Possible Peace, Unending War? Post-Agreement and Peacebuilding in Colombia

By A.H.J. (Bert) Helmsing, Katerina Siira, Darío Fajardo Montaña and 7 more

After more than 50 years of internal armed conflict in Colombia, finally on November 24, 2016, a final Peace Agreement was reached with the world's oldest guerrillas, the FARC-EP. How is the process of implementation of the Final Agreement and the construction of a lasting peace going? How might we understand the Colombian case? What do international lessons say about rebuilding post-conflict societies? How do more than 50 years of war impact a society and its hopes for reconciliation? Is a comprehensive transition, the reincorporation of former combatants and the construction of conditions for development in the territories really achievable? What are the challenges that the country faces in the construction of peace, understood as a medium and long-term process? In this sense, how has Colombia transitioned from peacemaking to peacebuilding in the post-agreement period? How might we assess the progress and existing challenges in each of the agreed areas of the peace agreement? In response to these questions, this book contains the contributions of different experts and researchers from institutions such as the Institute of Social Studies of the University of Rotterdam, the Center for Research and Popular Education (CINEP) of Colombia and the New York University Peace Research and Education Program.

This book is structured by proposing four thematic lines: rural development with a territorial approach and comprehensive rural reform; political participation and end of the conflict; victims, truth, justice, reparations and non-repetition; and cross-cutting peacebuilding issues. In a transversal way, it places special emphasis on the analysis of the territory, as the sustenance of the agreed peace. As a whole, the chapters address the complexity of the Peace Agreement as an integral opportunity for peacebuilding in the country. Their recommendations, based on the specialized literature and the critical analysis of the process to date, offer clues to be considered in order to make its results more profound and effective.

• Language: English
• Publisher: NYU Peace Research and Education Program
• Release date: Oct 27, 2021
• ISBN: 9780578942070

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POSSIBLE PEACE, UNENDING WAR?

Post-Agreement and Peacebuilding in Colombia

EDITORS:

Claudia M. Moreno Ojeda

A.H.J. (Bert) Helmsing

POSSIBLE PEACE, UNENDING WAR?

Post-Agreement and Peacebuilding in Colombia

Editors:

Claudia M. Moreno Ojeda

A.H.J. (Bert) Helmsing

© Claudia M. Moreno Ojeda y A.H.J. (Bert) Helmsing (editors)

© New York University Peace Research and Education Program 2021

ISBN 978-0-578-94207-0

Cover design Mary Pili Moreno. Photograph courtesy of Jennifer Rueda-CINEP.

Desarrollo ePub: Lápiz Blanco S.A.S.

Acronyms

Table of contents

FOREWORD: TAKING STOCK

Rafael Pardo Rueda

1. PRESENTATION: RAISING THE ISSUES

Claudia M. Moreno Ojeda & A.H.J. (Bert) Helmsing

2. PEACE IS MADE IN THE REGIONS: TERRITORIAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT IN COLOMBIA

Claudia M. Moreno Ojeda & A.H.J. (Bert) Helmsing

3. AGRARIAN ISSUES AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT

Darío Fajardo Montaña

4. IMPOSSIBLE DEMOCRATIZATION? A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE COLOMBIAN PEACE AGREEMENT

Víctor Barrera

5. THE ELN IN THE ARMED TERRITORIAL RECONFIGURATIONS IN TIMES OF POST-AGREEMENT

Andrés Aponte González

6. COLOMBIA: ANTECEDENTS AND DEMANDS FOR TRUTH, JUSTICE, REPARATION AND NON-REPETITION

Álvaro Villarraga Sarmiento

7. THE ROLE OF CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION EDUCATION IN BUILDING COMMUNITY-LED PEACE: THE CASE OF RESURPAZ

Rosalie Fransen, Thomas Hill, Katerina Siira

8. THE TRANSITION BETWEEN IMPERFECT PEACE AND PEACE WITH LEGALITY: A CRISIS OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF SOCIETY?

Fernán E. González

Foreword: Taking Stock

Rafael Pardo Rueda

¹

To write about the Final Peace Accord at this moment in time has advantages and disadvantages. It has advantages because more than three and a half years have passed since the signing of the agreement, which is a little more than one third of the period allocated to post-conflict measures. It has disadvantages in the sense that the current government has been hostile, to say the least, and has concealed aspects of the peace process.

There are many examples of resistance to the Peace Accord, starting with the objections to it and followed by the systematic underfunding of the programmes for its implementation.

The narrative of half of the country is that the referendum was lost, the presidential election was won by the ‘Uribismo’ and therefore they have the right to change the peace accord as they see fit. And the narrative of the other half is that after the referendum the accord was revised, something which this half does not recognize.

What is clear is that during the government of Juan Manuel Santos, 62 norms necessary for the implementation of the Final Agreement were expedited, and during the government of Ivan Duque only three, that is: the statuary law of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (Spanish acronym JEP), the change in the assignment of the Agency for the Renovation of the Territory, and the regulation of the Multipurpose Cadastre. Of the 107 norms which are indispensable to comply with the Final Agreement, 40 percent are still pending.

Let us start with compliance with the agrarian agreement, the economic and social measures and the substitution of crops. Document 21 of the Centro de Pensamiento y Diálogo stated: The thesis of underfunding and the pretence of implementation of the Peace Accord continues to be supported by evidence that, in addition to demonstrating the lack of interest of the governments in complying entirely with what was agreed, demonstrates that the agreement is subjected to their priorities and specific agendas. To demonstrate this for the case of the Integral Rural Reform [Spanish acronym – RRI] is a test for the Agreement as a whole since it has been indicated that the Integral Rural Reform absorbs 84.4 percent of the resources destined for its implementation.

The agrarian issue in the Peace Accord is controversial. The opposition argues that it is underfunded, as is the entire Accord. President Duque, for his part, announced that he would transfer one million hectares. One would have to see from where these hectares come and what characteristics these one million hectares will have. If the government executes this it will achieve half of the Accord in so far as it concerns land with title.

According to the most recent report En que va la Paz (What about Peace?) by the congressmen of the Peace Commission of Congress, the figures for implementation are very poor. In order to reduce rural poverty by 50 percent, one would have to execute 16 sectoral plans, but only five have been completed. The status of the remaining 11 are as follows:

Plan for the Massive Formalization of Rural Property – Pending

Environmental Zoning Plan – Pending

National Irrigation and Drainage Plan for the Family and Community Peasant Economy – Pending

National Rural Health Plan – In process

Special Rural Education Plan – Pending

National Plan for Potable Water Supply and Basic Rural Sanitation – In process

National Integral Plan for Technical Assistance, Technology and Research Impulse – Pending

Plan to Support and Consolidate the Generation of Income of the Family and Agriculture-based Peasant Economy – Pending

National Plan to Promote the Solidarity Economy and Rural Cooperative – Pending

Progressive Plan for Social Protection of Guarantees of Rights of Rural Male and Female Workers – In process

System to Guarantee the Progressive Right to Food – Pending

Almost all are pending.

What is relatively advanced are the Territorial Development Plans (PDETs to use the Spanish acronym) which cover 170 of the poorest municipalities. The government has boasted that it only found two development plans in these 16 PDETs. For sure. But the government has hidden the fact that these 16 development plans of the PDETs did exist and only lacked completion. These had already resulted in almost 200,000 consultations with communities of these regions. Independent of this, one can say that the PDETs have advanced a lot.

As far as the substitution of crops (PNIS) is concerned, the figures and results are mixed. It began in 2018, so we have 18 or 19 months of implementation to assess. Effectively some 40,000 hectares have been substituted in 15 departments and 55 municipalities where 70 percent of the coca of Colombia is concentrated. A report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) shows that there has been an achievement rate of 92 percent. This means that someone agrees to substitute and effectively takes out the coca, and does not sow the crop again. After various ups and downs, the government decided in its initial rhetoric to include a maximum of 100,000 families in the payment for substitution – probably in order to avoid a peasant uprising. The government has insisted that this component is underfunded, that there were only 310,000 million Col pesos and that the entire PNIS program would cost 3,200,000 million Col pesos. But the government did not say that the program was designed to last for multiple years.

In the Medium-term Fiscal framework of 2018 and in accordance with what has been defined in the Framework Implementation Plan, resources were stipulated for the implementation of the Peace Accord: 129.5 thousand million Col pesos for the coming 15 years. Of this total, 85.4 percent was destined for the Integral Rural Reform (110.6 thousand million) and 6.1 percent (8.3 thousand million) for the Solution of the Theme of Illicit Drugs.

In the previous context and in relation to PNIS the Santos government added in June 2017 (Decree Law 896) a budget for that year of 310,000 million Col pesos and included in the 2018 budget 700,000 Col pesos for this item. These are all ordinary resources from the national budget. For the fiscal year 2019, resources with a value of 1,332,000 million Col pesos were budgeted in the Fund Colombia in Peace for the PNIS, the figures reserved in the proposed budget of 2019. Herewith corrected that there is no underfunding.

The most controversial is the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP). Criticism has rained down from all sides. Let us review recent cases. The cases of Alvaro Ashton, now free, and Musa Besaile, tried by the JEP for only one of the presumed crimes, but one of the worst crimes committed against the justice administration – the bribing of the High Court, known as the ‘Gown Cartel’, to cover up links with paramilitarism. The case of Jesus Armando Arias Cabrales, condemned for forced disappearances, who gained his freedom. The most anticipated case of the FARC which ended up accepting kidnapping as retention and dismissing the more than 20,000 kidnappings which they committed during the development of the conflict… The letter of Ingrid Betancourt to the transitional tribunal is clear in this regard.

The JEP has a challenge to recover its legitimacy in the period that it remains in force, if it is not to convert itself into a laundering service for sentences.

What has worked well is reincorporation (of ex-combatants). Numerous collective and individual productive projects have been developed.

The words of José (Pepe) Mujica, referring to the Colombian peace process in a recent panel of the Grupo del Pueblo, No, eventually it is a failure for Colombia, it is a failure for entire humanity seem to me too pessimistic. Pepe Mujica and Felipe Gonzalez were international inspectors of the Peace Accord, and they knew that it would not be easy.

Looking back, it was not appropriate to use the maxim nothing is agreed until all has been agreed. If we could have succeeded in agreeing and implementing one plan at a time, we would have advanced more quickly on important issues for the territories such as the Integral Rural Reform, just to give one example. And early implementation would have shown a government that was a friend of peace and an advocate of reconciliation.

It is worthwhile to take stock and reflect critically. This volume, coordinated by Claudia M. Moreno-Ojeda, Bert Helmsing and Dario Fajardo, does this from distinct angles. I would like to emphasize two main contributions. First is the concern for the medium and long term. That is at the basis of the concept of the construction of peace. No peace is possible without this effort and work. But it implies also not neglecting the short term. Second, how it approaches complexity – the different aspects of the process and the form in which these interact in the territory. That is the challenge which we have as a country.

That Colombia does not forget its task in the construction of peace.

Rafael Pardo Rueda

Notes

¹ Rafael Pardo Rueda has served, amongst others, as Minister of Labour and as Minister of National Defence, and was elected Senator of Colombia. He has been a senior presidential advisor of post-conflict, human rights and security.

1

Presentation: Raising the Issues

Claudia M. Moreno Ojeda* & A.H.J. (Bert) Helmsing

†

After more than 50 years of internal armed conflict in Colombia, on November 24, 2016, a peace agreement was finally reached with the world’s oldest guerrilla group, the FARC–EP (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas – Ejército del Pueblo (FARC–People’s Army). After a long negotiation, a pact was proposed and accepted – a political alternative to war. It was recognized that there were neither victors nor vanquished, that an in-depth reconstruction would be required for reconciliation, for the inclusion of large rural territories and the sustainable construction of peace. The United Nations and the guarantor countries (Cuba and Norway) supported the negotiation efforts and the resulting agreement. However, after its signature, a plebiscite was held and, with a very narrow margin, the peace agreement was rejected.

The divided country then submitted to a revision of the accords and eventually, with the support of Congress, a final peace agreement (PA) was adopted. Compared to peace negotiation processes around the world, this agreement has been internationally recognized as one of the most complete, placing the victims at the center, proposing transitional justice and democratic opening, and focusing on comprehensive rural reform, especially for the territories which were previously dominated by the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)). The Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the Colombian people and the country’s president, Juan Manuel Santos. Despite this, Santos’s elected successor, President Iván Duque, and his government declared itself critical of the PA and announced modifications to it. Nevertheless, the PA is not only an existing agreement, with international recognition, but it is a concrete and ongoing political reality.

How to advance the process of implementation of the final agreement and the construction of a lasting peace? How to understand the Colombian case? What can one learn from international experiences of rebuilding post-conflict societies? How do more than 50 years of war impact on society and its hopes for reconciliation? Is a comprehensive transition to peace –, a reincorporation of former combatants and the construction of conditions for development in the territories – really achievable? What are the challenges that the country faces in the construction of peace, understood as a medium- and long-term process? In this sense, how has it gone from peacemaking to peacebuilding in this period? How can we best assess the progress and existing challenges in each of the agreed areas of the peace agreement?

This book seeks answers to these questions and contains the contributions of different experts and researchers from Colombia and beyond, from renowned institutions such as the Center for Popular Research and Education (CINEP) of Colombia, the International Institute of Social Studies of the Erasmus University of Rotterdam and the Peace Studies Program of the University of New York. The book is structured along four thematic lines:

i) Rural development with a territorial approach and comprehensive rural reform

ii) Social and political participation and the end of the conflict

iii) Victims, truth, justice, reparation and non-repetition

iv) Cross-cutting views on the construction of peace.

The first theme, rural development with a territorial approach and comprehensive rural reform, consists of two chapters. The first, "‘Peace is Made in the Regions’: Territorial Economic Development and the Implementation of the Peace Accord in Colombia’, by Claudia M. Moreno Ojeda and Bert Helmsing, addresses the challenges of territorial development from the perspective of economic regeneration as a basis for sustainable peace. To do this, the authors adopt a critical approach to examine the key issues that must be considered in the process, the implications that the context of generalized violence has for the territories and their marginalized, informalized and criminalized local economies, and, against this background, the challenges and projects required, especially in the territories prioritized for the implementation of the agreement.

The second chapter on this theme is the contribution of Darío Fajardo Montaña entitled Agrarian Issues and the Implementation of the Peace Agreement. He makes an historical review of the agrarian problem, of access to and use of land as the central axis of the agreed comprehensive rural reform, and the connections of this problem with poverty and rural exclusion, as well as with the economy of drug trafficking, to finally present a balance of the advances and persistent challenges.

Issues around social and political participation, contemplated in the agreement with a view to democratization, as well as an analysis of other armed actors in the territory, especially the ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – National Liberation Army), are developed in the second thematic strand. In his contribution entitled Impossible Democratization? A Political Perspective of the Colombian Peace Agreement, Víctor Barrera makes an assessment of each of the measures covered in the peace agreement and their progress, in the light of the institutional elements that have played a role in the process and the characteristics of the political positions that have, over the intervening years, determined the progress of realizing those commitments.

The other contribution in this strand focuses on the fact that the transition of the FARC–EP from war to politics and policies has opened a space for strengthening the role of the ELN guerrilla organization in general, and in the territories left by the FARC in particular. In his contribution entitled The ELN in the armed territorial reconfigurations in times of post-agreement, 2010-19, Andrés Aponte presents an analysis of the different characteristics of this guerrilla grouping in each of the main territories it controls – characteristics that should guide a possible negotiating process and that draw attention to one of the greatest challenges to Colombia’s post-agreement security and peace.

The third theme is related to one of the most notable characteristics of the PA: the recognition of the victims and the development of a system of truth, justice, reparation and non-repetition. Here, Álvaro Villarraga, in his contribution Colombia: Antecedents and Demands for Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition, addresses the constitutive elements of the system, progress made and critical aspects from the sociological and legal institutional perspective.

The fourth thematic strand covers cross-cutting issues which must be considered if peacebuilding is to succeed. From the perspective of peace education, Rosalie Fransen, Thomas Hill and Katerina Siira apply the concept of Conflict Transformation Education (CTE) to a case in Algeciras Huila, in their contribution entitled The Role of Conflict Transformation Education in Building Community-led Peace: The Case of RESURPAZ (Region Sur Paz). Their analysis explores the characteristics of the CTE process that motivate reconciliation and conflict transformation through education, as a means to achieve sustainable peace.

Finally, in his chapter The Transition between ‘Imperfect Peace’ and ‘Peace with Legality’: A Crisis of Political Representation in Society?, Fernán E. González offers a balance sheet of the political processes involved in the PA, and of the power relations that explain the degree of progress of implementation to date, evidencing the persistence of the crisis of political representation and social discontent, exacerbated in the past year by the context of the global pandemic.

Taken as a whole, these chapters address the complexity of the peace agreement as an integral opportunity for peacebuilding in Colombia. Their recommendations, based on the specialized literature and a critical analysis of the advances made so far in the implementation process, provide clues to be considered if the results of the peace agreement are to be more profound and more effective. We trust that readers will find these elements useful in thinking further about the construction of peace in Colombia, because – as articulated by the President of the Truth Commission, Francisco De Roux, in the United Nations Security Council – the people do not give up on the peace, once they have tasted the enthusiasm of living outside of terror.

Claudia M. Moreno Ojeda

Bert Helmsing

Notes

* Claudia M. Moreno Ojeda has more than 20 years’ experience in rural and territorial development, international cooperation and development projects with a gender and differential focus. She has been consultant to the United Nations in Spain, Central America and Colombia, and Deputy Director Academic Affairs and Dean of Research of the National School of Public Administration of Colombia. She holds a Master’s degree in Development and International Aid of Complutense University of Madrid, Spain, and a Postgraduate Diploma in Management of Externado University of Colombia. She is anthropologist of National University of Colombia and has a Doctorandus degree in Public Administration. E-mail: [e-mail].

† Bert Helmsing is Emeritus Professor, International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands. He obtained his doctoral degree in economics cum laude at the Catholic University Tilburg (1985), and also holds a Master’s degree in Social Sciences (ISS, 1975), a Postgraduate Diploma in Regional Development Planning (ISS, 1974) and a Doctorandus degree in Economics specializing in (Public Finance and Development Economics) (Catholic University Tilburg, 1973). He has more than 40 years’ experience in regional development studies in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa and has worked in Colombia since 1976. E-Mail: [e-mail].

2

Peace is Made in the Regions: Territorial Economic Development and the Implementation of the Peace Agreement in Colombia

Claudia M. Moreno Ojeda* & A.H.J. (Bert) Helmsing†

Abstract

Societies entering a post-conflict era aim at economic regeneration. This calls for a perspective that goes beyond reconstruction based on repairing physical infrastructure and restoring services. What is needed is an integrated vision of economic development in a territory, guaranteeing sustainable peace by providing conditions for the well-being and the social and economic inclusion of inhabitants previously affected by conflict. In this chapter, we examine what violent conflict does to economic development, tracing the way that it fragments, informalizes and criminalizes the local economy. Subsequently we critically examine three tracks in the regeneration process: stabilization of incomes and emergency employment; local economic recovery; and the building of post-conflict institutions. These three tracks go hand in hand in the short, medium and long term to create a multidimensional framework of action for local economic development in the designated territory. The second part of the chapter focuses on the Colombian Peace Accord, one of the key elements of which is the promotion of rural development with a territorial focus in regions most seriously affected by war. Based on the framework set out in the first part, we examine the main commitments of the Peace Accord and look at their implementation record between 2016 and 2019. This enables us to identify the critical issues and challenges that the country faces in achieving the much-needed local economic regeneration of these conflict regions.

Keywords: local economic development, post-conflict, economic regeneration, rural development with a territorial focus, territorial development with a gender focus, gender and local development, development of institutional capacities, institutional change, sustainability of peace

Introduction

This chapter has two purposes. The first is to present a general overview of literature on economic regeneration of areas that have been affected by armed conflict and to arrive at a basic analytical framework. The second is to use that framework to reflect on the Colombian reality of economic regeneration in the context of the implementation of the Peace Agreement (PA) in the war-affected areas previously dominated by the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas – Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia).

We begin by examining literature that looks at how the economic structure of the conflict-affected regions evolved prior to the process of peace and regeneration. In order to discuss elements of an economic regeneration program it is important to have a good appreciation of how and why local economies became fragmented and crumbled as a result of the violence. There can be no simple return to a situation prior to the conflict. After this we look at the process of economic regeneration. Here we will draw on the framework formulated by the United Nations (UN, 2009) but will add critical elements based on our analysis. On that basis we propose an inventory of distinct elements that could form part of an integrated economic regeneration program and we identify the challenges that these imply. This inventory comprises three strands: stabilization, recuperation and institutional capacity development.

Having set out our framework we then examine the relevant contents of the Colombian Peace Accord and the first three years of its implementation in the prioritized regions and localities.¹ The chapter will end with some general reflections on how peace can be created in post-conflict regions.

Economic Development in Conflict-affected Regions: An Overview

The economic environment in conflict-affected regions is typically fragile. Armed conflicts have harmful impacts on the local economy as a result of the destruction of institutions, norms, and formal and informal rules. These areas are characterized by a poor population with limited access to public services which have been partially or totally destroyed by the conflict. Frequently the poor population depends on non-governmental organizations for social and economic services and relief aid (Forero-Pineda, 2014).

If armed conflicts are prolonged, local economic conditions change in ways that are not easily reversible. Armed conflicts interrupt and destroy existing local markets; local industries and the local area itself lose competitiveness and it is difficult to reassert a strong position in external markets. The local demand for local products and services declines as the purchasing power of the population falls due to loss of economic activity and employment. This also increases the tendency of local populations to seek humanitarian assistance and/or to migrate out of the area and towards large cities, thus also affecting the size of the local population. The principal concern becomes survival and the economic competencies of migrants (usually agricultural or agro-industrial) become irrelevant as they cannot exercise these competencies either in the big cities or in refugee camps.

According to UN (2009), remaining consumers in conflict areas tend to be more concerned about price than quality. This undermines the imperative of product differentiation and maintaining standards and quality norms, which leads in turn to weakened access to high-quality markets. As quality standards decline, price competition requires physical inspection which raises transaction costs and opens up spaces for opportunistic behavior. Markets in conflict areas become thin (Ohiorhenuan and Stewart, 2008). That is to say, the volume of transactions becomes very small, which implies higher marketing costs per unit of product and a lower capacity to supply by individual suppliers. In such markets there is more uncertainty about supply and about the price at which that supply is available; there is less information available and suppliers are less likely to provide support or credit. The loss of certification standards implies loss of traceability and hence reduced opportunities to add value in complex value chains (ibid.).

Prior to conflict, a region would normally have a particular export base, often in agriculture, agro-industry or sometimes in mining or industry. This export staple can form part of concentrated upstream or downstream segments of a value chain. The conflict and its direct destructive effects on infrastructure (energy, transport and communications) make it difficult for such an export chain to maintain competitiveness in external markets. Export output of staples declines and this in turn sets in motion negative multiplier effects in related and supporting activities, as well as negative income multiplier effects in non-basic local economic activities. Such direct and indirect negative multiplier income and employment effects may be larger for more sophisticated chains than for shorter and more elementary chains.

Armed conflict changes the economic structure and character of the regional economy. Private formal activity disappears as does formal employment. Small-scale commerce, agriculture and personal services become more informal activities. If the formal private sector and government cease to operate in the area, then the associated formal institutions also disappear. Informal and illegal activities emerge in their place, such as smuggling and pillaging of natural resources (MacSweeney and Tanburn, 2008). Informalization is followed by criminalization.

The