Peron and Peronism

By Kerry Bolton

Peron and Peronism, is unique, especially among English language books, insofar as it is not so much a biography of the remarkable Argentine president, but an explanation of Peronism in theory and practice. While the lives of Juan, and especially Eva, Peron are relatively easy to access, seldom is it that a biography of the Perons, or even a sch

• Language: English
• Publisher: Black House Publishing Ltd
• Release date: Jan 2, 2019
• ISBN: 9781912759668

Kerry Bolton

Kerry Bolton holds doctorates in Historical Theology and Theology; Ph.D. (Hist. Th.), Th.D. as well as in other areas. He is a contributing writer for The Foreign Policy Journal, and a Fellow of the Academy of Social and Political Research in Greece. His papers and articles have been published by both scholarly and popular media, including the International Journal of Social Economics; Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies; Geopolitika; World Affairs; India Quarterly;and The Initiate: Journal of Traditional Studies. His work has been translated into Russian, Vietnamese, Italian, Czech, Latvian, Farsi and French. Arktos has also published his book, Revolution from Above: Manufacturing 'Dissent' in the New World Order, which deals with the secret collusion between the forces of Communism and Wall Street during the years when it was supposed that they were bitter rivals.

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Perón and Perónism

The Life & Thoughts of Juan Domingo Perón

by

Kerry R. Bolton

Perón and Perónism

The Life & Thoughts of Juan Domingo Perón

by Kerry R. Bolton

Copyright © 2014 Black House Publishing Ltd

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval without permission in writing from the publisher.

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Table of Contents

Peron and Peronism

Introduction

Juan Domingo Perón: A Biographical Sketch

Group of United Officers

October Revolution

‘Braden or Perón’

The Emergence of Justicialism

Fundamentals of National Doctrine

The Crisis in Socialism

Nacionalismo

F.O.R.J.A. - ‘Radical Nationalism’

Third Position: Beyond Capitalism and Communism

The Perónist State

Dr. Arturo Sampay and the 1949 Justicialist Constitution

Workers’ Bill of Rights

The Twenty Justicialist Principles

Social Justice In The Living Thoughts Of Perón

Body, Mind and Soul: A Return to the Classical Ethos

The Role of Catholicism

Fundación Eva Perón

Emergency Homes

Homes For The Elderly

Homes For Women Employees

Highly Trained Nurses

Policlínics

‘Social Aid’ Not Welfarism Or Charity

Women In The Perónist State

The Struggle Against International Finance

Arturo Jauretche On Bank Nationalisation

The Marshall Plan and the Closing of Export Markets

Perón on Banking and Credit

International Monetary Fund

The Second Perónist Period

The 1955 Coup against Perón

Aftermath

Revolt of General Juan José Valle

Achievements of the Perónist State

‘For the People of the World’

Mosley And Perón

Thiriart and Perón

Latin American Nation

The National State

The National Justicialist State

Capitalism and Democracy

Statement on the National Justicialist State

The New Justicialist Constitution

The Community

Freedom

Capital and Capitalism

State Capitalism - Communism

Property

Work

Political Sovereignty

Financial Independence

Social Justice

Justicialism And Latin America

Social and National Synthesis

National Syndicalism

The ‘Organised Community’

‘International Synarchy’

Freemasonry

Communism

‘Judaism’ And Zionism

Third World: Third Position

Libya and the Third Universal Theory

Perónistas, Left and Right

Perónist Guerrilla Warfare

Perónism and Che Guevara

The Third Perónist Period

Appeal For Unity And Discipline

The Ezeiza Massacre

Appeal After Ezeiza

After Perón

MERCOSUR

Conclusion

Introduction

The name Perón is now relatively well-known across much of the English-speaking world, thanks to the long-playing Andrew Lloyd Webber and Tim Rice stage musical Evita (1978-) and the film of the same name (1996). These also spawned the publication or republication of books, again for the most part about Evita Perón, ranging from the relatively useful, such as Alicia Dujovne Ortiz’s Eva Perón: A Biography (1997), and Evita: An Intimate Portrait of Eva Perón by Tomas de Elia and Juan Pablo Quieroz (1997), to the thoroughly scabrous Mary Main biography Evita: The Woman with the Whip (first published in 1952, and vomited forth again in 1996). As Francisco M. Rocha states in his introduction to Evita: An Intimate Portrait , ‘the popular cult of Evita has over the years persisted, reached immense proportions, and remained intact despite attacks and efforts to demythologize her’. (p. 190).

However, General Juan Domingo Perón, the man responsible for the Evita of world fame, is not so well known other than as Eva’s husband. Even those who write of Perón in a more substantial manner, do so inadequately. They do so with hints, at most, that he was not ‘just another Latin American dictator’.

In particular, little is written of Perón as a philosopher, who drew readily from Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Plato, and a range of others across time, nation, and culture. Even less is the English reader given the opportunity to know that Perón formulated a philosophy, Justicialism that has an impressive corpus of literature rivalling the accumulated tomes of liberalism, capitalism and Marxism.

In this book I hope to have presented the reader, and in particular the English reader, probably for the first time, with an adequate overview of Perónism in theory and practice, as part of a national-social synthesis that remains relevant to the present age of globalisation and super-power hegemony. I hope to have shown that Perón was in many ways far ahead of his time. He addressed issues that are only now being discussed at world forums, but in Perón’s case, with the insistence that problems must be solved within a national and more broadly continental context rather than imposing upon humanity a ‘new world order’ in which we are reduced to being a nebulous mass of economic cogs or, as Perón would say, ‘insectified’ for the sake of economics.

Kerry R. Bolton

Kapiti Coast, New Zealand

Juan Domingo Perón: A Biographical Sketch

This book is not primarily intended as a biography of Juan Domingo Perón, but as an examination of the doctrine of Perónism, or Justicialism, of which there are few in the English language. However, given that Perón lends his name to the doctrine his personality, thoughts and experiences are important for understanding the movement and the doctrine he formed. This chapter will provide a broad outline of Perón’s life, although other biographic details are infused throughout the book.

Perón, the military strategist and professor, an officer of the armed forces in a part of the world where the military is too often synonymous with ‘oligarchic’ interests, achieved a rare synthesis for Latin America, and indeed for most of the rest of the post-1945 world: Perón united the interests of all productive Argentine sectors into an organic national totality on the basis that the nation is a social unit. The ‘nation’ is not an area of contending economic forces – as per Marxism and capitalism – but a territorial expression of a shared heritage and destiny that goes to form a ‘people’. ‘Social justice’, the meaning of Justicialism, is the foundation upon which to build a ‘nation’.

What then of Juan Domingo Perón, the man, and the forces that shaped his life and work? He was born on 8 October 1895, in the provincial town of Lobos in the province of Buenos Aires, the second son of Mario and Juana Perón. His father was an employee of the local court, who was also involved in agriculture. Mario abandoned his family when Juan was five year old. Juana married a farm hand on the family estancia. When Juan was ten he went to live with his uncle in Buenos Aires and there began his formal education.

At sixteen Juan entered the national military academy, Colegio Militar, from 1911 to 1913, to continue his education. He then went to the Escuela Superior de Guerra from 1926 to 1929. The Argentine military academies, as elsewhere in Latin America, had a significant German influence, the academy having been established by a German military mission. The faculty included Germans when Perón studied there. As such the Argentine military was imbued with a strong pro-German sentiment. This encouraged a more sympathetic outlook towards the Third Reich than Anglo-American and other interests would have wished.

Perón as a child

Perón graduated in 1915 with the rank of sublieutenant, lieutenant in 1919, and captain in 1924.¹ His early career was militarily uneventful, other than having peacefully defused a strike in 1917,² and commanding a unit that suppressed rioting in Buenos Aires during Semana Trágica (Tragic Week) in 1919, an abortive revolt that had been fomented by Jewish Communists.³ The decade was eventful however in establishing Perón as a military scholar, during which he wrote Military Morale, Military Hygiene, Campaigns of Upper Peru, and The Eastern Front in World War I: Strategic Considerations, which were used as textbooks. He served as a Professor of Military History at the War College from 1930. He continued to publish military texts and wrote a study on the language of the Araucanian Indians of the Patagonian region, Place Names Etymology Patagonian Araucana, in 1935; and in 1937 the study, The Strategic Thought and Operational Idea of San Martin in the Campaign of the Andes.

While Perón had established himself as a notable scholar while serving on the Army staff, he also spent much time on sports, building up a formidable physique, and honing his skills in boxing, archery, horseback riding, and as a notable skier and fencer. A biographer points out that, ‘in a military where physical appearance contributed to power, Perón was six feet tall, dark haired and very muscular’.⁴

In 1928 Perón married a schoolteacher named Aurelia Tizón and adopted a daughter. Aurelia was an accomplished drawer and painter, and her knowledge of English allowed her to translate several military texts for Perón. She died of cancer in 1938.

In 1930 a coup led by General Jose F. Uriburu overthrew the Government of Hipólito Irigoyen. Perón’s role in the coup saw him take the presidential palace and environs on 6 September, actions that drew him to the attention of his military superiors.

In 1931 he was promoted to major, and was a member of the committee that defined the borders between Bolivia and Argentina.⁵ During 1930-1935 he served as private secretary to the Minister of War.

By 1936 he had reached the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and was teaching at the Escuela Superior de Guerra. During 1936-38 he served as Argentine military attaché to Chile, but amid accusations of espionage, which he always denied, Perón was recalled and embarked on a significant episode in the shaping of his thinking:

He was a member of a military mission sent to study in Europe, residing first in Italy in 1939, where he specialised in Mountain Infantry. In 1940 he toured Spain, Germany, Hungary, France, Yugoslavia and Albania. He also saw the Soviet Union, then in alliance with Germany.

In 1941 he was promoted to the rank of Colonel. His study of Italy and Germany, and in particular his time in the former sate, made an enduring impact upon his political and philosophical thinking. He saw the success of Fascism in overcoming class divisions, mobilising the masses for national construction, and achieving national unity through social justice.

Perón, of Sardinian descent, ‘spoke perfect Italian’. He closely studied Italian Fascism, and joined the mass rallies where Mussolini spoke to the crowds from the balcony of the Palazzo Venezia, a technique he was to master as a feature of his own regime. He regarded Italians and Argentines as similar, and saw how a variant of this national-social synthesis could be applied to his country.⁶ It is here that he formulated his ‘third position’, recalling to the historian Felix Luna in 1968: ‘When faced with a world divided by two imperialisms, the Italians responded: we are with neither side, we represent a third position between Soviet socialism and Yankee imperialism’. ⁷ Perón never repudiated this premise. When journalist Valentin Thiebault told Perón of Mussolini’s death and said, ‘We will have to erect a monument for him one day’, Perón replied, ‘One monument? Only one? Please say you mean one on every street corner!’⁸

Group of United Officers

Perón, returning to Argentina from Italy in 1941, joined the Group of United Officers (GOU), a brotherhood up to the rank of Colonel, who shared political ideas.

With the resignation of Minister of War General Pedro Ramírez, at the insistence of President Ramón S. Castillo, and the impending appointment of Patron Costas, a large landowner with a pro-British sentiment, this prompted the GOU and other pro-German elements in the military, to act against the civilian government of Castillo. On 2 June 1943 the GOU met to plan a march on the presidential palace. Although Perón was not at the meeting, the plan of action he sent was approved. The next day the GOU and others marched on Buenos Aires. On 4 June Castillo resigned. The army took control of the nation, and gave due recognition to the role of the GOU. Ratliff writes: ‘The three year long military regime saw many opportunities for officers to be promoted, however, it was Perón who gained the most. The key Minister of War post went to General Edelmiro Farrell, who before the coup had been Perón’s immediate superior’.⁹ Perón assumed the post of Secretary in the War Ministry.

The next pivotal event was in early 1944 when President Ramírez bowed to Allied pressure and broke off diplomatic relations with the Axis. In August 1943 the Ramirez government had asked the USA for arms. The USA responded that arms could not be sold to Argentina because of its neutrality. Ramirez then sent a mission to Germany to buy arms. The ship carrying the Argentine consul leading the mission was seized en route to Barcelona by the English. The English sent the documents of the mission to the USA. The American response was one of ‘gunboat diplomacy’, and ships moved menacingly towards Rio de la Plata (The River Plate), while American banks stopped the Argentine funds being transferred to Germany.¹⁰ Although Argentina ‘severed all relations with the Axis powers on 25 January 1944’, ‘this was not enough’ for U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull who demanded total compliance with his wishes’. A ban on U.S. shipping to Argentina was imposed. Despite the pressures, and the impending defeat of the Axis, Argentina did not declare war on the Axis until 28 March 1945; too late to be of any real meaning.¹¹

A struggle between pro-Axis and pro-Allied factions in government ensued. The position of the GOU had been unequivocally pro-Axis, with an internal manifesto stating in 1943 that ‘Germany is making a titanic effort to unify the European continent… Today, Germany is giving life a historic direction. We must follow this example. Hitler’s fight, in times of peace and in times of war, will have to guide us from now on’. ¹²Perón’s opposition to U.S. pressure on Argentina to join the Allies in the war contributed to the personal animosity from U.S. Ambassador Spruille Braden. Lindon Ratliff writes:

The result of the crisis was an almost total reorganisation of the military government. General Farrell became President and Perón was Vice President, Minister of War, Secretary of Labor and Social Reform, as well as Head of the Post-War Council. The USA refused to recognise the Farrell-Perón regime. In other words, even though [Perón] was not president he was the most powerful man in the government’.¹³

It was Perón’s position as Secretary of Labor and Social Reform that was the basis of his influence. The military regime had alienated the masses, although Perón and the GOU sought an alliance with the labour unions. Perón had already established himself as the people’s champion by enacting laws on social security and paid vacations, but most of all, because of his support for the unionisation of workers. His role in coordinating relief aid for San Juan after an earthquake on 15 January 1944, which took over 10,000 lives, had also gained him many supporters. It was through this involvement that he met his future wife Eva Duarte, a movie and radio actress, who was one of the celebrities helping with the work.

Eva Duarte was no vacuous First Lady there for the glitz and glamour. She had been a co-founder of the Radio Association of Argentina in 1943, the aim being to ‘defend the interests of Argentinean radio’s workers’. She had already been a forceful personality in defending her dignity as an actress, and was described as having an ‘indomitable personality’.¹⁴ When the earthquake struck San Juan, the Radio Association was one of the aid committees that helped organise a benefit concert to assist the homeless. It was as part of a delegation that Eva Duarte met Perón in the office of the secretary of labour and social affairs on 22 January.¹⁵

With Perón as the recognised leader of a major element in politics, not only among the military but among the masses of people, General Eduardo Avalos moved to pre-empt Perón’s rise. A coup was staged which forced Perón to resign all posts on 10 October 1945. After being permitted to deliver a radio address to his supporters, on 13 October he was sent to the prison island of Martin Garcia, where Argentina’s most important political prisoners were traditionally consigned.

General Edelmiro Julian Farrell June 1944

October Revolution

After Perón had been forced to resign his posts in October 1945, the new regime began to annul the social reforms that had been achieved by Perón. This confirmed the growing belief that only Perón could advance the welfare of the people. At this time Eva Duarte lobbied for Perón’s release, speaking before labour rallies, and keeping Perón informed of developments in her letters to him. The labour confederation (CGT) called a general strike for 18 October 1945. The day before, however, masses of workers marched on Buenos Aires and gathered at Plaza de Mayo. Protesting workers assembled outside the labour department demanding that they be paid the ‘Aguinaldo’ or share of company profits that Perón had legislated into effect. The only answer of the Government was to quip: ‘go ask Perón to pay that to you’.¹⁶ Workers from the industrial areas and suburbs converged on the city centre. When police blocked the bridges, workers commandeered boats to get to the Plaza in front of the presidential palace, the Casa Rosada.

Such was the wave of popular support that Perón was released. That night Perón spoke from the balcony of the Casa Rosada to workers crowding the square, declaring his candidacy for the presidency:

Workers: Almost two years ago I had three honours in my life: to be a soldier, that of being a patriot and being the first Argentine worker. This afternoon, the Executive has signed my application for retirement from active Army duty. With that, I’ve given up voluntarily the most distinguished honour to which a soldier can aspire: to gain the palms and laurels of the General’s Office. This I have done because I want to remain Colonel Perón, and put that name to the integral service of authentic Argentine people. I leave the holy and honourable uniform handed to me: to wear a jacket of the civil Patria, and mingle in that mass of suffering that produces the work and greatness of the country.

With that I give my final embrace of that institution, which is the mainstay of the country: the military. And also I give the first embrace to that great mass, which represents the synthesis of a feeling that had died in the Republic: the true civility of the Argentine people.

From this time, it will be historic for the Republic, that Colonel Perón who makes the bond of union, that indestructible brotherhood among the people, the army and politics. An eternal and infinite union, that this people may grow in that spiritual unity of the true and genuine forces of nationality and order.

On the brotherhood of working people we will build our beautiful homeland, in the unity of all Argentines. We will be incorporating from this beautiful day a movement not at all fractious and discontented, that will be together with us, as a patriotic mass.¹⁷

Perón then exhorted the crowd to return to their homes while he considered how to proceed. He did not want the regime to be given a pretext for violence:

I know what labour movements have announced. Sorry, there is no cause for it. So I ask, as an older brother, who will return quietly to work and think: today I ask you to return calmly to your homes…¹⁸

The day, 17 October, has endured ever since in celebrations as ‘Loyalty Day’. It was the day that not only were workers loyal to Perón, risking their lives to save their champion, but when, for the first time, the workers showed that they had the power to decide a nation’s destiny.

Perón married Eva Duarte that month. He prepared for the presidential election that had been called for 24 February 1946, after the military had been put on notice by the masses of people on 17 October. On 26 December 1945 Perón and Eva embarked on a train that he called El Descamisado (The Shirtless) in honour of the iconic masses of workers who were the backbone of Perónism. His opponents embarked on their campaign in a train dubbed ‘Victory’. Both were subjected to attacks. The presence of Eva was the first time a woman had participated in a presidential campaign.¹⁹

The military government weakened by events called presidential elections for February 24, 1946. Perón, in just four months, organized the political bases of support among workers, independent sectors and progressives who had detached from the Radical Civic Union, Conservative Party and Socialist Party. His opposition was a political front called ‘Democratic Union’ formed by the most conservative sectors of society in partnership with the internationalist Left and the Communist Party and openly supported by the Ambassador of the United States of America, Mr. Spruille Braden. The dilemma was ‘Braden or Perón’.²⁰

‘Braden or Perón’

From this earliest period of Perón’s political life, U.S. interests opposed him. At the time the U.S. Ambassador was Spruille Braden, whose opposition would continue when he was recalled to Washington to become Under-Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere. Braden was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), a globalist think tank founded in 1919 by international bankers, academics and industrialists, to promote a world state. The CFR has been referred to as the ‘secret government of the USA’ insofar as it has provided key advisers to every Democratic and Republican administration since the time of Woodrow Wilson. Rockefeller interests have long been dominant.²¹ Braden had been a lobbyist for the United Fruit Company (UFC).²² In 1954 he was a coordinator in the CIA-planned overthrow of Jacabo Arbenz, elected president of Guatemala.²³ Braden was a well-connected plutocrat, representing W. Averell Harriman Securities Corporation,²⁴ and was an agent for Standard Oil, a flagship corporation of the Rockefeller banking and oil dynasty. He was noted for his animosity towards trades unions.²⁵ On his own account, Braden was both an advisor and a close friend of Paul Warburg, the architect of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank and a scion of the Warburg international banking dynasty.²⁶ Braden had a similar relationship with Nelson Rockefeller, who was Braden’s predecessor as U.S. Under-Secretary of State.²⁷

Alicia Ortiz, whose father had been a member of the central committee of the Argentine Communist party who, along with his comrades, ‘lived in a dismal prison’ during 1943 to 1945, writes of Braden:

He arrived in Buenos Aires as fresh as a rose and ready to intervene without any restraint. He was welcomed by the entire democratic coalition – oligarchs, radicals, Socialists, and confused Communists. In the face of the dangers of Nazism, this ruddy Mr. Clean played the part of the Messiah.²⁸

According to Ortiz, Braden regarded himself as the ‘messenger’ of the USA’s Jews to their Argentine brethren who were in danger, and that this was ‘a profitable example that he could use to his advantage’.²⁹ That is to say, apparently, Braden hoped to mobilize Jewry against Perón if he did not tow the U.S. line. Ortiz writes that ‘the rosy cheeked American’ paid Perón a visit:

Faced with Perón who displayed a choirboy’s candour, Braden evoked ‘the German and Japanese assets’ that the Argentinean government could seize. He added, with raised eyebrows inspired by Groucho Marx, ‘But, Colonel Perón, you know that if we work these affairs out, the U.S. will not get in the way of your future presidential candidacy’. ‘Alas!’ Perón cried, opening his arms, ‘there is still a small problem’. ‘What problem?’ ‘In this country, he who enters into this type of scheme with a foreign power is a son of a bitch’.

Braden turned livid with rage and left without even a good-bye, in his haste forgetting his hat. Perón burst out laughing and threw the hat to ‘his boys’ for a little game of soccer…³⁰

General Juan Perón in 1946

On 23 May 1946 the separate parties that had supported Perón, including the Labour Party, were merged into a single party, originally called the Sole Party of the Revolution and, shortly after, the Perónist Party, formally known as the Partido Justicialista,³¹ which remains the ‘official’ Perónist party.

When Perón based his 1946 presidential campaign on the slogan ‘Braden or Perón’ this expressed a significant factor at work in the fight for Argentina and the doctrine of Perónism. Braden as a representative of U.S. plutocracy was connected with the highest echelons of international finance: Harriman, Rockefeller, Warburg. This international banking coterie, which has a firmer grip over the world than ever,³² was challenged by Perónism. Perónism arose, moreover, in the aftermath of a world war that had been fought by those same plutocratic interests against the Axis states, whose doctrine, generically called ‘national socialism’, and ‘fascism’, had also attempted to overthrow parasitic finance-capitalism. It was little wonder that Braden and his colleagues hated Perón with such vehemence.

At a farewell lunch before his return to the USA, Braden said in a speech that he would continue his fight against Perón from Washington’, which received ‘a standing ovation from the well-heeled audience’, wrote Latin American specialist Dr. Jill Hedges.³³

Perón election posters

In February 1946, at a meeting of diplomats from Latin America called in Washington by the U.S. State Department, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and his Under-Secretary, Braden, gave each delegate a copy of a book. The New York Times commented:

Only one nation was absent —Argentina. A few minutes later that absent neighbor stood accused of virtually every crime in the book against democracy. The stern indictment was a 130-page booklet written in language no nation ordinarily uses unless it is prepared to go to war. ³⁴

The USA attempted to demonize Perón and isolate Argentina in a manner similar to the tactics pursued up to the present against resistant states such as the Afrikaner Republic, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Assad’s Syria, Milosevic’s Serbia, Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela, and Putin’s Russia. What Braden had prepared was a ‘Blue Book’³⁵ vilifying Perón. Although their were allusions to ‘consultation’ among American Republics, this was not the case. The document was an ultimatum to Latin American states. The State Department released the Blue Book two weeks before the February 1946 Argentine presidential elections in a flagrant effort to thwart a Perón victory. It purports to prove collusion between Perón and Germany and Italy during the Second World War. The salient points are:

Members of the military government collaborated with enemy agents for important espionage and other purposes damaging to the war effort of the United Nations.

Nazi leaders, groups and organizations have combined with Argentine totalitarian groups to create a Nazi-Fascist state.

Members of the military regime who have controlled the government since June 1943 conspired with the enemy to undermine governments in neighboring countries in order to destroy their collaboration with the Allies and in an effort to align them in a pro-Axis bloc.

Successive Argentine governments protected the enemy in economic matters in order to preserve Axis industrial and commercial power in Argentina.

Successive Argentine governments conspired with the enemy to obtain arms from Germany. This information warrants the following conclusions:

The Castillo Government and still more the present military regime pursued a policy of positive aid to the enemy.

Solemn pledges to cooperate with the other American republics were completely breached and are proved to have been designed to protect and maintain Axis interests in Argentina.

The policies and actions of the recent regimes in Argentina were aimed at undermining the Inter-American System.

The totalitarian individuals and groups, both military and civilian, who control the present government in Argentina, have, with their Nazi collaborators, pursued a common aim: The creation in this Hemisphere of a totalitarian state. This aim has already been partly accomplished.

Increasingly since the invasion of Normandy, and most obviously since the failure of the last German counteroffensive in January 1945, the military regime has had to resort to a defensive strategy of camouflage. The assumption of the obligations of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace to wipe out Nazi influence and the repeated avowals of pro-democratic intentions proceeded from this strategy of deception.

By its brutal use of force and terrorist methods to strike down all opposition from the Argentine people the military regime has made a mockery of its pledge to the United Nations to ‘reaffirm faith in human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person.’ The information in support of these charges is respectfully submitted to the Governments of the American republics for their consideration in relation to the Treaty of Mutual Assistance to be negotiated at the forthcoming conference at Rio de Janeiro. By its terms the Act of Chapultepec lays the basis for a mutual assistance pact which will obligate the member governments to assist one another to meet an attack or a threat of aggression from any source whatsoever. This implementation would require a close cooperation in the development of security plans of vital importance to every American republic. It would also require cooperation in the maintenance of adequate military establishments for the defense of the continent. Such a defense structure can be built only on a foundation of absolute trust and confidence. Because the Government of the United States did not have such trust and confidence in the present Argentine regime, it took the position in October 1945 that it could not properly sign a military assistance treaty with that regime. It is submitted that the information transmitted to the Governments of the American republics in this memorandum makes abundantly clear a pattern which includes aid to the enemy, deliberate misrepresentation and deception in promises of Hemisphere cooperation, subversive activity against neighboring republics, and a vicious partnership of Nazi and native totalitarian forces. This pattern raises a deeper and more fundamental question than that of the adequacy of decrees and administrative measures allegedly enacted in compliance with Argentina’s obligations under Resolution LIX of the Mexico Conference [at Chapultepec]. The question is whether the military regime, or any Argentine government controlled by the same elements, can merit the confidence and trust which is expressed in a treaty of mutual military assistance among the American republics.

The Blue Book was adopted by the Unión Democrática in the electoral fight against Perón, and it was widely cited by the Argentine press.

It is