The Analysis of Virtue in Alasdair Macintyre and His View of “The Enlightenment Project”

By Benjamin Okon MSP

MacIntyre is greatly discontented with the nature of contemporary morality, which according to him has a form, i.e. what appears like morality, but lacks essential content. He argues that the most common feature of contemporary ethical discourse is that much of it is used to express individual preferences, which leads to disagreements among philosophers, and eventually results in debates that are interminable in character. MacIntyre attributes the cause of this situation to the activities of the enlightenment philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries who, in an attempt to find rational justification for morality repudiated those essential elements that define the essence of morality and give it its contents. Such elements include historical narrative, tradition, teleology, and divine law. In MacIntyres opinion, morality so constructed was destined for failure, since it was not founded on the true nature of the human person. The obvious consequences of this failure were the birth of diverse post-enlightenment ethical theories and a substantial change in the conception of virtue. In order to remedy this deplorable condition of contemporary ethics MacIntyre, along with other virtue ethicists, advocates a certain renaissance of ethical principles that are founded on the true nature of the human person, characterized by historical narrative, tradition, and teleology, all grounded on divine legislation. Morality thus reconstructed finds its fullest expression in the theory of human character traits, i.e. virtues. This is what has motivated MacIntyres construction of virtue theory, which has brought him into confrontation with the enlightenment philosophers. Our study and analysis of MacIntyres theory of virtue reveals that his account of virtue is inadequate. This inadequacy is what has motivated our own project of reconstructing MacIntyres theory of virtue in view of offering an account of virtue that is adequate. In this way our own project complements that of MacIntyre.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Xlibris US
• Release date: Apr 15, 2016
• ISBN: 9781514484395

Benjamin Okon MSP

Fr. Benjamin Okon is a priest of the Missionary Society of St. Paul of Nigeria. He hails from Oron, Akwa Ibom State. He was ordained priest for the missions on the third of July 1999. He obtained his bachelor degree in philosophy and bachelor degree in sacred theology from the National Missionary Seminary of St. Paul, Abuja–Nigeria, an affiliate of the University of Port Harcourt, Rivers State–Nigeria and the Pontifical Urban University, Rome, Italy. He obtained his licentiate degree in philosophy with specialization on metaphysics and his doctorate degree in philosophy with specialization on history of philosophy from the Pontifical University of St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelicum, Rome, Italy. He also holds a master’s degree in environmental science from the Pontifical University of the Queen of the Apostles, Regina Apostolorum, Rome, Italy. After his ordination, he served as the assistant cathedral administrator in the diocese of Minna, Niger State, Nigeria from September to December 1999. In 2000, he was assigned to Christ the King Junior Seminary, Gwada, as the assistant rector and as the assistant parish priest of Christ the King Parish, Gwada, Niger State, where he worked from January till June 2000. In October 2000, he was sent to the archdiocese of Douala in Cameroun for his first missionary apostolate. Here he worked as the assistant parish priest of Holy Trinity Parish, Douala. He was also appointed as the archdiocesan chaplain for the Catholic Women Association. While in Cameroun, he published two works: The Benediction Handbook, 2002, and Insight into the Catholic Faith, 2003. In October 2003, he was sent to Rome for specialized studies in philosophy. While studying in Rome, he used to help out during summer vacations at the Missionary Society of St Paul (MSP) Promotion Office located in Galveston diocese, Houston, USA. In 2008, he graduated from Angelicum. From 2007 and 2013 he was nominated and worked as the chaplain of the Anglophone African Catholic Community, Padua, Italy. In 2012, he was appointed the mission superior of the Missionary Society of St Paul in Italy. In 2013, he was appointed the parish priest of San Gioacchino Parish, Torino, Italy, where he is currently serving.

Book preview

Copyright © 2016 by Benjamin Okon, MSP.

Library of Congress Control Number:   2016905953

ISBN:      Hardcover      978-1-5144-8441-8

                Softcover        978-1-5144-8440-1

                eBook             978-1-5144-8439-5

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the copyright owner.

Any people depicted in stock imagery provided by Thinkstock are models, and such images are being used for illustrative purposes only.

Certain stock imagery © Thinkstock.

Rev. date: 04/15/2016

Xlibris

1-888-795-4274

www.Xlibris.com

735049

CONTENTS

Status Quaestionis

Acknowledgments

1.1. General Introduction

1.1.1. The Presentation of Our Author

1.1.1.1. His Personal Profile and Works

1.1.1.2. His Philosophical Method

1.1.1.3. Early Influences and His Way to Virtue Ethics

1.1.2. The Purpose of This Research

1.1.3. Delimitation and Scope

1.1.4. Method and Sources

1.1.5. The Structure and Content of the Work

1.1.6. Evaluation and Conclusion

PART ONE

A BRIEF SURVEY OF VIRTUE LEADING UP TO MACINTYRE

CHAPTER 1: VIRTUE IN THE ERA OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY

1.1.1. Aristotelian Virtue Ethics

1.1.1.1. Virtue as Aretē

1.1.1.2. Virtue as Phronesis

1.1.1.3. Virtue as Eudaimonia

1.1.1.4. Virtue as Mesotes

1.1.1.5. The Divisions of Virtue in Aristotle

1.1.1.5.1. Intellectual Virtues

1.1.1.5.2. Moral Virtues

CHAPTER 2: VIRTUE IN THE ERA OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY

1.2.1. Thomistic Virtue Ethics

1.2.1.1. The Essence of Virtues

1.2.1.2. The Subject of Virtue

1.2.1.3. The Causes of Virtues

1.2.1.4. The Divisions of Virtue

1.2.1.4.1. The Intellectual Virtues

1.2.1.4.2. The Moral Virtues

1.2.1.4.2.1. The Cardinal Virtues

1.2.1.4.2.2. The Theological Virtues

1.2.1.5. The Properties of Virtues

1.2.1.5.1. The Mean of Virtue

1.2.1.5.2. The Connection of the Virtues

1.2.1.5.3. The Hierarchy of the Virtues

1.2.1.5.4. The Duration of Virtues After Earthly Life

CHAPTER 3: VIRTUE IN THE ERA OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY

1.3.1. Factors Leading to the Decline of Medieval Virtue Ethics

1.3.1.1. The Rise of Rationalism

1.3.1.2. The Rise of Empiricism

1.3.1.3. The Rise of Transcendentalism

1.3.1.4. The Rise of Idealism

CHAPTER 4: VIRTUE IN THE ERA OF CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY

1.4.1. Revival of Medieval Virtue Ethics

1.4.1.1. Elizabeth Anscombe (1919--2001)

1.4.1.2. Philippa Foot (1920-2010)

1.4.1.3. Rosalind Hursthouse

PART TWO

MACINTYRE'S VIEW OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT PROJECTS AND THE CONTEMPORARY MORAL SITUATION

CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE ENLIGHTENMENT PROJECTS

2.1.1. The Background and Development of the Enlightenment Projects

2.1.2. Some Factors Leading to the Enlightenment Projects

2.1.2.1. The Renaissance

2.1.2.2. Humanism

2.1.2.3. The Scientific Revolution

2.1.2.4. The Protestant Revolution

CHAPTER 2: MACINTYRE'S ACCOUNT OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT PROJECTS

2.2.1. Macintyre's Account of the Enlightenment Project of Justifying Morality

2.2.2. Macintyre's Account of Some Individual Modern Enlightenment Projects of Justifying Morality

2.2.2.1. David Hume (1711--1776)

2.2.2.2. Denis Diderot (1713--1784)

2.2.2.3. Immanuel Kant (1724--1804)

2.2.3. Macintyre's Account of Some Post-Enlightenment Projects of Justifying Morality

2.2.3.1. Søren Kierkegaard (1813--1855)

2.2.3.2. Friedrich Nietzsche (1844--1900)

CHAPTER 3: MACINTYRE'S ANALYSIS OF THE CONTEMPORARY MORAL SITUATION

2.3.1. The Allegory of the Natural Science Catastrophe

2.3.2. The Characteristics of Contemporary Moral Debate

2.3.2.1. Conceptual Incommensurability

2.3.2.2. Impersonal Rational Arguments

2.3.2.3. Unhistorical Interpretation of Moral Philosophy

2.3.3. Factors Responsible for the Contemporary Moral Situation

2.3.3.1. The Failure of the Modern Enlightenment Project

2.3.3.2. The Failure of the Post-Enlightenment Project

CHAPTER 4: THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAILED ENLIGHTENMENT PROJECTS

2.4.1. Diverse Ethical Theories

2.4.1.1. Utilitarianism

2.4.1.2. Intuitionism

2.4.1.3. Pragmatism

2.4.1.4. Emotivism

2.4.2. Changing Conception of Virtue

2.4.2.1. An Account of Robert Nozick

2.4.2.2. An Account of John Rawls

PART THREE

MACINTYRE'S RECONSTRUCTION OF VIRTUE THEORY AND THE APPRAISAL OF HIS RECONSTRUCTION

CHAPTER 1: MACINTYRE'S CONCEPTION OF VIRTUE

3.1.1. Toward A Definition of Virtue In Macintyre

3.1.1.1. The First Stage: Virtue and Practice

3.1.1.2. The Second Stage: Virtue and Historical Narrative Unity

3.1.1.3. The Third Stage: Virtue and Tradition

CHAPTER 2: THE NECESSITY OF VIRTUE FOR HUMAN BEINGS

3.2.1. A Resume of Dependent Rational Animal

3.2.1.1. Chapter One: Vulnerability, Dependence, Animality

3.2.1.2. Chapter Two: Humans as Contrasted With, Human as Included in the Class Of Animals

3.2.1.3. Chapter Three: The Intelligence of Dolphins

3.2.1.4. Chapter Four: Can Animals Without Language Have Beliefs?

3.2.1.5. Chapter Five: How Impoverished is the World of the Nonhuman Animal?

3.2.1.6. Chapter Six: Reasons for Action

3.2.1.7. Chapter Seven: Vulnerability, Flourishing, Goods, and the Good

3.2.1.8. Chapter Eight: How Do We Become Independent, Practical Reasoners? How Do the Virtues Make this Possible?

3.2.1.9. Chapter Nine: Social Relationships, Practical Reasoning, Common Goods, and Individual Goods

3.2.1.10. Chapter Ten: Virtues of Acknowledged Dependence

3.2.1.11. Chapter Eleven: The Political and Social Structures of the Common Good

3.2.1.12. Chapter Twelve: Proxies, Friends, Truthfulness

3.2.1.13. Chapter Thirteen: Moral Commitment and Rational Inquiry

CHAPTER 3: VARIOUS PHILOSOPHICAL RESPONSES TO MACINTYRE

3.3.1. Jerome Schneewind's Critique of Macintyre's Theory of Virtue: A Noncommunitarian Approach

3.3.2. Charles Taylor's Critique of Macintyre's Theory of Virtue: A Communitarian Approach

3.3.3. David Miller's Critique of Macintyre's Virtue, Practices, and Justice

3.3.4. Elizabeth Frazer's and Nicola Lacey's Critique of Macintyre's Concept of Practice

3.3.5. Macintyre's Reaction to the Criticisms of Schneewind, Taylor, Miller, and Frazer and Lacey

CHAPTER 4: AN APPRAISAL OF MACINTYRE'S THEORY OF VIRTUE

3.4.1. An Assessment of Macintyre's Analysis of the Contemporary Moral Situation

3.4.2. An Assessment of the Accuracy Of Macintyre's Critique of the Enlightenment Project

3.4.3. An Assessement of the Inner Coherence of Macintyre's Virtue Theory

3.4.4. An Assessment of Macintyre's Virtue Theory In Relation to Traditional Aristotelianism and Thomism

3.4.5. Evaluation and General Conclusion

3.4.5.1. A Reconstruction of Macintyre's Theory Of Virtue Toward An Integral Conception of Virtue

3.4.5.1.1. Man as a Metaphysical Being

3.4.5.1.2. Man as a Human Person

3.4.5.1.3. Macintyre's Theory of Virtue Reconstructed

3.4.5.1.4. Final Assessment of the Project of Reconstructing Macintyre's Virtue Theory

General Bibliography

TEACHING ACCORDING TO THE SPIRIT¹

(1 Cor 17:7--8)

THE LOGO OF MY LITERARY WORKS

87183.png

To

my beloved sister

ELIZABETH OKON JOHN

of

blessed memory

STATUS QUAESTIONIS

MacIntyre is greatly discontented with the nature of contemporary morality, which, according to him, has a form, i.e., what appears like morality, but lacks essential content. He argues that the most common feature of contemporary ethical discourse is that much of it is used to express individual preferences, which leads to disagreements among philosophers and eventually results in debates that are interminable in character. MacIntyre attributes the cause of this situation to the activities of the Enlightenment philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who, in an attempt to find rational justification for morality, repudiated those essential elements that define the essence of morality and give it its contents. Such elements include historical narrative, tradition, teleology, and divine law.

In MacIntyre's opinion, morality so constructed was destined for failure since it was not founded on the true nature of the human person. The obvious consequences of this failure were the birth of diverse post-Enlightenment ethical theories and a substantial change in the conception of virtue. In order to remedy this deplorable condition of contemporary ethics, MacIntyre, along with other virtue ethicists, advocates a certain renaissance of ethical principles that are founded on the true nature of the human person, characterized by historical narrative, tradition, and teleology, all grounded on divine legislation. Morality thus reconstructed finds its fullest expression in the theory of human character traits, that is, virtues. This is what has motivated MacIntyre's construction of virtue theory, which has brought him into confrontation with the Enlightenment philosophers. Our study and analysis of MacIntyre's theory of virtue reveals that his account of virtue is inadequate. This inadequacy is what has motivated our own project of reconstructing MacIntyre's theory of virtue in view of offering an adequate account of virtue. In this way, our own project complements that of MacIntyre.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The way to the successful completion of this project was a long and tedious one. The challenges were enormous. The confusion in dealing with so many authors was all but frustrating. The ability to remain focused, maintaining all the technicalities required of a project such as this and being able to weave the entire work together in order to bring out its synthetic formal unity, was painstaking and almost daunting. In all this, I felt the gentle hand of the Lord leading me on and the illumination of the Holy Spirit. I thank God for His faithfulness, guidance, and protection all through the course of this project.

Very instrumental to the success of this project is my moderator, Prof. Alfred Wilder, OP. I cannot thank him enough for his enlightening insight, gentle but hard pushing in his insistence on getting right all the technicalities needed for such a research work all in place. Above all, his patience and fatherly advice were a great source of strength and encouragement. I am very indebted to him. I also acknowledge and appreciate the effort of two other professors: Prof. Williams Bruce and Prof. Albert Bagood, all the Angelicum, Rome, who worked with me at the beginning toward the clarification of this project outline. Their criticisms and suggestions enabled me to have a clearer focus ab initio, and this has sustained me along the course of this research work. I deeply appreciate the diligent and timely effort of my second moderator, Prof. Rodolfo Garcia, OP. His corrections and fatherly advice were very helpful in the final editing of this work. Not to be left out of this appreciation is the then dean of the philosophy faculty, Prof. Charles Morerod, currently bishop of the diocese of Lausanne, Geneva, and Fribourg in Switzerland.

I acknowledge and appreciate the role of Most Rev. Dr. Hyacinth Egbebo, MSP, my ex-superior general, who is the current bishop of Bomadi vicariate of Nigeria. He, with his council, sent me to Rome for specialized studies in philosophy. After obtaining my licentiate degree from the faculty of philosophy in the Pontifical University of St. Thomas Aquinas, Rome, he granted me permission to commence the doctoral program in the same university. His moral support and encouragement gave me the needed strength to forge ahead. My appreciation also extends to my former superior general, Most Rev. Dr. Anselm Umoren, MSP, the auxiliary bishop of Abuja Archdiocese, who gave me the nihil obstat for this publication and has been a brother and friend. I equally appreciate my current superior general, Very Rev. Dr. Victor Onwukeme, MSP; the vicar general of the Missionary Society of St. Paul, Very Rev. Fr. Augustine Ogar, MSP; and other councillors: Very Rev. Frs. Raphael Asika, Robert Kajoh, and Patrick Etuk, MSPS. I acknowledge the fraternal support of Frs. Augustine Inwang, Matthias Selemobri, Anthony Mbanefo, Oliver Obele, Joseph Udo, Francis Essang, William Egedegbe, George Okeahialem, Pius Ekpe, and Patsilver Okah, MSPS. I also appreciate Frs. Guy Noel Tchapda, Kingsley Okereke, Desmond Newman Egbo, and Frau Angelika Fischer-Munsch, who assisted me in the translation of the summary of this work into French and German.

Worthy of special mention is the Congregation of the Oblates of the Virgin Mary, Rome, which offered me scholarship for accommodations and the necessary facilities I needed both for my licentiate and doctoral programs. I'm very grateful to them, especially the then provincial Padre Mauro Oliva, who approved of my stay with the Oblates. I deeply appreciate the immense contribution of the Associazione pubblica universale di diritto pontificio (Aiuto alla Chiesa che Soffre), which gave me a partial scholarship coverage for the first two years of my doctoral program.

I also acknowledge and appreciate my provincial archbishop, Most Rev. Dr. Joseph Effiong Ekuwem, the Catholic archbishop of the Archdiocese of Calabar, Nigeria, who has been a mentor and a great source of encouragement to me. I appreciate my home bishop, Most Rev. Dr. John E. Ayah. I appreciate and remain grateful to his Lordship, Most Rev. Dr. Antonio Mattiazzo, the archbishop of the Diocese of Padua, Italy, who offered me the opportunity of pastoral experience in his diocese throughout this period of studies in Rome. I'm equally grateful to Msgr. Paolo Onello, the vicar general of the Diocese of Padua, who granted me the imprimatur for the presentation of my doctoral dissertation for the University of Angelicum. I acknowledge also the support of Don Elia Ferro, the diocesan director of immigrants. I'm also grateful to his Lordship, Most Rev. Dr. Leo O'Reilly, the bishop of Kilmore Diocese in Ireland, who ordained me and has always been very supportive. I appreciate Most Rev. Dr. Cesare Nosiglia, the archbishop of the Archdiocese of Torino, where I am currently serving. I appreciate the moral and brotherly support of my big brothers in the priesthood: Very Rev. Fr. Michael Ekpenyong, the ex-secretary general to the Nigerian Episcopal Conference; Very Rev. Fr. Emmanuel Ating, the vicar general of the Catholic Diocese of Uyo; and Very Rev. Fr. Anthony Ekong.

I acknowledge the support and encouragement of my colleagues and friends who stood by me and helped in reading through this work. Of special mention are Frs. Iffiok Inyang, Patrick Etuk, Raymond Aina, Cletus Obijiaku, Valentine Iheanacho, James Yakubu, and Jerome Eruoghororere, MSPs; Frs. Joseph Okojie, Peter Egbe, Henry Omonisaye, Anthony Nyong, CM, Clement Nkereuwem, Donatus Ukpong, John Idio, Augustine Isek, and Godwin Ubom. I appreciate the friendship of Don Giuseppe Bragagnolo, the parish priest of Santa Maria Assunta, Saccolongo, and Don Alfredo Neri of Campo S. Martino, all of Padua. I sincerely acknowledge and appreciate the immense support of the Nigerian Catholic Community of Padua. They have been wonderful and very supportive. I appreciate the moral support of Very Rev. Fr. Robert Ngbeahurike, the ex-chaplain of the Anglophone African Immigrants in Italy.

I also recognize and appreciate the effort of my friends who were very faithful in their commitment to assist me all through this period of studies. Of special mention are the Sama family, the Ebai family, the Asuagbor family, the Obidike family, the Patcha family, the Nforkolong family, the Oben family, the Bosah family, the Ajibade family, the Athekame family, the Opara family, and Sir and Lady Maurice Ekpo family. I am also appreciative of the moral support of Rev. Srs. Regina Etim, HHCJ, and Aloysius Onwuegbuchulam, DDL.

I am indebted to my family members and relatives for their undaunted support and encouragement: my parents, late Sir Brendan Okon John and Lady Christiana Okon John; my sisters, Comfort Okon, Elizabeth Okon (late), and Mrs. Rose Enubiak; and my brothers, Mr. Michael Okon (late), Mr. Paulinus Okon, Emmanuel Okon, and Clement Okon. I appreciate the support of my relatives: Mr. Orok Bassey, Dr. Eyo Efretuei, Mr. and Mrs. Sunday Enidiok, and Mrs. Glory Bassey.

I acknowledge and appreciate all those who assisted me in the course of my doctoral program, especially the parish council members of the Anglophone African Catholic Community of Padua: Mr. F. Obiapuna, Chief N. Okonkwo, Prince K. Nwakamma, Mr. M. Nwachukwu, Mr. F. Obijiaku, MRS. T. Gamba, MR. A. Oranye, Mr. I. Okoye, Mrs. V. Ogechukwu, Mr. S. Okonkwo, Mr. F. Egbuogu, Mrs. A. Obijiaku, Mr. Cyril Mbara and Rita Gallo, Mr. A. Nwaugha, and Mr. J. Ozurumba.

I also acknowledge Dr. and Dr. Mrs. Mbaso, Dr. Okoye, Dr. Susana Atebong Nojang, Mr. P. Ekeh, Mr. D. Amanambu, Chief Ibeh, Chief Ejesi, Chief Nnaji, Giancarlo Garbin, Giuseppe Garbin, Franco Garbin, A. Casotto, L. Broggian, M. Marin, L. Palma, Laura e Roberto, E. Predebon, Luciano, Chief H. Umeh, Chief Okoro, Chief C. Ocheoha, Chief Ogaraku, Mrs. G. Nkume, Mr. L. Ugochukwu, Mr. M. Mgbeabu, Mr. and Mrs. B. Akubuko, Mr. and Mrs. Ajaegwu, Mr. and Mrs. Z. Ezeokafor, Mr. and Mrs. I. Nwachukwu, Sr. Eugenie de Sopi (Chichi), Mr. I. Nnebuo, Ms. B. Onuh. I appreciate the mothers of my parish (CWO), the fathers (CFO), the youths (CYO), the Bonus Pastor Catholic Charismatic Renewal, altar servers, church wardens, Legion of Mary, the choir, Divine Mercy Prayer Group, lay readers, the friends of S. Pio X parish, and all my children in the Anglophone community.

1.1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION

MacIntyre argues that the language of contemporary morality is in a grave state of disorder,² characterized by conceptual incommensurability, impersonal rational arguments, and an unhistorical interpretation of moral philosophy.³ He describes its concepts of morality as simulacra, where expressions are used without regard to their historical meaning-giving context.⁴ For him, The most striking feature of contemporary moral utterance is that so much of it is used to express disagreements,⁵ which are rather interminable in character. MacIntyre identifies the cause of this contemporary moral situation with the failure of the Enlightenment project of justifying morality.⁶ Such an independent rational project became the concern not merely of individual thinkers but also central to Northern European culture in the eighteenth century.⁷ MacIntyre discusses the Enlightenment project in relation to the works of David Hume, Denis Diderot, Immanuel Kant, Søren Kierkegaard, and Friedrich Nietzsche.⁸ He argues that the Enlightenment projects did not just fail but was also bound to fail because it harbored inherent contradictions.⁹

MacIntyre explains that the general form of the moral scheme, which is the historical predecessor to the Enlightenment project, was rooted in Aristotelian ethics as analyzed in the Nicomachean Ethics. This ethical scheme was founded on the nature of the human person, i.e., a nature that is directed toward an end, that is teleological, and one that contrasted man-as-he-happens-to-be with man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature.¹⁰

Ethics is the science that enables the human person to make the transition from the former to the latter. The project of this transition is identified with virtue ethics. This moral scheme throughout the medieval period endured and sustained moral discourse and moral persons because it was rooted in human nature. MacIntyre is convinced that a reconstruction of the Aristotelian approach to ethics and of the virtue theory associated with it is imperative in order to remedy the contemporary disordered moral situation. The needed method would furnish moral thought with an objective standard capable of sustaining moral discourse and moral persons. Thus, he initiated his project of reconstructing the theory of virtue.¹¹ This reconstruction has attracted a good deal of attention from different ethical philosophers who have reacted, some in favor of and others against it.

In this general introduction, we shall consider the following points: the presentation of our author, the purpose of this research, the method and sources of this research, its delimitation and scope, and the structure and content of the work.

1.1.1. THE PRESENTATION OF OUR AUTHOR

1.1.1.1. HIS PERSONAL PROFILE AND WORKS

Alasdair Chalmers MacIntyre was born on January 12, 1929, in Glasgow, Scotland. He was educated at Queen Mary University of London and has a master of arts from the University of Manchester. He began his lecturing career in 1951 at Manchester University. He also taught at the University of Leeds, the University of Essex, and the University of Oxford in the United Kingdom. Toward the end of 1969, he migrated to the USA. Between 1969 and 1970, he was a professor of history and ideas at Brandeis University. In 1972, he was the dean of the college of arts and professor of philosophy in Boston University. In 1980, he was Henry Luce professor at Wellesley College. In 1982, he was A. Alton Jones professor in Vanderbilt University. In 1985, he was a professor of philosophy in the University of Notre Dame. This same year (1985), he was a professor of philosophy in Vanderbilt University. In 1988, he was a visiting scholar at the Whitney Humanities Center and Yale University. In 1989, he was a McMahon-Hank professor of philosophy, and in 1997, he was the professor of philosophy in Duke University. He was elected to the American Philosophical Society in April 2005. From 2000 to the present time, he has been the Rev. John A. O'Brien senior research professor in the philosophy department and the permanent senior research fellow in the center for ethics and culture at the University of Notre Dame, Indiana. He is also professor emeritus at Duke University. He is a convert to Catholicism in the early 1980s. As a philosopher, he is primarily known for his contribution to moral and political philosophy. He is also known for his work in the history of philosophy and theology.

His maiden work was Marxism: An Interpretation, 1953.¹² This was followed by New Essays in Philosophical Theology, coedited with Antony Flew, 1955. Other works include The Unconscious: A Conceptual Analysis, 1958; Difficulties in Christian Belief, 1959; Hume's Ethical Writings (ed.), 1965; A Short History of Ethics, 1966; Secularisation and Moral Change, the Riddell Memorial Lectures, 1967; The Religious Significance of Atheism, written with Paul Ricoeur, 1969; Against the Self-Images of the Age: Essays on Ideology and Philosophy, 1971; After Virtue, 1981; Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 1988; Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, the Gifford Lectures, 1990; Marxism and Christianity, 1995; Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues, 1999; Edith Stein: A Philosophical Prologue, 1913--1922, 2005; The Tasks of Philosophy: Selected Essays, vol. i, 2006; Ethics and Politics: Selected Essays, vol. ii, 2006. He has also written a host of articles, reviews, and papers.¹³

1.1.1.2. HIS PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD

MacIntyre is particularly known for his ability to present rather complicated and historically controversial philosophical challenges in a sociologically contextualized historical narrative. His approach is not like other contemporary philosophers who employ a more logical or analytical method. MacIntyre uses a dialectic method in presenting a historical narration of the development of ethics in order to illuminate the contemporary problem of incommensurable moral notions used independently of their original conceptual frameworks. Through this method, he is able to discover the problem in contemporary moral utterances and its cause. He argues for a moral tradition against its rivals that, in his opinion, presents the best theory both of how things are and of how we ought to act, i.e., the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. Thus, his philosophical method can be said to be a dialectic method founded on Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition.

1.1.1.3. EARLY INFLUENCES AND HIS WAY TO VIRTUE ETHICS

MacIntyre's early thought was highly influenced by Marxism.¹⁴ The fact that his first book was on Marxism is a proof of his early susceptibility to Marxism. MacIntyre presents Marxism as one of the two contemporary attempts to provide a clear rival world view to Christianity, the other being positivism. He considered Marxism more important than positivism because positivism had a rather limited scope. It was largely limited to the learned, the intellectuals of the society, who had little interest in trying to provide a wide-ranging and popular positive account of the nature of man and, in particular, of religion. Marxism, in contrast, had a very clear and powerful account of nature and the function of religion within its own theoretical terms of reference. The key point of Marxism, for MacIntyre, is that it envisages the whole of human life in terms that explicitly deny the God-given character of the world.¹⁵ What, however, makes Marxism most paradoxical is that it has religious roots.¹⁶ From this perspective, Marxism is presented as secularism, rooted in the Christian Gospels, which is committed to justice and is so charged with theological and ethical significance.

The fact that MacIntyre was a member of the Communist Party and continued, after his leaving the party, to be active in socialist causes¹⁷ also attests to his being early influenced by Marxism. His commitment to Marxism, however, coexisted with a deep uneasiness about its ultimate adequacy. This was because Marxism had been refuted as inadequate to provide solutions to the impending contemporary problems at the time.¹⁸ MacIntyre observes that Marxism, though widely condemned, could linger on because of its capacity to articulate certain truths that were not articulated in other ideological frameworks.¹⁹ Such truth is expressed in Marxism's condemnation of the distorting effects on human life and human relationships produced by the economic and political institutions of modern capitalism.²⁰ In spite of his agreement with the Marxist condemnation of modern capitalism, he was, however, unable to ally himself with any of the two Marxist thought formulations available to him at the time: scientific Marxism and the humanist Marxism popular within the British New Left.²¹ He condemns both forms of Marxism as being morally empty and false.²²

In an interview given in 1991, MacIntyre gave a summary of the history of his own philosophical work. This account highlights the nature of his early thought and the influences on it. His life as an academic philosopher, he says, falls into three parts. The first part was the twenty-two years, from 1949 until 1971, when he became a graduate student of philosophy at Manchester University. This was a period of heterogeneous, badly organized, sometimes fragmented, and often frustrating and messy enquiries,²³ from which he, however, learned a lot of lessons. The second part was from 1971 until 1977, shortly after he migrated to the United States, which was an interim period of sometimes painful self-critical reflection.²⁴ The third part was from 1977 onward, when he has "been engaged in a single project to which After Virtue, (1981); Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1988); and Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, (1990) are central."²⁵ In this interview, he explicitly acknowledged having been influenced by Marxism.²⁶

Having detected the moral defects and failures of the two forms of Marxism most discussed at the time, MacIntyre confronted them in a two-part essay written for the New Reasoner in 1958 entitled Notes from the Moral Wilderness.²⁷ In this essay, he diagnosed the fundamental problems in humanist Marxism as rooted in its acceptance of the autonomy of moral principle, i.e., the notion that the scope of ethics as an academic discipline stands independently of and in contrast to the scope of natural, social, and historical facts. By the stripping off of moral judgment from the domains of history, sociology, economics, and anthropology, the humanist Marxist, who acts as the moral critic of Stalinism, cuts himself off from any argumentative route to his moral conclusions.²⁸ All that remains is arbitrary choice. This isolation, according to MacIntyre, renders moral criticism ineffective and moral evaluation unintelligible. This criticism, however, was also applicable to the scientific Marxists.²⁹ MacIntyre argues that a morality that is cut off from other realms of judgment and inquiry becomes like primitive taboos, imperatives that have no substantial content.³⁰ Both the scientific socialist and the humanist Marxist, in their own ways, break the connection between ethics and other disciplines. The scientific socialist does so by treating the realm of moral judgment as illusory or mere appearance, while the humanist does so by stripping moral judgment of its authority. This constitutes, for MacIntyre, a moral wilderness.

MacIntyre argues that what is needed is a third way, i.e., a way to connect morality to history, sociology, psychology, and other fields of study in order to safeguard it from being reduced to a mere arbitrary preference or choice. He suggests that this middle way can be achieved by connecting ethics with what he calls authentic human desire, i.e., a desire that is not distorted. In this way, morality is grounded in the is of human desire but is not subsumed by it, for he stipulates that it is the authentic desire that is the standard for moral judgment. Any adequate ethics then would have to be historically grounded.³¹ Thus, the way out of the modern moral wilderness is the articulation of an ethics that is grounded on the biological, historical, and sociological nature of the human person. It is only such an account that would make possible authoritative political and social criticism. The outlining of such a substantive moral project and of a theory of rational inquiry that would sustain such a project "is the central tasks of his After Virtue project."³² In this way, MacIntyre paved his way through to his virtue project.

1.1.2. THE PURPOSE OF THIS RESEARCH

Not content with modern moral philosophy's preoccupation with a law-based conception of ethics, Elizabeth Anscombe, in a paper entitled Modern Moral Philosophy,³³ advocated an ethics that emphasizes virtues or moral character. Taking her inspiration mainly from Aristotle, she called for a return to concepts, such as character, virtue, and wholeness in moral philosophical discourse. This research is intended to explore this very important dimension of normative ethics, i.e., virtue theory. It will do this through the analysis of MacIntyre's notion of virtue in confrontation with the Enlightenment project. The choice of this topic was motivated by the rather extensive treatment that MacIntyre has given to the analysis of the contemporary moral debate, in which he identified its problems, stated the factors that were responsible for it, and his eventual reconstruction of a theory of virtue as a way forward in his perceived contemporary moral dilemma.

His analysis of the problem of contemporary ethics and its causes has led to his confrontation with the Enlightenment project, which is the presupposition of contemporary ethical debate. Through this research work, we hope to contribute to the understanding of MacIntyre's virtue theory. This contribution will attempt to probe into MacIntyre's virtue theory in its confrontation with the Enlightenment project. How does MacIntyre see the Enlightenment project? How does MacIntyre's leaning to the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition enable him to address the disorder in contemporary ethics as an aftereffect of the Enlightenment project? Why do practice, tradition, and institution play such an important role in MacIntyre's definition of virtue? These are some of the questions that this research will seek to address. It is our hope that this research work will enable us to have sufficient reasons to propose an understanding of virtue that is integral, taking into consideration the anthropological, metaphysical, psychological, and theological dimensions of the human person, in view of overcoming some of the inherent contradictions in contemporary moral discourse as it has been affected by the Enlightenment project.

1.1.3. DELIMITATION AND SCOPE

Our research project entitled The Analysis of Virtue in Alasdair MacIntyre and His View of the Enlightenment Project falls under the subject of virtue ethics, which is generally designated as the science or philosophy of human action.³⁴ The word action in this definition is to be understood strictly as corresponding to the Aristotelian praxis.³⁵ Thus, it is distinct both from theoria, i.e., speculation, and from poiein, i.e., making, which implies artistic and technical activity, production of goods or the transformation of a milieu.³⁶ The virtue approach to moral issues forms an intrinsic part of normative ethics, and this provides the immediate context of our research work. This project is delimited to MacIntyre's virtue theory, which is one of the contemporary attempts to revive medieval ethical principles³⁷ and his view of the Enlightenment philosophers' ethical theory. It seeks to establish how the failure of the Enlightenment projects contributed, according to MacIntyre, to the contemporary moral disorder. This work does not undertake an independent study of virtue neither does it undertake an independent study of the moral philosophy of the Enlightenment philosophers. It rather undertakes a study of their works insofar as MacIntyre relates them to virtue ethics.

1.1.4. METHOD AND SOURCES

This research proceeds by way of a critical analysis of the original works of MacIntyre that are relevant to his treatment of virtue and his view of the Enlightenment project. Our approach in the analysis of MacIntyre's theory of virtue and his view of the Enlightenment project is interdisciplinary, while in our reconstruction of MacIntyre's theory of virtue, we employ the complex system method. Our primary sources for this thesis are MacIntyre's main works. Of paramount importance are A Short History of Ethics, 1966; After Virtue, 1985; Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 1988; Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, 1990; Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues, 1999; The Tasks of Philosophy: Selected Essays, vol. i, 2006; and Ethics and Politics: Selected Essays, vol. ii, 2006. We also examine some of his relevant articles and reviews: A Partial Response to My Critics, in After MacIntyre, edited by John Horton and Susan Mendus, 1994, 283--304; An Interview for Cogito, in The MacIntyre Reader, edited by Kelvin Knight, 1998, 267--275; Some Enlightenment Projects Reconsidered, in Questioning Ethics: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy, edited by Richard Kearney and Mark Dooley, 1999, 245--257; Epistemological Crisis, Dramatic Narrative and the Philosophy of Science, in Monist, 1977, 453--472; The Nature of the Virtues: From Homer to Benjamin Franklin, in Hastings Center Report, 11, 1981, 27--34. We also study some works about MacIntyre with specific reference to his virtue theory. Of particular relevance are After MacIntyre: Critical Perspectives on the Work of Alasdair MacIntyre, edited by John Horton and Susan Mendus, 1994; Alasdair MacIntyre Critic of Modernity, by Peter McMylor, 1994; and The MacIntyre Reader, edited by Kelvin Knight, 1998. Furthermore, we examine some of the writings of Charles Taylor, Jerome Schneewind, David Miller, and Elizabeth Frazer in their critique of MacIntyre. Our secondary sources include the works of other contemporary virtue ethicists, such as Virtues and Vices by Philippa Foot, 2002; Modern Moral Philosophy, in Philosophy, 33, 1958, by Elizabeth Anscombe; and On Virtue Ethics, 2001, by Rosalind Hursthouse in order to consider their contributions and how they have influenced MacIntyre. We examine some of the ethical writings of Aristotle and Aquinas relating to virtue and some relevant writings of the Enlightenment philosophers to which MacIntyre makes reference in his critique of their projects. Finally, we study some critiques of MacIntyre's virtue ethics insofar as they impinge on his confrontation with the Enlightenment project.

1.1.5. THE STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF THE WORK

This research work is divided into three parts, each in relation to MacIntyre's virtue theory and his confrontation with the Enlightenment projects. Each of the three parts is made up of four chapters.

Part One: This part of our work examines the history of the development of virtue theory from the ancient Greek period up to MacIntyre. The first chapter considers virtue in the era of ancient philosophy with specific emphasis on Aristotle. The second chapter treats of virtue in the era of medieval philosophy with special reference to St. Thomas Aquinas. The third chapter looks at virtue in the modern era of philosophy. Due to historical factors, virtue theory did not receive in the modern era the prominence it had in the previous eras. Thus, this chapter seeks to identify some of the factors that, according to MacIntyre, led to the decline of the medieval doctrines of virtue. These factors he identifies with the rise of rationalism, empiricism, transcendentalism, and idealism. The fourth chapter examines virtue in the contemporary era of philosophy. In this examination, our thesis considers various contemporary attempts at a revival of medieval ethical principles. This includes the contributions of Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, and Rosalind Hursthouse.

Part Two: This part of our research gives a presentation of MacIntyre's view of the Enlightenment project and the contemporary moral situation. The first chapter of this part discusses the Enlightenment project itself. It analyzes its background and the historical development. It also considers some of the factors that led to the project. These, among others, include the Renaissance, humanism, and the scientific and the Protestant revolutions. The second chapter in this part discusses MacIntyre's view of the Enlightenment project of justifying morality with specific reference to Hume, Diderot, Kant, and some post-Enlightenment philosophers, such as Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. The third chapter studies MacIntyre's view of the contemporary moral situation. This entails a consideration of his analysis of the contemporary situation of morality, taking into consideration the characteristics of the contemporary moral debate and factors responsible for contemporary moral disorder. The fourth chapter examines the consequences of the failure of the Enlightenment project. This failure manifests itself, according to MacIntyre, in diverse ethical theories---utilitarianism, intuitionism, pragmatism, and emotivism---and in the changing conception of virtue among some contemporary thinkers, such as John Rawls and Robert Nozick, who, unlike Foot, Anscombe, and Hursthouse, do not complement MacIntyre's virtue theory but stand in contrast to it.

Part Three: This section of our work looks into MacIntyre's attempt at reviving medieval virtue ethics, which involves his reconstruction of virtue theory and our appraisal of his reconstruction. The first chapter of this section is a presentation of MacIntyre's conception of virtue as an attempt to remedy the failure of the Enlightenment project. His definition of virtue evolves through three stages. In the first stage, he defines virtue in relation to practice. In the second, he defines it in relation to historical narrative, and in the third, he defines it in relation to tradition. However, MacIntyre's definition of virtue as found in After Virtue is complemented by his subsequent explanations in his Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, and Dependent Rational Animal. The second chapter undertakes a resume of Dependent Rational Animal in order to establish in detail the necessity of virtue for human beings. In this chapter, we present MacIntyre's fourth and final stage of his definition of virtue from the background of his teaching on man as a dependent rational animal. The third chapter of this section gives an appraisal of MacIntyre's theory of virtue. This explores the various reactions of some virtue ethicists to his theory of virtue. It takes into consideration some criticisms leveled against him by moral philosophers, such as Jerome Schneewind, Charles Taylor, David Miller, and Elizabeth Frazer and Nicola Lacey. It also gives MacIntyre's own reaction and response to these criticisms. The fourth and ultimate chapter presents our appraisal of his theory of virtue in his confrontation with the Enlightenment project. This appraisal involves an assessment of MacIntyre's analysis of the contemporary moral situation, an assessment of the accuracy of MacIntyre's critique of the Enlightenment, an assessment of the inner coherence of MacIntyre's own theory of virtue, and an assessment of his virtue theory vis-à-vis the traditional Aristotelianism and Thomism.

1.1.6. EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION

Our general conclusion offers an evaluation of MacIntyre's theory of virtue in confrontation with the Enlightenment philosophers in the light of his contribution to the overall discipline of virtue ethics. Through this evaluation, we are able to discover some deficiencies in MacIntyre's theory of virtue. We realize that MacIntyre's theory of virtue, which was meant to restore the Aristotelian-Thomistic virtue tradition that was destroyed by the Enlightenment projects, is limited to the acquired human virtues. His accounts are philosophically developed, and his arguments are often valid and sound. However, we think that an exclusively philosophical theory of virtue does not present an adequate account of virtue. This is because of the fact that virtue, understood as such, is not an exclusively philosophical notion. There is need, therefore, to complement MacIntyre's philosophical theory of virtue with some theological underpinnings. This is possible since theology is not opposed to philosophy and man, who is the subject of virtue and is both a philosophical and theological being. Moreover, even as a philosophical being, man has some access to God through the light of his natural reasoning. From our inquiry, it is evident that human virtue has both the dimension that is acquired by human natural endowment through the constant choice and practice of good deeds and the dimension that is transcendent.

Based on this fact, we have attempted to offer a definition of virtue that is integral in the sense that it incorporates the humanly acquired and transcendent dimensions of virtue. This takes into consideration the anthropological, metaphysical, psychological, and theological dimensions of the human person. Such a definition complements MacIntyre's rather narrow philosophical theory of virtue and seeks to bring out an adequate account of virtue as a way of restoring the medieval ethical principle that seems to offer a more adequate notion of virtue, which was neglected by the Enlightenment project.

PART ONE

A BRIEF SURVEY OF VIRTUE LEADING UP TO MACINTYRE

The first part of our thesis is focused primarily on a historical development of virtue leading up to MacIntyre. It is divided into four chapters. The first chapter examines virtue from the era of ancient philosophy. In this epoch, our concentration is on Aristotle as one of those whose virtue ethics provided the background to MacIntyre's theory of virtue. The second chapter deals with virtue in the medieval era of philosophy. Here, we dwelt more on St. Thomas Aquinas's virtue ethics as another major source of MacIntyre's theory of virtue. The third chapter explores virtue in the era of modern philosophy. Here, our emphasis is on the various factors that led to the decline of medieval virtue ethics. The fourth chapter looks at virtue in the era of contemporary philosophy. In this context, our priority is on the different attempts made by various contemporary virtue ethicists to revive the medieval ethical principles.

PART ONE

CHAPTER ONE

VIRTUE IN THE ERA OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY

INTRODUCTION

The era of ancient philosophy is outstanding in the history of the development of virtue theory. Ancient philosophy is rooted in ancient Greek civilization. Greek epic poets and playwrights, such as Homer and Sophocles, painted the morality of their heroes and antiheroes in terms of their respective virtues and vices. The philosophers in this era of human civilization, whose moral teachings still have immense influence, were notably Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics.

In contemporary research on Socrates (469--399 BC), there has been a shift of emphasis from his method of philosophizing to the content of his philosophy. He is regarded by contemporary historians as the first philosopher who definitively placed the soul at the center of the intellectual and moral life of man.³⁸ In Plato's Protagoras, Socrates identifies happiness with pleasure, and he explains the various virtues as instrumental means to pleasure. Having a virtuous character is a matter of being knowledgeable about what brings us more pleasure rather than less.³⁹ Socrates identified virtue with knowledge, which covers practical knowledge, art (technē),⁴⁰ wisdom (sophia),⁴¹ and theoretical knowledge (epistēmē).⁴² Accordingly, such knowledge enables man to perfect his soul, to achieve his proper end, and to attain the happiness that he is destined to enjoy. Knowledge for Socrates is the mainspring of virtue, just as ignorance is the source of every form of vice. Virtue enables one to act correctly, and the absence of this leads to evil.⁴³ Socrates taught the doctrine of the unity of virtues. To have one virtue is to have all virtues. For instance, he argued that to be wise is to be temperate.⁴⁴

Frederick Copleston explains that Plato's (428--347 BC) ethics is eudaemonistic, implying that it is directed towards the attainment of man's highest good, which is happiness. This highest good consists in the true development of his personhood as a rational and moral being, the right cultivation of his soul, the general harmonious well-being of his life.⁴⁵ Following Socrates, his master, Plato tried to give a response to the question of the relation between excellences of character (aretai) and happiness (eudaimonia). Both concepts, for him, are inseparably linked. While happiness is the final end of action and constitutes success in life,⁴⁶ the virtues of characters are the practice of acting or dispositions to act in a determinate way defined by a rule.⁴⁷ Plato's conception of aretē is very broad. It refers to the excellence or goodness of anything: objects or animals. In each case, it means that state or the property of the said object or animal that makes it good. In regard to man, his aretē includes being intelligent, well-born, and courageous as well as being just and sexually well-behaved.⁴⁸

Both Plato and Aristotle argue that virtuous character requires a distinctive combination of cognitive and affective elements. In the Republic, Plato divides the soul into three parts and gives to each a different kind of desire (rational, appetitive, and spirited). As types of nonrational desire, appetitive and spirited desires can conflict with the rational desires about what contributes to the overall good, and they are capable of sometimes moving one to act in ways contrary to the greater good. This gives rise to a situation of incontinence. To be virtuous, then one must both understand what contributes to the overall good and have his or her spirited and appetitive desires educated properly so that they agree with the guidance provided by the rational part of the soul. For Plato, virtue is an exclusive activity of the rational part of the soul.⁴⁹ In his Republic, he originated the doctrine of the four cardinal virtues: wisdom (sophia), as a virtue of the rational part of the soul, is the quality of reason that grasps theoretical and practical truth; courage (andreia), of the spirited part, holds fast to reason's guidance in the face of fear; temperance (sophrosunē), consists in the union of the spirited and appetitive parts under the rule of reason; and justice (dikaiosunē), consists in the fact that every part of the soul performs its proper task in due harmony.⁵⁰

The Stoic school of philosophy flourished for about five centuries, from about 300 BC to the second century AD. Its guiding principles throughout its history are nature and reason.⁵¹ Their view of aretē was close to that of Socrates, but they reach it through agreement with Aristotle. For the Stoics, philosophy was "primarily concerned with conduct. The end of life, happiness (eudaimonia) consists in virtue, i.e. in the natural life or life according to nature or the agreement of human action with the law of nature or of the human will with the divine Will."⁵² Living in accordance with