Battles of Texas

By Joseph P. Regan LTC USAR

My book is an anthology of battles fought in Texas from the year 1758 to 1874. This manuscript is directed at readers who have an interest in Texas or military history. I chose those battles I believed had the most dramatic impact on the course of Texas History. As a military historian, I focused on critical decisions by individual commanders. As much as possible, I tried to use the Battle Analysis System developed by the US Army Command and General Staff College to look at all aspects of a military engagement (strategy, leadership, weather and terrain, etc.) and how these influenced the battle.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Xlibris US
• Release date: Nov 16, 2017
• ISBN: 9781543444575

Book preview

Copyright © 2017 by Joseph P. Regan LTC, USAR (ret).

Library of Congress Control Number:   2017912533

ISBN:      Hardcover      978-1-5434-4455-1

      Softcover      978-1-5434-4456-8

      eBook         978-1-5434-4457-5

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the copyright owner.

Rev. date: 11/16/2017

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Contents

Acknowledgement

Introduction

Chapter 1   Battle of Spanish Fort – October 1759

Chapter 2   Battles of the First Texas War for Independence – 1813

Chapter 3   The Alamo – 23 February – 6 March 1836

Chapter 4   The Battle of San Jacinto – 21 April 1836

Chapter 5   Battle of the Neches River – July 15 & 16 1839

Chapter 6   The Council House Fight and Plum Creek – March 19 and 12 August 1840

Chapter 7   The Battle of Salado Creek and the Dawson Massacre –18 September 1842

Chapter 8   The Battles of Palo Alto and Resaca De La Palma – 8 and 9 May 1846

Chapter 9   The Battle of Galveston – 1 January 1863

Chapter 10   The Battle of Sabine Pass – 8 September 1863

Chapter 11   Battle of Adobe Walls I – 25 November, 1864

Chapter 12   Battles of the Red River War – 1874

Bibliography

There is nothing new in the World Except the History you do not know

Harry S. Truman

This book is dedicated to

Lionel V. Patenaude

And

Robert H. Thonhoff

Two gentlemen and scholars which Texas can be proud of

Acknowledgement

I would like to acknowledge the assistance of many fine scholars and experts in helping me put together this work. First, I would like to thank Dan Arellano for his help in touring the Medina Battlefield and Robert Thonhoff for his review of my text on that battle. I would like to thank Dr. Winders the curator of the Alamo for his input and Dr. Steve Hardin, Professor of History at Victoria College, for his review of my chapter of the Battle of San Jacinto. I would like to thank Donaly Brice for his tour of the Plum Creek Battlefield and his insights on that Battle. I would like to thank Wayne Austerman, the Historian of the Army Medical Department Center and School at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, for his assistance with the Battle of Salado Creek and the Dawson Massacre. I wish to thank the personnel of the US Park Service at the Palo Alto Battlefield for the time they spent touring the Battlefield with me. Thanks go to the staff of the Daughters of Texas Library in San Antonio for their help in research. I wish to thank Dr. Edward Cotham for his advice on the Battles of Sabine Crossing and Galveston. My special thanks, goes to Dr. Cotham for permission to use the drawings from his two works on the critical Civil War battles of Galveston and Sabine Crossing in Texas. Special thanks to the staff of the Panhandle Plains Museum for their assistance in the finding source material for the Battles of Adobe Walls One and Two, as well as the other battles of the Red River War. Special thanks go to close friends such as Edwin E. Loving, CMSGT, USAF (Ret.), Colonel James Van Straten USA (Ret.), Colonel William Beverly USA (Ret.) and CW3 Rod Dotson USAR (Ret.) and for reviewing specific chapters and providing comments.

Special thanks also to Mrs. Barbara Morse for her proofreading of the manuscript illustrations.

Introduction

While many of Texas battles and conflicts have been the subject of historical works, novels and films, (the Alamo, being the most celebrated), many have escaped notice. Sometimes both books and films do not answer key questions. What impact did the first Texas war of independence in 1813 have on laying the grounds for the 1835 rebellion? (More Tejanos and Anglos died in the Battle of Medina than would die at the Alamo, Goliad or San Jacinto.)

Why did Santa Anna and William Barrett Travis decide to fight at the Alamo? Was San Jacinto in 1836 really the last battle of the Texas War for Independence, or did it take place in 1842 in San Antonio? What Texas battle did Jefferson Davis call the Confederate Thermopylae? What battle involving Kit Carson, almost became the Little Big Horn of the Southern Plains? Why was the Second Battle of Palo Duro Canyon a disaster for the Comanche nation when only three warriors were killed? These are the issues I wanted my readers to discover in this study of the battles of Texas.

Texas has been a cockpit of struggle between peoples and empires for much of its history, despite the fact that the term Tejas, used to describe the original Amerindian inhabitants of the land means friendly. What is interesting about the conflicts that Texas has witnessed is the variety of combatants that fought here. Spanish presidials fought the Plains Indians. Texas revolutionaries fought Mexican nationalists. Later on this struggle grew into conflict between the United States Army and Mexican regulars to decide to which nation Texas would belong. For a brief period of time, Americans fought Americans over the question of slavery and states, rights. Finally, the long, epic conflict between the White and the Red men would reach its unavoidable conclusion in the 1870s.

As a military historian I was fascinated by the decisions made by individual commanders and how they were influenced by terrain, weather, time and the forces available to each side. While readers of Texas history are all familiar with William Barret Travis, Jim Bowie and Santa Anna, equally fascinating personages such as Quanah Parker, Ranald Mackenzie, Nelson Miles, and, John Bankhead Magruder, are fascinating individuals who need to be studied by the serious military historian. In writing this book, I sought to follow as closely as possible the Battle Analysis System devised by the U.S. Army War College in Leavenworth Kansas. The Battle analysis system acts as a guide to the historical writer to insure he looks at all the factors (politics, terrain, weather, etc,) that influence the dynamics and outcomes of battle. While some readers may criticize the book for spending too much time on analyzing the preliminaries before the battle, than on describing the actual combat, I feel that setting the stage and examining the factors which influence commanders and military forces, is a critical part of understanding the eventual outcome of any battle or campaign.

I could not hope to cover every battle, skirmish or ambush that took place in Texas, I did seek to pick those that were the best known or had the biggest impact. If some readers think I missed one that I should have covered I can only offer my regrets. I made my choices based on which battles I felt had the greatest impact and were the most interesting from the purview of a military historian.

Joseph P. Regan

San Antonio Texas, 2017

Battle of Spanish Fort –

October 1759

Battles that have a major impact on the course of Empires or history do not need to be large, involving hundreds of thousands with immense casualties on both sides. Sometimes a relatively small encounter can have a stark and long-lasting impact. Roughly one month after British and French forces clashed at the Battle of Quebec; an engagement that would decide the fate of French Canada, a brief battle at a Taovaya Indian stronghold on the Red River would mark the high water mark of the Spanish Empire’s fortunes in North America.

Spain had always looked at the area beyond the Rio Grande or Rio del Norte as a critical yet dangerous piece of territory. The Spanish were continually worried about French incursions into the area of present-day East Texas. In 1689, Don Alonso de Leon, the Governor of Coahuila, ordered a party of one hundred soldiers across the Rio Grande, under the command of Captain Alonso de Leon, to march on Fort Saint Louis, the pitiful stockade erected by Ferdinand La Salle’s shipwrecked adventurers on the Texas Coast. Don Alonso could have saved himself the trouble. La Salle had departed overland to French Louisiana in January of 1687, with as many men as he could that were not sick. He left the Fort, with its sickly men, women and children, under the command of Sieur Barbier. The local Karankawa Indians attacked the fort, killing the men and carrying off women and children. Thus, ended Louis XIV’s attempt to colonize Texas for France. Don Alonso burned the Fort and returned to Mexico.

In 1690, Don Alonso returned to Texas and erected a mission, in the pine-wooded Caddo country of East Texas near the Trinity River. Disease among prospective Indian converts ended this endeavor, and the Spanish returned to Mexico in 1692.

Despite the failure of La Salle’s expedition, the French never abandoned their claims to Texas. In 1716, at the behest of the French governor of Louisiana, Louis Jochereau St. Denis established four new mission forts, one at Nacogdoches, near Natchitoches on the Red River. Depending on how you look at him, St. Denis, a Quebecois, was either an outstanding diplomat or an adroit con-man. He charmed both French and Spanish officials into allowing him to set up a fairly profitable smuggling operation in East Texas. St. Denis set up a healthy trade relationship with the Caddoan Indian tribes in East Texas. Whatever side benefit Spanish officials might gather from St. Denis’s commercial activities, the Frenchman’s influence with the local Indian tribes could lead to trouble for New Spain.

A French presence in east Texas required some sort of response from the Spanish. In 1716, The Marquis De Valero, governor of New Spain, authorized the establishment of missions north of the Rio Grande, in Texas. In 1718, Franciscan friars established the Mission San Antonio De Valero (named after the Viceroy) one hundred fifty miles from Coahuila, near the headwaters of the San Antonio River. This would grow into the City of San Antonio.

Now the Spanish had a different view about exploring, colonizing, economic development and spreading influence among Native American tribes. Spanish missions were a system, initially of frontier expansion and defense. A group of friars along with some Christianized Indians, protected by some Spanish soldiers, would enter an area and establish a mission. Local Indian tribes would be contacted; exposed to the benefits of Spanish civilization and Christianity through the proselytizing efforts of the religious. In time, the local Indians would come into the mission, be taught European agriculture and manufacturing skills, be protected by the soldiers and incorporated into Spanish colonial society (albeit at the lowest level as a worker). Once the Indian tribes in the area were incorporated, or subdued, Spanish or Mestizo settlers would enter the area and establish farms or ranches. Missions were established and funded by the Spanish Throne. The missions, despite the good wishes and ideals of the religious orders that founded them, were instruments of expanding state power.

This effort by the Spanish, which basically involved incorporation of indigenous peoples into the Spanish system of political and cultural control, was directly opposite of the French. The French sought to extend influence by trade. Make the Indian your trading partner. Provide him the things he needed; firearms, metal tools, cloth, and win his good will. Your trading partner in peace was your ally in war. In the end, the French would win out in the battle for hearts and minds (or at least the commercial interest) of the Plains Indians. In the words of T.R. Fehrenbach:

"But at its inception it (the Spanish mission system) was a triumph of Ideology over reality. The Spanish ecclesiastics made assumptions that were false. It was a beautiful, humanitarian idea, designed to create a lovely, paternalistic Spanish-Indian culture, and it was an idea that never really died in Spanish Catholic hearts. But whatever, its eventual social faults, there was one thing wrong with it. In Texas the Spanish would come into contact with the types of Amerinds they never had to face before, and all their dreams and illusions about savage mankind-and the nature of civilizing European man-would fall to crashing ruin.¹

The major Amerind group that would shape the Spanish experience and dash their expansionist dreams in Texas was the Comanche.

spanish%20Missions%20in%20Texas4.jpg

Colonial Spain primary locations, San Antonio.

Roughly at the same time the Spanish were moving to enter Texas and counter French influence among the tribes of east Texas, another migration was taking place into the central and southern plains of what would become the United States. This migration would shape the political, military, and economic future of Texas possibly more than the Spanish incursions across the Rio Grande. In the words of historian, Pekka Hamalainen, the Comanche invasion of the southern plains would set off the bloodiest campaign of conquest the American west would ever see.²

The Comanche were an offshoot of the Shoshone Indian tribes, which for centuries had inhabited areas of the Great Basin and the Rocky Mountains. It is not known what drove the Shoshone offshoots to migrate into the Great Plains. It may have been caused by climate change, disease, or pressure from other tribes, but by the early seventeenth century the Shoshones had muscled their way on to the Great Plains, and were living as nomadic hunter-gathers. However, some time in the late seventeenth century, the Shoshone had split apart into two distinct groups. The larger group moved into the northern plains, with the smaller group, who would later become the Comanche, moving toward the Spanish settlements in New Mexico.³

One thing drawing the southern Shoshone (Comanche) southward was possibly the prospects of obtaining horses from the Spanish settlements in New Mexico. In this movement southward in the early eighteenth century, the Comanche forged an alliance with another Numic-speaking people the Utes. It was apparently the Utes that introduced the Comanche to the horse and the vagaries of war, trade and diplomacy that shaped the relationship of the Utes with the more sedentary Navajo, and later the Spanish settlements in New Mexico.

It was in 1706 that we find the first mention of the Comanche in Spanish records. Navajo residents of Taos sent word to the Spanish governor that they were in imminent danger of attack by the Utes and their new allies, the Comanche. Soon the Spanish found that the Comanche considered their rancherias and outposts fair game for attack and plunder⁴. In 1726, a Spanish military official, Brigadier Pedro de Rivera gave the first ethnographic description of the Comanche as brutal semi-naked slave raiders who make war on all nations. ⁵ Through the acquisition of the horse, the Comanche had revolutionized the way he waged war, hunted and directed his economic life. By the middle of the Century, the Comanche had expanded their domain into the southern plains of Texas and Oklahoma.

As the Comanche expanded southward, he expelled the Apache from his traditional hunting grounds. Apache groups in New Mexico and Texas, being pushed further south, sought allies. It was in this complex world of Indian expansion, Spanish desires for a buffer state against the French, and the religious zeal of the Spanish clerics, that the seeds of war and savagery were brought to Spanish Texas in the mid-Eighteenth Century.

By 1758, Spanish Texas consisted of a population of roughly two thousand people concentrated around San Antonio (580), Los Adeas (350) and La Bahaia (260).⁶ Spanish Texas managed to survive, but not prosper. Texas attracted few settlers from Mexico. Idiotic Spanish commercial regulations, which routed all trade through Mexico City, coupled with squabbles between the mission friars and the settlers, held back economic development. However, the biggest impediment to Spanish Texas was the reoccurring raids by Plains Indians. Almost from the beginning, the Spanish suffered from Apache raids. Apache attacks on outlying farmsteads would lead to punitive Spanish expeditions against them, and a constant cycle of violence was the result. However, in 1745, Father Santa Anna was able to begin negotiating an end of hostilities with the Apaches. By 1749, with the release of some Apache captives, the Spanish concluded a peace treaty with the local Apaches. This end of hostilities raised hope among the missionaries that a Catholic mission could be established in Apache country, northwest of San Antonio along the San Saba River.

For the next several years, there was avid debate among the councils in San Antonio as well as Mexico City on the possibility of establishing such a mission. Missions were expensive, and lives were not to be put in jeopardy without a good reason. Father Marino de los Delores y Viana, President of the Queretaran missions in San Antonio, pushed to establish such a mission. The military in San Antonio viewed the Apaches with suspicion and were wary of the enterprise. Father Delores countered with the fact that the Apaches were sincere; they now came regularly to trade in San Antonio, had not continued depredations against the settlers, and some had come to live inside the missions in San Antonio. Jacinto de Barrios y Jauregui, the Spanish governor of Texas, balked at the idea of establishing a mission, correctly assuming that what the Apache really wanted was the Spanish to ally themselves with them against other Plains Indian tribes to the North. However, by 1757, the viceroy in Mexico City decided to go ahead with the establishment of a mission in Apache territory along the San Saba River.⁷ The viceroy reasoned that New Spain needed to expand toward the Great Plains before some other European power did, and there were strong indications of valuable mineral deposits in this area.

This was a fateful decision on the part of the viceroy, for the decision to expand toward the southern Great Plains and enact a de-facto alliance with the Apaches would bring New Span into conflict with a much more deadly groups of Plains Indians, the Comanche and their allies.

In 1757, a joint religious-military expedition was dispatched to the area of the San Saba. The priest in charge of the mission was Fray Alonso Giraldo de Torreros. His parents had brought him to Mexico as a small child. He studied for his career as a missionary at the College of Queretero and entered the priesthood at the age of twenty two. He had had extensive missionary experience in east Texas and was president of the missions of the Rio Grande. He served for a time as the president of the College of Queretaro. Father Torreros owed his appointment to the intercession of his cousin, Pedro Romero de Torreros, a wealthy mine owner in Mexico, who had volunteered some of his own fortune to the enterprise, provided his cousin was put in charge of the mission. However, his connections did not change the fact that Father Torroros was an ardent disciple of our Lord, who firmly believed in the goal of saving Apache souls.

The military part of the expedition was commanded by Colonel Diego Ortiz Parrilla. Parrilla, also a native born Spaniard, had enlisted in the Army in 1734 and had served in the New World since 1740, in Cuba and Mexico. He had been promoted to colonel in 1755, when he was a little over forty. He was a tough professional soldier. If he had any faults, it was that often he let his ego get in the way of good judgment. It was his job to build the Presidio de San Luis de Amarillas and protect the mission.

You now have two strong personalities involved in a joint venture. One was a devout missionary, who felt that he should run any risk including his own death to bring souls to Christ. Father Torerro accepted the fact that he may face martyrdom. In many respects, he may have believed it was the ultimate sacrifice his God may require of him. Now on the other side we have Parrilla, a professional soldier. He probably had doubts about the chances of Apaches becoming good hymn-singing Christians. However, his main job was to see that the friars and their people did not become martyrs. The relationship between the mission and the presidio thus was never a comfortable one, and at times puts the leadership of the two institutions at cross-purposes to one another. Dual command very rarely works, and when the principle leaders have such divergent views of what success is, indecision and confusion are bound to follow.⁸

Parrilla’s first task was to gather soldiers for the expedition. The San Saba Garrison was to have a compliment of one hundred soldiers. Some of these would come from the transfer of the garrison from the defunct Presidio at San Xavier to the new San Saba Mission. He recruited an additional twenty-seven men for the San Saba garrison as he moved northward through Mexico on his way to San Antonio. At San Juan Bautista, he met up with Fray Torreros, with nine families of Tlaxcalteca Indians from Saltilo, who were to serve as instructors for new Apache converts at the mission. Eventually both groups reached San Antonio in mid-December.⁹

Parrilla brought down the nearly destitute garrison of presdials from San Xavier. They required new horses and firearms and their uniforms were in rags. They were probably happy to leave their miserable surroundings on the San Gabriel River and return to San Antonio. The expedition remained in San Antonio through the winter, and here is where the first disputes arouse among the clergy and the soldiers, and among the clergy themselves. Father Mariano De Los Doloras wished to have the Mission San Xavier on the Guadalupe River to be financed with monies donated by Fray Torerros’ cousin, Don Pedro Romero Torerros, for the Mission on the San Saba. Fray Torreros objected, saying equipment meant for the San Saba mission had already been turned over from the San Xavier Mission, and that the Guadalupe mission was not included in the original plan for San Saba. He could not grant the request.

One can understand Father Dolores’ indignation. For years he had championed the idea of a mission on the San Saba for the Apache. Now it was going ahead without him because Fray Terreros had a wealthy relative. Colonel Parrilla, who had surveyed the San Xavier mission sight and found it attractive, sided with Father Dolores. Eventually it was an open feud between Dolores and Parrilla against Terreros and Father Trinidad. Parrilla, likewise, in letters to the viceroy, continued to argue that the Apache could not be trusted, and the whole mission project was not a wise move. Likewise, Father Torreros sent letters to the viceroy decrying the interference he was experiencing.

It appeared to Torrerros that Parrilla was delaying the start of the expedition. In March, Parrilla moved the expedition, soldiers, clergy, Indians and livestock to the San Marcos River. Parrilla maintained that this was to prepare the cattle for the long march to the San Saba, but Terreros felt it was only an excuse to delay the start of the mission. On 5 April 1759, Parrilla split his force, leaving thirty-nine soldiers on the San Marcos to protect most of the supplies and the livestock, and took the remainder of the expedition back to San Antonio, to begin the movement to the San Saba.

One could argue that Parrilla’s motives were driven by his fear of a surprise attack, primarily by the Apaches. One could also argue that he hoped the expedition would flounder and the clergy would see the folly of continuing. Most likely, he understood the logistics and difficulty of moving such a large force with their livestock through this territory. Eventually, the expedition reached the site of the proposed mission on 17 April near the current day town of Menard, Texas.

After exploring the area along the San Saba for several days, Parrilla and his officers sat down with the missionaries and tried to talk them out of the venture. Despite the promises of the Lipan Apaches to come to the mission, no Lipans had yet approached them. Father Torroeros and his fellow clergy refused and threatened to go to the Viceroy. Parrilla reluctantly sent for the soldiers and supplies that had been left at the base camp on the San Marcos. Then both sides began to construct the Mission San Saba and the Presidio San Luis de la Amarillas. Logs were used to build both. The Missionaries sought to build two missions: one for the College of San Fernando, and one for the Queretaran Mission. The soldiers erected the Presidio three miles downstream and across the river from the mission. Eventually a crude stockade with several crude mud and straw huts for soldiers and their families were erected.

One may question the logic of placing the guard force for the mission such a distance from the mission. Tactically it makes no sense. However, the padres knew that soldiers tended to have a bad effect on new converts. Previous experience showed that the soldiery often mistreated the neophytes and made the religious work of the missionaries more difficult. While this arrangement kept the Spanish soldiery away from interfering with the life of the mission, it made it almost impossible to protect the mission in case of attack.¹⁰

In May, the friars began searching out prospective Apache converts. Father Torreros had with him Fathers Joaquin de Banos and Diego Jimenez from the College of Queretaro and Fathers de Santiestaban and Juan Andres from the College of San Fernando de Mejico. There was also a Father Francisco de la Santisima Trinidad, a Father Benito Varela and a Father Francisco De la Lara, who may have been designated the chaplain for the soldiers at the Presidio. There was little success at first. However, in mid-June a group of three-thousand Apaches of both sexes camped near the mission. While the Apache allowed the clergy to administer to some of their ill, they did not enter the mission. They insisted that they were on a hunting expedition to the north and would visit their mission on their return. Father Terreros was greatly disheartened by these turn of events, and he may have begun to question the eventual success of the mission. Most likely this hunting expedition was also to be a large scale raid by the Apache against the Comanche and their allies.

Robert S. Weddle, in his fine work, The San Saba Mission: Spanish Pivot in Texas, speculates that the Apache may have revealed their alliance with the Spanish to the northern plains Indian tribes, during this ride north. The Comanche and their allies now quickly united against this Spanish–Lipan threat. This may be the cause of the destruction of the San Saba Mission by the Comanche and their allies.¹¹

Within a few days, the Apache did return, with buffalo meat, but they only stayed a few days at the mission and showed no interest in conversion. The Missionaries, even Father Terreros, began to show their discouragement. Colonel Parrilla wrote to the viceroy, stating that the Mission project had no hope of success, and should be re-located to the Rio de Las Chanos (Llano River). In response, the viceroy informed Parrilla of his duty to make the project work, and refused permission to relocate.¹² By this time only the Queretaro Mission had been built. It was decided that because of the lack of converts, there was no need to build the San Fernando Mission. Demoralization among the priests finally led to some of them departing. Father Varela was the first, followed some time later by Fathers Bano and Jimeneze. This left only Fathers Terreros, Trinidad and Santestiban at the mission by the end of the summer.¹³

While the viceroy and Don Pedro De Torerros may still have viewed the San Saba project through rose-colored glasses, the situation on the San Saba was looking bleaker and bleaker. Small groups of Apache would come in, partake of the friars’ hospitality, and then quickly depart. It seemed to the friars that they were fleeing from something. Reports came in that the northern tribes may have been preparing to attack San Saba. Fall turned to winter and the soldiers and their families (roughly four hundred people) at the Presidio San Luis de la Amarillas suffered through wind, snow and ice. Father Miguel de Molina arrived from the College of San Fernando replacing Father Santisima Trinidad, who had departed. Apparently, Father Torrero and Colonel Parrilla intended to journey to Mexico City in the spring to brief the viceroy on the possible future of the mission.

On 25 February a band of Indians struck and ran off the stock and captured fifty-nine horses. The Spanish pursued, but with little success. The soldiers were convinced that the northern tribes were gathering, perhaps for a strike at the mission. However, Parrilla was more concerned over the safety of the supply train coming from San Antonio. He dispatched a small force to reinforce the supply train down on the Pedernales River and to see it got to the Presidio. Smoke signals were seen in the distance. Parrilla asked Father Torrero to bring his people into the Presidio. The Father refused, insisting that the mission offered more protection against attack, particularly from fire than the huts of the Presidio.

Colonel Parrilla’s position was desperate. He personally went to the priests and asked them to return to the Presidial, which they refused. He then suggested they curtail any work outside the mission walls in the fields till the military danger had passed. Apparently, this was agreed to. He assigned eight soldiers to the mission. This was all he could spare, because even without the mission to be protected, his forces were dangerously scattered. Twenty-two of his men were off guarding the supply train, four were escorting the new priest coming to the Presidio, three were at the mission on the Guadalupe River and eleven were guarding livestock twelve miles to the west. He had women and children in the Presidio that he had to protect. The thirty-two people residing in the mission were going to be largely on their own.

On 16 March the Plains Indians struck. The mission occupants were already awake when the first cries of alarm were sounded. The defenders of the missions saw hundreds of Comanche and Wichita Indians swarm across the River.¹⁴ The gates were closed and the soldiers manned the walls of the mission. The Indians fired their guns as they approached the walls and then they stopped. They then began to speak in some broken Spanish to the guard and professed peaceful intentions, saying they were only looking for Apaches.

It is at this point that Corporal Cadena surmised that the Indians did have peaceful intentions. He had dealt with Tonkawas and Tejas Indians at other missions and had found them friendly. The priests now conferred among themselves and possibly felt that they could risk opening the gates and offering presents of tobacco and beads to the Indians. The Indians, sensing the indecision on the parts of the defenders, decided to take matters into their own hands and rush the gates. They removed the bar and quickly swarmed into the courtyard. At this point the friars attempted to offer gifts, but the Indians struck down Father Molina. They began to spread out through the mission, stealing food and other items. At this point they had still refrained from killing anyone, being more interested in booty than blood.

Things turned real ugly when a chief came forward and said that three of his warriors had been killed as they rode toward the Presidio. This was undoubtedly a lie, but the Indians who had approached the soldiers in the Presidio had been fired upon. Father Torreros offered to ride with the chief to the Presidio, and he mounted his horse, but as he neared the gate, he was shot by one of the Indians. The Spaniards fought their way to the mission buildings hoping to barricade themselves against the onslaught. Father Santiesteban died on the church altar. The Indians set fire to the mission as the Spaniards fired through loopholes at them.

The Mission defenders had managed to get word to the soldiers in the Presidio that they were under attack. Jose Gutierrez, the son of the mission steward Juan Antonio Gutierrez, reached the Presidio and told of the attack. Parrilla sent word to a party under the command of Sergeant Flores to take an eight-man party to the mission and attempt to reinforce it. However, Flores’ group was attacked and suffered three losses