Civil Society, Conflict Resolution, and Democracy in Nigeria

By Darren Kew

African nations have watched the recent civic dramas of the Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street asking if they too will see similar civil society actions in their own countries. Nigeria—Africa’s most populous nation—has long enjoyed one of the continent’s most vibrant civil society spheres, which has been instrumental in political change. Initially viewed as contributing to democracy’s development, however, civil society groups have come under increased scrutiny by scholars and policymakers. Do some civil society groups promote democracy more effectively than others? And if so, which ones, and why?

By examining the structure, organizational cultures, and methods of more than one hundred Nigerian civil society groups, Kew finds that the groups that best promote democratic development externally are themselves internally democratic. Specifically, the internally democratic civil society groups build more sustainable coalitions to resist authoritarian rule; support and influence political parties more effectively; articulate and promote public interests in a more negotiable fashion; and, most importantly, inculcate democratic norms in their members, which in turn has important democratizing impacts on national political cultures and institutions. Further, internally democratic groups are better able to resolve ethnic differences and ethnic-based tensions than their undemocratically structured peers.

This book is a deeply comprehensive account of Nigerian civil society groups in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Kew blends democratic theory with conflict resolution methodologies to argue that the manner in which groups—and states—manage internal conflicts provides an important gauge as to how democratic their political cultures are. The conclusions will allow donors and policymakers to make strategic decisions in their efforts to build a democratic society in Nigeria and other regions.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Syracuse University Press
• Release date: May 31, 2016
• ISBN: 9780815653677

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CIVIL SOCIETY, CONFLICT RESOLUTION, AND DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA

Syracuse Studies on Peace and Conflict Resolution

Robert A. Rubinstein, Series Editor

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Copyright © 2016 by Syracuse University Press

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First Edition 2016

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ISBN: 978-0-8156-3458-4 (cloth)

978-0-8156-3444-7 (paperback)

978-0-8156-5367-7 (e-book)

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Kew, Darren, author.

Title: Civil society, conflict resolution, and democracy in Nigeria / Darren Kew.

Other titles: Syracuse studies on peace and conflict resolution.

Description: First edition. | Syracuse : Syracuse University Press, 2016. |

Series: Syracuse studies on peace and conflict resolution | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2016007231| ISBN 9780815634584 (cloth : alk. paper) | ISBN 9780815634447 (pbk. : alk. paper) | ISBN 9780815653677 (e-book)

Subjects: LCSH: Civil society—Nigeria. | Democracy—Nigeria. | Conflict management—Nigeria.

Classification: LCC JQ3096 .K49 2016 | DDC 320.9669–dc23 LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2016007231

Manufactured in the United States of America

To Marielena, Daniel, Rita, and Daria, my favorite democrats

Contents

List of Illustrations

Preface

Acknowledgments

1. Two Competing Visions of Civil Society

2. Democratic Theory and Conflict Resolution Methods

Gauging Civil Society’s Democratic Impact

3. Nigerian State and Nigerian Civil Society

4. The Traditional Way

The First Generation of Nigerian Civil Society

5. The Power of the Social Contract

The Second Generation of Nigerian Civil Society

6. Replacing the Receding State

The Third Generation of Nigerian Civil Society

7. Nigerian Civil Society under Authoritarian Rule in the 1990s

The Primacy of Democratic Structures in Democracy Promotion

8. Epilogue

Nigerian Civil Society under the Young Democracy, 1999–2015

Appendix: Nigerian Civil Society Groups

Notes

Bibliography

Index

Illustrations

Figures

1. Traditional liberal view of civil society

2. Testing civil society’s democratic impact

3. Expected impacts of civil society structures and cultures on efficient and effective democracy promotion

Tables

1. Layers of Political Culture

2. Three Generations of Nigerian Civil Society Groups

3. Common Values of Conflict Resolution Methods and Democratic Political Culture

4. Three Generations’ Structural Orientation toward the State

5. Political Structures of the First Generation

6. Approach to Conflict of the Kano Emirate

7. Approach of the Methodist Church Nigeria to Its 1976 Reorganization Conflict

8. Political Cultures and Democracy Promotion of the First Generation

9. Political Structures of the Second Generation

10. Approach to Conflict of the Nigerian Labour Congress toward a Dispute in the Sokoto NLC

11. Approach to Conflict of the Nigerian Labour Congress toward the 1988 Presidency Crisis

12. Political Cultures and Democracy Promotion of the Second Generation

13. Political Structures of the Third Generation

14. Approach of the Civil Liberties Organization to the Conflict over Its Political Activities

15. Political Cultures and Democracy Promotion of the Third Generation

16. Political Structure and Democracy Promotion

17. Political Culture and Democracy Promotion

18. Democratic Political Structures, Cultures, and Democracy Promotion

19. Ethnicity and Democracy Promotion

Preface

Civil Society as Classrooms for Democracy?

The dramatic wave of democratic revolutions that swept the globe in the late 1980s and early 1990s lionized the reputations of the civil society groups that helped to lead them, and thereafter inspired movements worldwide in the new millennium. Stunning images of trade unionists, human rights activists, student leaders, community associations, and other civil society organizations facing down communist dictatorships in Europe, military juntas in Africa, and authoritarian governments elsewhere raised expectations among many democracy advocates regarding the roles these groups could play. Western donors channeled increasing funds for civil society groups in authoritarian or transitional countries in the hope that they too could rise like Nelson Mandela or Vaclav Havel to lead their nations down the democratic path.

But what exactly is the contribution that civil society groups make to democratic development? Robert Putnam’s pathbreaking 1993 book, Making Democracy Work, caught the prevailing Western donor perspective and framed the academic debate on civil society’s contribution when he reached a straightforward and appealing conclusion: More is better. Putnam argued that, regardless of the make, type, or orientation of a nation’s civil society associations, the denser the number of these groups, the deeper and more effective a country’s democracy will be.

Nearly thirty years since the revolutions of 1989, however, scholars and activists alike have grown less enamored of the contribution of civil society. Western policymakers have become particularly impatient with African civil society partners, who appear to have had little success at breaking the neopatrimonial lock on politics that predatory elites retain in many countries on the continent, Nigeria most of all. A growing body of evidence and scholarly analysis has led to increasing skepticism with unqualified portrayals of the democratic contribution of civil society groups. They point to the need for more nuanced approaches to civil society both as an analytical concept and as an object of democracy-promotion policies.

This book seeks to contribute to the search for a more precise understanding of the contribution of civil society to the democratization process. Do some civil society groups promote democratic political development more effectively than others, and if so, which ones and why? I provide extensive evidence from Nigeria that the answer to this question is indeed yes, and that the civil society groups who are themselves more democratic are more effective democracy-promoting organizations. Consequently, donor agencies seeking to promote democratic development through civil society groups are advised first to encourage these groups to practice what they preach by democratizing themselves.

Scholars have tended to overlook the internal political climate of civil society groups and to focus primarily on their external behaviors within the national polity. Many civil society organizations, however, have authoritarian political structures, meaning that their executives are not elected by their members and/or target constituents. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs—the small, professional service organizations) in particular tend to feature authoritarian executives, and many do not have a formal membership; instead they have only employees of the organization. An authoritarian political structure does not mean that the executive necessarily acts unaccountably or irresponsibly, but it does influence what the individuals involved in the organization learn about democratic values and conduct, and democratic structures repeatedly prove to be the best teachers in this regard. Alexis de Tocqueville long ago cited civil society associations as classrooms for democracy, but the learning is clearly better in the democratically structured ones. Moreover, not only do democratically structured groups promote democracy inwardly more effectively than their authoritarian counterparts, but they are also more effective in promoting democracy externally in the national polity, in terms of both the depth of impact and the sustainability of their efforts.

Democratic structures foster political cultures within these groups that are founded upon the notion of a democratic Social Contract: that legitimate governance authority ultimately resides in a group’s members, who lend this authority to leaders—typically through elections—in exchange for responsible leadership that utilizes its position to pursue the best interests of the members. The idea of a Social Contract forms the bedrock upon which all other political activity within these groups is based. Because members see executives as responsible to them, they regularly hold their leaders accountable and demand policy actions that serve their best interests, including policies that promote democracy at the national level. New members in turn learn the contract and similar democratic values as they work within this environment.

Another important finding of this study is that democratically structured organizations mitigate interethnic conflicts and alter undemocratic patterns of behavior reflective of ethnicity-based authoritarian political values. Democratically structured groups tend to negotiate ethnic-based differences within the group, producing working compromises and solutions, while authoritarian-structured organizations tend to avoid or squelch the issue. Interestingly, even ethnic-interest or ethnonationalist organizations that are democratically structured typically articulate their interests onto the national stage in a democratic fashion, in terms of negotiable interests and compromise solutions. When such groups are authoritarian structured, by contrast, they tend to make more extreme, zero-sum demands in national politics and play a divisive, incendiary role.

Democratically structured organizations are also found to form more durable coalitions with other civil society groups than their authoritarian counterparts do, and they tend to stay committed to pro-democracy struggles far longer. Elected civil society leaders face the continual pressure of having to show some evidence of success to their constituents, which serves as a check on their personal interests. Authoritarian-structured organizations, on the other hand, are typically dominated by the personality of their executives, such that personality clashes among heads of organizations consistently undermine coalition viability.

These findings draw on analysis of the internal politics of civil society groups by examining their organizational structures and political cultural approaches to resolving conflicts within their groups. Using an innovative analytical perspective on democracy itself, I argue that democratic institutions can be seen as elaborate conflict resolution mechanisms, and that mainstream methods in conflict resolution are based upon the same premises as those of democratic political culture. This connection opens new avenues for analyzing the politics of these groups based upon their approaches to conflicts within their organizations and externally in the larger polity. Moreover, it provides deeper avenues for democracy promotion by demonstrating how the spread of conflict resolution methods also spreads democratic political culture.

Civil Society and the Struggle for Democracy in Nigeria

Nigeria’s tremendously diverse civil society offers a rich array of data to explore these issues, and the country’s perpetual crisis of governance features important lessons in regard to the international community’s attempts to support civil society in developing countries. The military regimes of Generals Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha accelerated the decay of Nigerian state structures that began in the mid-1980s. In response, local civil society organizations took increased responsibilities for issues of governance and dispute resolution. International actors, in turn, recognized this heightened role, and tried to support and encourage Nigerian civil society efforts in the face of the antagonistic Nigerian government. The key role these groups have continued to play since Nigeria returned to civilian rule in 1999 has confirmed their prominence in building democracy in the country.

This study is the first book-length treatment of Nigerian democratic development to address Nigerian civil society in its entirety with research from more than sixty different groups. Several works have examined one sector, such as the trade unions, NGOs, or specific coalitions such as the pro-democracy movements, but none has so far looked at civil society’s overarching role with this depth during the period of the 1990s and early twenty-first century. Other works on civil society elsewhere in Africa have also tended to focus on specific sectors, particularly NGOs.

With a more comprehensive view, we see the great democratic impact of the Social Contract and democratic structures, yet we also see how democratic structures leave civil society groups vulnerable to the machinations of predatory government actors. The flexibility and international savvy of the NGOs can also be examined alongside the important traditional cultural links of ethnic associations, religious institutions, and traditional institutions. Together the civil society groups of Nigeria present an important analytical picture of the many potential roles that civil society can play in building democracy and resolving conflicts, not only in Africa but worldwide.

Democracy and Conflict Resolution

An important academic contribution of this book is its fusion of the political science literature on democratization with conflict resolution theory. The former provides a wealth of thought on democratic theory and the politics of civil society, but it remains less developed in explaining the internal politics and cultures of these groups or in terms of practical application to strategies for civil society action. Conflict resolution theories, on the other hand, are typically concerned with interpersonal interaction and methods that can be utilized for fieldwork. I propose that what political scientists view as democratic political culture is essentially equivalent to the core methodology of conflict resolution theory. Thus one way to view democratization is as the institutionalization of conflict resolution methods, because these methods reflect and foster democratic political culture. Moreover, the more that an institution approaches its conflicts in a manner reflective of conflict resolution methods, particularly transformative ones, the more we can judge its political culture to be democratic.

Because civil society groups are themselves small political systems, conflict resolution methods offer a useful approach to analyze and operationalize democracy-promotion efforts at the micro level. Specifically, conflict resolution training assists in spreading democratic political cultural norms throughout civil society and, by extension, to the polity at large. In addition, a number of conflict resolution methods presume a basis in local cultures, indicating how more sustainable democratic institutions can be developed—and academically measured—from the bottom up.

Conflict resolution theorists, for their part, have only recently begun to address the notion that the institutional arrangements required to sustain a negotiated settlement are most likely democratic. Moreover, theorists have shied away from normative conclusions that democratic institutions are better equipped to consolidate a resolved conflict in the long run. This study hopes to offer analytical support to this notion based on the experience of Nigerian civil society’s contribution to democratic development.

I will also discuss international influences on civil society’s democratic role in nearly every section, as the impact of international actors grew tremendously in the 1990s. US private and government funds supported the work and development of a number of Nigerian organizations, encouraging these groups to take a more active or implicit role in the promotion of democracy in the country, with the broader goal of conflict resolution explicitly in mind as well. This international dimension to the political role of Nigerian civil society is a recent phenomenon that has altered dramatically the structural, behavioral, and cultural parameters within which these groups operate.

Analyzing and explaining the nexus between civil society organizations, democratization, and conflict resolution are critical to understanding local and international efforts to stem Nigeria’s systemic crisis—and those of like cases—through grassroots actors. This study seeks to build on established literatures in transitions from authoritarian rule, political culture and democratization, NGOs and civil society groups, transnational civil society, conflict negotiation theory, and related works. A deeper understanding of what role civil society groups play in democratization and resolving conflicts provides the basis for a strategic response to assist in managing state dysfunctions in Africa and other regions.

Preventing State Failure, Fragility, and Violent Extremism: Bridging Theory and Practice

This study seeks to break new analytical and theoretical ground in our understanding of the democratic and conflict resolution contributions of civil society groups. It also proposes an innovative blend of political science and conflict resolution theory that provides not only a deep explanation of these groups’ role, but also a clear path for organizations to utilize the material in practice. In addition, this book provides a comprehensive account of Nigerian civil society in the 1990s and early twenty-first century, examining this critical sector in its entirety and in depth.

This work is especially important in light of the persistence of failed and failing states and rising violent extremism across the African continent and the Middle East. Nigeria’s vast ethnic diversity offers important lessons for other multiethnic states seeking to bring their many groups under one political roof. Civil society groups provide the necessary link between governments and their diverse populations that allows these groups to articulate and bargain their interests in a peaceful manner.

Chapter Outline

Chapter 1 begins with a brief assessment of the leading theoretical explanations from the academic literature of the role of civil society groups in democratization. A significant divide exists between academics who see civil society as consisting primarily of public-oriented associations and those who see it as the middle sphere of political activity between the state and the individual. This argument is more than academic, because the dominance of the former (organizational) view among policymakers has meant that donor support for civil society has significantly overlooked its larger political cultural role.

Chapter 2 explores the links between democratic political culture and transformative conflict resolution models, in order to demonstrate how an analysis of civil society groups’ approaches to intra- and extra-organizational conflicts can shed light on how these groups build democratic political culture. I hypothesize that the more democratic a civil society group’s political structure or political microculture, the more efficient the group’s democracy-promotion efforts are, and consequently the more effective. I will explain this hypothesis and break it down into a number of testable statements.

Chapter 3 reviews the development of the Nigerian state and how it impacted the development of Nigerian civil society. Three broad stages of state development are cited, producing three generations of civil society groups in Nigeria, which encompass the major variations of their political structures that we find today. This categorizing of groups will allow a more thorough explanation of how different types of political structures impact democracy-promotion efforts.

Chapter 4 examines the first such generation of civil society in Nigeria: traditional institutions, religious institutions, and ethnic associations. Chapter 5 subsequently looks at the Second Generation—trade unions, academic and student associations, professional and business associations, and the media—while Chapter 6 looks at the Third Generation, the wide range of groups known collectively as nongovernmental organizations. I examine the political structures and cultures of each generation in terms of how democratic they are and how they approach conflicts within their organizations. I will then compare this analysis of the internal politics of groups to the external politics of these organizations, to see how internal structures and cultures influence their external activities in the larger political arena of the nation.

Chapter 7 presents the overarching conclusions of this inquiry into Nigerian civil society. I find strong support for the central hypothesis that the more democratic a civil society group’s political structure or political microculture, the more efficient the group’s democracy-promotion efforts are, and consequently the more effective. The evidence, however, is much more conclusive in supporting the notion that democratic political structures produce efficient, effective democracy promotion in civil society, primarily owing to the central role of the Social Contract in democratically structured organizations. Democratic political cultures also produce such behavior, but to a lesser degree than structures and with a number of caveats. I will also explore the important impact that democratic structures can have on managing ethnic divisions.

Chapter 8 looks at how the trends present in Nigerian civil society under military rule in the 1990s have developed since the military exited power in 1999. The period since 1999 has seen a dramatic increase in civil society activity, including the regeneration of the long-standing democratic war horses such as the trade unions that bore the brunt of military interference, and a boom in the number of new NGOs across the country. An increasing number of organizations have democratized their political structures. Yet the absence of a central unifying theme like the anti-militarism of the 1990s has sapped civil society alliances, and many groups have built new patronage ties with the civilian government. The chapter will discuss the importance of civil society’s political cultural impacts for democratic governance and the slow work of consolidating Nigeria’s fragile new democracy.

Acknowledgments

This book has been a labor of love during two decades of work in a country that continues to inspire me every time I visit. Any foreigner who visits Nigeria marvels at the incredible energy of the nation, and I am still overwhelmed at the generosity and welcome that are so prevalent in people everywhere one goes. Complete strangers will call you brother (or as my gray hairs sprout, papa), introduce you to their children as uncle, and take you into their homes and treat you like family. For most Nigerians, such a welcome is just common hospitality and common sense. I remain forever indebted to the many Nigerians who have helped teach me about their nation along the way, and I hope this honors the kindness and support that so many friends and acquaintances have shown me over the years.

I am especially indebted to the many Nigerian civil society and political leaders who contributed their time and comments to the development of this book. Some of them continue to be at risk of reprisals from the government or the many powerful politicians who dominate the political landscape. Consequently, I have used nonspecific attributions for most of the information given during the numerous private interviews cited throughout the book.

After these years of effort, my list of friends, colleagues, and mentors who deserve mention is bound to be incomplete, and I ask those not mentioned here for their usual patience with my limited capacities. Throughout this time, I have been privileged to call friends some of Nigeria’s most outstanding civic leaders, such as Bishop Matthew Hassan Kukah, Dr. Kayode Fayemi, Clement Nwankwo, Dr. Kole Shettima, Prof. Oyeleye Oyediran, Prof. Attahiru Jega, Diran Onifade, Akin Jimoh, Jahman Anikulapo, Dr. Tunde Ahonsi, Chom Bagu, Dr. Francis Enemuo, Dr. Judith Asuni, Dr. Cyril Obi, Dr. Adekeye Adebajo, Gen. (rtd.) Abdulrahman Dambazau, Prof. Abubakar Momoh, Jackie Farris, Prof. Ebere Onwudiwe, Pastor James Wuye, Imam Muhammad N. Ashafa, Imam Sani Isah, and Reverend Bitrus Dangiwa. Their help throughout this work has made it possible. Meanwhile, mentors at home in the United States have helped me launch this research and sharpen its analysis, including Prof. Eileen Babbitt, Prof. Larry Diamond, Prof. Peter Lewis, Prof. Paul Lubeck, Prof. John Paden, Prof. Richard Joseph, Prof. Richard Sklar, Dr. Joshua Lincoln, and Prof. Anthony Wanis–St. John. Colleagues at UMASS Boston have also shown tremendous patience and support in helping me see this through, especially Prof. David Matz (David, you can strike this one off the list). I am also deeply grateful for the patience of Lou Kriesberg, Suzanne Guiod, and Kelly Balenske at Syracuse University Press in getting this book into print.

Most of all, I owe the deepest debt to my family, who have been with me all the way: my parents, Robert and Geraldine, who started me off; my sister Tammy; my children, Marielena, Daniel, and Rita, who make life beautiful; and my wife, Daria—te amo.

CIVIL SOCIETY, CONFLICT RESOLUTION, AND DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA

1

Two Competing Visions of Civil Society

At the height of the 1993 election crisis in Nigeria, university student leaders visited Chief Moshood Abiola in his Ikeja home. Preliminary results had indicated that Abiola was the certain presidential victor of a generally free and fair process, but the military regime arbitrarily annulled the election within days. The students were avid supporters of Abiola and of democratization through strikes and demonstrations, and wanted him to lead the struggle. Abiola reportedly thanked them and sent them home, asking them to be patient and to let their elders handle such weighty matters. Shortly thereafter, he fled the country, ostensibly seeking support for his cause from the British and American governments. Key figures in his political party, meanwhile, shamelessly began participating in the military’s new dispensation.

When Abiola returned and proclaimed himself president in mid-1994, and was promptly imprisoned by the military junta controlled by General Sani Abacha, the students again filled the streets. Scores were shot and imprisoned while many of the loyal remnants of Abiola’s now-banned political party quickly fled the country. Trade unions and human rights groups, in coalition with the students, continued the struggle for several months, but soon buckled as their leaders were hounded and imprisoned. Small wonder—a student union president quipped—that by 1996 few students were willing to heed the calls to rise against Abacha from opposition politicians sitting comfortably in London.¹

Civil society, the vanguard of pro-democracy movements across the globe in the late 1980s and early 1990s, is facing increasing skepticism among its advocates, donors, and analysts as to its contributions to democratization efforts. Authors such as Thomas Carothers and Allison Brysk warn against assuming that civil society is an unqualified boon for democracy, while Sheri Berman chillingly reminds us that civil society in Weimar Germany first overloaded the fragile democratic system and then embraced the Nazi Party, facilitating its rise to power.² In Africa in particular, donors by 1990 turned to the nongovernmental sector as the spearhead for promoting democracy in authoritarian, dysfunctional, and/or disintegrating states. Yet more than twenty-five years after the tide of Huntington’s third wave of democratization swept across Africa,³ Western enthusiasm for civil society–led democratization is waning. What we thought was a spearhead may in fact be a tool of a different sort.

Theorists, for the most part, have come to share this skepticism. Civil society has tended to be seen as an undertone or brief interruption in a democratization process dominated by the state and political elites, perhaps one factor out of ten that are critical for democracy.⁴ Some works portray civil society as showing up in force at key moments of weakness for the authoritarian state, only to recede into the theoretical background as a secondary explanation at best. That civil society is important to democratization is taken as an item of faith, yet Berman notes that there has actually been little in-depth analysis by political scientists of the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ effects [civil society] associations actually have on individual members and the wider polity.⁵

As the twenty-first century added to the debate over the role of civil society in democratization, academics and practitioners have digested some of the sobering examples of the 1990s and the early 2000s, but only in the past several years have comprehensive analytical frameworks been proposed to filter the deluge of evidence being gathered. Theorists are increasingly returning to more familiar ground, finding new wisdom in Tocqueville’s point that a strong civil society needs a strong state and party system to make a meaningful contribution to building democracy.⁶ Representative of these views, Skocpol warns against the assumption that

local voluntarism is fundamental, the primary cause of all that is healthy in democratic politics and effective governance, in contrast to the dreaded ‘bureaucratic state.’ But . . . [it is] wrong to assume that spontaneous social association is primary while government and politics are derivative. On the contrary, U.S. civic associations were encouraged by the American Revolution, the Civil War, the New Deal, and World Wars I and II; and until recently they were fostered by the institutional patterns of U.S. federalism, legislatures, competitive elections, and locally rooted political parties.⁷

This reaffirmation of the role of state structures is important, but we are still left holding a frame absent a picture of what civil society really does for democracy. What remains unexplained, to echo Berman, is a precise accounting of the democracy-promotion impacts that civil society groups have internally on their own members and externally on the national-level institutions, norms, and patterns of political behavior. The fact that civil society groups can serve as large free schools⁸ for democracy is unchallenged, but why, how, and under what circumstances they provide this function is less clearly understood.

This book seeks to contribute to a growing literature that is searching for more precise understandings of the contributions of civil society to the democratization process. I also look to address some of the skepticism and critiques of civil society that have arisen recently. Do some civil society groups promote democratic political development more effectively than others, and if so, which ones and why?

This question can be broken down into several avenues of inquiry. Does the type of political structure featured by these groups matter in terms of this intra-organizational role in democracy tutelage? If so, is a democratic type of organization most effective in this regard? What other influences are important? What political cultural influences can be surmised and explained in this context?

Much also remains to be explained of civil society’s extra-organizational contributions to promoting democracy at the national level. Authors often refer to the pivotal role civil society groups can play in overthrowing authoritarian governments, or in joining the coalitions that later form political parties.⁹ These highly visible, dramatic events, however, encompass only a small portion of what civil society groups spend most of their time doing. Furthermore, without a more holistic view of groups’ functioning, these dramatic events become difficult to explain, much less to predict to any degree or to promote their replication elsewhere. What led organizations to be, theoretically speaking, at the right place at the right time? Perhaps more important for cases like Nigeria, what contributions to democracy promotion at the national level can civil society groups make in addition to or in lieu of these dramatic impacts? Beyond the democratic shape of state institutions, how can civil society alter the manner in which political behavior is conducted?

A number of authors have already begun to sift through the pieces of this puzzle. This chapter will present and explore the primary theoretical division about civil society in the social science literature, in pursuit of these lapses in our understanding of its role. What is the contribution of civil society to democratization, and do some groups contribute more effectively than others? Like the battle-weary Nigerian students, we need to think more deeply about civil society’s role in promoting democracy within authoritarian and transitional states to understand both its potential contributions and its limits.

I will begin by locating civil society theories within the larger body of literature on democratization. I will then present two general models of civil society, the middle sphere and the organizational, that characterize most of the theoretical perspectives on this sector, and compare the relative merits of both. I will then adapt the middle sphere perspective to expand upon its aspects dealing with political culture and to incorporate key provisions of the organizational view. This blending of the middle sphere and organizational views will lead me to posit structure and culture as the two most important independent variables to test civil society’s effectiveness in democracy promotion, which will frame the central inquiry of this study.

Moving Beyond Elite-Centered Theory

Political science literature has reached near-consensus on the centrality of political elites in the democratization process. Elites drive the bargaining process, set the pace, and develop the shape of the new political system. So fundamental is the role of elites that Larry Diamond concludes, most scholarly studies of democratization have given primary emphasis to the divisions, choices, calculations, and strategic alliances among elites in both the authoritarian regime and its democratic opposition.¹⁰ Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter’s seminal work on transitions from authoritarian rule seems to capture the dominant analytical view of civil society as a destabilizing, amorphous, but passing force against a dying authoritarian regime. Its involvement crests in an inverted U-shaped curve of initial general politicization and popular activism, but which eventually runs out of resources, tires, or becomes disillusioned.¹¹ More important to the transition is a negotiated elite pact among a small number of participants representing established (and often highly oligarchic) groups or institutions . . . [who] seek to limit accountability to wider publics.¹² The pathbreaking works of Robert Dahl and Dankwart Rustow on the subject also move nonelite actors to the periphery of the democratization process.¹³

At first glance, cases of democratization like that of Nigeria appear to confirm the centrality of elites in the process. When the elites scattered during the 1993–94 election crisis, democratic development ground to a halt. As Abacha prepared in 1998 to have himself elected president through a sham transition program, key elites formed a coalition to condemn him. After Abacha’s mysterious death that June, this coalition transformed into a political party that won firm control of the presidency, National Assembly, and many of the governorships and state assemblies.

If we restrict the analysis of these events simply to elite politics, then the key event for democratization in Nigeria was what the media dubbed an act of God: the demise (or more likely, murder) of General Abacha. The military then can be seen as the key orchestrator of democratization, and Nigerian civilian elites appear primarily as bystanders and fortunate opportunists. No doubt this characterization of Nigerian elites during this period is largely accurate and carries great credence among both academics and nonacademics in Nigeria. Analysts echo Richard Joseph’s call for a transition within the transition,¹⁴ from the perspective that the prospects for real democratization only began when the military handed over to these unreliable civilians, through elections of dubious outcome.¹⁵ Consequently, Nigeria since 1999 remains a democracy without democrats.¹⁶

Theoretical explanations of the Abacha period that stop at the level of elites, however, miss some of the most important democracy-building developments that set the stage for Nigeria’s current and possibly last democratic experiment. Indeed, the present elite political game that constitutes Nigerian democracy probably rests, more unconsciously than not, on political foundations whose successful developments are of equal importance if the nation is to survive as a unified political entity. These foundations are the organizations of civil society that have struggled to build accountable, effective governance, sometimes in cooperation with, but more often despite the actions of Nigerian political elites.

Nigeria was certainly not the only country in the 1990s to benefit from democratic contributions from civil society. Subsequently, theory on the political role of civil society has enjoyed a renaissance since the 1990s, moving perspectives on democratization beyond the elite-centered view. The collapse of states supported through Cold War competition between the superpowers, and the efforts of others to democratize, have fostered a more prominent role for nonstate organizations in political life in these countries. The important role of such groups in 1980s Eastern Europe in particular caught the imagination of political theorists; policymakers soon followed in viewing civil society as a vehicle for promoting their democracy and human rights policies in totalitarian and authoritarian states. In response to this opening of political space and increasing support from international donors, the number of international nongovernmental organizations alone jumped from 6,000 in 1990 to 26,000 in 1999, and to 40,000 in 2010,¹⁷ while far more groups exist within national borders.¹⁸

This greater role of civil society in toppling authoritarian regimes and promoting democratization has been recognized in the literature in several respects. In reviewing the expanded perspective beyond elites of these new works on civil society, Diamond explains that

the elite-centered model of democratic transitions poorly comprehends the dynamics of many third-wave cases, in which either the sequence [proposed by O’Donnell and Schmitter, explained above] is turned on its head (and it is the mobilization and then the upsurge of civil society that generates divisions in the ruling regime) or the causal dynamics are more intricate and subtle (with the growth in civil society pluralism, autonomy, and resistance advancing incrementally and interactively with political liberalization from above and with shifting or intermittent regime divisions over the pace of that liberalization).¹⁹

Nigeria in the late 1980s and early 1990s featured examples to support both the O’Donnell and Schmitter sequence, when civil society mobilized upon public consciousness of divisions within the regime, and Diamond’s reversal of this pattern, when civil society provoked such regime divides. His second alternative to O’Donnell and Schmitter, the more incremental pattern, appears to be the case at scattered times throughout this period and then steadily after 1994. Indeed, Diamond’s latter characterization of an ongoing process of give and take between civil society and an authoritarian regime increasingly appears to be true for nearly all democratization processes worldwide over the long term. Relatively sudden surges toward liberalization originating within civil society or within the authoritarian regime, on the other hand, are increasingly seen as only proximate causes for the demise of the regime.

An increasing number of studies support these conclusions; civil society is, if not the driving force for the divisions within authoritarian regimes that lead to its demise, then at least in an overall give-and-take struggle that contributes to provoking the more dramatic flashpoints.²⁰ Ruth Collier and James Mahoney, for instance, examine a number of the same cases explored previously by O’Donnell and Schmitter in Latin America and southern Europe during the 1970s and 1980s, and conclude that civil society groups were a critical factor in destabilizing authoritarian regimes in several of these countries. Even in cases where such groups, primarily trade unions, were not necessarily the pivotal force in provoking regime change, they still played an important role in undermining the legitimacy of authoritarian governments and regime efforts to control the process of political change.²¹

Similar contributions were made by civil society in the democratization of South Korea. During the height of the military regime of Chun Doo Hwan in the mid-1980s when the general populace was generally silent and submissive, student groups and labor unions engaged the regime in titanic political struggles using all available means, including revolutionary ones.²² Individuals of more moderate political orientation from the middle class linked with business and other associations in gradually joining the civil society movement for democratization. After the military instituted a democratization program in 1987, civil society groups flourished and played a pivotal role in consolidating democracy in South Korea,²³ and in democratizing its political culture.²⁴

The wave of democratization that then swept across Africa in the early 1990s also featured a central role for civil society groups, and scholars of democracy there have taken notice. Beginning with the regime change provoked by trade unions and professional associations in Benin in 1989, this wave moved across the continent. The Congress of Trade Unions in Zambia launched its chairman into the presidency; trade unions played similar roles in transitions in Mali and Niger, whereas in Ghana, Togo, and Kenya, professional associations of lawyers and professors mobilized public efforts to promote democracy.²⁵ In several African countries where the organizations of civil society were well developed, organized, and mobilized, and where their relationships with the state were well defined (either in terms of law or custom), civil society exercised great influence over the democratization processes.²⁶ Nowhere was this more true than South Africa, where confederations of organized labor combined with a vast array of student, business, and professional associations; human rights groups; and other organizations to join with the action of the African National Congress in toppling and deconstructing the apartheid regime.²⁷

By the mid-1990s, however, scholars of African politics were lamenting the disappointing record of civil society in promoting democracy across the continent. In cases where authoritarian regimes handed over to civilian politicians, some of whom themselves were products of civil society, the new governments proved just as adept as their predecessors in harnessing the state for personal ends. African civil societies have generally proven too weak to redress state-society relations in favor of the latter . . . [and have] also failed to transcend ethnoregional, religious, and other cleavages in any lasting way.²⁸ Even in African countries where civil societies have been relatively strong, this failure to transcend ethnicity and religion has undermined grassroots roles to promote democratic development or to build broader coalitions to unseat authoritarian regimes. The greatest irony—and tragedy—of the 1990s in this regard was Rwanda, whose civil society before the 1994 genocide was seen as one of the continent’s densest and most promising in terms of pushing the Rwandan regime to democratize and developing more pluralistic and accommodating modes of politics.²⁹

Further, as the state in Africa has come under increasing stress or unraveled, civil society groups have offered elites alternative avenues to pursue their personal, ideological, and clientelistic agendas. John Lucas comments that in Nigeria, the role of civil institutions in elite strategies became especially significant as the capacity of the state diminished throughout the 1980s . . . [which] in turn gave elites increased leverage with and independence from the state.³⁰ Subsequently, some civil society organizations in Nigeria, and the new nongovernmental organizations in particular, reflected the interests of the upper class and became focal points for elites demanding more effective governance.³¹ Across Africa in the 1990s, the weakening of the state combined with the lack of viable representative institutions to decrease the availability of political avenues for the pursuit of elite interests. This restricted, often chaotic environment afflicting national institutions has pushed elites to utilize the associations of civil society as substitute vehicles for the pursuit of their interests.

Although some difference of opinion exists as to what extent these ethnic, religious, or class influences among civil society groups influence their democratic contribution, the consensus is growing among scholars that these groups nonetheless play a critical role in the democratization process. There is much less certainty, however, on how to gauge this contribution. Even the very term civil society remains somewhat ambiguous and imprecise among the wider community of scholars and practitioners interested in democracy promotion, despite the many analytical frameworks offered in the literature. Chris Hann notes the analytical dangers we face as widespread use of the term threatens to debase it from a well-defined analytical category to a catch-all slogan.³²

Two overarching trends are apparent among both the scholarly and the policy debates for defining what civil society is and what overall contribution this sector makes to democratization. The first speaks of civil society as a sphere of social interaction distinct from those of the state and economy (the market).³³ The second focuses exclusively on the politics of actors that undertake social activity within this sphere: associations, typically voluntary ones; social movements; and organizations for public communication. The second perspective encompasses much of the recent literature on civil society, but grew out of the first. How did the former line of thought develop?

Traditional Civil Society: The Middle Sphere

The notion of civil society is, of course, not new. George F. McLean, among others, traces the concept to classical Greek thought, particularly Plato and Aristotle, who sought to find a balance between individual freedom and fulfillment on the one hand, and what is best for the community on the other. To achieve this balance, they stressed the importance of a common value system to moderate