious to say the least, if he were to attempt to do justice to his subject. Some of these so called States like the Republic of Datheenah boasted a population of around 5,000 inhabitants. Then there were ones at the other extreme like the Qu‘aiti State, Hadhramaut, with an area of over 80,000 square miles and a population at the time of at least 350,000.

Since any insurgency in Aden and its vicinity up to the period covered by this book has always had something to do with the Yemen of old (i.e. pre-1968) due to religious and geo-political reasons, the civil war then raging there between the Royalists and the Republicans in support of their own interests and as surrogate representatives of greater regional powers like Sa‘udi Arabia and Egypt could hardly afford to have been ignored by him in any such exercise as this, due to its continuing reflection of the events, primarily in Aden and the Western Protectorate on almost a daily basis. This of course is in addition to him having to refer to the effect on these of the Egyptian political and military presence in the Yemen, which ostensibly was in support of the fledgling Republican regime in Sana‘a, but intrinsically happened in actuality to involve President Nasser’s political and strategic ambitions in the region and beyond on a much grander scale.

Nevertheless, since the history of this area in general and even of the duration covered by the title in particular, has always suffered from a paucity of material, particularly printed and in any language, let alone English, the works of those like Julian Paget, David Ledger and Jonathan Walker are indeed highly welcome additions to the list of whatever is hitherto available and notably so on the subject of British military operations in the area and especially in Aden. Regarding this topic, these are a veritable mine of information for all, regardless, and particularly so for the uninitiated layman. In short, they truly bear the distinct hallmarks of meticulous research, unmatched knowledge, accuracy and honest credibility.

Hence, on the basis of these aspects, these authors sincerely deserve the genuine gratitude of the sons of the region for placing so much accurate information and expertise in interpretation about a highly critical period in its history at our disposal and based on a wide range of sources of information and official documents, though these happen to be mostly British and therefore purveying in the main, the British point of view. In fact, due to their obvious familiarity with the British military establishment and focus on including the personal experiences of a large range of British personalities and individuals, they also succeed in bringing episodes of events to life.

However, the fact that these seldom include any Arabs amongst their ranks, whether former British allies or foes, is an omission which tends to grow on readers in negotiating the narrative and to give these otherwise admirable efforts a somewhat lop-sided effect. In all fairness, Jonathan Walker, for example, has attempted to redeem this shortcoming to some extent by seeking access to the Arab World Documentation Unit at the University of Exeter. Nevertheless, one wonders what of truly intrinsic value relating to the topic of his book could have been found there, as so little of authentic worth was commonly known in the Arab world or elsewhere about South Arabia and Hadhramaut even amongst the people of the region and unbelieveably even till as late as the time of this crisis itself, let aside the hopes of the availability of written or documented material on it. In short, these books mostly represent the British view and experience of this episode.

It also has to be said, that the innate patriotic pride and faith of such authors in their own race, its institutions and values appear at times to blur somewhat the level of clarity in their judgement when British policies as practiced then and the questionable ethics behind them, call for greater scrutiny and fairer evaluation. In such cases, they tend rather meekly to tow the official line and to present it without adequate questioning, while also using on occasion sources whose reliability could hardly be said to match the levels of integrity required in such sensitive studies.

Having digressed in general on the main features of these books, I aspire to review their contents and to clarify, comment, explain and add information which I hope will make this exercise of greater relevance and historical value, especially from the indigenous angle, the chief missing ingredient, the view of the local Arab side.

Also, since these accounts merely touch cursorily the developments during this period in the Eastern Aden Protectorate (Hadhramaut and Mahrah) in the manner of all the other authors who have written on the region before, an attempt has been made by this Commentator to address this shortcoming as near to his satisfaction as possible, with something, occasion permitting, on the rulers as well, whose States had come to compose the British-inspired Federation, with a focus on the critical issues and the dilemma faced by them at the time.

An attempt has also been made to provide an essay of photographs of related interest based on whatever was made available to this Commentator by members of the various former ruling families also his sources for much first-hand information, for which he is unreservedly grateful.

Basically, this is an attempt to place historical facts and events as perceived by the indigenous side on record without meaning to give offence to anyone, as this Commentator considers the past akin to water which has flown under the bridge a long while ago. Hence, should this Commentary give anybody cause for offence in any manner, then this Commentator would like to offer his sincere and unconditional apologies to any party that may consider itself aggrieved, whatever be the reason. He would also like to assure them that this has not been the intended purpose of this exercise.

Finally, he would like to express in all sincerity and humility his gratitude to his many dear friends whose support he has always enjoyed and particularly all those who have contributed in making the compilation of this book a tangible reality. They are too numerable to be listed here and given the credit due to each one of them in an individual manner. Indeed, to name any and leave out others would be tantamount to sacrilege. Yet, at the expense of committing this cardinal sin, he feels compelled to name the following for their myriad suggestions and contribution or assistance in the past, direct or indirect. This list indudes Joanna Ellis, Leila Ingrams, John and Barbara Horrell, Anne Neilsen, Philippa Vaughan, John and Patricia Ducker, John and Georgina Harding, Stewart Hawkins, Corinne and Patricia Hillman and Richard Louden, John Shipman, Hugh Leach, John Carter, John and Pamela Bunney, Dr. Ulrike Freitag, Ambassador Dr. Stefan and Renate Keller, Renate and Taha al-Husseini, Muna and Cornel Vulcu, Tom Stacey, Pete and Pat Taylor, Audrey Allfree, Dr. Spencer Mawby and, of course, Jonathan Walker.

Some friends from university days whom he would like to add to this list are Michael Sayer, Peter Edwards, Mark Blackett-Ord, Geoff and Ulla Calvert, Michael Wigan, Julia and Oric Basirov, Rebecca and Nicholas Camu, Mark Whitcombe, David Chaldecott, Michael Matantos, Yangos Colocotronis, Charlie and Serena Colchester and Brian Fyfield-Shayler. A particular debt of gratitude is owed to Henry and Frances Jones-Davies for assisting with the editing.

Saleh ‘Abdullah, Saleh Fareed and ‘Ali Shaikh al-‘Aulaqi and particularly Haidar Sha‘fal al-Ameeri and Muhammad Abubakar bin ‘Ajroumah provided some valuable material and a number of photographs for which they also deserve special thanks, as do HRH Prince ‘Abdul-Rahman bin Yahya Hameeduddin and his nephew HRH Prince ‘Ali bin Ibraheem, the Sultans ‘Ali ‘Abdul-Kareem al-‘Abdali, Ahmad bin ‘Abdullah al-Fadhli, Faisal bin Suroor al-Haushabi, Nasser bin ‘Aidarous al-‘Aulaqi, al-Ameer Sha‘fal bin ‘Ali al-Ameeri, al-Ameerah Halah, Muhsin Fadhl and ‘Ali bin Ahmad al-‘Abdali, al-Ameer ‘Awadh bin Muhammad and his son Muhammad al-‘Aulaqi, Abubakr bin Ahmad and his son Mahmood al-‘Aulaqi, al-Ameer ‘Ali and Muhsin bin Muhammad al-Wahidi, al-Ameer Hamood and Fadhl Muhammad Harharah, Shaikh Faisal al-Muflahi and last but not least, the great Adeni leaders ‘Abdullah al-Asnaj, the brothers Hasan and Husain al-Bayoomi, Salim Naigah, Muhammad Hasan al-‘Obali and ‘Abdul-Rahman Girgirah. He would like to include in this list his sister (with nephew ‘Omair), his wife, son (Saleh), daughters (Fatima and Muzna), sons-in-law (Shad and Hisham), brother ‘Omar, nephew Salah bin Muhammad, uncle ‘Abdul-‘Azeez bin ‘Ali et al.

For taking on the onus of typing this manuscript, a major debt of gratitude is owed to my daughter Muzna, son-in-law Shad al-Sherif Pasha, Frances Jones-Davies, Muzaffar, Mohammed Hyder ‘Ali and Jameel. Should this humble effort succeed in the purpose for which it was intended to any reasonable extent, then this Commentator would feel more than amply rewarded.

He would also like to stress that his views on the events and topics covered in this commentary are primarily based on recollections still very much vivid in the mind due to the lasting effect they were to have on the course of his life as well as the lives and destinies of so many people, including many of those consulted in its compilation, or referred to. However, in order to provide additional, verifiable substantiation to the theses and views in content, a list of sources as applicable has been included, or the name of the relevant oral source included within the related narration.

To reiterate, the prime purpose of this commentary is to put a number of overlooked events and arguments on record and not to give offence, though their effects very much continue to linger on. It is important, nevertheless, as should be realised, that the other side of the story ought also to be placed on record, lest it be forgotten with the passage of time.

Briefly speaking, Britain’s historic and strategic rationale in the occupation of Aden was initially in the interests of supporting the British presence in India.This was to be followed after the latter’s independence in August 1947 by another and much more vital concern, that of guarding the oil supplies from both shores of the former Persian and now the Arabian Gulf region (to the Arab), as well as of warding off the strategic and ideological threat posed to these interests by the age old Russian dream which was still very much relevant at the time Walker’s work covers, of reaching its warm waters.

Though this Russian political and strategic threat is presently no more, the continuing vital importance of oil to the economies of the world can hardly be under-stated. Hence, it is in this context and that of Aden’s continuing relevance to British strategic concerns in particular, that this commentary raises and examines the questions surrounding Britain’s decision to withdraw from there in what could only be termed a highly negligent manner.

This illogical strategic decision is shown by many of these authors such as Jonathan Walker to have been primarily based, at least on the surface as it appears, on the ostensible success of the insurgency in Aden and the surprising speed of the collapse of the British-created Federation. This new political entity, established and supported by the British, had comprised a large number (19) of the Protected States around Aden, which were grossly under-developed in every sense till this stage and had ended up unwillingly tied due to British pressure and the accident of a chance shot-gun marriage, to the apron strings of one of the world’s largest, modern and prosperous oil bunkering ports at the time, which happened to be Aden.

In the process of this Federation’s collapse, the so called inability of the seasoned armed forces of Britain, still a great world power even if on the decline, to control the situation on the ground is said to have had much to do with this unexpected, rapid disintegration. However, is this really the case, or was it the lack of true political foresight and resolve on the part of the politicians which had led to this sad outcome is what needs to be examined. By creating this Federation and engineering Aden’s entry into it against the will of its population, Britain’s plan had been to see that Aden’s prosperity bore the financial burden of the region’s administration after its eventual departure, this despite the unwillingness of the majority of Adenis.

That, however, was not to be for a number of reasons which occurred while the British were still there. One of these was the semi-successful coup of September 1962 in the Yemen inspired and backed by President Nasser. This had soon been followed by the arrival of Egyptian troops there in its support, whose number was eventually to grow to 70,000. The United States under President John Kennedy had chosen to accord diplomatic recognition to the new republican regime in keeping with his party’s (the Democrats) generally liberal traditions. Britain’s unwillingness on the other hand to recognise what was clearly a rickety republican establishment which was only surviving in the face of staunch tribal opposition due to heavy Egyptian support, was to irritate Nasser enough to sponsor and support dissidents from Aden and the hinterland into taking up armed opposition to the British presence in the region.

A major factor encouraging him into adopting this course was the British declaration itself to withdraw from the region in the course of a few years, though no one seemed to be willing to believe it at the time. One major reason for this decision had been UN and American pressure on the one hand to decolonise and another more serious one was Britain’s inability to bear the financial burden despite all that was at stake due to the oil factor. However, Nasser’s involvement in the Yemen had actually been in support of his future designs in the Arabian Peninsula of possessing its oil. These were not unlike those of an earlier ruler of Egypt, the great Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha (r. 1805 – 1849).

Though not a highly educated individual in the normal sense of the term, Nasser as an able army officer had lectured as an instructor at the Egyptian Army’s Staff College. Furthermore, a feature of his policy of which he spoke openly was that, he often reacted to events and this reaction of his towards British unwillingness to see the issue of the Yemeni revolution his way was an illustration of it.

Another major event or reason that was to tell on Aden’s prosperity negatively and to affect its inability to assist in bearing the brunt of financing the region’s management after independence, which was to take place some five years after the revolution in Sana‘a, was the closure of the Suez Canal following the Arab-Israeli War of June 1967. This was to terminate Aden’s strategic and commercial significance and hence, its great prosperity to a major extent due to the compulsory diversion of all shipping traffic from it.

Consequently, it is in seeking answers for this dilemma that this commentary endeavours to enquire and find the answers to what went so terribly wrong? and to comment, explain and feed further information in an attempt to clarify the total picture more comprehensively.

I

Britain and the Legacy of John Buchan’s Greenmantle

In his first Chapter titled "The Kingdom of Sheba" (Saba’), Jonathan Walker presents an interesting, historical background narrative, in which we are reminded from the very outset, that the "Aden Insurgency", also the title of his book, which had enveloped the southwest of the Arabian Peninsula, had included the wild and remote interior, known as the Protectorate, and also the adjacent Kingdom of the Yemen.¹ Yet, it is important to know that Hadhramaut, which its sons place in Southeast Arabia (see for example Muhammad bin Ahmad al-Shatiri’s history called "Adwaar al-Tareekh al-Hadhrami") and which represents more than two-thirds of southern Arabia’s area, a factor which established it only next to Aden in regional importance in economic and international terms, is merely referred to by him and mostly en passant no more than seven times.² In this, he follows the pattern of all the earlier authors who have written on the subject. Hence, one of the primary objectives of this study is to address this shortcoming in a serious manner.

Then, on the subject of whether to include Hadhramaut in (the Southeast or the Southwest of Arabia), it would be of some relevance to bear in mind here that the former rulers of al-Shihr (from the clan of Bin Braik) and of al-Mukalla (from that of the Kasadi), who were addressed by the title of "Naqeeb" and hailed originally like their successor, the Qu‘aiti, from the tribes of Yafa‘, would raise the standard of the Sultan of Muscat on their towns, forts and vessels in times of need. In their mutual disputes, they would also refer to him for arbitration.³

On the basis of texts, geographical and historical descriptions, Hadhrami scholars when referring to the concept of Hadhramaut’s limits in the region, tend to use two terms, "Hadhramaut al-Kubra (Greater Hadhramaut) and Hadhramaut al-Sughra" (Lesser or Hadhramaut Proper of today, limiting it to the valley bearing that name and its coastline). While the former concept would more or less include the whole of the region in southern Arabia over which the British exercised authority prior to their departure in November 1967, Hadhramaut, in its concise form would be restricted to the Qu‘aiti and the Katheeri States, to which some add the regions formerly covered by the Wahidi and the Mahrah Sultanates, but not without complaints from them, particularly the latter.

Harold Ingrams, with whom this Commentator was to have genuinely sincere relations and a close rapport after having met him during the last few years of his life, reports in his book "Arabia and the Isles, that: Altogether I calculated there were about 2000 separate ‘governments’ in the Hadhramaut of which only two were recognised by the British. In his other book The Yemen, he elucidates: There were two treaty chiefs – the Qu‘aiti Sultan who was an appointed suzerain supported by his mercenaries and his paid governors, and the Katheeri Sultan, a hereditary elected tribal chief of a confederation".⁴

Here, he seems to forget or was ignorant at that time of the fact, that by the time he had appeared on the scene, the Qu‘aiti State alone was divided into four "Alwiyah (Liwa’ in the singular) or provinces, each with its Na’ib (governor). These were then sub-divided into Muqati‘aat (Muqati‘ah" in the singular) or districts over whose administration presided district commissioners (Qa’im in the singular). These Provinces had been Shibam, al-Shihr, al-Mukalla and Du‘an, to which was added Hajar as a separate fifth following its formal incorporation into the realm during the first decade of the 20th century, though this Province had initially constituted a part of Liwa’ al-Mukalla. Doreen Ingrams, in her "Report on the Hadhramaut following her and her husband’s visit in 1934, lists five Provinces with the addition of Other Districts under Qu‘aiti Influence".⁵

The tribes of the region had owed allegiance to the rulers while being allowed to continue unmolested, in keeping with ancient tradition honed by the environment, to preserve and persevere with their way of life as regulated by their well understood and recognised code by the inhabitants of the region since times immemorial. Action was only taken against them by the most accessible of means when necessary. This was primarily due to the paucity of means at the State’s disposal, which it could ill afford to waste in wars adding to regional insecurity, with little gain and much direct and indirect loss in the end. Shaikh ‘Abdullah Ahmad al-Nakhibi, soldier, State poet, State Councillor for Hajar Province, Custodian of the Sultan’s Library and Imam of the Sultan ‘Omar Congregational Mosque in al-Mukalla was to inform this Commentator that there were nearly 5,000 documents involving treaties and engagements with the tribes in Hadhramaut and beyond in the State’s custody.

However, Ingrams, while making the above observation seems to have overlooked that at the time of his arrival on the scene, the British government itself, despite its might and resources, had chosen in the interests of parsimony to follow the same policy in the region where the tribes and their chiefs were concerned ever since its arrival in the region. This was one of establishing and maintaining links with the relevant tribes by attracting their chiefs with the payment of what must surely be nominal stipends in order to ensure that they had no dealings with other rival powers, and then to observe strict non-interference in their affairs unless its interests were directly threatened. For example, the Qu‘aiti Sultan was merely paid an MT (Maria Theresa) thaler per diem, not that he minded much, as he was merely after British recognition in order to escape the pressures he was made to suffer until entering into formal treaty relations.

In comparison to Ingrams’ assertion, the Bents, (Theodore and Mabel), who were to visit Hadhramaut (1893–94) and travel widely accompanied by a team of experts in a number of fields were to mention in their book "Southern Arabia, that: The government of the country is now almost entirely in the hands of the al-Qu‘aiti family ... reported to be the richest in Arabia ... They are continually increasing by purchase, the area of their influence in the collateral valleys, building substantial castles and establishing one of the most powerful dynasties in this much-divided country ... The power and wealth of this family are almost the only guarantee for peace and prosperity in an otherwise lawless country."⁶

That aside, even as early as 1872, the Assistant Resident in Aden WF Prideaux, had submitted a report dated 2nd December (1872) to the Political Resident following his visit to the Hadhrami coast, in which he was categorically to state: Although the means by which the Ka’yatee (Qu‘aiti) family had risen to power (on the coast) may be condemned, there is little doubt that under their rule the greater part of Hadhramaut has attained to a state of peace and security, to which it could lay no claim for many years previously.⁷

The signing of the Treaty of Advice in 1937 was to enable the ruler, in keeping with British thinking and policy, to subject the tribes to more direct methods of British control with the aid of military might personified by the use of that weapon almost unknown to them, the aeroplane. Ingrams being a foreigner and a Colonial servant with some experience of Africa and a newcomer on the local scene, was of course ignorant of the fact that the administrative structure in the Qu‘aiti State was greatly influenced by its rulers’ experience of what they saw in princely and British India which they sensed could be beneficially applicable in their native homeland. He appears also to have been ignorant of the fact that the Colonial administration of Africa, a later acquisition in comparison to India, was itself greatly influenced by Britain’s experience in India.

The last Resident Adviser, the shrewd Jim Ellis, was to realise this and state so in Part III of a series of highly interesting articles he wrote titled "Hadhramaut and Thereabouts relating to his memories and experiences during his long sojourn in differing capacities in Hadhramaut. The text reads: Over the next forty years (since entering into treaty relations with the British), the Qu‘aitis built up an administration roughly along the lines of the so-called Native States in India, but their main revenues came from customs dues, collected by a tax-farmer, which were seldom sufficient to maintain order over the area to which they laid claim. The State’s income had to be subsidised from the much greater income the Sultan derived from his estates in Hyderabad. The British had no wish to become financially involved in the running of the country and the limit of his power was in the strength of the forces he could maintain. He had an army of mainly Yafa‘i tribesmen with a few Indian officers and gunners, mostly foreigners, and he maintained well over a thousand Yafa‘i irregulars."⁸

Here, it is important to comment on what Ingrams surprisingly states in the Introduction of his book: The revenue was then (1936) about Rs. 630,000 of which the Sultan (‘Omar bin ‘Awadh) put about half in his pocket ... Before Sultan ‘Omar left for India (for treatment from cancer of the lungs), where he died, he emptied the till and left the treasurer to borrow from the market.⁹

In this matter, Ingrams unlike Ellis, appears clearly to be totally ignorant of the crucial facts, that the founder of the Qu‘aiti Sultanic house’s fortunes, ‘Omar bin ‘Awadh I (d.1865) had made a will in December 1862 bequeathing a third of all that he possessed wherever it may happen to be for the welfare of his native homeland under the discretionary management of three of his five sons. These revenue bearing assets located mostly in India and Hadhramaut, were treated as one and referred to as "Amlaak al-Qa‘tah (literally the properties of the Qu‘aitis"). Hence, apart from it being common practice for the income from all these assets, wherever they may lie, to be treated as State assets, it was a norm for large sums of money to be transferred from India, where actually most of the revenue producing assets lay, every two years in order to meet the budgetary deficit, which during the reign of Sultan ‘Omar bin ‘Awadh II hovered around 50%.

Shaikh ‘Abdullah Ahmad al-Nakhibi, was to confirm all this in great detail to this Commentator. He was also to narrate the following story which is worth repeating: "During a visit by Sultan ‘Omar bin ‘Awadh II to al-Shihr, of which he was very fond and to the extent of actually desiring to restore to it the status of the State’s capital, he was to hear from a distance a wag recite a verse enquiring of a bee if there was any honey still left in the ‘Jubh’ (a beehive container – and an apiary utensil used in Hadhramaut). Understanding the political meaning of the verse, he immediately sent out orders to the capitals of the State’s four Provinces at the time to dispatch post-haste their registers recording details of the annual revenues and expenditure and upon their arrival, fixed a Friday after the congregational Prayer for these to be displayed and examined by anyone who wished to do so."

This exercise was to reveal, as may have been expected by the knowledgeable, that expenditure, primarily on security, in each case exceeded revenue by large margins. Once this had been established to the knowledge of all and sundry, he summoned a public meeting and told the gathering that he now intended to reduce expenditure on all services to match the actual income in the case of every province, which of course would have affected greatly the security on the roads, as the policing efforts even at that stage were hard pressed, to say the least and this too after regular agreed annual payments to the relevant tribes lying astride the concerned arteries and highways. When the gathering and patricualrly the merchant community amongst them discovered the actual size of the deductions in policing strength that would be involved in this exercise and what it implied in reality for the security of transportation and commerce, they were horrified and begged him to reconsider his decision. This he was to agree to in the end after a display of considerable intransigience.

Another account that needs to be recorded here in response to Ingrams’ above allegations that Sultan ‘Omar bin ‘Awadh II had emptied the till before his departure for India for treatment, was related to this Commentator by Shaikh ‘Omar Bahashwaan, the State’s Director of Education and a State Councillor, who happened to be an eye-witness to what is related, that when Sultan ‘Omar bin ‘Awadh II’s nephew and successor, Sultan Saleh bin Ghalib entered the "Qasr ul- Mu‘een Palace in al-Mukalla with his retinue upon the former’s death, he was to find 60,000 thalers (Maria Theresa) piled in an empty bathing pool used by the late Sultan, which he was to order to be transferred to the new Treasury he was to establish in the premises of al-Husn", the old palace in al-Mukalla, which was to come to house the State administration’s Secretariat complex for all the new departments under his reorganisation.

It has to be stressed here that in all such cases, Ingrams, despite his many great deeds was a young and total newcomer to an alien scene when making such sweeping claims at the expense of others. He mostly managed to get away with these because he wrote in a foreign language to which the poor indigenous population neither had any access nor could read in most cases. To assist him in his endeavours, he was of course relying at all times for information and guidance on functionaries of the out-going regime of Sultan ‘Omar bin ‘Awadh II, who because of the political change following that Sultan’s death, were to find themselves suddenly without power and consequently, held grudges against the new establishment with axes to grind.

Earlier on in Part II, Ellis was to state following the departure of the Kasadi Naqeeb of al-Mukalla from the scene and later political developments, that: This left the Qu‘aiti in control of the Hadhrami coast, from the mouth of Wadi Hajar to the Mahrah border and the Katheeri with an enclave round Sai’un and Tareem. Although the Qu‘aiti claimed sovereignty over the whole of the Hadhramaut, neither he nor his successors were able to interfere effectively in matters in the Katheeri area, but he had cut off the Katheeris from the sea and from the west and was able to establish an administration over the most important other parts that he claimed. In 1882, he signed a Treaty (of Friendship) with the British giving them control over his external affairs and binding himself not to dispose of his dominions to anyone else without British agreement.¹⁰

When the administration and political responsibility for this region was to be transferred from New Delhi to the Colonial Office in London in 1937, the then Political Resident in Aden and later Governor, Colonel Sir Bernard Reilly, had initially intended to make quite independent arrangements for Hadhramaut from Aden and the States in its hinterland which came to be known as the Western Aden Protectorate (WAP), until he was dissuaded from doing so by Harold Ingrams following his exploratory visits to Hadhramaut accompanied by his wife Doreen, the first of which was in 1934. This suggestion by Ingrams to Reilly, as he was to inform and explain to this Commentator in person in London during 1967/68 had been made by him on the grounds that such a measure by Reilly, if adopted, would render the future of the grouping of the Aden Protectorate States less viable in the future.

Hence, it is to Harold Ingrams that the debt of promoting the concept of clubbing Hadhramaut with Aden and its hinterland (the WAP) is owed in no small measure, though he was to become deeply regretful about it by the time this Commentator met him and to consider it to have been a major misconception and error on his part. It is again an interesting and mystifying story that he was also to come to consider many of his political and other achievements in the region and for which he had become famous, particularly amongst anthropologists, in the same regretful manner, as he was to inform this Commentator. For example, the sentence he uses to end his highly interesting book "The Yemen, published in 1960, his last word, seems to substantiate these latter day sentiments of his, even if indirectly, when he adopts T.E. Lawrence’s view as expressed in his Seven Pillars of Wisdom, for the purpose. This is: Arabia should be left at leisure to fight out its own fatal destiny".¹¹

In the Introduction of the 1966 edition of "Arabia and the Isles, he was actually to express, though somewhat late to have any great effect on the course of British policy in the region, that: The Hadhramaut is not and never has been part of the natural hinterland of Aden nor indeed are Aden and its hinterland ‘absolutely complementary’ in the sense that (Sir Charles) Johnston (Governor of Aden 1962–64) means. Ingrams further adds to this, that: Aden never had to be merged with the hinterland ... Moreover, the distinction ‘between Eastern and Western (Aden) Protectorates’ was not merely an artificial one ‘of an administrative type’; the Hadhramaut was physically always a separate geographic province from al-Yemen (Ingrams here means the Western Aden Protectorate as well) and since history is always governed by geography, it developed into a separate one historically too."¹²

For example, he was to seriously advise the South Arabian Federation’s able and erudite Foreign Minister Muhammad Fareed al-‘Aulaqi in the same vein and at least on two separate occasions after inviting him to meals. This had been greatly to the latter’s surprise and chagrin, as he was to inform this Commentator. To this, he was also to add that Ingrams had stressed to him in all sincerity, that he and his people ought to go back to their old ways of tending flocks which they understood best and found happiness in, instead of adopting the course towards modernisation. As this exercise was repeated on more than one occasion, it was to test even his gifts as a silent and good listener to breaking point, particularly as he viewed himself as a shining product of this process of transformation, having topped for example, all the written exams at the Military and Administrative School, the "Madrasat Tahseen al-Wahdaat" in al-Mukalla and then attended an administrative course at Oxford as well.

Muhammad Fareed was probably unaware in this regard, that such a course had been recommended and tried out earlier by many 19th century thinkers, a number of them Russian and one of whom was Count Leo Tolstoy. Later on, the great Indian Mahatma Gandhi himself was to call his first experimental commune in South Africa "Tolstoy Farm" after that renowned Russian aristocrat, before he had moved on to India. Zemliya y Volya was another major Russian 19th century thinkers’ movement in this vein and there were others elsewhere.

This lack of focus on Hadhramaut on the part of Jonathan Walker and others before him can perhaps best be explained by the fact that Hadhramaut during this troubled period in question between 1962 and 1967 was not a major theatre of operations in any manner of speaking, either for the British forces, or for that matter their opponents, if one at all. Hadhramaut had almost been incident-free throughout this critical period, save for the murders of the two British officers, Colonel Pat Gray and Major David Eales, both of the regional British force, the almost three battalion strong Hadhrami Beduin Legion (HBL). These two incidents, however, had been accepted after very through investigations by the British authorities with the involvement of Scotland Yard, as pure individual crimes of passion with completely personal, non-political motives.

For example, Brigadier James Lunt, who had commanded the Aden Protectorate Levies (APL) later on the Federal Regular Army (FRA) between 1961 and 1964, writes in his book "Imperial Sunset on the basis of information confirmed by the last British Agent and Resident Adviser in al-Mukalla, Jim Ellis, that Major David Eales had had occasion to punish a soldier ... on some petty crime and it was generally considered that the fine imposed was out of proportion to the offence. He had in fact ‘blackened the offender’s face’, and one night the soldier entered the tent while Eales was asleep and shot him dead in the head."

Concerning the allegations involving HBL Commandant Colonel Pat Gray’s murder in July 1966, which was claimed as a victory by Egypt and its henchmen’s propaganda, as had been the earlier incident, Jim Ellis was to state: There was no truth in this... He was to explain further that: There was nothing ‘political’ about Gray’s murder. The ordinary soldiers of the HBL, almost all Bedouin tribesmen, were little interested in events taking place as far afield as Aden.¹³ This statement by Ellis also illustrates how the average Hadhrami generally viewed political developments beyond Hadhramaut. However, this then gives rise to another very serious question, which is, how to explain the sudden collapse of this whole region politically and militarily to unknown elements, almost without the firing of a shot! It is in addressing this aspect that books by authors like Jonathan Walker, who have written so far on this subject and all of whom happen to be British are found wanting, basing as they do their accounts almost entirely on British sources.

In any case, going back some four decades in time, it is interesting to note that, even as early as 1926, the financial burden of laying claims to this vast area had already caused the London Government to seriously consider abandoning their claim to all but the immediate hinterland around Aden.¹⁴

Basically, Britain was not willing to spend money on a region which was not financially viable and for which she was not strictly speaking administratively responsible due to the nature of the political arrangements as defined in the treaties. However, this was hardly to spare the rulers from being labelled her lackeys and stooges as time progressed and the theme of nationalism fanned by propaganda began to take roots in people’s emotions, regardless of the facts and the realities of the situation.

He also stresses that, it was the rapid development of air power and the consequent realisation in Whitehall that the functions required for exercising control over the region could be effectively executed from the air and at a fraction of the cost of ground operations, which was to bring about a change of heart in the British corridors of power about adopting the formerly proposed decision to limit their claim solely to Aden and its immediate hinterland.¹⁵

Nevertheless, as this choice, even if in part, was to require the support of sound ground intelligence and the development of some basic infrastructure in relevant areas, if only to make the successful exercise of this control possible, the policy of greater involvement in the affairs of the hinterland was to be adopted.¹⁶ It was then to receive further encouragement following the region’s transfer from the jurisdiction of the Bombay Presidency and the British Indian Empire to the Colonial Office in London in 1937.

In keeping with the requirements of the purpose in hand, local units had to be formed involving small numbers for such functions as guard duties and in order to support the writ of the locally based regional political officer on the ground. For example, it was in this vein that the Hadhrami Beduin Legion (HBL) was originally raised. Initially a Company or so in strength and patterned on the Desert Patrol of the Arab Legion of Jordan, it was neither intended to, nor did in actuality replace the local State forces in the performance of their regular duties despite the multiplication of its units four-fold, and then to double and treble that strength later towards the end of the British presence in the region. This was officially to be the case till the very end. It did, however, act in the support of the State forces when called upon to do so and its role was also to evolve soon enough with the additions in its strength to policing till the very end the international boundaries, which were with the Yemen, Sa‘udi Arabia and ‘Oman.

At the time, this was seen as welcome relief by the State, as it enabled the reallocation of resources saved on this count towards other important requirements. Walker, for example, mentions that the HBL drew its recruits from the most influential families of the Hadhrmaut region.¹⁷ This was not so. Concerning this matter and the Force’s birth, it may be said that its founder Harold Ingrams, the very first Resident Adviser and British Political Agent in al-Mukalla had proposed as late as 1941 to raise a unit recruited only from Beduins, preferably the more distant tribes, and it was not only to be a tribal police force of sorts, but a means of spreading education, medical help and above all, to develop a sense of trust between the very different and often antagonistic sections of Hadhramaut society. Its initial strength had been fifty men and its equipment a dozen camels, two lorries and a wireless set; but by 1944, it was almost to grow in size to a battalion.¹⁸

Over two decades later, its size, as stated earlier, was to be doubled and then trebled just before independence, enabling it to attain parity in numerical strength with the Qu‘aiti State’s Armed Forces, with its pay scales raised to match those of the Federal Forces, the best paid in the Middle East after oil-rich Kuwait.

This creation, which was to be a mixture of Glubb’s ideas and the Boy Scouts in Ingrams’ words, was also made to repeat a daily oath of loyalty to the King (later on the Queen), the Hadhrami Sultans, their own superiors, to each other and then to a series of model virtues. However, even with the best of intentions, how all this could be expected to be understood, digested and followed by a meagre number of these poor, uneducated recruits, other than serving to remove some of the mistrust amongst them concerning British intentions towards their kin, even with a fair stretch of the imagination, would be beyond most.

It was basically an opportunity for employment and earning that was to draw these men to this Force’s ranks. One of the major benefits of this recruitment was that, the families or clans of those men selected would henceforth act in a friendly fashion towards their kinsman’s pay-masters in order to support him in accordance with those well-known principles, which anthropologists or social scientists would refer to as "al-‘Asabiyyah (tribal or group loyalty). This was a theme which that great father of modern sociology and historiography of Hadhrami origin, ‘Abdul-Rahman Ibn Khaldun (1332 – 1406) was to elaborate on in Al-Muqaddimah – (the Prolegomena" of his mostly lost work on the history of the world). Arnold Toynbee for example refers to it in a review in the British daily, "The Observer as the most comprehensive and illuminating analysis of how human affairs work that has been made anywhere."¹⁹

Jonathan Walker in his second chapter delves on the subject of Federation, which is well argued and presented, as is the dilemma of young political officers, fresh with Oxbridge degrees, who would be sent out by the Colonial Office with some preparatory training in Arabic, to do their best in defence of British imperial interests in one of the oldest and most complex societies and in one of the most inhospitable regions in the world, whose intricate system of co-existence, based on principles of checks and balances, had been honed and polished by long centuries of internecine strife. That they actually managed to survive, often do well and endear themselves despite all the handicaps to the people amidst whom they were to serve and where a much deeper understanding of the issues involved would have been called for, speaks volumes for their character and mettle.

It certainly ought to come as a shock, at least to the uninitiated, that if the local rulers trusted the policies and sincerity of the British Government deep down, then it was mostly due to their trust and faith in these officials who represented it and with whom they inter-faced. They would often develop intimate, personal relationships with these officers after a while, and the officers too, while loyal to their own Government, were also sincerely committed to the interests of their charges.

However, it would have been the height of blind arrogance and ignorance for any of these officers to assume that they understood the workings of such a totally