British Town Class Cruisers: Design, Development & Performance: Southampton & Belfast Classes

By Conrad Waters

This scholarly study of the Royal Navy’s WWII light cruisers presents extensive design, performance, and engagement analysis of each ship.
 
When the Second World War began, the ten British ‘Town’ class cruisers were the most modern vessels of their type in the Royal Navy. Primarily designed for the defense of trade, they played decisive roles in victories such as the Battle of the Barents Sea and the destruction of the German Scharnhorst at the North Cape. They also paid a heavy price: four of the ships were lost and the other six sustained serious damage.
 
In this major study, Conrad Waters provides a technical evaluation of the ‘Town’ class design and its subsequent performance. He outlines the class’s origins in the context of inter-war cruiser policy, explains the design and construction process, and describes the characteristics of the resulting ships and how these were adapted in the light of wartime developments.
 
An overview of service focuses on major engagements and presents detailed assessments of action damage. Concluding chapters explore the the modernization program that kept the remaining ships fit for service during the Cold War era. Heavily illustrated with contemporary photographs and expert drawings, British Town Class Cruisers provides a definitive reference to one of the Royal Navy’s most important warship designs.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Nov 18, 2019
• ISBN: 9781526718877

Conrad Waters

A barrister by training and a banker by profession, Waters has had a lifelong interest in modern navies, about which he has written extensively. He edited the recent 'Navies in the 21st Century' and has been the editor of the 'World Naval Review' since its foundation in 2009.

Book preview

Chapter 1

CLASS ORIGINS

ROYAL NAVY CRUISER REQUIREMENTS

The start of the twentieth century marked the zenith of the United Kingdom’s steady rise from the status of a regional northern European power to leadership of a global trading empire.The nature of this empire was both formal – through direct control of colonies and protectorates – and informal – through the exertion of economic and political influence over notionally independent states – but was bound together by a number of common threads.¹ These included the manufacturing might that was provided by being first mover in the Industrial Revolution, the financial dominance of the City of London and – most importantly – control of an intricate network of maritime trading routes across which international trade flowed.

Given its importance to empire, protection of this maritime trading network became, arguably, the Royal Navy’s primary role. Largely performed by frigates during the age of sail, this task became the responsibility of cruisers of varying size and power during the Victorian era. Deployed in considerable numbers around the world, these ships protected trade routes from potential interdiction by hostile powers whilst ensuring the stability of empire through various ‘flag waving’ tasks. The most powerful, armoured cruisers were also expected to act as a fast wing of the battle fleet during a fleet action and smaller vessels had an important scouting role. Maintaining this cruiser force was an expensive proposition; the cost of both the larger individual cruisers and that of the overall fleet was comparable with the expense associated with the battle fleet by late Victorian times.²

Protection of the British Empire’s extensive maritime trading network required the Royal Navy to maintain a large fleet of cruisers to police the sea lanes.This picture shows Lancaster, one of ten Monmouth class armoured cruisers completed between 1903 and 1904 for the trade defence role. (Author’s collection)

The emergence of Germany as a major naval power early in the twentieth century saw the Royal Navy increasingly concentrated on home waters and cruiser construction refocused towards smaller ships intended to operate with the fleet. Typical of these new generation of cruisers were the extended ‘C’ series. Caradoc, completed in 1917, was one of these ships. Their small size and limited endurance made them poorly suited for service on the trade routes, although Caradoc was serving in this role when photographed here in North American waters in November 1939. (Author’s collection)

The emergence of Germany as a potential rival to British naval supremacy during the early years of the twentieth century brought a major change in strategy. Alliances both with friends (e.g. Japan) and former rivals (e.g. France and Russia) greatly reduced the naval threat to the all-important trade routes and allowed the fleet to be increasingly concentrated in home waters.At the same time, technological development – notably in radio communications – opened the potential of policing the trade routes on a more efficient, centralised basis. It also helped that Germany’s continental geographical position and relatively limited network of overseas bases meant that she was less able to sustain a naval threat to trade than former enemies. The composition of the fleet shifted markedly as a result of this revised strategy, particularly during the tenure of ‘Jacky’ Fisher as First Sea Lord. A new breed of warship – the battlecruiser – replaced the armoured cruiser and smaller cruiser construction was largely focused on ships designed principally to operate with the fleet.³ Here they continued to act as scouts for the battleships and also reinforced the destroyers shielding them from the threat posed by torpedo boat attack.

The British strategy adopted to counter the German naval build-up was broadly vindicated by the experience of the First World War. The threat to maritime trade routes from surface cruiser warfare was initially significant but largely eradicated at relatively modest cost within six months of the conflict’s outbreak. Notably, the new battle-cruisers proved their value as commerce-raider destroyers by their swift eradication of the German East Asia Squadron at the Battle of the Falkland Islands in December 1914. Thereafter, the German surface fleet was largely confined to its bases by the ability of the Royal Navy’s concentrated naval forces to dominate the North Sea. The extent of the threat to maritime trade posed by the submarine was an unexpected development but one ultimately countered by the effective application of convoy tactics and new technology.

The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 had a significant impact on the future direction of cruiser designs both in the Royal Navy and worldwide.The Washington Treaty’s provisions with respect to cruisers were, in turn, influenced by the Royal Navy’s small group of ‘Elizabethan’ class cruisers, which had been ordered during the First World War as oceanic raider hunters. This is Hawkins at Durban during the 1930s. (Author’s collection)

The end of the First World War and Germany’s defeat resulted in the removal of Britain’s most immediate naval rival. However, the new balance of maritime power posed even more complex and challenging questions than before. Both the United States and Japan had used the war years to embark upon considerable naval expansion and – although Britain’s wartime allies – were increasingly viewed as maritime rivals. Although the challenge from the United States was seen largely in political terms, Japanese expansionism was increasingly viewed as a real threat that came to dominate much of the Royal Navy’s planning during the interwar years. Moreover, unlike Germany, Japan’s geographical position meant that she was well-placed to interdict British maritime trade. One consequence was that Britain continued to need fleet cruisers to operate in conjunction with the battlefleet but had also to rebuild a force of trade protection cruisers.⁴ By 1923, the Admiralty had determined a requirement totalling seventy cruisers. Thirty-one of these were to operate with the battle fleet with the balance used to secure the trade routes.⁵ This number exerted a lasting influence on Royal Navy planning assumptions.

WASHINGTON TREATY CRUISERS

Meanwhile, the characteristics of the Royal Navy’s initial post-war cruiser designs had been determined by the first in a series of naval armaments limitation treaties that were one of the most important influences on naval developments during the interwar period. The result of fears over a new naval arms race similar to that preceding the First World War, the Washington Conference was convened on the initiative of the US government in November 1921. The resultant treaty between the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan and the United States was signed on 6 February 1922.

The Washington Naval Treaty’s main result was to enforce reductions in the total number of capital ships in service with the contracting powers and to introduce individual and total caps on replacement tonnage. A new definition of displacement – standard displacement – was agreed to facilitate international comparisons.The treaty also suspended – with some exceptions – the construction of new capital ships for a period of ten years and imposed similar individual and overall displacement caps on the future construction of aircraft carriers. Attempts were made to extend this approach to cruisers and smaller warships but it proved impossible to reach a consensus. However, individual limits were agreed restricting the displacement of such vessels to 10,000 tons and their armament to 8in (203mm) calibre guns. These had a significant impact on the trajectory of future cruiser development.⁶

The origins of these individual limits agreed on ship qualities under the Washington Treaty for warships below capital ship and aircraft carrier size can be traced to the Royal Navy’s Hawkins or ‘Elizabethan’ class cruisers, which were ordered between 1915 and 1916. These large cruisers – displacing around 9,750 tons and armed with seven 7.5in guns – were designed specifically as oceanic-raider hunters. As such, they were far removed from the smaller cruisers intended for fleet service that were the main focus of Royal Navy construction of the type at that time. Although only five were completed, they exerted considerable influence on Japanese and US thinking. Both these countries’ navies came to view comparatively large cruisers armed with 8in guns as particularly appropriate for the long-range scouting and screening roles they envisaged their cruiser forces would perform in a future Pacific war. Moreover, whilst the Royal Navy later came to regret its support for the type, the large cruiser undoubtedly offered a potential combination of firepower, speed and endurance that was well suited to the imperial trade-protection role. By contrast, the fleet cruisers that had dominated wartime construction were simply too small and too short-ranged for employment on the trade routes. Given this background, it is easy to see why the Washington Treaty’s limits on ships of cruiser size (and below) were relatively readily accepted.⁷

The effective suspension of capital-ship construction imposed by the Washington Treaty inevitably spurred its signatories to build cruisers – the most powerful type now allowed – of the largest size permitted by the qualitative restrictions. All quickly drew up construction plans for socalled ‘treaty cruisers’. Nevertheless, the emergence of these ships was not without its problems. From a technological perspective, all five treaty powers found it challenging to design an effective 8in cruiser on a 10,000-ton standard displacement.Various compromises – few entirely satisfactory – with respect to areas such as armour, sea-keeping and propulsion had to be adopted.The new ships were also relatively expensive.⁸ This particularly impacted the Royal Navy, as the unique extent of its trade protection role meant that it required far more cruisers than any other fleet.

The Royal Navy ‘County’ class cruiser Cumberland pictured off Wei Hai Wei in northern China during the 1930s. Like contemporary ships built by foreign navies, she was designed up to the 10,000-ton limit on standard displacement mandated by the Washington Treaty and armed with 8in guns, the maximum calibre permitted. The ‘County’ class’s size and endurance made the design well-suited for operation on the trade routes but the ships were too expensive to be built in the numbers the Royal Navy required to meet its global commitments. (Author’s collection)

The Leander class was an attempt to design a smaller, 6in gun-armed cruiser that was sufficiently affordable to be built in the numbers the Royal Navy needed. The lead ship was ordered in advance of the negotiations that led to the London Treaty of 1930 in an effort to encourage other naval powers to adopt similar ships. This is Orion at Gravesend in May 1935. (Author ’s collection)

Nevertheless, the Royal Navy rapidly initiated a programme of treaty cruiser construction. This ultimately resulted in thirteen of the famous ‘County’ class being completed, of which two were for the Royal Australian Navy. All were designed around the 10,000-ton treaty limit and mounted eight 8in guns. However, it quickly became apparent that there was neither the funding nor political support to allow the desired seventy-ship force to be achieved through the construction of such expensive ships. Throughout the middle and later years of the 1920s, various expedients were adopted to try to square the circle. These included extending the normal lifespan expected of cruisers from 16 to 20 years; accepting that ten of the seventy ships would have to serve beyond this age; and looking at cheaper designs. The last-mentioned approach initially resulted in the smaller York and Exeter, which displaced around 8,500 tons and – although somewhat better armoured than the ‘County’ class – were armed with only six 8in guns. These were designated as ‘B’ type cruisers to distinguish them from the maximum-sized ‘A’ type. Unfortunately the savings involved in such an approach were not particularly significant, being calculated at c.£230,000 or a little over 10 per cent of the £2.1 million cost of an ‘A’ cruiser.⁹ A more radical approach was clearly required.

THE LEANDER CLASS

Throughout this period, there had been considerable interest in resuming construction of cruisers equipped with the 6in (152mm) calibre weapons that had dominated the armament of cruisers built in the run-up to and during the First World War. The reasons for this interest were varied, although the considerable economies to be gained in producing a more lightly-armed and, hence, smaller cruiser were a recurring theme. However, such a significant change in policy was only practical to the extent that other Washington Treaty signatories could be persuaded to abandon construction of the 8inarmed treaty type. Otherwise the smaller cruisers that the Royal Navy was now tempted to acquire would likely be crushed in any engagement with their more powerfully armed foreign counterparts.

Efforts to reach agreement on this point were made during the abortive Geneva Conference of 1927, which attempted to extend the limits on naval construction agreed at Washington. These discussions failed. The United States wanted to limit total cruiser numbers (through a restriction on overall cruiser tonnage) to a level far below the Royal Navy’s imperial needs to enable the US Navy to achieve parity. Meanwhile, the British wanted to curtail individual cruiser size and armament to an extent incompatible with the characteristics the US Navy desired for Pacific operations. Nevertheless, pressure on the Royal Navy to move to a smaller, cheaper cruiser design was increased by a deteriorating economic backdrop. In 1928, formal design work began on a new type of 6in cruiser that was ultimately to result in the Leander class.¹⁰

Notes:

1. Data based on revised legend approved 4 Jun 1931 as amended for known subsequent changes.

The staff requirements for the new, smaller cruisers were largely focused on the fleet role, although it was also anticipated they might be used to protect safer trade routes.They were to have a minimum standard displacement of 6,000 tons, endurance of 7,000 nautical miles at 16 knots and a speed of 30.5 knots. Magazines and shell rooms were to be protected from 6in gunfire between the critical ranges of 10,000 and 16,000 yards and – reflecting the fleet mission – from 4.7in (destroyer) gunfire beyond 7,000 yards. Five sketch designs incorporating single open mounts, twin mounts, and a combination of the two were drawn-up. None fully met the requirements but a sketch incorporating four twin turrets was selected for further development. Size steadily grew as the design was refined and during the subsequent construction phase. This was accompanied by a shift in emphasis more towards trade protection. The displacement in the final approved legend was c.7,150 tons. Leander actually came out slightly higher than this figure in spite of the extensive use of welding – a first on more than a purely experimental scale for the Royal Navy – as a weight-saving measure. However, the experience gained paid dividends in terms of reductions achieved in the subsequent ships. Cost also grew with size – the original hope was for c.£1.2 million but actual unit cost was c.£1.6 million. Nevertheless, four of the new cruisers could be built for around the same cost as three of the larger ‘County’ class. Full design characteristics for Leander – the first of the modern, post First World War Royal Navy light cruisers from which the ‘Towns’ traced their lineage – are set out in Table 1.1.

Although international agreement on a reduction in cruiser size had yet to be reached, the lead Leander was ordered early in 1930 under the Royal Navy’s 1929 construction programme. By this time, a new Labour government headed by Ramsay MacDonald was in power. It had a strong desire to achieve further arms limitation and had called a fresh naval disarmament conference in London in an attempt to achieve the agreement that had proved so elusive in Geneva. It had indicated a willingness – accepted reluctantly and on a temporary basis by the Admiralty – to reduce the Royal Navy’s cruiser requirement to fifty ships in a hope of achieving a compromise with the United States.¹¹ The order for Leander also likely formed part of the groundwork for a new agreement, tangibly demonstrating through construction of a prototype the British government’s intent to build smaller ships.With the US economy also under pressure following the 1929 Wall Street Crash, the potential for a deal seemed promising.

THE LONDON TREATY OF 1930

The London Naval Conference, held between 21 January and 22 April 1930, was a qualified success. Positively, the three major naval powers – the British Empire, Japan and the United States – agreed to maintain the ‘holiday’ with respect to capital ship construction for a further five years and extended overall limits on tonnage to the main warship categories not covered by the Washington Treaty. Additional qualitative restrictions on individual ships were also achieved. Negatively, the French and Italian delegations refused to accept the extension of total tonnage restrictions to additional warship categories. Moreover, their respective governments – whilst maintaining general compliance – failed to ratify the new agreement’s other terms. More broadly, the conference can be viewed as producing a series of unsatisfactory compromises that heralded the effective collapse of the naval limitation system over the next decade.

Notes:

1. The maximum number of cruisers allowed in category (a) was British Commonwealth of Nations 15, United States of America 18 and Japan 12.

2. The United States could elect to substitute 15,166 tons (15,409 tonnes) of category (b) cruisers for up to three category (a) cruisers to maintain overall parity in total cruiser displacement with the Britain.

3. There were additional requirements relating at what age ships could be replaced (i.e. when they were considered ‘over age’), which also had an impact on the displacement of cruisers that could be laid down for ships becoming ‘over age’ in 1937, 1938 and 1939. The British Commonwealth of Nations was specifically limited to laying down no more than 91,000 tons (92,456 tonnes) of new cruisers from 01 Apr 1930 to 31 Dec 1936 but could prematurely replace some under-age ships of the Hawkins class.

4. It was planned a new naval conference would be held in 1935 to reach a further agreement for the period from 1937 onwards.

The thorny issue relating to cruiser numbers and size was resolved by dividing cruisers into two sub-categories: (i)those with guns exceeding 6.1in (155mm) in calibre and (ii)those with a calibre of 6.1in or less. Either type – subsequently known respectively as ‘heavy cruisers’ and ‘light cruisers’ – could be built up to the 10,000-ton cap on standard displacement set at Washington. Each signatory had to comply with an overall tonnage limitation for both subcategories by the end of 1936, as set out in Table 1.2. Additionally, the number of heavy cruisers were limited to eighteen for the United States, fifteen for the British Commonwealth of Nations and twelve for Japan. The United States was allowed a larger quota of heavy cruiser tonnage than the British Commonwealth of Nations in line with these numbers but less cruiser tonnage overall. However, in order to allow it to ‘save face’ on the issue of parity, it could trade heavy for light cruiser tonnage to achieve equivalence. Amongst further clauses was one restricting the British Commonwealth of Nations from completing any more than 91,000 tons of new cruiser tonnage before 31 December 1936.

Notes:

1. In replacement for 18 old ‘over age’ 6in cruisers. The total number of 14 new 6in cruisers was not specified in the Treaty but contemporary documents suggest it formed the basis of an understanding with the United States. The 91,000 tons did not have to be split equally to result in the construction of 14 ships of 6,500 tons each – by the end of 1930 the plan was for ten cruisers of c. 7,000 tons (the Leander s) and four cruisers of c. 5,000 tons (to become the Arethusa class).

2. To be rounded down to 339,000 tons through reducing new construction displacements.

3. Given an expected construction time of three years, the 14 new ships could be laid down during the 1929–1933 programmes. The Treaty effectively allowed a further 15 ‘over age’ ships totalling 67,350 tons to be replaced from programme year 1934 onwards (i.e. for completion in 1937 or later) and an additional four ships totalling 19,000 tons to be replaced from programme year 1935 ) onwards (i.e. for completion in 1938 or later). No further ships fell due for replacement in the 1936 programme.

The terms relating to the permitted tonnage both of total Royal Navy cruisers and of new construction that were agreed under the 1930 London Treaty had been based on a calculation of the tonnage required to ensure the ‘magic number’ of fifty ships was achieved at the end of 1936. This is detailed in Table 1.3.¹² The 91,000 tons allowed for new construction was anticipated to permit the completion of ten Leander class vessels, at that time estimated to displace c.7,000 tons each. The balance would be allocated to four new, smaller cruisers optimised for fleet duties that would each displace in the region of 5,000 tons. These became the Arethusa class. The ability to build a total of fourteen ships within the tonnage agreed for new construction was to become a key part of the debate that preceded the ‘Town’ class’s approval.

Japan’s Mogami class – built in response to the 1930 London Treaty’s restrictions on heavy cruisers – were very different from Leander as a result of the characteristics deemed essential for operations in the Pacific. Armed with fifteen 6.1in guns, they were officially reported as displacing 8,500 tons standard displacement but this had risen to over 11,000 tons when Mogami was first completed. However, the new ships suffered significant structural problems due partly to defective welding and further reconstruction pushed displacement to as much as 12,400 tons. This picture shows the third ship of the four-strong class, Suzuya, in a partlycompleted state during November 1935 trials that were subsequently interrupted to allow the necessary modifications to be made. (NH 73074 Naval History & Heritage Command).

FOREIGN DEVELOPMENTS

The Royal Navy was unhappy with the reduced cruiser force it was allowed under the London Treaty tonnage restrictions. However, it was already painfully apparent that previous target of seventy cruisers had become completely unaffordable in the prevailing economic circumstances, particularly if construction remained focused on Washington Treaty type heavy cruisers.The new agreement was therefore welcome in so far as the caps it imposed on this type of ship opened up the prospect of building sufficient numbers of smaller, cheaper ships so as to make the new target of fifty vessels achievable. Unfortunately, foreign developments quickly undermined this assumption.

Notes:

1. Data from Ships’ Cover, supplemented by secondary sources.

2. Data largely from Norman Friedman, U.S. Cruisers: An Illustrated Design History .

3. Data largely from Eric Lacroix & Linton Wells III, Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War . Details relate to the design at the time of delivery, although not all the close-range armament was fitted at this time.

Although France and Italy had both refused to participate in the relevant Part III of the London Treaty and had failed to ratify its other terms, it is interesting to note that they did not cause the challenges that the Royal Navy’s cruiser programme quickly faced. It seems clear that neither nation wished to destabilise the international system of naval armaments limitation initiated at Washington. As such, neither authorised any new heavy cruisers after 1930 and, at least initially, focused further construction on light cruisers of relatively modest proportions.¹³

Instead, the problem arose as a result of actions taken by Japan and the United States, neither of whom believed the moderately-sized cruiser favoured by the Royal Navy was suited for the demands of warfare in the Pacific. First out of the starting blocks was Japan. It made provision for four new Mogami class cruisers to be completed before the end of 1936 in the so-called First Replenishment Programme, which was authorised towards the end of 1930. The first pair had been laid down by the end of 1931 and were officially reported under the communication requirements of the London Treaty as having a standard displacement of 8,500 tons.¹⁴ Their main armament of fifteen 6.1in guns had also been deduced from newspaper reports. Calculations by the British Admiralty’s Director of Naval Construction’s Department in early 1932 suggested that a design with these characteristics was feasible. In practice, however, it seems that Japan increased displacement to 9,500 tons in the final design and that this had risen further to as much as 11,200 tons when Mogami was first completed.¹⁵

Although the United States agreed to curtail further construction of cruisers armed with 8in guns under the London Treaty, its new generation of 6in cruisers was very similar to Japan’s large light cruisers as a result of being influenced by largely identical design priorities and was therefore broadly unchanged from its previous ships in terms of overall size. Its new Brooklyn class continued to be designed on the basis of a standard displacement of 10,000 tons and were armed with fifteen 6in guns. Nashville is pictured here in September 1938. (Author’s collection)

The Royal Navy’s Arethusa class four small fleet cruisers formed part of the Admiralty’s original plan use the total tonnage available under the London Treaty to build fourteen new light cruisers. By 1932 this plan was beginning to unravel in the face of the construction of large, heavily-armed American and Japanese ships.The class was significant in adopting the unit system of machinery that was to be a feature of all subsequent British cruiser design. This is Aurora pictured in the course of trials from Portsmouth Royal Dockyard in 1937. (Author’s collection)

The United States was somewhat slower to act. It was still preoccupied with completing its programme of heavy cruisers and had some interest in using its light cruiser allocation for an innovative aircraft-carrying cruiser design. Nevertheless, by early 1932 design work on a new large light cruiser class, which the Admiralty understood would displace between 9,600 and 10,000 tons and carry an armament of up to fifteen 6in guns, was well underway. This understanding was not far from the truth, with the American design effort ultimately resulting in the 9,800-ton (10,000-ton design) Brooklyn class.A comparison of the new Japanese and US designs with the British Leander is provided in Table 1.4.

THE ADMIRALTY RESPONSE

The growing concern over foreign developments was reflected in an Admiralty Board memorandum prepared in February 1932 and considered at a meeting held on 17 March of that year.¹⁶ It looked at whether the planned British cruiser programme needed revision in light of the intentions of overseas powers to construct ships of much larger displacement than the Leander class. The memorandum summarised existing policy before referencing the planned larger and more heavily-armed American and Japanese cruisers. It was also noted that the more comparable French cruisers still had a ‘valuable’ margin of 500 tons over the British ships. The memorandum posed the question as to whether it would be beneficial to abandon the plan to build a fixed number of fourteen ships from the tonnage available under the London Treaty.This would provide more flexibility to design ships up to the treaty’s limits on individual cruiser characteristics and reduce the risk of building a fleet of inferior vessels.

These aerial views of Ajax ( Leander class) and Perth (formerly Amphion ) in the Panama Canal Zone show how the original Leander class design was modified to incorporate unitised machinery. The resulting Amphion s were an important way point in the progression to the much larger and more powerfully-armed ‘Towns’. By the time these photographs had been taken in, respectively, 1939 and 1940 the original single Mk IV mountings for the HA armament had been replaced by twin Mk XIX mountings. Note that Perth is also without her catapult . (NH 50344/NH 57861 Naval History & Heritage Command)

In spite of the obvious dangers posed by a new generation of powerful foreign light cruisers, the memorandum revealed a considerable divergence of views arising from consultations on the potential policy revision amongst the Admiralty’s leadership. On the one hand, there was an appreciation that overseas developments could not be ignored and that qualitative improvements in the Leander design were desirable. On the other, there was much unease over the inevitable consequence of overall cruiser numbers falling below the critical figure of fifty, not least because of the importance attached to that number in previous Admiralty pronouncements. There was also a strong desire to avoid action that would reinforce the overseas trend towards larger ships. A belated recognition that the London Treaty’s failure to distinguish between the maximum displacement of 8in and 6in cruisers was the root of the problem resulted in the hope that this could be resolved by further negotiation.

The main conclusions reached by the time the Admiralty Board meeting broke up were that an improvement in both the armour and the armament of the Leander class was desirable, even though it was recognised that this would push up displacement.¹⁷ However, it was decided that any precipitate change in policy was to be avoided in order to ensure that foreign powers were not encouraged to order more large cruisers and give ongoing disarmament discussions the best chance of success. Practically, these conclusions resulted in the following three steps:

These three sketch drawings show the evolution of Royal Navy light cruiser design from the Leander via the Amphion to the Southampton classes. In addition to the increase in size and the adoption of unit machinery, other notable changes include the steady extension of the armoured belt, as well as the triple 6in turrets, improved anti-aircraft armament and more extensive provision for aircraft operation in the Southampton s . The rotating type catapult shown in the Amphion class drawing was initially fitted to Australia’s Sydney to allow operation of the new Seagull V amphib ian. The other two ships of the class were fitted with lighter fixed catapults until after they too were transferred to Royal Australian Navy service. (John R Dominy)

-Attempts being made at the abortive Geneva disarmament conference (Geneva Conference 1932–4) to obtain agreement that 6in cruiser size be limited to 7,000 tons, albeit recognising that an 8,000-ton restriction was the best that could be anticipated.

-Instruction being issued to the Director of Naval Construction (DNC) to prepare sketch designs for an improved Leander -type cruiser of c.7,500 tons displacement incorporating improved armour and either ten guns in four turrets (‘B’ and ‘X’ turrets being triples) or nine guns in three turrets. The aim was, if necessary, to be able to include at least one ship of this new design in the 1932 construction programme.

-The design of a new triple 6in mounting being progressed to meet the requirements of the improved cruiser.

AN IMPROVED LEANDER

The DNC’s response to the Admiralty’s decision was commendably prompt. Indeed, preliminary work on the improved Leander design had commenced early in March 1932.¹⁸ In addition to the revised armament schemes referenced above, the sketch designs were to look at increasing both belt armour and magazine protection, as well as improving the subdivision of the machinery spaces.The lastmentioned instruction reflected the ‘unit system’ just adopted in the new small fleet cruisers of the Arethusa class, which had been formally approved the previous month. Derived from US Navy practice, this saw boiler rooms (BR) and engine rooms (ER) alternated in a BR–ER–BR–ER sequence rather than grouped together to reduce the risk of total loss of propulsion in the event of action damage.¹⁹

The constructor tasked with these preliminary sketches by the then DNC – Sir Arthur Johns – was C S Lillicrap, the designer of the unit system adopted in the Arethusas. Charles Swift Lillicrap was then the department’s foremost cruiser expert, being particularly closely associated with the series of ‘County’ class cruisers produced in the immediate aftermath of the Washington Treaty.²⁰

Various designs were sketched out combining the alternative armament schemes with improved protection and/or the revised machinery layout. Ultimately, only the unit machinery arrangement was adopted. It is not entirely clear from surviving documentation why armament was not increased at this stage, although a number of considerations probably played a part. There was certainly unease in some quarters about the practicality of implementing efficient firecontrol solutions for a salvo of more than eight rapid-firing 6in guns, whilst there may also have been a question as to whether the new design of triple turret required would be ready for the planned 1932 programme ships. Other considerations may have included the lower speed – below 31 knots – of the sketch designs incorporating all the requested enhancements and the extent of the displacement required. This was as much as 7,640 tons for the ten-gun design with improved armour and unit machinery incorporated. This would have been a particular concern given the growth in displacement then being experienced with the basic Leanders.

As it was, the adoption of the unit machinery arrangement was not without its costs. The machinery box needed to be longer than for the existing design, increasing both overall length and the extent of side armour protection required. Beam grew slightly in consequence to maintain overall stability. The internal volume taken up with machinery also increased pressure on crew accommodation in what was already a very cramped ship.This pressure was exacerbated by a decision that there needed to be sufficient crew to man the entire armament simultaneously (the Leanders and Arethusas were crewed on the basis of manning only half the high- angle and torpedo armament at the same time as the main guns). All-in-all, DNC’s Department was remarkably successful in responding to these challenges. The detailed design for the improved Leander – known as the Amphion class – was only 100 tons heavier and 8ft longer than the Leander design when approved by the Admiralty Board on 10 November 1932.

A REVISED POLICY

Two Amphion class cruisers were ordered under the 1932 programme, as well as one of the smaller Arethusas. In addition, it proved possible to upgrade one of the two 1931 programme Leanders to the improved specification.²¹ Original long-range plans called for a further pair of Amphions and two Arethusas to be ordered the following year. However, the upwards pressure on cruiser displacement now made itself felt and there was only sufficient tonnage left under the London Treaty limits to provide for a single Amphion and three of the smaller type in the navy Estimates for 1933. For the time being, the fifty-cruiser target still held.

Foreign developments, however, were to force a change of plan. By mid-1933, Japan’s intention to follow the initial Mogami class cruisers with a second pair had become known to the Admiralty. Moreover, the United States’ plans for the 10,000-ton Brooklyn class had also crystallised, negating previous hopes that the lead Japanese ships would not be repeated. The previous fears that the Royal Navy’s new cruisers would be inferior to the types being developed by the other leading fleets had come to be realised. With all potential responses involving some form of risk, it was determined that the trade defence role must take priority through the construction of cruisers of sufficient size and power to meet their foreign contemporaries on fair terms. Otherwise, the destruction of imperial trade would inevitably lead to defeat, irrespective of whether any fleet action took place.

The revised policy was summarised in a Board Memorandum circulated by the Admiralty’s professional head, First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Ernle Chatfield on 25 July 1933 and subsequently approved at prime ministerial level by Ramsay McDonald at the start of August.²² It was decided to focus 1933 programme construction on three trade protection cruisers of 7,800 tons. They should be armed with twelve 6in guns, protected against 6in gunfire and have a maximum speed of 30 knots.The decision would reduce the total number of cruisers at the end of 1936 from fifty to forty-nine, one below the requirement. It was hoped that this deficiency might be made good in future programmes. DNC was instructed to prepare sketch designs for the new ships for consideration by the Admiralty Board by September 1933: the design process for the ‘Town’ class was underway.

1. The origins of the informal empire concept can be traced back to C R Fay’s Cambridge History of the British Empire, published in 1940, although its leading exponents were John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson in ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’, The Economic History Review – Second Series,Vol VI, No 1 (1953). Major constituents of the British informal empire included China and much of South America, both of which were to feature prominently in the ‘Town’ class’s careers.

2. D K Brown, Warrior to Dreadnought, p 203 quotes the cost of the battleship Implacable (laid down in 1898) as £1.1 million compared with £1 million for the 1899 armoured cruiser Drake .There were also more cruisers than battleships in commission, although many of these were smaller, cheaper types.

3. The shift of emphasis in the

Reviews for British Town Class Cruisers

[shrike58 · Rating: 5 out of 5 stars]

A few years ago when I had the opportunity to read Erminio Bagnasco's study of the Italian "Littorio" class battleships, I thought that this was the model of what a class monograph should look like, while recognizing that it was going to be a rare event for a book on that scale to be published. With Conrad Waters' study of the "Town" class cruisers one has something of the same magnitude, and one can only be impressed with the amount of work and detail that went into this book. The caveat here is that this isn't a narrative history of the class, and those who are mostly interested in the men who crewed these ships might not find this their cup of tea. Otherwise, if you care about British warships, and cruisers in particular, you definitely want this book before it becomes a prohibitively expensive collector's item.