The Samora Machel and Helderberg Conspiracies and Other South African Air Accidents

By Roy Downes

The main purpose of this book is to try and convince thinking readers of just how ridiculous are the Conspiracy theories, regarding the accidents to the Tupolev TU-134A aircraft in which the President of Mozambique: Samora Machel, lost his life and the “Helderberg,” the South African Airways Boeing 747 off Mauritius, that accounted for 159 persons losing their lives. There are also examples of other aircraft accidents the author investigated during his role in aircraft accident investigation.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Lulu.com
• Release date: Apr 21, 2020
• ISBN: 9780244574024

Book preview

The Samora Machel and Helderberg Conspiracies and other South African Air Accidents

The author was a licensed aircraft maintenance engineer, a captain on Boeing 707 aircraft and has fourteen years of air accident investigation experience. During that period, he participated in no fewer than 530 investigations. Regrettably, in 106 of these cases there were fatalities.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank all the people mentioned in this book for their input and for those from whom permission has not been formally requested or granted. I sincerely hope they will approve. In particular, I would like to thank my son Walter and Captain John Reid Roland for their invaluable contributions.

The main purpose of this book is to try and convince thinking readers of just how ridiculous the Conspiracy theories are, regarding the accidents to the Tupolev TU-134A aircraft in which the President of Mozambique: Samora Machel, lost his life and the Helderberg, the South African Airways Boeing 747 off Mauritius, that accounted for 159 persons losing their lives.

Some of the photographs too, have been handed down over time and there is no record of when they were taken or by whom. I likewise would hope they will approve.

I would also hope that any General Aviation pilot reader will benefit from the accounts of the light aircraft accidents.

Glossary of Abbreviations and Technical Terms

Units of measurement

In aviation, the units of measurement used are a mixture of metric and other units.

Altimeter settings

The height at which an aircraft is flying may be given as feet AGL, as an altitude (the number of feet AMSL), or as a flight level (FL).

An aircraft’s altimeter is a pressure instrument; it measures the static pressure around the aircraft. To be useful, it is calibrated in feet (or, in some aircraft, meters). The altimeter has a sub-scale on which a pressure datum is set, so that the altimeter reads a height in relation to something.

Aircraft taking off from or landing at a particular aerodrome usually use the barometric pressure at that airfield, reduced to mean sea level according to the ISA formula (see below). When this pressure (known as QNH) is set, the altimeter will read the airfield elevation when the aircraft is on the ground there. Heights indicated when QNH is set are known as altitudes.

Because the barometric pressure at the departure point may well be very different from that at the destination, aircraft flying from one airfield to another, when above a certain level, use the ISA sea-level pressure as the datum. As aircraft above that level are using the standard pressure, they are all at the same indicated heights relative to one another. The level at which the pressure setting is changed depends on the elevation of the airfield in question. Heights indicated when the standard setting is used are known as flight levels. A flight level is shown by the letters FL followed by three numbers. Multiplying the numbers by 100 gives the height that should be indicated. Thus, at FL350, the altimeter will show 350x100 = 35 000 feet.

A barometric pressure setting that may be used (but nowadays is seldom used) is the local actual barometric pressure, known as QFE. When the QFE is set, the altimeter shows the height of the aircraft above the airfield in question.

ISA: international standard atmosphere. Because the air density and barometric pressure vary widely from place to place, a standard for calibration of aircraft instruments is used. This assumes a sea-level barometric pressure of 1013.2 hectopascals, a sea-level temperature of 15°C, and a fall in temperature of 1.98°C per thousand feet, up to a height of approximately 36 000 feet.

Runway designations

Runways are designated by their magnetic headings, rounded off to the nearest 10 degrees, with the last digit omitted. Thus, a runway with a magnetic heading of 067 degrees would be designated runway 07. The same runway, from the other direction, would be the reciprocal heading (247 degrees) and would be designated 25.

Other abbreviations:

NDB: non-directional beacon: a ground-based radio station which continuously transmits a Morse code identification signal. The equipment in the aircraft which picks up the signal from an NDB is called an ADF (automatic direction finder). A pointer, or needle, on a dial in the aircraft points towards the NDB and gives the NDB’s relative bearing – the angle between the aircraft’s heading and the NDB.

VOR: VHF (very high frequency) omni-directional radio range. This is a ground-based station which emits signals referenced to local magnetic north.  A display in the aircraft shows the aircraft’s magnetic direction, or radial, from the VOR. 

ILS: instrument landing system. A ground-based radio installation which indicates the aircraft’s position relative to the centre line of the runway, as well as the position relative to the glide path or descent angle. It is known as a precision approach system. Some ILS systems will enable a suitably equipped aircraft make a fully automatic landing in poor or even no visibility.

DME: distance measuring equipment. Another ground-based radio aid which gives the slant range in nautical miles of the aircraft from the ground station. Many VORs have co-located DMEs.

USG: US gallon(s)

EDP: engine-driven pump (for fuel or hydraulics)

POH: Pilot’s operating handbook

TAS: true airspeed – the speed at which the aircraft is actually moving relative to the air mass that it is in. It is necessary to know the true air speed for navigation purposes.

IAS: indicated air speed – the speed which the pilot sees on the ASI, or air speed indicator. This may or may not be the same as the true air speed. The air speed indicator is a pressure instrument; it measures the pressure difference between the static air pressure (the air pressure around the aircraft) and the dynamic air pressure, the pressure exerted at the open end of the pitot tube. The pitot tube faces forward into the air flow. The greater the forward speed of the aircraft, the greater the pressure. The instrument is calibrated in units of speed (usually in knots, though in some aircraft miles per hour or kilometers per hour are used).

The IAS is only the same as the TAS at sea level, in the International Standard Atmosphere (ISA). Because the air gets less dense with increasing altitude, the aircraft must move actually faster through the air for the same speed to be indicated as at a lower level.

G/S: ground speed. The aircraft’s speed over the surface of the earth. The ground speed is the aircraft’s TAS as affected by the wind speed.

VMCA: a critical speed yaw happens when an engine failure occurs before the aircraft has attained the minimum control speed air when there is insufficient rudder authority to control the yaw that results from an engine failure.

UTC: Coordinated Universal Time (abbreviated to UTC) is the primary time standard by which the world regulates clocks and time.

There are no new causes for accidents only new pilots making the same old mistakes

New Beginnings

The purpose of all air accident investigations is, in accordance with the ICAO (International Civil Aviation Convention) Annex 13, to determine the cause of an accident to prevent a recurrence.  It is NOT TO APPORTION BLAME. Unfortunately, in this day-and-age of litigation at the drop-of-a-hat, it is becoming increasing difficult to adhere to the Annex 13 principle of not apportioning blame.  Nevertheless, as a direct result of Annex 13 and the advent of flight simulators aviation is; without doubt, the safest mode of transport considering that there are about 29000 aircraft airborne at any one time, worldwide.

I left Air Zimbabwe on the 1st November 1984 and four days later, started work with the South African Department of Transport (SADOT) in the Forum Building, in Pretoria. I was allocated an office on the second floor and issued with all the necessary office equipment, which included the obligatory roll of RED tape. To my horror, I discovered that red tape isn’t red at all but a light pink colour. My office looked out onto a solid concrete wall about thirty feet from my desk. After I had settled my few pencils and the roll of pink tape in the desk drawers, I looked out at the wall and reflected, privately bemoaning the fact I had - because of my declining health - been compelled to exchange an office at 39000 feet with the finest possible view, for this. It was like being in some sort of prison.

During a routine aircrew medical in 1980, the doctor found I had a systolic murmur and sent me to a cardiologist. The cardiologist considered me fit to continue flying, conditional on passing a six-monthly stress ECG. By 1984 it was becoming obvious to me that my flying days were numbered, which is why I left the airline and was fortunate enough to be able to join the SADOT. My mitral valve incompetence continued to deteriorate until in 1991, I was sent for an angiogram. Whilst recovering from this procedure, the surgeon, Mr. Mark Stevens, imparted the good news that, if I did not have a replacement valve fitted, I would be dead within a fortnight. Ten days later a ceramic valve was installed that still seems - in 2019 - to be functioning correctly.

Saturday the 10th November dawned, the skies bright and clear. We were in for another scorching; November day and I was looking forward to getting myself settled into my new environment. However, it was not to be. The phone rang. During a training flight, a Cessna 150 had crashed at the Swartkop Air Force base in the Pretoria area. Both occupants had been killed.  I was to attend the investigation but only with observer status, to watch the ‘experts’ at work.

This, I soon learned was to be the pattern of my life for the next fourteen years - not the observer status but the weekends on duty, most accidents occurring during that period. This was to be the first of over 530 accidents I investigated in one capacity or another. More-often-than-not, as the Investigator-in-charge. In all, one hundred and six of these accidents included fatalities. On arrival at the accident scene we found the bodies of the instructor and a student pilot still in the wreckage. This may seem somewhat macabre but whenever possible, it was desirable for the wreckage to be left intact until the arrival of the investigation team. It is extremely important for the investigators to know the exact location of individuals, especially the flight crew, at impact.  Obviously, if there were survivors every effort had to be made to assist them but there were occasions, when the wreckage was disrupted to such an extent by the efforts of the rescuers, it seriously compromised the investigation.

In a country as large as South Africa, most accidents occurred a considerable distance from our home base. Because of the climatic conditions and the time taken to reach accident sites, we often had to rely on photographic evidence to determine the position of casualties in or, as so often was the case, outside the wreckage. The very able South African Police photographers always furnished these photographs. In the accident Cessna, the student correctly occupied the left-hand seat and the instructor the right. It transpired that the instructor had that day, completed a spinning exercise with another student before landing and changing students, with the intention of carrying out further spin training. Even to my unpractised eye, it was apparent that the aircraft had spun into the ground. The ground marks; the difference in the leading-edge damage, between the port and starboard wings, the manner in which the engine bearers and the vertical fin had failed, all clearly indicated the aircraft was spinning to the right at impact. However, the investigator-in-charge was adamant; the spin was to the left.

When the experts had completed their inspection, I was permitted to have a closer look at the wreckage. I found several 9-volt dry cell batteries in the cockpit area. These loose, foreign objects had no place in this cockpit. One of the batteries was firmly lodged under the left-hand rudder pedal, torque tube.  It had a clear mechanical imprint on it, suggesting it may have been in the position in which it was found, in flight.

I wondered why an instructor, who had already carried out a number of successful spin recoveries that day, would suddenly get it wrong.  Could it be that the batteries had perhaps, been placed on the shelf behind the pilots’ seats and then been thrown around the cockpit by the gyrations of the spin? Could the damaged battery have fallen into the rudder-pedal torque tube area and obstructed the amount of left rudder travel available? A rudder input the instructor desperately required to stop the rotation if they were to have any chance of recovery.

When I suggested this to the expert, he hardly considered it. Surely, he reasoned, it should be evident to me; this was no more than pilot error. Whether the spin was to the right or to the left, may seem purely academic but it is not so. The aircraft was spinning to the right and if the left - anti-spin - rudder-pedal travel was obstructed, it would explain why the instructor was unable to stop the rotation and recover from the spin. In my view, the possible cause of this accident was the presence of loose objects in the cockpit, something every pilot is taught to avoid, especially when attempting an unusual manoeuvre such as spinning. This offhanded approach to the investigation and the early difference of opinion did not bode well for the future.

During my days as an investigator, there were some ten thousand aircraft on the South African register. Unfortunately, the attrition rate was high with, on average, an accident occurring every second day. Obviously, the vast majority were very minor in nature but, in terms of the ICAO Annex 13 (the investigation of accidents) they, nevertheless, required investigation. The accidents were mainly confined to the light aircraft of the General Aviation sector as the airlines were quite another matter and had an exceptional safety record.

Over the years came the realization that there were a number of factors applicable to most of these accidents and I chose to categorize them as follows:

Make haste slowly

To begin towards the end of my accident investigation career may seem somewhat strange but the accident I wish to describe, typifies some of the many pitfalls encountered in accident investigation.  More than anything, it aptly illustrates just how pilots can and will, attempt to mislead the investigators, especially when partially responsible for gross negligence. Negligence, that in this case cost the life of another.

At 20:30 on Tuesday 25th August 1998, the phone in my Pretoria home rang urgently, calls at that time of day always seem to have that pressing quality and, for an air accident inspector they usually herald bad news.  This was no exception and I was informed that a turbine powered DC3 - registration letters: ZS-NKK - had crashed at Pretoria’s Wonderboom airport. There were only two-crew members on board, one of whom had been killed.

A large air plane on a runway at an airport Description automatically generated

Dakota ZS-NNH

As Wonderboom was only a twenty-minute drive from my home, I arrived at the accident site at 21:05, to be met by a scene of utter chaos. Every man-and-his wife seemed to be milling around the still smoldering wreckage, obliterating the ground scars which probably were of paramount importance to the investigation.  Yet another of our human failings is we all, at some time or another, are guilty of ‘rubber-necking.’ South Africans have, however, made it an art form and appear to have an unhealthy, morbid fascination with death.  A handful of police were desperately trying to restore some sort of order and when I attempted to add my voice to theirs was told, probably because I was not in uniform, where I could go.

The post impact fire had set the tinder-dry grass alight, adding to the confusion. So intent was the crew of one of the fire tenders on extinguishing the fire in the aircraft, they failed to notice until I pointed it out, the grass burning under their tender. Finally, the police managed to remove most of the spectators and to cordon off the wreckage.  It was only then I learned that one of the pilots, although seriously injured, had managed to escape through the rear door and had been rushed to hospital. The only other occupant, the captain, had lost his life. The body was still in the right-hand seat in the cockpit and I found to my absolute horror, it was that of a well-liked colleague. It was the sixth and, I hope, the last time I have had to assist in the removal of dead friends and colleagues from broken aircraft. I had known the pilot, an experienced instructor, for a number of years when he had been an Operations inspector in the DOT.

A picture containing outdoor, sky, ground, grass Description automatically generated

Once the excitement had died down and most of the onlookers had had their fill, we, the investigation team, started our work.  One of the first things to do at an accident site is to try to ensure that the aircraft is all there, i.e., an in-flight separation of some component has not occurred.  Having satisfied ourselves that the aircraft was certainly intact at the time of impact, we started the detailed investigation.  All the fabric had been burnt off the rudder and elevators but what was rather strange was; the fact that the metal, elevator trim tabs on both elevators were in the fully nose-up position.  We obviously took a keen interest in the tab positions and although the majority of the onlookers had departed the scene, a number of pilots and maintenance engineers remained. One of these must have noticed our interest and conveyed our initial findings to the surviving pilot, before I was able to interview him.

If the elevator trim tab setting was at the full nose up position for the take-off, it was a possible explanation for the accident. The length of the fuselage in the turbine powered DC3 was increased by the insertion of plug, forward of the wing leading edge. As a result, the Centre of Gravity (CG) range differed from that of the standard aircraft. On the latter, the range of movement of the elevator trim was equal and the neutral position was equidistant between fully nose-up and fully nose-down. However, on the turbine DC3, in order to compensate for the increased CG range, the elevator trim settings were modified. Only a limited amount of nose-down trim was necessary but the required nose-up trim travel was well in excess of that on the standard DC3.

The following day we started the in-depth investigation.  While part of my team was photographing the wreckage and recording the remaining ground scars on the accident site plan, I interviewed the operating company’s operations personnel. The aircraft had been operating in Natal and had developed an engine defect and had been flown to Wonderboom for repair. The rectification had taken longer than anticipated and therefore, the crew was late and, in a hurry, to return to Durban. A maintenance engineer, who had rectified the engine defect was one of those present the previous evening, when we had noted the position of the elevator trim tabs. He too, had obviously seen the trim tabs in the fully nose-up position and could well have been noncommittal about the tab positions and we would have been none the wiser. However, he