Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Morgan, KCB The Planner Who Saved Europe

By John D Gazzelli

History has forgotten Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Morgan, yet without Morgan there would have been no D-Day. In the development and execute of the operational plan that was to become OVERLORD, Lieutenant General Morgan faced numerous challenges, the most pressing being the inability of American and British political and military senior lead

• Language: English
• Publisher: John Gazzelli
• Release date: Jul 6, 2021
• ISBN: 9781638377702

Book preview

Introduction

H

istory remembers 6 June 1944, D-Day, as one of the decisive operations of World War II. History remembers the name of the operation, OVERLORD. History remembers the commanders of OVERLORD, such as General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery, and General Omar Bradley. History forgets Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Morgan. Morgan planned OVERLORD, and if there had been no Morgan, there would have been no D-Day. Not only did Morgan plan the operation, but also for months Morgan orchestrated the efforts to bring OVERLORD to life. Morgan accomplished all this without the benefit of a Supreme Allied Commander assigned to the effort. Yet history has forgotten Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Morgan.

For the studies of OVERLORD, the focus on planning for OVERLORD began when Eisenhower became Supreme Allied Commander in December 1943. Any planning efforts done prior are studied as a whole, with Morgan’s planning efforts meshed with the strategic planning efforts of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the British Chiefs of Staff (BCS). There are few histories that look specifically at Morgan’s plan that he developed in 1943 and how it changed to what was executed in 1944. While Eisenhower and Montgomery had the prerogatives of being the commanders and are remembered for their roles, it was Morgan’s plan they executed, and he receives no credit.

This book will examine Morgan’s central role to OVERLORD from his assignment as the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate) (COSSAC); through the planning of OVERLORD; to operationalizing OVERLORD; and finally, through the handoff to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF).The review of historical records highlight several aspects of Morgan’s accomplishments in light of numerous challenges placed before him. This first challenge was the lack of an identified Supreme Allied Commander capable of advocating for OVERLORD. Without a Supreme Allied Commander, Morgan consistently lost the resourcing battles to other operations.

Another challenge faced by Morgan was the inability of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff and British Chiefs of Staff to come to an agreement on the best strategy to defeat Germany. This dispute carried right through until Eisenhower’s appointment as Supreme Allied Commander. These arguments impacted Allied cohesion, sowing mistrust between the two sides. In this atmosphere Morgan set about to create a true Allied Staff where national interests were secondary to the Allied war effort. Despite all these challenges, Morgan succeeded. Overshadowed by his contemporaries, General Morgan’s role in the shaping, development, and execution of Operation OVERLORD has been forgotten by history, and it was Morgan’s efforts that led to the success of the Allied forces in 1944.

As the 75th anniversary of D-Day approaches, it is important to provide a holistic review of the historical records of Operation OVERLORD. While it is important to note the contributions of Eisenhower and Montgomery, it is also important to note they both inherited a viable plan from Morgan, regardless of the modification done by SHAEF. An examination of the planning that occurred in 1943, led by General Morgan, will allow a fuller understanding of what was achieved in the summer of 1944. Without understanding what Morgan accomplished, a student of World War II cannot truly appreciate the accomplishments of the Allies in the war against Nazi Germany.

Chapter 1

Literature Review

O

peration OVERLORD is a well-documented historical event, with extensive archival, primary, and secondary source materials. The United States National Archives holds the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, COSSAC, and SHAEF, all housed at the National Archives in College Park, MD. In addition to these records are the records of correspondence and memorandums of key participants in OVERLORD held at the Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene, KS. These records include the collection of Major General Ray Barker, Morgan’s deputy at COSSAC, as well as planning documents for OVERLORD from various headquarters. The United Kingdom Archives houses the entire collection of the meetings, correspondence, and memorandums of the British Chiefs of Staff as well as memorandum written by Morgan in his role as COSSAC. All these records provide a near real time understanding of the challenges faced by Morgan and planners to build, shape, and execute OVERLORD.

In an examination of these archival sources, what comes through is not only an understanding of the debates on the strategy for war in Europe between the U.S. and British on the need for a cross-channel invasion, but also the growing animosity between the two sides over the debates. The impact on Morgan was an American side that did not trust him and a British side that abandoned him. Although, in time, Morgan was able to win over the Americans, the same could not be said of his relationship with his British superiors. To the British Chiefs of Staff, Morgan became a Yankee. For the British,

Morgan’s role had to be minimized in their documenting what occurred from 1943‑1944; for the Americans, Morgan was just one part of the larger struggle over strategy. In the years after the war, the literature written of the time only reinforced Morgan being forgotten by history.

The first point to address is the lack of literature specific to General Morgan. There is no biography written about Morgan. The only book length material on Morgan is from his two autobiographies. The first, Overture to Overlord,¹ written after the war, highlights his and the role of COSSAC in developing OVERLORD. He concentrates mostly on the period of his assignment as COSSAC, in April 1943, to when SHAEF became operational in January 1944. He addresses the challenges he faced during that time yet never complains about the circumstances.

Morgan’s other book was a memoir of his life, Peace and War: A Soldier’s Life.² This account does not expand upon what he already wrote in Overture to Overlord but rather highlights the relationships he developed in working with the senior leaders of the American and British Armies. Morgan’s memoir highlights his pro-American bias, and how he enjoyed working with his American counterparts more than having to deal with British military leaders, primarily Field Marshal Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (equivalent to the U.S. Army Chief of Staff), and Field Marshal Montgomery.

Morgan’s actions at COSSAC are documented in archival data. Morgan wrote a weekly summary of events from the time he took on the duties in April 1943 to January 1944. Along with the weekly summaries are the minutes of the various meetings held by COSSAC. Additionally, there are numerous memorandums and correspondence written by Morgan addressing issues related to OVERLORD housed in the U.K. National Archives. These documents provide a detailed accounting of Morgan’s efforts throughout 1943. His only other non-published account was a personal diary¹ he kept of his six week visit to Washington D.C in the fall of 1943, housed at the Imperial War Museum in London, England.

The only historical account specific to COSSAC was compiled by the Historical Section of SHAEF, History of COSSAC, Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander 1943‑1945.² This short 100-page summary addressed the three major plans, including OVERLORD, developed by Morgan and his team. The history briefly discusses how OVERLORD was approved and later modified by SHAEF planners. Finally, two other secondary sources examine the role of Morgan. Both are short accounts written merely to highlight the need for a fuller discussion on Morgan’s involvement. Phillip Green’s chapter Frederick Morgan in Chief of Staff The Principal Officers Behind History’s Great Commanders, Volume 2, World War II to Korea and Vietnam³ and David Zabecki’s article in World War II magazine, Overlooked Overseer,¹ both advocate that Morgan’s role was far more important than history remembers and that his contributions should not be overlooked.

To place Morgan’s accomplishments in their proper historic context, it is important to examine the contrasting opinion on the cross-channel attack from both the American and British perspectives. Both are captured in archival data as well as articulated in the various official histories. On the American side, the arguments focus on the need to ­concentrate all efforts into a cross-channel attack, the earlier the better, while the British argued for attacking Germany through the Mediterranean.

From an archival point of view, these issues are covered in records captured of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff. In addition, the differences of opinions are reflected in the position papers and meeting notes of the various Allied conferences that occurred from 1941 to 1943, at Washington D.C. (1941) Casablanca (1942), Washington, D.C. (1943), Quebec (1943), and finally Cairo/Tehran (1943).²

Continuing these debates, after the war, are the published official histories. On the American side, these events are covered in Maurice Matloff’s two books, The United States Army in World War II: The War Department, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1941‑1942³ and The United States Army in World War II: The War Department, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1943‑1944.¹ Matloff’s accounts focus on the strategic and operational level planning conducted by the American Army during the period of 1941‑1943. He examines the integration and challenges in coalition planning with British forces. Over time, Matloff noted the building animosity of the American planners towards the British planners and the growing belief the British would never conduct a cross-channel attack. Matloff’s views on the works of COSSAC are seen as the bridge between the strategic and tactical.

Arguing the British side are the works by Michael Howard and John Ehraman. Both wrote volumes in the History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series, Grand Strategy, series. In Howard’s book, History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series, Grand Strategy, Grand Strategy, August 1943-September 1944² he covers the period of the end of 1942 through the Quebec Conference in 1943. Howard ­continuously attempts to explain British strategic thinking and argued the importance of the Mediterranean strategy, seeing it as an enabler for OVERLORD. In John Ehraman’s History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series, Grand Strategy, Grand Strategy, August 1943-September 1944³ he does not focus on OVERLORD planning until January 1944, when Montgomery became the operational ground commander. Ehraman examines the revision of Morgan’s plan by Eisenhower and Montgomery without examining Morgan’s original concept and the resource constraints he was under. Ehraman’s account examines the initial planning for OVERLORD in context to impacts on ongoing operations in the Mediterranean.

At the operational level two additional accounts highlight the contrasting views of the Americans and British and how both sides viewed Morgan. For the American perspective, Gordon Harrison’s The United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations, Cross Channel Attack¹ provides an in-depth discussion of the events leading up to the invasion of Northern France, focusing on the numerous Allied planning conferences, the creation and involvement of COSSAC, and highlighting the policy disagreements between the American Army and British Army in their efforts to establish a coherent strategy. On the British side, L.F. Ellis’s History of The Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series, Victory in the West, Volume I, The Battle of Normandy² only presents a brief overview of the events prior to January 1944 and does not delve into discussing the plans until the ground operation was taken over by Montgomery. For the planning stage, Ellis focuses his discussions around Allied unit formations, the assembly of the invasion force, the command structure for the invasion, and how the flow of forces would occur during and immediately after the invasion.

Outside the official history, other historical literature focuses primarily on events after Eisenhower became