Venezuelan Insurgency, 1960-1968:: A Successful Failure

By H. Micheal Tarver

Venezuelan Insurgency, 1960-1968: A Successful Failure examines and analyzes the Venezuelan Extreme Left and its activities from the first serious uprising against the government of Venezuelan President Rmulo Betancourt in April 1960 through the Venezuelan national elections of December 1968. As background, an examination of Venezuelan politics begins with the 1899 introduction to power by President Cipriano Castro in order to provide a framework to the development of the political environment from which the prominent insurgency and government leaders emerged. In addition, a summary examination of contemporary global insurgency and terrorism introduces the specific examination of the Venezuelan Extreme Left and the reasons why it viewed guerrilla warfare and urban terrorism as the paths necessary to achieve its goals. The work also undertakes an assessment of the Venezuelan peasantry in order to shed light on the reasons that, in general, they remained loyal to the Venezuelan government rather than support the Left. Finally, the present work presents some conclusions concerning the political impact of the insurgency movement on the Venezuelan democratic process.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Xlibris US
• Release date: Oct 12, 2001
• ISBN: 9781462834600

H. Micheal Tarver

H. Micheal Tarver teaches Latin American History at McNeese State University (Louisiana), and is an adjunct member of the “Grupo de Análisis Socio-Político de Venezuela” at the Universidad de Los Andes (Mérida, Venezuela). Tarver was a 1999 J. William Fulbright Senior Scholar to Venezuela and a 1998 Shearman Research Fellow at McNeese State University, Lake Charles, Louisiana. He is a past Chairman of the Gran Colombian Studies Committee of the Conference on Latin American History, and is the current Secretary of the Southeast World History Association. Tarver has a doctorate in Modern Latin American History from Bowling Green State University (Ohio).

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Copyright © 2001 by H. Micheal Tarver.

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Contents

List of illustrations

Preface

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 2*

POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: 1900-1960

Chapter 3*

INSURGENCY AND TERRORISM IN GLOBAL CONTEXT: AN OVERVIEW

Chapter 4

VENEZUELAN INSURGENCY EFFORTS: 1960-1962

Chapter 5

THE FUERZAS ARMADAS DE LIBERACIÓN NACIONAL AND THE FRENTE DE LIBERACIÓN NACIONAL

Chapter 6

THE FUERZAS ARMADAS DE LIBERACIÓN NACIONAL AND THE DECEMBER 1963 ELECTION

Chapter 7

THE AFTERMATH OF THE 1963 NATIONAL ELECTIONS

Chapter 8

CONCLUSIONS

Endnotes

Bibliography

List of illustrations

Figure 1 Votes Received and Delegates Elected Venezuelan National Constitutional

Assembly (1946)

Figure 2 Votes Received for

Presidency (1947)

Figure 3 Votes Received for

Presidency (1958)

Figure 4 Votes Received for

Presidency (1963)

Figure 5 Votes Received for

Presidency (1968)

Figure 6 Left-Wing Violence-1963

Figure 7 Reported Left-Wing

Violence-1960-1963

TO MY FAMILY

Preface

The 1960s can probably best be summarized by the immortal words of Charles Dickens, it was the best of times, it was the worst of times. The ‘Sixties’ was a world of questions and of answers, a world of challenges and of accomplishments, a world of commitment and of defiance, a world of inclusion and of exclusion, a world of detachment and of attachment, a world of peace and of bloodshed. This bipolar characterization is as true for the impoverished world of Angola, Cambodia, Viet Nam, and Mozambique, as it is for the industrialized world of France and the United States. The 1960s also witnessed movements of decolonization and efforts to create emerging democracies. Few in the 1960s escaped the changes and challenges of the often-rehashed decade.

This present work examines only one small corner of the world in the 1960s: Venezuela. It explores Venezuelan politics and society in the early 1960s, and its countless difficulties with leftist insurgency movements. While the South American nation was not unique in its insurgency problems during the decade, it did serve as an inspiration for many of the Castro-Communist guerrillas who were continuing their struggles worldwide. While some of these leftist movements, such as the Mat Tran Dan Toc Giai Phong Mien Nam (i.e., the Viet Cong) efforts in Southeast Asia, are fairly well known to North American students of history, others like the Frente de Libertagao de Mozambique movement in Africa remain relatively unknown.

The 1960s was a period of national independence, both politically and economically. One problem of the process of gaining independence is that, more often than not, the creation of something new is more difficult that the casting off of the old. In the case of Venezuela, the 1960s was a time of democratic infancy: prior to the December 1 958 elections, the Venezuelan people had only experienced three years of democracy in the 20th Century. Through a general examination of insurgency and terrorism, and a specific examination of the Venezuelan Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional, this work hopes to introduce the reader to at least one aspect of the paradoxical world of the 1960s.

This work also chronicles the completion of a political cycle. A cycle that began in January 1959 when Cuban Premier Fidel Castro (who only weeks before had completed his Cuban Revolution) visited Venezuelan President-Elect Rómulo Betancourt and praised both Betancourt and the Venezuelan people for their struggle against the military dictatorship of Marcos Pérez Jiménez. A cycle that soon witnessed the abandonment of the Castro-Left in Venezuela by President Betancourt and his coalition government. A cycle in which Cuba prepared Venezuelan guerrillas for their mission of overthrowing the democratic governments of President Betancourt and his successor, Raúl Leoni. A cycle that included efforts by Leoni’s successor, Rafael Caldera, to come to terms with the extreme left in Venezuela and to find common ground with both Cuba and the Soviet Union. And finally, a cycle that eventually completed itself under the presidency of Carlos Andrés Pérez, who not only maintained good relations with Fidel Castro, but also worked to reincorporate Cuba into the Western Hemispheric arena.

For the benefit of non-Spanish-speaking readers, English translations are provided the first time the Spanish name of a political party, institution, or government program is mentioned. This project could not have been completed without the help and support of friends and colleagues, and I want to thank Henry Sirgo, Wes Schwemmer Cady and Robert W. Butler for reading various versions of this project and offering insightful comments and suggestions. Any oversights or mistakes in this book, however, are mine and certainly not theirs. A word of acknowledgment also goes to Rathnam Indurthy, Alfredo Angulo Rivas, and Luis Loaiza Rincón, for their efforts in writing selected portions of the manuscript.

Finally, a special note of gratitude goes to Carlos Márquez for his efforts throughout this project, especially his assistance in proofreading translations and in creating the index.

H. Micheal Tarver

Mérida, Venezuela

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

A student of Venezuelan History observes that the country has experienced violence and turmoil for most of its 190 years of declared independence. The country has been governed by twenty-seven different constitutions supporting both dictatorial as well as democratic governments headed variously by juntas, generals and presidents. The Venezuelan experience with democracy and presidents, however, has been only recent, and has invoked much opposition. The first major attempt at democracy in Venezuela came about through the 1945-48 government, known as the Trienio, of the Partido Accion Democrâtica [Democratic Action Party]. The Party could be considered a national revolutionary party in that it strived to bring about fundamental economic and social changes and had a multi-class membership. Accion Democrâtica arose from the student leaders who revolted against the dictatorship of Juan Vicente Gómez (1908-35) and became known as The Generation of ‘28.

After its brief three-year exposure to democracy, a military strongman once again took control of Venezuela. As part of a military junta, Colonel Marcos PérezJiménez entered into his ten-year period (19481958) of political domination. During his years in power, Pérez Jiménez transformed Venezuela into a materialistic country, with Caracas as his showplace. After outright election fraud and financial abuse, the Venezuelan people rose up and ousted Pérez Jiménez in January 1958.

The Pé rez Jimé nez opposition returned Venezuela to a democratic system with the national elections of December 1958. Rómulo Betancourt, the Acción Democrática candidate, won the election and established a coalition government with the two other major parties, the Unión Republicana Democrática [Democratic Republican Union] and the Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente [Committee of Independent Electoral Political Organization]. By 1961, however, Betancourt’s political coalition showed signs of weakness. The Unión Republicana Democrática had left the coalition, largely over the government’s unfavorable attitude toward Cuban Premier Fidel Castro. In addition, intra-party dissension within Acción Democrática led to party fragmentation, resulting in the emergence of a splinter party, the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria [Movement of the Revolutionary Left].

Members of the Partido Comunista de Venezuela [Communist Party of Venezuela], the Unió n Republicana Democrática, and the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria independently began a series of insurgent attacks in hopes of ousting the Betancourt government. By 1962, they adopted guerrilla warfare tactics and urban terrorism. Poorly led and coordinated, the early attempts of the guerrillas failed to effect a change in government. In February 1963, members of the three above-mentioned parties and disgruntled military officers, formed the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional [Armed Forces of National Liberation] in an attempt to stage a unified rural/urban movement against the government. The formation of the organization and its political arm, the Frente de Liberación Nacional [National Liberation Front], eliminated the lack of organization. Many student leaders active in the overthrow of Marcos Pérez Jiménez in January 1958, assumed leadership positions within the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional and the Frente de Liberación Nacional.

The guerrilla movement attempted to forge a revolutionary coalition of students and peasants. One of its primary objectives was the downfall of the Betancourt regime. As part of their plan, the insurgents tried to create a climate of chaos in the cities and countryside, whereupon the military would step in and remove the Betancourt government to protect the lives and property of the Venezuelan people. It would be in this state of chaos that the extreme left intended to move into a position to obtain power in the country. An important ingredient in their formula for the government overthrow was the politicization and recruitment of the peasant population of Venezuela. The peasants were to be both the source of the guerrilla manpower and the source of political support for the new government.

This book will examine and analyze the extreme left and its activities from the first serious uprising against the Romulo Betancourt government in April 1960 through the national elections of December 1968. An examination of Venezuelan politics beginning with the 1899 introduction to power by Venezuelan President Cipriano Castro provides a background to show the development of the political environment from which the prominent insurgency and government leaders emerged. In addition, a summary examination of global insurgency and terrorist movements will introduce the examination of the goals of the Venezuelan extreme left and the reasons it viewed guerrilla warfare and urban terrorism as necessary to achieve its goals. An assessment of the peasantry will also be undertaken to shed light on the reasons they remained loyal to Romulo Betancourt and his government rather than support the extreme left. Finally, the present work will present some conclusions concerning the political impact of the leftist insurgency on the Venezuelan democratic process.

Chapter 2*

POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: 1900-1960

A fundamental turnaround began to take place in Venezuelan political life in 1899, with the emergence of Cipriano Castro and his Revolución Restauradora. Even though Castro fought to defend the principles of federalism, his revolution gave rise, paradoxically, to a heavily centralized Venezuelan State. During Castro’s administration (1899-1908), Venezuela experienced a period of transition whereby it was finally able to forge out of the turmoil of the nineteenth century. This transition would allow the country to enter the twentieth century under an aura of modernization and order. Among the most influential phenomena which forced the country to seize its new modern outlook were the end of political fragmentation, the influx of a forward-looking mentality into leadership roles, and the development of a nationalistic identity.

Castro’s government consisted of a transitional period between the so-called yellow liberalism of the caudillo past and a more participatory government. His tenure was also one of personalism, as well as a regime marred by corruption in top administrative levels. Castro’s liberal Revolución Restauradora [Restorative Revolution] was, in fact, the direct result of the decentralization and turmoil brought about during President Ignacio Andrade’s administration (1898-99), upon the death of General Joaquín Crespo (1898), his most powerful military supporter. The sudden loss of General Crespo’s support, coupled with rising international pressure to repay the country’s foreign debt, led to a period of domestic strife and dissension. This domestic turmoil paved the way for General Castro’s eventual overthrow of the Andrade government.

Under Castro’s banner of radical change, new