Philosophical Semantics and Term Meaning

By Charles Schlee

In this book the author presents a meanings-as-entities view of term meaning utilizing set theory. In doing so the author discusses limitations of customary formal semantic theories, argues for the primacy of term meaning, provides an account of analyticity based on synonymy, discusses possible-worlds semantics, provides a defense of our traditionaland common-senseview of meanings as entities, and sketches an approach to bridging the gap between formal semantics and natural language. The author discusses the views of many philosophers, including Carnap, Donnellan, Hintikka, Kripke, Linsky, Quine, Russell, and Searle.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Xlibris US
• Release date: May 3, 2012
• ISBN: 9781469126487

Charles Schlee

Charles Schlee has a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Kansas, an MBA from Rockhurst University, and an M.S. in counseling psychology from Avila University. Dr. Schlee was involved in academic philosophy for nearly a decade, then worked in information systems for over twenty years, and has worked as a professional counselor in recent years. Dr. Schlee’s lifelong interests are languages, writing, and philosophical psychology.

Book preview

Copyright © 2012 by Charles Schlee.

Library of Congress Control Number:       2012906940

ISBN:         Hardcover                               978-1-4691-2647-0

                   Softcover                                 978-1-4691-2646-3

                   Ebook                                      978-1-4691-2648-7

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the copyright owner.

This book was printed in the United States of America.

To order additional copies of this book, contact:

Xlibris Corporation

1-888-795-4274

www.Xlibris.com

[e-mail]

113294

Contents

Preface

Introduction

Chapter 1

Chapter 2

Chapter 3

Chapter 4

Chapter 5

Chapter 6

Chapter 7

Chapter 8

Chapter 9

Notes

Bibliography

Preface

In 1976 I completed a dissertation on Bertrand Russell’s theory of definite descriptions. In my dissertation I supported Russell’s critique of complete-symbol theories of definite descriptions (his critique of theories that construe definite descriptions as standing for something) as well as Russell’s own account of definite descriptions. What I did not address in my dissertation was the notion of a proposition in whose verbal expression a definite description occurs. Propositions seemed clearly to be something other than sentences, yet I had no clear idea of what they were.

After completing my dissertation I became interested in the analytic-synthetic distinction and researched it for several years. In the course of my research on this distinction it became clear to me that term meaning was at the heart of this distinction. And so I proceeded to develop a theory of term meaning utilizing set theory since this seemed like my best chance to achieve reasonable clarity and avoid criticisms based on alleged obscurity.

Once I achieved what I thought was reasonable clarity concerning term meaning, I proceeded to develop a corresponding account of sentence meaning. And in doing so I quickly realized how close my views were to those of Russell on the topic of definite descriptions. It was in my account of sentence meaning that I was finally able to achieve clarity regarding what propositions might be plausibly taken to be.

I was also much impressed with John Searle’s work on illocutionary acts, and so it was important to me not just to develop a semantic theory, but to integrate semantic considerations with the illocutionary forces operative in the actual contexts in which language is used.

So this analysis is an outgrowth of several interests: Russell’s theory of definite descriptions and the implicit notion of a proposition, the analytic-synthetic distinction, and Searle’s theory of illocutionary acts.

In pursuing these interests, I was inevitably pulled into other related topics, such as possible worlds and possible objects as well as Willard Van Orman Quine’s critique of meaning.

I brought these ideas together in such a way as to provide a defense of the traditional notion of meanings as entities for, as I have analyzed them, term meanings—and meanings in general—are entities: set-theoretic constructs.

I pursued this research until late 1989 when, not yet successful at getting the research published, I decided it best to turn my attention to other interests. I have not actively pursued this research since, yet I think it has sufficient merit to warrant a summary of key ideas.

The following analysis is a result of 15 years of research in philosophical semantics, the study of meaning from a philosophical perspective. And this analysis invites the reader to reconsider the traditional view of meanings as entities.

Kansas City, Missouri Charles Schlee

February 2012

Introduction

This analysis is about term meaning. A singular term, such as ‘Mary’, singles out—or at least purports to single out—a specific object. A general term, such as ‘rabbit’, singles out—or at least purports to single out—a group of objects. These are the most obvious kinds of terms. However, for the purposes of this analysis, we will use the word ‘term’ very broadly to include any word or phrase that singles out—or at least purports to single out—an object, a group of objects, or objects related in some way. So, for example, we will also treat verbal expressions as terms. We will treat ‘is identical to’ as a term that singles out all self-identical pairs and ‘believes’ as a term that singles out believer-belief pairs. So for the purposes of this analysis, a term is any expression that singles out or purports to single out irrespective of what is singled out or whether what is singled out even exists.

There is a long-standing tradition in philosophy that terms have meanings, and that these meanings are entities of some sort. This tradition is the meanings-as-entities view of term meaning. And within this tradition, the term ‘bachelor’, for example, might be taken to mean ‘being unmarried, adult, male, and human’; and this meaning would be viewed as some sort of special entity, such as an idea or concept. Various philosophers have presented—or a least suggested—such a view.

In his Republic Plato has stated: We are in the habit, I take it, of positing a single idea or form in the case of the various multiplicities to which we give the same name.¹ This passage suggests that we give a name to certain multiplicities in virtue of an idea or form. The Kneales have interpreted this passage to mean the Form is a character or set of characters common to a number of things, i.e., the feature in reality which corresponds to a general word.² A further paraphrase would be: a term applies to objects in virtue of those objects exhibiting certain features. These features are what would commonly be called the term’s ‘meaning’. So Plato’s remark suggests a view according to which a term’s meaning consists of features; and a term—say, ‘bachelor’—applies to an object because that object has those features—say, being unmarried, adult, male, and human. More briefly, term meaning consists of the features in virtue of which a term applies to an object.

In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Locke has stated: Words become general by being made the signs of general ideas: and ideas become general, by separating from them the circumstances of time and place, and any other ideas that may determine them to this or that particular existence. By this way of abstraction they are made capable of representing more individuals than one, each of which having in it a conformity to that abstract idea . . . .³ This passage suggests that a general term is a sign of a general idea which represents various individuals having a conformity to that idea. Again, a general term expresses or means an idea which represents objects. And the intended connection between word and object is that a general term applies to an object just in case that object conforms to the idea which is that term’s meaning. Expressed non-ideationally, a general term’s meaning is some sort of entity such that the term applies to an object just in case the object conforms to that entity. If we read Locke’s ‘general idea’ as ‘features’, Locke’s view becomes: term meaning consists of the features in virtue of which a term applies to an object.

In discussing names Mill has stated: "The word white denotes all white things, as snow, paper, the foam of the sea, etc., and implies, or in the language of the schoolmen, connotes, the attribute whiteness. The word white is not predicated of the attribute, but of the subjects, snow, etc.; but when we predicate it of them, we convey the meaning that the attribute whiteness belongs to them.⁴ This passage exemplifies what Mill calls a ‘connotative term’: one which denotes a subject and implies an attribute."⁵ And Mill claims that a connotative term implies or connotes an attribute and such a term applies to an object just in case that object has that attribute. Construing attributes as features, Mill’s view becomes: the meaning of a connotative term consists of the features in virtue of which that term applies to an object.

And Frege has stated in On Sense and Nominatum: The regular connection between a sign, its sense and its nominatum is such that there corresponds a definite sense to the sign and to this sense there corresponds again a definite nominatum.⁶ This remark applies to what Frege calls a ‘proper name’, whose nominatum accordingly is a definite object.⁷ And Frege claims that a sense corresponds to a proper name and a nominatum corresponds to a sense—or, stated more simply: a proper name has a sense and this sense designates an object. According to Frege’s view, in a sense is contained the manner and context of presentation of an object.⁸ So on Frege’s view, a proper name has a sense and this sense designates an object of which that sense is the manner and context of presentation. Moreover: "We let a sign express its sense and designate its nominatum."⁹ So for Frege, a proper name designates (applies to) an object just in case the sense of that name is the manner and context of presentation of that object. If we construe Frege’s senses as features, Frege’s view becomes: the meaning of a proper name consists of the features in virtue of which that name applies to an object.

We have briefly considered isolated passages from Plato, Locke, Mill, and Frege with no intention of characterizing their philosophies of language, but only with the intention of noticing that a certain theme runs throughout their otherwise disparate views. This theme is not explicitly stated by any of them yet is implicit in their views on term meaning, for we arrive at this theme by abstracting from their views in such a way as to retain only what they have in common. And this theme is simply that a term’s meaning consists of the features in virtue of which that term applies to an object. What these features might be taken to be—forms, ideas, attributes, senses—is a separate issue, although the present analysis will utilize the more contemporary notion of set-theoretic construct.

None of these views involved any kind of appeal to possible worlds. Regardless of how attractive any one of these philosophers might have found an appeal to alternative possible worlds, all of their views were in fact expressed without making any such appeal and without suggesting a need for such appeal. So their views on term meaning may be characterized as intra-world views, emphasizing the fact that with our attention wholly limited to some given world, we must still make sense of term meaning, and we must do so regardless of whether there even are any alternative possible worlds.

The views we have considered represent a certain historical tradition. Each of these views has construed term meanings as entities that in some way single out objects.¹⁰ We will call such singling out ‘determination’. We may summarize this historical tradition as the view that term meanings are intra-world determinative entities constituting the features in virtue of which terms apply to objects.

This historical tradition is an encapsulation of semantic common sense, for according to semantic common sense, words and expressions have meanings and, to common sense, this implies that meanings are something which words and expressions have, that meanings are entities of some sort. Moreover, these meanings consist of features, exhibitable in a given situation, in virtue of which a word or expression is or is not applicable to a given object in that situation. One meaning of ‘bachelor’ consists of being human, adult, male, and not yet married, since these are the features in virtue of which ‘bachelor’ (in one sense) applies or fails to apply to a given object in a given situation. So the meanings of words and expressions are determinative. And these meanings are intra-world, since they capture features relative to a given situation, a given world.

Despite the longevity and deep-rootedness of its appeal, this view of term meaning has been severely criticized since Quine’s Two Dogmas of Empiricism,¹¹ in which Quine has pointed out that, as typically construed, term meanings are obscure. Historical accounts of term meanings have construed them as forms, ideas, attributes, senses; and the obscurity of the latter notions has left the notion of term meaning correspondingly obscure. Yet the late nineteenth century gave us a useful and important intellectual tool, set theory, which, when suitably constrained, is (as far as we know) free of paradox.¹² In subsequent chapters we will show how set theory may be used to provide a rigorous analysis of intra-world term meaning capturing the traditional view. While Quine’s criticisms appear to refute pre-set-theoretic views of intra-world term meaning, they do not refute set-theoretic views. Of course, this claim requires proof, and furnishing such proof is one of the primary purposes of this analysis.

Alston has criticized entitative views of term meaning on the grounds that asking what kind of entity a meaning is involves a formal defect.¹³ Alston argues that ‘procrastinate’ means ‘put things off’; so if the meaning of ‘procrastinate’ were an entity, then by engaging in the activity of putting things off (which I sometimes do), I would, ex hypothesi, be engaging in the meaning of ‘procrastinate’ (which I never do, since it doesn’t make any sense!); and from this Alston concludes that "it is impossible to identify the meaning of a word with any entity not