Nasa New Millennium Problems and Solutions

By Don A. Nelson

THIS BOOK PREDICTED COLUMBIA DISASTER.. NASA New Millennium Problems and Solutions is a wake up call about the dire conditions of the U.S. space transportation program. NASAs management philosophy of faster, better, cheaper has resulted in the Agency trying to do, too much... with too little... too fast. The space programs momentum has been eroded by NASAs numerous project failures, cost overruns, and mismanagement. NASAs space transportation operations have been compromised to the point where serious safety conditions exist. Astronauts, ground personnel, and even the general public are exposed to unsafe flight operations. This book examines the following daunting questions:

Why isnt the Space Shuttle safe?

Why doesnt the Space Shuttle have a crew escape system?

What happened to NASAs commercial Space Shuttle?

Will the International Space Station be worth the cost?

Was the X-33/VentureStar launch project a $1 billion blunder?

Are the proposed X-33 population over-flight tests safe?

Will the human exploration of Mars be postponed for decades?

Is there light at the end of this dark tunnel?

This book gives the reader with an insiders knowledge of decisions that have placed the future of the U.S. space transportation programs in grave peril. It is a compelling reading for the space enthusiast, the aerospace professional community, those seeking aerospace careers, and political supporters and opponents of the space program.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Xlibris US
• Release date: Jun 27, 2001
• ISBN: 9781462836475

Don A. Nelson

Don A. Nelson is an aerospace consultant and writer. He retired from NASA in January 1999 after 36 years with the Agency. He participated in the Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, and Space Shuttle Projects as a mission planner and operations technologist. Mr. Nelson was a supporting team member for the first rendezvous in space, first manned mission to the moon, first manned lunar landing, and the first flight of the Space Shuttle. During his last 11 years at NASA, he served as a mission operations evaluator for advanced space transportation projects.

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Copyright © 2001 by Don A. Nelson.

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This book was printed in the United States of America.

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Contents

Preface

Introduction

1-The New NASA

2-Here an Astronaut.. There an Astronaut.. Everywhere an Astronaut

3-Is the Space Shuttle Safe?

4-International Space Station … Worth the Cost?

5-NASA’s Failed Space

Shuttle Replacement Program X-33 / VentureStar

6-Human Exploration of Mars—Still A NASA Management Fantasy

7-Light at the End of the Tunnel?

Appendix

Endnotes

SPEAK OUT… OR FOREVER SUFFER THE

CONSEQUENCES OF REMAINING SILENT!

Preface

I wrote this book because I believe it was my duty to alert the American public about the perilous condition of our Nation’s space transportation programs. Writing this book was an extremely difficult decision for me. In January of 1999, I retired from NASA after 36 years as an aerospace engineer. The first 25 years were the glory years of NASA. I had the privilege and honor to be a team member of the Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, and Space Shuttle projects. There are no words to adequately describe the feelings that I have for being a contributor to these fantastic achievements. Unfortunately there are words to define the last 11 years of my NASA experiences … disillusionment, despair, and disgust! When I signed my retirement papers on my last day at the NASA-Johnson Spacecraft Center, I had to bite my lip to keep from crying, as I thought of what we had been … and what we have become. This book is about my last 11 years at NASA … and what NASA has become.

I am deeply indebted to my aerospace colleagues who have encouraged and contributed to this book. If you are a student considering a career in aerospace, a NASA or contractor employee, a political space program support or detractor, or someone who always been fascinated by space exploration, then this book is one you must read.

Introduction

NASA … You Have a Problem… and that problem is MANAGEMENT!

This book is a wake-up call to NASA management, the space industry, political leaders, and the general public to face the reality that this Nation’s space transportation programs are in serious trouble. Just consider the following:

•   This Nation is no longer the leader in providing launch services to the commercial payload market. Over 70 percent of all commercial payloads are now launched on foreign launch vehicles.

•   The Space Shuttle program is an entrenched government jobs’ program, where a single launch cost can exceed $500 million. Efforts to commercialize the launch system are sidetracked by NASA Shuttle managers. This aging fleet has been sending warning signals of another disaster, however NASA management refuses to believe that a crew escape module is a mandatory safety requirement.

•   The Space Station Freedom program was canceled after wasting over $11 billion. Its replacement, the International Space Station is already behind schedule and over budget. If allowed to proceed as planned, it will cost over $94 billion and create another government jobs’ program.

•   NASA’s planned Space Shuttle replacement, the X-33 / Venture Star launch vehicle program is a billion dollar blunder. It also had the potential to be a major public disaster if the flight testing had been conducted over populated areas.

•   The two Mars Surveyor 98 missions failed because of NASA mismanagement.

•   A NASA lunar exploration program does not exist. Lunar exploration is now left to be conducted by the European, Chinese, and Japanese space agencies.

•   NASA’s failure to reduce the cost and improve the reliability of space transportation has slowed the effort for deep space robotics explorations and has postponed manned Lunar and Mars explorations for decades.

•   NASA’s space research funding is only 10 percent of the budget. Without space research the Agency is stranded with obsolete technologies.

The casual reader may mistake this strong condemnation of NASA’s management as just the angered ravings of a former NASA engineer. Hopefully, the studious reader will recognize that this book reveals serious flaws in the management of this Nation’s space transportation programs. Hopefully the studious reader will be a mechanism in correcting these flaws.

No individuals will be identified in this book, except those listed in publicly issued statements. The objective of this book is not to determine who has been at fault. The objective is to reveal the problems and seek solutions.

1-The New NASA

Hodge Podge: any jumbled mixture; a medley; a mess … the New NASA.

The American space transportation industry is floundering. Numerous attempts by government agencies, aerospace societies, and the aerospace industry have been made to correct this dire situation. These attempts and those being considered have all failed (or will fail) because they have not correctly identified and coordinated comprehensive priorities for the near and long range development of the space transportation system. In other words, there has never been a feasible and realistic concept for a space transportation system roadmap. A consistent roadmap that allowed all involved participants to focus their resources on the solutions for reliable and efficient delivery of payloads to space. Consider the following:

Chronological Development of the American Space Transportation System (1972—Present)

1972—Decision was made to build Space Shuttle to launch all government payloads. Commercial payloads were to be flown on a space available basis. Decision to fly commercial pay-loads was made to reduce costs of launch operations. 1979—European Space Agency (ESA) began flight of their Ariane expendable launch vehicle in December.

1980—   Arianespace,   created in March 1980 as a private stock company by European aerospace firms, banks, and the French space agency to market Ariane launch services.

1981—   April   12, first Space Shuttle flight.

1984—Space Station Freedom program started.

1984—   May,   Arianespace first commercial mission, the U.S. Spacenet 1 satellite.

1985—   Arianespace   held firm orders for orbiting thirty satellites and had options for launching twelve more. Arianespace marketing combined the best of both worlds: the marketing freedom of a private company, plus the direct support of government agencies.

1985—   McDonnell   Douglas Delta commercial launch services protests Arianespace pricing policy. President Reagan determined that the pricing and subsidy practices of Arianespace were neither unreasonable nor a restriction on U.S. commerce, because Arianespace practices were not sufficiently different from those of the United States Shuttle to warrant action under the Trade Act of 1974.

1986—   January   26, the Space Shuttle Challenger exploded during launch. Shuttle grounded for nearly three years.

1986—Shuttle failure requires Air Force to upgrade Titan expendable launch vehicle system. Designation, Titan IV.

1986—National AeroSpace Plane (NASP), a reusable, air-breathing single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) technology demonstrator project started as a joint effort of NASA and the Department of Defense.

1988—Europe, Japan, and Canada join Space Station Freedom project.

1988—   September,   Space Shuttle returns to flight status. Executive Order prohibits any commercial payload flights. Launch costs now approach a staggering $500 million per flight. The Space Shuttle launch system has become a government jobs program for 24,000 employees.

1989—   Titan   IV first launch. Project development cost was over $10 billion and launch cost exceeds $300 million per flight. Vehicle reliability is suspect.

1989—   Studies   conducted for the Advanced Launch System ( also called the National Launch System) proposed an advanced expendable launcher capable of putting heavy NASA, military, and commercial payloads into orbit. Funding rejected by Congress because it was too costly to develop and operate.

1990—   Advisory   Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program (Augustine Committee)¹ stated that, the overall technical base, underpinning the space program has been permitted to languish in terms of funding for several decades. The Committee urged NASA to develop a new unmanned launch vehicle to supplement the Shuttle and to retain the NASP program.

1990—The National Space Council asked the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) to build a technology demonstration reusable single stage to orbit (SSTO) vehicle.

1993—Space Station Freedom program canceled after spending $11 billion. The program was $1 billion over budget and behind schedule. Technology was not a factor in the cancellation. This was a NASA management blunder (Discussed further in Chapter 3).

1993—   President   Clinton invites Russia to join new International Space Station (ISS) project. (Initially called Space Station Alpha)

1994—   NASP   canceled because of serious technology problems which would have resulted in exorbitant development costs.

1995—   NASA   and Russian Space Agency start joint missions to Space Station Mir.

1996—   July,   NASA contracts with Lockheed Martin to build X-33 half scale flight demonstrator to verify feasibility of SSTO shuttle replacement vehicle. Development cost and flight safety issues raised by the author are ignored (Explained in Chapter 5).

1996—The Titan IV launch system has suffered three catastrophic failures since its inception resulting in the loss of billions of dollars of flight hardware and payloads. National security was compromised by the lost of key spy satellites.

1996—Air Force issues contracts for an Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) to replace their existing light, medium, and heavy payloads launch vehicles. Launch cost reduction of at least 25% and increased reliability is the primary design goals. Commercial launches to decrease operations costs were to be encouraged. Commercial payloads on the Space Shuttle are still prohibited.

1998—   Arianespace   offers the Ariane 5 launch system for commercial heavy payloads service. Vehicle cost $9 billion to develop and launch costs are estimate to be $130 million per flight. Arianespace is now in a position to capture the heavy lift payload market. The American heavy lift EELV launch vehicle first flight is still years away and it may not be able to compete with Ariane V.

1999—   Shuttle   safety problems kept fleet grounded most of the year.

1999—Because of development problems the Boeing EELV will not be ready to compete with the Arianespace launch vehicles until the 2001—2002 timeframe. The Lockheed-Martin heavy payload version of the EELV may never be developed because of performance problems. The majority of U.S. commercial satellites are now launched on foreign launch systems.

1999—   November,   the X-33 flight demonstrator suffers a major composite liquid hydrogen tank failure during ground tests. NASA’s $1.3 billion Shuttle replacement program is a failure.

2000—   February,   NASA asks Congress for $2.1 billion for a five year program to upgrade the Space Shuttle fleet. It’s believed the Shuttle fleet will now be required for the next 10 to 15 years.

2000—February, ISS is $1 billion over budget and behind schedule. Russian economic conditions made their continued support questionable. Commercial interest in ISS is lacking. Congress placed budget limits on the station development.

The primary reason for the above failed space transportation programs has been, and continues to be … politics. The politics of the government, the aerospace industry, and especially the politics of those who see their job threatened by change. However, political involvement is a base ingredient for the continued growth of the U.S. space transportation industry. Therefore, the first step in the development and operation of a next generation space transportation system must be to define the near and long range priorities and goals that are politically and economically acceptable to all concerned.

This will not be an easy task because there is a hideous odor permeating the halls of the New NASA. It is the odor of bureaucracy. It is so strong that it has blurred NASA’s vision of where it’s going and how to get there. NASA Administrator, Dan Goldin established a NASA work goal of faster better, cheaper. Instead NASA has assumed too much responsibility and finds itself trying to do; too much, with too little, too fast. The space agency today is a hodge podge of poorly coordinated activities with limited management oversight and is on the verge of losing its creditability.

To understand why it has so difficult to introduce a feasible and realistic concept for the development of the space transportation system the reader must understand how today’s NASA functions. The reader must also be aware of the many internal and external political demands that have weakened NASA’s ability to function efficiently. The rest of this chapter addresses these issues.

The NASA Organizational Structure and Functions

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was established by the Space Act of 1958 and is the Federal Agency responsible for exercising control over aeronautical and space activities sponsored by the United States. At the time the space act was approved, NASA had a clear vision of what its primary responsibility was … land a man on the moon before the Soviet Union. Almost immediately after the first landing on the moon, NASA’s purpose started to blur in the eyes of many. NASA and its many supporters then began a quest to develop a vision for NASA’s future roles. The high development and operating cost of the Apollo Program made it clear that continued human exploration of the moon or starting a Mars program would have to be postponed indefinitely. Many believed the next logical step was to develop a manned space station. The Soviet Union was already directing the role of their space program in that direction. However, NASA management in 1970 realized that to have an enduring space program, the high cost of space transportation must be significantly reduced. NASA’s answer to this dilemma was the Space Shuttle … a fantastic engineering success and a dismal failure in reducing launch costs. NASA’s failure to reduce the space transportation launch cost is the primary reason the Agency has been unsuccessful in so many of its projects.

The New NASA Management System

Image588.JPG

Source: NASA Strategic Management Handbook

The New NASA management system has been structured to meet the requirements of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. This Act requires NASA to submit to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and to congress, a strategic plan and an annual performance plan for the activities in the proposed budget. An attempt is made to define the overall management system in the October 1996 NASA Strategic Management Handbook.² This management handbook identifies the Agency’s four enterprises strategic plans: Space Science, Earth Science, Human Exploration and Development of Space, and Aeronautics and Space Transportation Technology. The goals of these enterprises are to be carried out by NASA Headquarters and the ten field centers. Also identified are 16 Councils and Boards with overlapping functions to assist in achieving the goals of the enterprises. One Board on the organization chart is defined as Other Boards. The management handbook is 39 pages of complex tables, charts, and fine print. There was even a video narrated by Walter Cronkite attempting to explain this puzzling management structure. In the back of the handbook is a concurrence page signed by all

NASA senior managers. This complicated management handbook illustrates the point Dan Goldin issued to all NASA employees shortly after he became NASA Administrator when he said: If you can’t measure it… you can’t manage it.

NASA Headquarters

The NASA webpage³ defines NASA Headquarters as follows: NASA Headquarters Agency Management is the external focal point for accountability and communication for NASA, and functions as a liaison between NASA and its many customers. Here, budget integration, long-term investment strategy, NASA policy and standards, and Agency functional leadership are carried out.

Image595.JPG

NASA Headquarters is comprised of seventeen functional offices and four enterprise offices. The functional offices serve in an advisory capacity to the Administrator and work in partnership with the enterprise offices and the NASA Centers. The functional offices are the office of :

Chief Engineer

Chief Information Officer Chief Technologist Chief Financial Officer Headquarters Operations Equal Opportunity Programs General Counsel Procurement External Relations Management Systems

Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization Legislative Affairs Public Affairs

Safety and Mission Assurance Policy and Plans

The Four Enterprises Offices are:

Space Flight / Life & Microgravity Science & Applications Aero-Space Technology Space Science Earth Science

Before discussing the management functions, it should be known that NASA Headquarters has been in a process of downsizing and has always been in a continuous state of reorganization. It is a rare occurrence for senior NASA technology managers to hold their position more than five years. This is especially the case for the associate administrators in the Enterprise offices. Morale, project management problems, reorganizations, and the temptation to take higher paying contractor jobs are the primary factors for leaving.

In general, for each Headquarters office, there is a corresponding office at every NASA field center. The Headquarters office does not have direct management control of the field center office and must share the management with the field center director. This management arrangement can be very awkward.

NASA has established the four enterprises offices (AeroSpace Technology, Earth Science, Space Science and Space Flight) to function as primary business areas for implementing NASA’s mission. Their mission has been defined as follows:

Aero-Space Technology—The mission of this Enterprise is to pioneer the identification, development, verification, transfer, application and commercialization of aeronautics and space transportation technologies. This effort is coordinated with the FAA, U.S. industry, the Department of Defense, and the university community. The Enterprise consists of five NASA Centers: Ames, Dryden, Langley, Glenn, and Marshall. The Enterprise is managed by the Office of Aero-Space Technology. Earth Science—The mission of the Enterprise, formerly the Mission to Planet Earth Enterprise, is to provide information about Earth’s environment. The mission is to develop an understanding of the total Earth system and the effects of natural and human-induced changes on the global environment. In support of the US Global Change Research Program, NASA has established the following Earth System Science research themes: Atmospheric Chemistry, Hydrological and Energy Cycles, Land Use, Ozone, and Natural Hazards and Solid Earth. The Earth Science Enterprise is managed by the Office of Earth Science.

This research is extremely important, but it does not belong at NASA. NASA should be a source for providing the technologies for studying earth science, not a coordinator of earth science research. This is another major reason NASA is so difficult to manage. Space Flight—The Offices of Space Flight and Life and Microgravity Sciences and Applications has joint management of the Human Exploration and Development of Space (HEDS) enterprise. Their mission is to open the space frontier by exploring, using and enabling the development of space and to expand the human experience into the far reaches of