Pax Syriana: Elite Politics in Postwar Lebanon

By Rola El-Husseini

Pax Syriana provides readers with a broad picture of what has changed, and what has failed to change, in the Lebanese political system after the end of the civil war.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Syracuse University Press
• Release date: Dec 5, 2012
• ISBN: 9780815651949

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Pax Syriana

Modern Intellectual and Political History of the Middle East

Mehrzad Boroujerdi, Series Editor

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Pax Syriana

Elite Politics in Postwar Lebanon

Rola el-Husseini

With a Foreword by Ryan Crocker

Syracuse University Press

Copyright © 2012 by Syracuse University Press

Syracuse, New York 13244-5290

All Rights Reserved

First Edition 2012

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ISBN: 978-0-8156-3304-4

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

El-Husseini, Rola.

Pax Syriana : elite politics in postwar Lebanon / Rola el-Husseini ; with a Foreword by Ryan Crocker. — First edition.

pages cm. — (Modern intellectual and political history of the Middle East)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-8156-3304-4 (cloth : alkaline paper) 1. Lebanon—Politics and government—1990– 2. Lebanon—Politics and government—1975–1990. 3. Lebanon—History—Civil War, 1975–1990—Peace. 4. Lebanon—Foreign relations—Treaties. 5. Ta’if Agreement (1989) 6. Elite (Social sciences)—Political activity—Lebanon—History—20th century. 7. Elite (Social sciences)—Political activity—Lebanon—History—21st century. 8. Lebanon—Foreign relations—Syria. 9. Syria—Foreign relations—Lebanon. 10. Hizballah (Lebanon) I. Title.

DS87.54.E44 2012

Manufactured in the United States of America

To my parents

Rola el-Husseini is a research assistant professor at the Middle Eastern and Middle Eastern American Center, City University of New York–Graduate Center. She has previously held positions at Texas A&M University and Yale University. Her publications have appeared in Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East; the Middle East Journal; Orient; and the Third World Quarterly.

Contents

Foreword, Ryan Crocker

Acknowledgments

Note on Transliteration

Introduction

1. The Lebanese Political System

The Elite Pacts of 1943 and 1989

2. Postwar Elite Interaction

3. Political Parties

4. State Elites and the Legacy of Corruption

5. Strategic Elites

6. Emerging Elites and the Absence of Women from Politics

7. Elite Attitudes on Syria and Sectarianism

Conclusion

Who’s Who of Lebanese Politics

Lebanese Political Timeline (1989–2005)

Notes

Glossary of Arabic Terms

Bibliography

Index

Foreword

Since the start of the civil war in 1975, Lebanon has had an enormous impact on the region and the international community. A series of foreign powers have intervened militarily—the United States, France, Britain, Italy, Israel, and Syria. Sometimes they have come as peacekeepers, sometimes as invaders. Sometimes it is hard to tell the difference. All have departed, many with heavy losses and none with core objectives accomplished, with the partial exception of Syria. Lebanon also hosted a bewildering variety of militia groups, from every Lebanese sect and political faction, virtually the entire Palestinian guerrilla movement, and now one of the most formidable nonstate forces in the world, Hezbollah, which enjoys support from both Syria and Iran.

So Lebanon matters, and it will continue to matter. We ignore it or misunderstand it (which we commonly do) at our grave peril. In this sense, Dr. el-Husseini has done us an enormous service with her groundbreaking book. It is the first to cover the so-called postwar period with scholarly rigor. Her focus on elites is key to an understanding of the complex political landscape of Lebanon. Events and actions can unfold with bewildering rapidity; the dominance of elites is a constant. Her construct of looking at Lebanon as two republics, the first created by the National Pact of 1943 and the second through the Ta’if Agreement of 1989 is extremely useful to the scholar, the practitioner, and the lay reader. Her analysis of Hezbollah draws on sources within the movement and sheds important new light on an organization that is as complicated as it is lethal. And her examination of the Syrian role in Lebanon is more nuanced, detailed, and accurate than anything I have read elsewhere.

I served twice in Lebanon, as political counselor at the American Embassy from 1981 to 1984 and as ambassador from 1990 to 1993. As a practitioner I would have given a great deal for a comprehensive, well-researched, and balanced guide to Lebanon’s chaotic politics. Thanks to Rola el-Husseini, now we have it.

Ryan Crocker

Former US Ambassador to Lebanon

(1990–1993) and Syria (1998–2001)

Acknowledgments

This book took a decade to come to fruition. Originally a dissertation written in French and defended in 2003, it was substantially revised and updated for publication. This work would not have been possible without the help and support of many people—mentors, colleagues, friends, and family. I am indebted to many people for their support, feedback, and guidance throughout the research and writing phase of the dissertation and then the book.

I am especially grateful to all the Lebanese politicians, academics, and journalists who agreed to meet with me in Lebanon. I am honored to have had the opportunity to meet Basil Fuleihan, Gebran Tueni, and Samir Qassir before their untimely deaths. Joseph Alagha and Lara Deeb were two scholars I had the pleasure of meeting while doing fieldwork, and I was delighted to get the chance to read their wonderful books on the Shi‘i community.

Thank you to my friends in Paris, Aliki Angelidou, Adele Thorens, Michela Trisconi, and especially my childhood friend Khaled el-Khatib, for their moral support. I also extend special thanks to the members of the Arab Elites team at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Berlin, especially to Iris Glosemeyer and Saloua Zerhouni. Their comments and feedback were crucial in shaping my thinking on the book, and their friendship made my three years in Berlin much richer. Volker Perthes, who took me on board the Arab Elites team and effectively served as my dissertation adviser, will always have my gratitude and affection. I am also indebted to Ellen Lust, who encouraged me to apply to a postdoctoral position at Yale University. Her friendship in New Haven and that of Hala K. Nassar were lifesavers.

Colleagues and friends in Texas also provided advice and a listening ear when needed. I would particularly like to thank Ryan C. Crocker and Michael C. Desch for their encouragement and mentorship. Harry Berger and Giovanna del Negro, Christopher Menzel and Tazim Jamal, Zulema Valdez and Andrew Yinger, Cara Wallis and John Zollinger, and Rhonda Struminger and Gil Rosenthal entertained me in their homes and provided much-needed solace at times. Ulrike Gretzel and Amanda Stronza were great girlfriends and essential social support.

I am also especially thankful for the work Jesse L. Rester put into copyediting this manuscript. His comments and suggestions were always helpful. Mary Selden Evans, the former Middle East editor at Syracuse University Press, deserves my gratitude for her belief in the importance of this project. Others at Syracuse University Press have also been crucial for the completion of this book. After Mary’s retirement, Kelly Balenske was wonderfully supportive and helpful, and Marcia Hough was always responsive to my queries about the production schedule of the book.

I am deeply appreciative for the encouragement of Mehrzad Boroujerdi and Augustus R. Norton and their comments on sections of this book. Many others, too numerous to name, were instrumental in the writing of this book. I am deeply thankful.

This book would not have been possible without the love and encouragement of my family, especially my mother’s support. She taught me the value of an education for a woman and pushed me to excel and to be resilient in the face of adversity. I would not be where I am without her. I also thank my husband, Wesley R. Dean, for his unflagging support of my academic work. He read many versions of this book and always gave valuable feedback. I would not have completed this book without his occasional prods to go write your book.

Note on Transliteration

A simplified form of the International Journal of Middle East Studies style has been used for transliteration from Arabic throughout the text. No diacritical marks have been used with the exception of the hamza (’) and the ayn (‘). Lebanese names have been written in the most common form found in the Lebanese press in English (for example, Aoun instead of ‘Awn, Geagea instead of Ja‘ja‘, Gemayel instead of Jumayyil, Siniora instead of Sanyura). Names of places have been kept in their common English form: Beirut instead of Bayrut, Tripoli instead of Tarablus, and Sidon instead of Saida.

Introduction

The recent political history of Lebanon has been defined by the legacy of war. In addition to repeated external invasions and the ongoing presence of foreign troops of diverse nationalities, the Lebanese people have endured the scars of a bitterly contested civil war that began in the spring of 1975 and continued unabated for the next fifteen years. Political normality began to be restored only in the closing months of 1989, in the wake of negotiations brokered by Saudi Arabia under the auspices of the larger international community. Representatives of various Lebanese factions convened in the Saudi Arabian city of Ta’if to hammer out a compromise that eventually put an end to active hostilities. The document produced by these negotiations, which came to be known as the Ta’if Agreement, reestablished the same general form of government that had been in place before the civil war—a system in which political representation is apportioned on the basis of religion. In this system of confessional power sharing, an informally designated number of parliamentary seats and ministerial positions are allocated to each of the country’s diverse religious communities: Sunni Muslims, Shi‘i Muslims, Maronite Christians, and Druze, to name just a few of the largest constituencies.¹ Confessionalism has been a feature of Lebanese politics since the country gained its independence in 1943, and this political structure was further institutionalized by the Ta’if Agreement. The seeming intractability of the confessional system, combined with the legacy of ongoing sectarian tension, leads to an important question: does structural confessionalism act to mitigate sectarian tensions in Lebanon by promoting the sharing of power, or does the political structure merely express and exacerbate these tensions by forcing all political interests into sectarian contours?

The Ta’if Agreement also had the notable effect of consolidating the long-standing influence of the Syrian government in Lebanese politics. Syrian influence was deeply embedded in Lebanon at the end of the civil war, and owing to Syria’s alignment with Saudi Arabia and Western powers during the 1990–91 Gulf War, the international powers allowed Syria to have a free hand in Lebanon. Syria’s ruling regime forced the rebellious general Michel Aoun out of Lebanon’s presidential palace and made Lebanon into a satellite state through a series of agreements that linked the two countries in fields ranging from security to education. Syrian political hegemony and a Syrian military presence would prove to be the rule in Lebanon throughout the 1990s. It was only after the turn of the millennium that criticism against the Syrian presence began to be publicly voiced in Lebanon, culminating in the Cedar Revolution of 2005,² which forced a withdrawal of Syrian troops, and the legislative elections of 2009, which heralded the rise of a new generation of independent Lebanese political elites. Only time will tell whether Syrian oversight was a necessary feature of the political stability that Lebanon experienced after the Ta’if Agreement. Since March 2011, Syria has been rocked by antiregime demonstrations calling for Assad’s removal from power. These demonstrations have been received by the Syrian regime with force. On March 27, 2012, the United Nations estimated the number of deaths to be nine thousand. The outcome of the turmoil in Syria and its impact on Lebanon will be telling regarding the importance of Syria on Lebanon’s stability.

Although much has been written about the history of Lebanese politics and especially about the tragedy of the civil war, scholars have not yet turned their attention to a systematic analysis of the evolution of the Lebanese political scene in the years after the Ta’if Agreement.³ In this book I provide such an analysis, based on fieldwork and interviews that I conducted between 2001 and 2006, as well as on my critical readings of news broadcasts, position papers, memoirs, party platforms, and other primary sources. My approach to understanding the Lebanese political scene is focused on the examination of the small cadre of individuals whom sociologists and political scientists call the political elite.⁴ This label refers to people who exercise power in society or who can be said to have a personal influence on national decision making. It includes a range of public and nonpublic figures, from high-ranking government officials and military officers, to leaders of professional associations and business and industry representatives, to the heads of politically influential families, and to people who are highly placed in media organizations, interest groups, and religious communities. These individuals are both influential upon and implicated within the political discourse of the nation.

Studying politics through the lens of the political elite is in some ways a limited mode of analysis. Approaching politics through elite cultures runs the risk of minimizing the agency of nonelite individuals. Nevertheless, this approach provides a very direct line to understanding the shifting features of political power and of national political discourses. Significant changes in the composition of the political elite, such as those that I will describe in this study, can be understood as indicative of broader changes in Lebanese society. Approaching politics through the lens of the elite is particularly effective in Lebanon owing to the historical importance of zu‘ama, community leaders who are perceived as intercessors for their clients or followers. In this tradition, political agency is understood to be primarily about cultivating one’s place within a hierarchy of personal relationships, rather than advocating for an overarching ideology or legislative platform. The clients of a za‘im (the singular of zu‘ama) vote for their leader’s person, not for a political program. In many cases, the leader may not even have a political platform, beyond an established ability to further the interests of clients.

Describing the prewar political system, Lebanese sociologist Samir Khalaf argued that this historical concept of personal leadership, along with an electoral system that allocated political posts according to sectarian quotas, resulted in a situation in which individual Lebanese elites were able to wield an influence extending far beyond that of their personal electoral bases. By constructing alliances with other zu‘ama, representing other segments of Lebanese society, certain leaders were able to build extensive patronage networks and to establish long-standing family dynasties.⁵ The personal relationships among Lebanese elites, more than any particular set of ideological schisms, have long been the axis around which Lebanese politics has revolved. As of this writing, there seems to have been little change in this culture of political patronage. A study of personal histories and of the fortunes of individual power is therefore particularly relevant to understanding the trajectory of Lebanese political discourse. Who belongs to the Lebanese political elite in the postwar period? How do these elites maintain their power? What kind of discourses do they hold? How are new elites recruited, and what new bases of political power are emerging?

Fieldwork and Methodology

My analysis is based on fieldwork conducted in Lebanon during September and October 2001, April and May 2002, April and May 2003, and January 2006. I conducted fifty-six semistructured interviews with established and emerging members of the political elite, in addition to twenty-two informal discussions with journalists, academics, and other observers of the Lebanese political scene. All of the individuals whom I interviewed were male (in keeping with the general absence of women from Lebanese politics, which is discussed in chapter 6). More than half of my interviewees were then parliamentarians. Others were later elected into office. The sample also includes nine cabinet ministers (from various post-2000 cabinets), one former prime minister, and three retired military officers.

My approach to conducting research on the Lebanese elite was to use the reputational method, in which the individuals chosen for study are people who are widely described as having the ability to influence the political system. This approach allows the researcher to look beyond the merely formal conduits of power. It has a great advantage over more limited studies of officeholders, and it is perhaps the most effective way to obtain information about elite cultures.⁶ There remains a concern, however, that the sample obtained may not be perfectly representative of the sources of political influence. It is difficult for any researcher to gain access to a country’s core elite, and this task seemed especially difficult for a Lebanese national who wanted to study Lebanese politicians. I often found that I had to overcome a sense of fear or mistrust in order to obtain interviews. I believe that these attitudes most likely stemmed from the interviewees’ concerns that a Lebanese researcher might be motivated by a specific political agenda.⁷ It was also impossible for me to interview active military officers, as they are not allowed to speak to researchers or journalists, although I compensated for this by speaking with former military officers who are still close to the institution. Perhaps the most significant lacuna is that my sample did not include interviews with members of the clergy. In spite of these limitations, the sample of elite Lebanese with whom I conducted interviews is relatively balanced in terms of age, education, profession, political outlook, and religious affiliation.

The majority of the interviews took place in the capital, Beirut, in a private setting in the homes or offices of the interviewees. These settings helped to minimize distractions and to establish a degree of trust between the researcher and the interviewees. In addition, anonymity was promised to these informants, especially concerning their opinions on sensitive issues. Direct references to the interviewees are thus avoided in this book. Most of the interviews were taped, but were then transcribed by the author to preserve the confidentiality of the information. Since the recording of conversations can sometimes lead to a decrease in sincerity,⁸ informants who did not wish to be taped were interviewed without the recorder. These conditions helped to ensure that the interviewees could relate direct and informal perspectives on the Lebanese political scene while remaining largely unconstrained by the requirements of their positions.

The choice to use a qualitative methodology was determined by the nature of the research. A population as limited and exclusive as the political elite cannot be studied with questionnaires or surveys. Instead, to gain an understanding of the attitudes and life trajectories of Lebanese elites, I began with the classic technique of reading the local press, the speeches of politicians, and memoirs and biographies.⁹ Of course, the basic facts gathered in this research needed to be corroborated and fleshed out, and it was therefore necessary to combine the study of printed material with personal interviews. This is a research process that poses distinct practical, methodological, and analytical difficulties—Jean Lacouture has described interviews using the terms inter-seduction and counter-seduction.¹⁰ Nevertheless, when interviews are conducted by an astute and critical researcher, they remain one of the best means available for apprehending the attitudes and intentions of elites.¹¹ These subjective attributes cannot be easily quantified and are most appropriately studied through a personal approach.

The interviews were organized according to a semistructured format, an approach that is commonly used by researchers who are working with elites and one that is ideal for studying material that needs in-depth interpretation.¹² The same questions, with minor variations, were asked of all interviewees. However, flexibility was allowed in the direction of the conversation after the questions had been asked. The questions can be divided into four main groups: questions about the life and political trajectory of the interviewee; questions about the positions and attitudes of the interviewee vis-à-vis themes deemed to be of national and strategic interest, such as the future of the confessional system and Syrian-Lebanese relations; questions about the interviewee’s perceptions of postwar elites, including their attributes, attitudes, and behaviors; and finally, questions about the future of Lebanon and of the future roles of Lebanese elites. To avoid potential drawbacks, I cross-referenced information between interviews and asked the same questions to each interviewee in more than one way, in an attempt to prod interviewees who were being evasive.

My fieldwork leads me to conclude that the postwar Lebanese elite can be divided into three main groups, which I will call state elites, strategic elites, and emerging elites. The first group, state elites, consists of those individuals who first came to power during the violence of the civil war and then found a place in the political system in the 1990s. Today these elites are at the zenith (or slightly past the zenith) of their careers, and they tend to occupy important positions in governmental institutions. The second group, strategic elites, is composed of individuals who emerged onto the political scene because of special circumstances or unusual talents. These unelected elites frequently operate from the shadows, as éminences grises who influence better-known politicians, though in some cases they can also be outspoken opinion makers who promote national agendas on the public stage. In Lebanon these unelected elites include military commanders, religious leaders, and important journalists. The third group, emerging elites, is mainly composed of young, aspiring politicians who are ready to accede to positions of political responsibility when the occasion presents itself.

For analytical purposes, the interviewees can also be categorized into three groups according to age. Those individuals over sixty years of age were socialized in the pre–civil war Lebanese society, and they were heavily influenced (in one way or another) by the Pan-Arabist ideology that swept the region during the 1950s and 1960s. Those interviewees from forty-five to sixty years of age are of the generation that fell into sectarian conflict and participated actively in the civil war. Finally, those persons from thirty to forty-five years of age were socialized during the height of the violence and tended to exhibit weariness with conflict and a distrust of sectarian dogma. (I discuss these generational differences in more detail in chapter 6.)

Argument and Outline of the Book

My central argument in this book is that the Ta’if Agreement and the other accords that followed it ushered in an era of systematic Syrian control in Lebanon, leading to temporary stability but not to an actual reconciliation of the political tensions that led to civil war. In the period between 1991 and 2005, the Syrian influence was felt strongly throughout Lebanon, but most especially in the area of elite recruitment. Many new political players who were willing to work with Syria emerged on the scene. Former warlords who turned over a new leaf were allowed to enter politics after the 1991 general amnesty, and religious leaders played an increasingly important role in the political process. Businessmen also came to play a greater role in the government, demonstrating a growing importance of financial capital in the political arena. There was an inherent optimism in the creation of a viable civic government after years of violence; however, it soon became apparent that the new political elites who came together in the postwar framework were not arriving with new attitudes or behaviors.

Like their predecessors, these postwar elites seemed to be focused almost exclusively on maintaining their influence, staying in office, and establishing sectarian political dynasties. Furthermore, as the Pax Syriana continued, the postwar elites slowly merged with traditional political players. Long-standing dynasties that had played a crucial role throughout twentieth-century Lebanese history were inexorably incorporated into the postwar political scene, and it seemed that the new regime was not in fact substantially different from what had come before. The Pax Syriana also involved an insidious intrusion of military and security apparatuses into Lebanon’s political life, and for many the cost of this kind of security was too high. The drastic change that occurred during the Cedar Revolution and Syrian withdrawal was a shock to this system. The elections of 2005 involved a very high degree of elite circulation, as the coalitions held together by Syrian influence collapsed and elites who relied on Syrian support were purged from office. In the wake of the Syrian withdrawal, Lebanon entered a period of new possibilities—and renewed risks.

I have organized my analysis of the postwar Lebanese elite into seven chapters. Chapter 1 is a description of the formal structure of the Lebanese political system as it was initially formulated in the National Pact of 1943 and as it was modified and reestablished in the Ta’if Agreement. In this chapter I also provide background information on important prewar political actors and the history of Syrian involvement in Lebanon. Chapter 2 explains why an understanding of the formal governmental structures is not sufficient to identify the actual political relationships through which power flows in Lebanon. In this chapter I elaborate on the concepts of elite settlements and elite factionalization, and I make an argument for the value of interpreting Lebanese politics through an examination of elite interactions.

From chapter 3 onward, I begin to flesh out the detailed histories of political factions and elite actors in Lebanon. In chapter 3 I turn to a discussion of specific Lebanese political parties, explaining their function within the political system and their failure to act as vehicles for elite recruitment. The principal Lebanese parties (the Kata’eb, the Lebanese Forces [LF], the Progressive Socialist Party [PSP], and Hezbollah) are discussed in some detail, as are the individual leaders of these parties. Chapter 4 describes the composition of the state elite. I examine the various social and professional groups from which these individuals are drawn and provide biographical sketches of important postwar presidents, prime ministers, and parliamentarians. This chapter also includes an analysis of the social mechanisms by which these state elites maintain their political influence and a discussion of the problem of financial corruption among Lebanese politicians. In chapter 5 I discuss the role of strategic elites in postwar Lebanese politics. The individuals discussed in this chapter include military leaders, members of the clergy, and prominent journalists. I examine the strong and diverse influences of these nonstate actors on the country’s political discourse and national decision making.

Chapter 6 examines the features of Lebanon’s emerging elites and discusses the prospects for change in the political culture. I describe the unfortunate continuation of the patronage-based system and the absence of women from positions of influence. I also discuss the means by which new elites are recruited into the political system and provide some examples of this process. Finally, in chapter 7 I examine the discourse of Lebanese political elites, focusing on two central questions of national interest: the viability of the confessional system and Lebanese-Syrian relations. I conclude by discussing the sectarian backdrop of Lebanese national identity and posing questions about the political future of the country.

Pax Syriana

1

The Lebanese Political System

The Elite Pacts of 1943 and 1989

Arend Lijphart, focusing on the period between 1943 and 1975, has described this relatively stable time in Lebanese history as a successful consociational democracy.¹ Consociationalism refers to a political situation in which a variety of groups, none of which are large enough to constitute a majority, are able to achieve social stability by means of a pact among the elites of the various groups. In the application of this term as developed by Lijphart, elites from the various factions negotiate power-sharing arrangements among themselves and thereby regulate political life in a divided society. Lijphart’s analysis of the First Lebanese Republic is also applicable to the country’s situation in more recent years. In order to put an end to the country’s civil war in 1989, the ruling elites in Lebanon once again united around issues of shared strategic interest, such as the presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon, which all elite factions supported as an aid to peace and stability—at least until the Cedar Revolution of 2005. In response to the chaos and destruction of the civil war, the various Lebanese elites came to share an acute fear of a disintegration of the system and the return of anarchy. In the postwar period, therefore, they largely agreed to postpone their differences in order to promote stability.

Lijphart and others have suggested that Lebanon became a consociational democracy after its independence in 1943. Looking at the postwar years of Syrian hegemony (1989–2005), I am forced to agree with Tamirace Fakhoury-Muehlbacher in saying that although this political system had consociational features, it cannot fully be considered a consociational democracy.² Indeed, the same power-sharing arrangements that made stability possible in an ethnically and culturally fragmented nation have also tended to impair the full development of democracy.³ I will argue that the transition to democracy was thwarted by the nature of this political system, in which elites simply reorganized their power-sharing arrangements after each political upheaval, and also by the tendency of the consociational arrangements to rely on the stabilizing influence of external powers.

Marie-Joëlle Zahar has noted that Lebanon’s experiment with power sharing dates back to 1861 (the end of the sectarian war in Mount Lebanon between Druze and Maronites) and that power sharing has brought long periods of peace, but this has depended on external protectors.⁴ In the nineteenth century, the protector of the peace was the Ottoman Empire; through the early twentieth century, the role was played by France. My view is that the authoritarian regime in Syria came to be a similar arbiter of the peace between the end of the civil war in 1989 and the Cedar Revolution of 2005. Because Lebanon’s power-sharing institutions have relied on external proctors, they have consistently thwarted the country’s transition to democracy. Lebanese elites renegotiated the terms of their power-sharing agreements after each civil war; however, each renegotiated settlement was only slightly different from the preceding one.

In this chapter I explain the two primary power-sharing agreements established by Lebanese elites since the nation’s independence: the National Pact of 1943 and the Ta’if Agreement of 1989. Each of these pacts led to an associated period of stability—the First and Second Lebanese Republics. I also address the issue of democracy in these republics and explain the role that Syria played as guarantor of the Ta’if Agreement in the Second Republic.

The Political System and the First Republic

Consociational Democracy

Writing in the late 1960s, Lijphart defined consociational political systems as government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy.⁵ He identified four primary characteristics of such systems: the government is composed of a coalition of leaders that represent the various factions of the plural society, these leaders have a mutual veto over the other leaders’ decisions, political factions are represented proportionally, and each political faction retains a high degree of autonomy.⁶ Lijphart identified the First Lebanese Republic as a clear example of consociational democracy and argued that it was a successful system: On the whole, consociational democracy in Lebanon must be judged to have performed satisfactorily for more than thirty years. Its main weakness was the inflexible institutionalization of consociational principles. [However,] . . . compared with the frequent revolutionary upheavals to which other Middle Eastern countries have been prone, and in spite of the flaws in its consociational institutions, the Lebanese consociational regime established a remarkable—although obviously far from perfect—record of democratic stability.⁷

Notably, Lijphart’s interpretation focuses on political elites as systemic agents of change. In his model, the role of elites is perceived as crucial in attenuating or exacerbating sectarian conflicts. According to Lijphart, in order to promote stability the leaders of the diverse political factions must make active interventions and must be willing to transcend sectarian divisions and accommodate the demands of other elites. Their ability to do so depends on a commitment to stability and a desire to avoid the negative consequences of political fragmentation.⁸ Lijphart’s consociational model offers a useful theoretical perspective for the examination of power sharing in divided societies such as Lebanon. Scholars have largely agreed with Lijphart’s assessment of the Lebanese political system and have acknowledged that the First Lebanese Republic was a perfect example of his consociational model.⁹ To examine the reality of this political system in more detail, I will begin by discussing the creation and conditions of the First Republic.

The National Pact and the Founding of the First Republic

The founding act of modern Lebanon was the National Pact of 1943. The pact was an unwritten gentlemen’s agreement between representatives of what were at the time the two main Lebanese communities, the Maronites and the Sunnis. This arrangement, alongside the earlier French-sponsored constitution of 1926, regulated political life in the independent Lebanese Republic from 1943 until the breakdown that led to civil war in 1975. The National Pact was the product of intense negotiations between the notables, parliamentarians, and zu‘ama (local leaders) of the two communities. The discussions were initiated by bankers and merchants, from Greek Catholic and Greek Orthodox backgrounds, who had a vested interest in seeing better cooperation between Muslims and Christians. The resulting coalition among members of different elite groups was based on negotiation and compromise, rather than on the dictates of a majority. The governmental arrangements of this elite pact went beyond the basic outlines of the constitution to ensure that representatives of each important faction would share in the organization of power. For example, it was (informally) established that the Lebanese president would always