French Battleships, 1922–1956

By John Jordan and Robert Dumas

This illustrated naval history presents a comprehensive study of French battleships constructed after the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922.

The French battleships of the Dunkerque and Richelieu classes were the most radical and influential battleship designs of the interwar period, and were coveted by the British, German and Italian navies following the Armistice of June 1940. Using a wealth of primary-source material, this volume provides a full account of their development and a detailed analysis of their design characteristics.

The technical chapters are interspersed with operational histories, with a particular focus on the operations in which the ships engaged other heavy units. The book is extensively illustrated with hundreds of photographs and technical drawings, including twenty-two color profile and plan views of the ships. An introductory chapter provides additional historical context with an overview of French naval craft from the Dreadnaught era through the First World War.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Sep 17, 2009
• ISBN: 9781473828254

John Jordan

John Jordan is a former teacher of modern languages. He is the author of two major books on the Soviet Navy, and has coauthored a series of books for Seaforth Publishing on the French Navy, of which the most recent are French Battleships of World War One (2017) and French Armoured Cruisers 1887–1932 (2019) with Philippe Caresse. John is also the sole author of Warships After Washington, published by Seaforth in 2011; a sequel, Warships After London, was published in autumn 2020. John has been associated with Warship from its earliest beginnings and took over the editorship in 2004.

Book preview

PREFACE

The battleships of the Dunkerque and Richelieu classes were among the most radical and influential designs of the interwar period, and were coveted by the British, the Germans and the Italians following the Armistice of June 1940. Dunkerque and her sister Strasbourg were scuttled at Toulon in November 1942, but following an extensive refit in the United States, Richelieu went on to serve alongside the Royal Navy during 1943-5, and her sister Jean Bart, finally completed during the 1950s, was the last battleship in the world to enter service.

This book aims to bring the results of Robert Dumas’ original research, first published in a series of Frenchlanguage monographs during the early 1990s, to English-speaking readers. However, the book is also more ambitious in its scope in that it aims to present these ships in their full historical context, with a greater emphasis on war service and the extent to which that served to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of their design. There is a greater emphasis on the progression of French battleship design from the Washington Treaty onwards, and there is much new material on the technical aspects both of these ships and of their ‘paper’ predecessors of the 1920s. Finally, the book focuses closely on issues of infrastructure, demographics, strategic thinking, tactical organisation and even national culture which are not always well understood on this side of the English Channel. We hope that this book will give the reader a better understanding not only of the design philosophy and technical characteristics of these ships, but also of the history and traditions of the Marine Nationale during the twentieth century.

THE DRAWINGS

The colour artwork, line drawings and maps were all specially drawn for this book. The colour profiles and plans of Bertrand Magueur are based on original line drawings by Robert Dumas, on official plans currently held by the Service Historique at Vincennes and the Archives de l’Armement at Châtellerault, and on photographs and other documentation.

The line drawings by John Jordan are based on official plans and other documentation located in the French archives. Some of these plans and documents have only recently been made available as part of the Fonds Potsdam, an archive of material assembled by the German Kriegsmarine during the Occupation and transferred to Berlin, where it was seized by the Russians; the materials were returned to France after the fall of the Berlin Wall and have now been reclassified and distributed among the various French national archives.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors thank the following organisations that have assisted them with their research:

– the Service Historique de la Marine Nationale, Vincennes, Paris

– the Centre d’Archives de l’Armement, Châtellerault

– the ECPA(D), Fort d’Ivry

Sincere thanks are also due: to Richard Worth, whose enthusiasm provided the initial impetus for this book; to Dr Jean Bladé, who provided the watercolour of Strasbourg that illustrates the jacket; to Bertrand Magueur, who was responsible for the high-quality colour outboard profiles of the ships; and to Philippe Caresse, Patrick Du Cheyron, Henri Landais, Bertrand Magueur, Max Moulin, Claude Picard, Erminio Bagnasco and Alain Casprak for their assistance with photographic illustration. Bill Jurens, Nathan Okun, John Roberts, Kent Crawford and John Spencer provided support, advice and documentation on the large-calibre guns and shells, and Dag Sundkuist was an invaluable source of information on French coast defence artillery. Bruno Gire provided documentation on the 37,000-ton battlecruiser, the uncompleted battleship Gascogne and the NC 420 seaplane, and Harold Winkel kindly permitted us to publish his drawings of the superstructures of Gascogne. The authors also wish to extend their thanks to Rob Gardiner (Seaforth Publishing), who has offered support and advice thoughout the project, and to Steve Dent, both for the intelligence and creativity he has displayed in designing the layouts and for the infinite patience with which he has accommodated the inevitable last-minute amendments. Without the collaboration of these people this book would not have been possible.

Please note that the uncredited photographs are from the collection of Robert Dumas, for which all rights are reserved.

John Jordan and

Robert Dumas

July 2009

INTRODUCTION

A PRE-HISTORY

IT WAS 1910 BEFORE FRANCE BEGAN THE construction of her first ‘dreadnought’ battleship. When the British laid down the first of these revolutionary vessels in October 1905 the Marine Nationale was about to embark on a new series of battleships armed with twin 305mm (12in) turrets fore and aft and six twin side-mounted 240mm (9.4in) turrets. Laid down in the same month HMS Dreadnought was launched, Danton was a classic pre-dreadnought design, with armour plates of graduated thicknesss covering her sides from bow to stern, a protected lower deck of sufficient thickness only to keep out fragments of shell which succeeded in penetrating the armoured belt, and no fewer than four different gun calibres, her armament being completed by sixteen 75mm and ten 47mm anti-torpedo-boat guns. She would be the first French ship to be powered by steam turbines, but maximum speed would be little more than 19 knots as compared with the 21 knots of Dreadnought.

Five more ships of the Danton class would be laid down, three in 1907 and a further two in 1908, but because of the slow building times endemic in the French shipyards and naval dockyards it would be late 1911 before Danton and her sisters entered service. In the interim, the Royal Navy had completed no fewer than ten dreadnought battleships and five dreadnought battlecruisers, and had laid down the first eight of a new type of ‘super-dreadnought’ battleship armed with 13.5in guns and three similarly armed battlecruisers. The Imperial German Navy had completed the first eight of its own dreadnought battleships together with its first full fledged battlecruiser, Von der Tann, and five further battleships and three battlecruisers were on the stocks. Even the United States, not yet regarded as a major naval power, had completed six dreadnought battleships by late 1911 and laid down a further four.¹

When construction of the dreadnoughts Courbet and Jean Bart began in late 1910 the Marine Nationale was therefore already well off the pace. Two further ships of the class, Paris and France, would be laid down in November 1911. They would be followed by the three ships of the Bretagne class, two of which would be laid down in mid-1912 and the third at the end of the same year. The latter were of similar design, but with ten 340mm guns in five centreline twin turrets replacing the twelve 305mm guns (two superimposed turrets fore and aft plus two on the beam) of the Courbet class. The 340mm (13.4in) calibre was adopted in an effort to match the British 13.5in gun. However, displacement, dimensions, protection and propulsion remained essentially unchanged from the Courbet class, largely because of the limited dimensions of existing building ways and graving docks.

With the Marine Nationale seriously lagging behind the Royal Navy and the Imperial German Navy in modern battleships, recourse was made to the traditional strategy of putting a large, comprehensive longterm naval programme before the French Parliament. The Statut Naval authorised on 30 March 1912 envisaged a powerful battle fleet comprising the following:-

28 sea-going battleships (cuirassés d’escadre)

10 scout cruisers (éclaireurs d’escadre)

52 fleet torpedo boats (torpilleurs d’escadre)

The ships were to be in service by 1920, and the yearon-year construction schedule, as with all such programmes, was fixed in advance. The figure of twenty-eight battleships was to include the eleven modern pre-dreadnoughts of the République, Vérité and Danton classes (two, three and six respectively – the battleship Liberté had been lost to an internal explosion in 1911), and the four dreadnoughts of the Courbet class. The remaining thirteen ships were to be laid down over the next five years as follows:

1912: three Bretagne class (23,500 tonnes)

1913: two Normandie class (25,200 tonnes)

1914: two Normandie class (25,200 tonnes)

1915: four Lyon class (29,000 tonnes)

1917: two ships of a new type

With the deterioration of the international situation the new programme would be accelerated and compressed during the following two years with a view to having twelve super-dreadnought battleships in service by 1918. The schedule would now be:

1913: four Normandie class

1914: one Normandie (to make a four-ship division with the Bretagne class)

1915: four Lyon class

The six battleships of the Danton class, laid down between February 1906 and July 1908, were a development of Liberté. Although they introduced steam turbines to the Marine Nationale, they were essentially of conservative design, with the classic predreadnought combination of a mixed main battery and graduated armour covering virtually the entire hull. In this class the 305mm twin turrets at the ends of the ship were complemented by six twin 240mm turrets mounted along the sides of the ship. This is Voltaire in 1912.

The Normandie design was essentially a slightly enlarged Bretagne with twelve 340mm guns in four quadruple turrets. Although by this time triple turrets had been adopted by the navies of Italy, Russia and Austria-Hungary, this would have been the first adoption of the quadruple turret by any of the major navies. It was dictated in part by the limited dimensions of the dry docks available to the Marine Nationale, which in turn put a premium on centreline length if large numbers of 340mm guns were to be accommodated.² The alternative, the development of a larger-calibre 380mm gun comparable to the latest 15in weapon adopted by the Royal Navy, was not thought to be feasible in the time available for the 1912 programme. The Lyon class, which was scheduled to follow the five Normandies, therefore took this process a stage further by mounting no fewer than sixteen 340mm guns in four quadruple turrets. Even so, overall length had now grown from 166 metres in the Courbet and Bretagne classes to 194.5 metres, and displacement from 23,500 tonnes to 29,000 tonnes. The only existing docks which could accommodate ships of this size were the Missiessy No. 1 and No. 2 docks at Toulon, which had been lengthened to 202 metres between 1909 and 1913. New graving docks 250 metres in length at Cherbourg, Brest and Toulon were therefore an important part of an ambitious infrastructure programme intended to underpin the 1912 Statut Naval, and work had begun on these in 1909-11 with a view to completion by 1914-17.

The guns in the quadruple turrets of the Normandie and Lyon classes were paired, the turret being divided by a thick steel partition into two independent gunhouses in order to minimise the chance of a single hit disabling all four guns. The turret itself could still be immobilised on a particular bearing as a result of action damage, resulting in a loss of 33 per cent of main gun power in the Normandie class (25 per cent in the Lyon class), but the care taken in the two designs to space out the turrets along the ship’s axis would ensure that no two turrets could be jammed by a single hit.

FRENCH BATTLESHIPS OF THE 1912 NAVAL PROGRAMME

GRAVING DOCKS AVAILABLE OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION IN METROPOLITAN FRANCE 1914

Note: The larger two of the Missiessy docks, on which work was completed only in 1913, could comfortably accommodate the Normandie class, and their dimensions appear to have dictated those of the Lyon class. Work on the Vauban Grands Bassins, a major engineering project involving reclaimed land, was discontinued during the Great War and resumed only in 1919. The maximum usable length of the two Grands Bassins was 408 metres, but in practice each was divided into two docks by watertight caissons.

Other features of these two designs were less advanced – although the design of the Lyon class was never finalised. The Normandie class retained the dated protection system of France’s earlier dreadnoughts, and concerns about the limited cruise radius associated with direct-drive turbines led to the retrograde step of reverting to triple-expansion engines, which were more economical at lower speeds, for the outer two shafts while retaining turbines for the inner shafts. This mixed propulsion plant attracted considerable criticism within the French Navy: the different properties of the two types of engine when combined at higher speeds was an issue, maintenance and the provision of spares would be complicated, and there were also implications for the training of personnel.

The first French dreadnoughts, the four units of the Courbet class, were laid down during 1910-11 and had an all-biggun armament of twelve 305mm guns in twin turrets. However, it was still envisaged that battle ranges would be short and shell trajectories correspondingly flat. The protection system therefore continued to based on that of the French pre-dreadnoughts, and the big guns could elevate only to 12 degrees for a maximum range of 13,500 metres, at a time when most foreign battleships had guns which could elevate to 15 degrees and the British Royal Navy was moving to 20 degrees. This is Jean Bart in 1916.

These later designs were never put to the test, however, as construction of the Normandie class ground to a halt in 1914 and none of the battleships of the Lyon class was ever laid down. The outbreak of war in August 1914 resulted in the mobilisation of much of the French industrial workforce, including many of those who worked in the naval dockyards, the arsenaux. Priority for both personnel and matériel was given to the Army. Only those ships already launched and fitting out would be completed; those laid down would – where possible – be launched to clear the slipways, but construction work would thereafter be suspended. In real terms this meant that the three ships of the Bretagne class, all of which had been launched in 1913 and for which the steel, guns, propulsion machinery and other equipment had been ordered and/or delivered, would be completed as quickly as possible with the smaller workforce available; Bretagne and Provence would complete in 1915 and their sister Lorraine the following year. However, work on the battleships of the Normandie class, three of which were launched shortly after the outbreak of war, was quickly abandoned. The fourth ship was finally launched in 1916, but the fifth, Béarn, remained on the stocks until the end of the war. Many of the components delivered for these ships were redirected elsewhere: boilers were installed in other ships, and the guns went to the Army; some items were used as replacements for those fitted in the Bretagne class after 1918.

THE FRENCH FLEET IN 1918

When the Armistice was signed on 11 November 1918, the most modern battleships in the Marine Nationale were the six Dantons, the four Courbets and the three Bretagnes. The abandonment of the Statut Naval of 1912 in the face of greater priorities on land now meant that the French were even farther behind in numbers and technology. During the war, the British had completed no fewer than ten battleships and two battlecruisers armed with 15in guns, all of which were significantly larger than the Bretagnes; the five ships of the Queen Elizabeth class had an oil-fired propulsion plant and a designed speed of 24 knots, while the battlecruisers Repulse and Renown could make 30 knots. Even these ships were eclipsed in size and power by the latest American and Japanese superdreadnoughts, which were armed with twelve 14in guns, and in 1918 the British launched the largest, fastest and most powerful warship in the world, the battlecruiser Hood, which would enter service in May 1920 (see table).

The Courbets and the Bretagnes were not only inferior in size, power and speed to the latest foreign battleships but were of obsolescent design. Even with the advent of the ‘all-big-gun’ ship, the French persisted with the belief that ‘decisive’ battle range would be around 6000 metres, and that engagements between opposing battle lines were unlikely much beyond 8000 metres. The protection systems of the new battleships therefore continued to assume pre-dreadnought opponents armed with a multitude of calibres which included medium guns in the 165-240mm range, firing at relatively flat trajectories. Vertical protection was prioritised at the expense of horizontal protection, and little account was taken of plunging shell. The hull had a high, deep two-strake belt of thick cemented armour, with a strake of cemented armour of reduced thickness amidships; there was thick cemented armour on the turrets and the barbettes, and the casemate battery guns were in armoured ‘redoubts’, also with thick walls of cemented armour. The two light protected decks, which were composed of triple layers of thin steel plating, and the entrepont cellulaire between them, were intended simply to prevent the fragments of shells which broke up on the armoured belt from penetrating into the ship’s vitals. The belt covered virtually the entire hull, and declined in thickness towards the bow and the stern. In contrast the British had moved in the direction of heavier protection over the ship’s vitals, other areas of the hull being armoured only sufficiently to keep out QF shell of 6in (150mm) calibre or below while the Americans, with their radical Nevada design of 1912, had accepted the logic of the all-big-gun ship and adopted an ‘all-or-nothing’ system in which the ship’s vitals were protected by the heaviest possible armour, including a relatively thick armoured deck, while areas outside this ‘citadel’ remained virtually unprotected.

Because of the relatively short battle ranges envisaged, long range fire for the 305mm and 340mm main guns of the Courbet and Bretagne classes was considered unnecessary, so neither the turrets nor the fire control systems were designed with this in mind. The 12-degree elevation of the 305/45 and 340/45 guns, equivalent to maximum ranges of 13,500m and 14,500m respectively, was significantly less than in any of the other major navies.³ The powerful secondary battery of twenty-two 138.6mm guns was to be used not only to repel torpedo-boat attacks but to pepper the superstructures of enemy battleships, disable the small-calibre guns mounted topsides, cause fires and general devastation, and bring about a crippling deterioration in fighting capability.

Grouped with the Courbet class as the cuirassés de 23,500 tonnes, the three ‘super-dreadnoughts’ of the Bretagne class had the same hull and dimensions as their immediate predecessors, the only major change being in the number and calibre of the main guns. In place of the twelve 305mm guns of the Courbet class there were ten 340mm guns in five twin centreline turrets. This is Provence shortly after her completion in 1915.

During the pre-dreadnought era the Marine Nationale had been well to the fore in the development of sophisticated fire control equipment, and both the Courbet and the Bretagne classes were fitted with a modern Le Comte-Aubry Follow-the-Pointer (FtP) transmission system to supply bearing and elevation data directly to the guns, a Le Prieur graphical computer, and mechanical correctors for distance and deflection. However, the rangefinders initially supplied were British Barr & Stroud FT coincidence models with a base of only 2.74 metres (9 feet), and all aspects of fire control, including spotting the fall of shot, was exercised from the armoured conning tower. The rangefinders provided to the turrets for local control were 1.35-metre (5-foot) models mounted in a cupola at the after end. The heavy pole foremast had only a small platform – later slightly enlarged to form a crow’s nest with canvas sides – and in the Courbet class was stepped directly abaft the first two funnels, thereby ensuring that it would be constantly shrouded in smoke during action. In contrast the British dreadnoughts used the foretop, which was generally supported by a sturdy tripod mast, as the primary spotting position, for which purpose it was equipped with binoculars on fixed pedestals to minimise the effects of vibration.

The Marine Nationale was sufficiently concerned about the long range fire control capabilities of these ships to stipulate in a note dated 25 April 1914 that the 2.74-metre rangefinders atop the conning tower be replaced by 15-foot (4.57-metre) models again purchased from the British company Barr & Stroud. These were duly fitted in a triplex tiered installation in the last two ships of the Courbet class while the latter were building, and were retrofitted in the first two ships in 1915. At the same time the 1.35-metre rangefinders on the turrets were replaced by two-metre B&S FT models. These modifications were applied to the Bretagne class from the outset.

However, the limited range of the guns themselves was to become a more pressing issue, as battle ranges in the early naval engagements of the Great War greatly surpassed what had previously been thought possible. In the Battle of the Falkland Islands (December 1914) the British battlecruisers Invincible and Inflexible opened fire at almost 15,000 metres, and the main action took place at 9000-13,000 metres. In January of the following year, at Dogger Bank, the action took place at ranges between 18,000 metres and 14,500 metres, while at Jutland fire in the early (daylight) phases was generally opened at ranges of 18-19,000 metres.

An early decision was made to increase the maximum angle of elevation of the guns from 12 to 18 degrees in the Bretagne class, thereby increasing the maximum range to 21,100m. However, the pressure of other more urgent maintenance work on the naval dockyards made this impossible in the short term. The after turret of Lorraine was modified in 1917, but work on her other turrets and on those of the other two ships of the class had to be postponed until after the war.

The other area in which the French had fallen behind was in anti-torpedo protection. The French dreadnoughts continued to rely on coal bunkers outboard of the machinery spaces with an internal reinforced holding bulkhead to absorb the worst effects of an exploding warhead, and there was little protection for magazines. The British and the Americans, on the other hand, had developed elaborate torpedo protection systems by the late war period. The British had adopted the external torpedo ‘bulge’, with alternating void and liquid-filled compartments, and was fitting these to its most modern battleships and battlecruisers from 1917. They were also experimenting with sealed steel tubes designed to absorb the force of the explosion while at the same time minimising the flooding of side compartments. The US Navy was building similar torpedo protection systems using alternate void spaces and liquid loading into the design of its latest battleships. The cost in terms of both beam and speed would have been difficult for the French dreadnoughts to absorb, given that these ships were already relatively slow and had access to graving docks with limited dimensions.

The half-section view of Normandie at Frame 89 shows the classic French dreadnought protection system, which was derived in turn from the pre-dreadnoughts of the République/Liberté and Danton classes. The main belt, which was of cemented armour, extended over virtually the entire length of the ship. It comprised two strakes of roughly equal height; the upper strake tapered slightly towards its upper edge and the lower strake tapered more sharply to 80/100mm below the waterline. The thickness of the plates was uniform amidships but was progressively reduced towards the ends of the ship. Immediately above the main armoured belt, between the Main Deck and the First Deck, there was an upper belt of cemented armour amidships. The battery-mounted secondary 138.6mm guns were housed within ‘redoubts’ protected by a mix of cemented and special steel plates with a thickness of 160-180mm: In the Normandie class these ‘redoubts’ partially incorporated the barbettes for the main guns: the forward redoubt was at the level of the Second Deck, the central redoubt (housing no fewer than twelve of the 14cm guns) on the First Deck, and the after redoubt on the Main Deck.

The main armoured deck was the First Platform Deck. Its primary purpose was to protect the magazines and machinery from shell fragments which managed to penetrate the main belt. French armoured decks of the period comprised multiple sheets of relatively thin mild steel (generally 12-15mm) riveted together. The central part of the main armoured deck in the Normandie class comprised three sheets of 14mm, 14mm and 12mm respectively. Although this added up to a total thickness of 40mm, a ‘composite’ deck of this type was far less effective in resisting penetration than a single thickness of 40mm; it did, however, permit the thickness of the deck to be graduated according to the importance of what was beneath it. The main armoured deck in the French dreadnoughts and pre-dreadnoughts extended from the steering gear at the stern to the bow, where it was angled down to form a sort of carapace. It was also sloped down at the sides to join the lower edge of the armoured belt, and these inclined sections were reinforced by a double row of plates of 42mm special steel to serve as a ‘back-up’ for the main belt.

Underwater protection in the Normandie was provided by a 30mm bulkhead, and there were coal bunkers to absorb the explosion of a torpedo warhead. Coal was also used as a ‘filler’ directly behind the main belt and in the typically French ‘cellular layer’ (entrepont cellulaire) between the First Platform Deck and the Main Deck. The outstanding features of French pre-dreadnought and dreadnought protection systems were their complexity and the extent of their coverage. It was envisaged that decisive battle ranges would be no more than 6000-8000m, at which large-calibre shell would have a relatively flat trajectory. The emphasis was therefore on thick vertical armour, with the lightly-protected decks intended only to keep out fragments of shells which succeeded in penetrating the main or upper belts. The lessons of the actions in the North Sea during the First World War were that capital ships now needed to be protected against plunging shell, which implied a major redistribution of armour from sides to decks. This was a key factor in the decision to send four of the five incomplete hulls of the Normandie class to the breakers.

FROM HERE TO MODERNITY

When the Great War ended the Marine Nationale faced some difficult decisions. The seven dreadnoughts, all except two of which had been completed during the conflict, now constituted the backbone of the battle fleet. However, these ships had so many obsolescent features built into their design that they were totally outclassed by the powerful modern units built or building for Britain, the United States and Japan. There was also the issue of whether, and with what modifications, the five battleships of the Normandie class should be completed. Four had been launched, their hulls and engines being generally 60-65 per cent complete; the fifth, Béarn, remained on the stocks at the private shipyard of Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée, La Seyne, and would be finally launched in April 1920. Despite their more powerful armament these ships as designed had the same dated features as the Courbet and Bretagne classes, particularly with respect to their horizontal and underwater protection, while the ‘mixed’ propulsion system was now considered a retrograde step which would need to be reconsidered

These were not the only issues facing the Marine Nationale. France was bankrupt, her finances exhausted by the war. The industrial North had been a battlefield, and the shipyards and naval dockyards had been denuded of skilled labour to service the more pressing needs of the Army. The entire naval infrastructure would have to be renewed before France was in a position to rebuild its battle fleet. Moreover, given the ambitious scope of the 1912 Statut Naval, it could be argued that battleship construction had suffered far less than other elements of the programme. Of the ten scout cruisers projected, not a single one had been laid down. The destroyer situation was in many respects just as bad. The standard 800-tonne destroyer built in the immediate prewar period had proved too small, too fragile and too short-legged to operate effectively with the battlefleet. The 1500-tonne torpilleur d’escadre envisaged in the 1912 programme, of which no fewer than thirty-two were to have been built, never materialised. Four 950-tonne torpedo-boats building for Argentina were requisitioned in August 1914 as the Aventurier class, but these and three 800-tonne torpedo-boats of the Enseigne Roux class were the only flotilla craft to be built in France during four years of war. In 1917, the situation was so desperate that twelve ‘second class’ destroyers of the Kaba class were ordered from Japan for anti-submarine duties in the Mediterranean.

In February 1919, Admiral de Bon, Chief of the Naval General Staff, established the construction priorities of the Marine Nationale as: first ‘destroyers’ (British terminology being adopted to denote the entire category of flotilla craft), and second light cruisers (to be employed as scouts); battleships came last. These were realistic priorities; even so it proved impossible to lay down a single light cruiser or destroyer until summer 1922.

In the interim what money and dockyard labour was available could at least be used to bring the existing battleships up to modern standards. Even within this category of warship, however, priorities had to be established. The super-dreadnoughts of the Bretagne class, France’s most modern battleships, would be the first to be taken in hand. Modernisation of the Courbet class would await a decision on the fate of the incomplete Normandies. It was conceivable that should the latter be completed the older ships, which were outgunned by the latest foreign battleships, might be used for training or placed in reserve.

Bretagne was duly taken in hand at Toulon in 1919, with her sister Lorraine following in 1921 and the third ship, Provence, due to follow in 1922. All would have the elevation of the main guns increased from 12 to 18 degrees. A heavy tripod foremast would be fitted forward with a large fore-top for the gunnery officer, equipped with a 3.66-metre (12-foot) rangefinder in the Bretagne. Bretagne trialled a British Vickers fire control director; the other two units received a French Laurant-Paquelier model. The bridge structure was enlarged and the fore funnel raised. The four forward 138.6mm casemate guns were removed, as they could not be operated in a seaway, and four single 75mm HA guns were added topsides.

Meanwhile discussions proceeded as to whether the battleships of the Normandie class should be completed. Following her launch in 1920, Béarn was fitted with a temporary wooden flight deck and used for aviation trials. These were generally successful and led to proposals for the ship to be completed as an aircraft carrier. Factors in favour of her selection for conversion were her recent launch, her relatively incomplete state (which made modification easier), and her all-turbine propulsion plant. As for her four sisters, consideration was given to new propulsion machinery capable of delivering 24-25 knots, but modifications would be costly; in addition to a new allturbine plant with more than double the original horsepower (80,000shp against 32,000shp in the original design), the hull would need to be lengthened both to accommodate the new machinery and to secure a more favourable length to beam ratio. It was envisaged that the elevation of the main guns would be increased to 23 degrees, increasing gun range to 25-26,000 metres, and that a new tripod foremast similar to that currently being fitted in the Bretagne class, together with director fire control, would replace the original pole mast. Horizontal protection would be strengthened and one-metre bulges added at the waterline both to protect against torpedoes and to restore buoyancy. However, such extensive rebuilding would be both costly and labour-intensive, and by the time sufficient funding and dockyard capacity were available the basic design would be ten years old. There was an understandable reluctance by the civilian government to commit to such a major programme at a time of demobilisation and financial constraints.

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

Invitations to attend a conference in Washington for the purpose of limiting naval armaments were received by each of the five leading naval powers in August 1921. Some of the more important items for discussion were flagged up well before the conference began. The French government was aware that overall tonnage restrictions would figure prominently on the agenda. It was also thought likely that a pause in new naval construction would be proposed, both for economic reasons and to defuse the new naval arms race developing between the United States, Japan and – belatedly – Britain. And it became clear that the British would press for the abolition of the submarine in the wake of the destructive ‘unrestricted’ campaign against British shipping by the German U-boats in the final two years of the war.

The French were not opposed in principle to overall tonnage limitations, although they naturally expected any differentiation in the totals accorded to each of the major powers to reflect status and need, with the worldwide French Empire – second only to that of Great Britain – weighing heavily in the balance. However, any suggestion of a ‘naval holiday’ was to be resolutely opposed, given the parlous state of the Marine Nationale with its ageing, obsolescent fleet units, as would any attempt to abolish the submarine, which the French saw as essential to defend its own coasts and the colonies.

On 12 November, Secretary of State Hughes (United States) opened the first plenary session of the conference with a proposal to freeze capital ship construction for ten years, and to agree future force strengths based on the total tonnage of ‘capital ships’ currently in service with the major navies. This sweeping proposal sent shock waves through all the delegations present. From the French standpoint the proposal was particularly uncomfortable. First, it established the capital ship as the primary unit of currency for the purpose of naval arms limitation – a move which favoured a ‘battleship navy’ such as the United States over the imperial navies of Britain and France, which had traditionally required large numbers of cruisers for ‘policing’ duties and commerce protection. Second, it attempted to impose a freeze on the construction of capital ships at a time when the Marine Nationale was looking to renewal for its salvation. And, third, it would leave France with a battle fleet older and less capable ship-for-ship than that of any of the other three major powers.

The Courbet class underwent major refits during the early 1920s. The elevation of the main guns was increased from 12 degrees (13,500 metres range) to 23 degrees (26,300 metres). A heavy tripod foremast with a large Britishstyle foretop was fitted and director fire control provided; the bridge structure was enlarged and the first and second funnels trunked together, changing their external appearance considerably. However, the protection system remained dated. This is Courbet in 1939, by which time she had been relegated to the role of gunnery training ship.

In terms of its world status the Marine Nationale considered itself to be beneath the navies of the United States and Britain but at least on a par with that of Japan and certainly some way ahead of the Italian Regia Marina. However, for Britain and the United States the balance of power in the Western Pacific was seen as the key area for the deliberations of the conference. Tripartite negotiations between the latter two countries and the Japanese delegation quickly secured agreement on a 5:5:3 ratio for capital ships, but the French and the Italians were left outside these discussions; the balance of naval forces in Europe was considered to

Reviews for French Battleships, 1922–1956

[Jacek Lubecki · Rating: 5 out of 5 stars]

a masterful account of the french battleships of ww2. There is no better one.

[shrike58 · Rating: 4 out of 5 stars]

If your interest is in the design and deployment of battleships in the French Navy after the Great War there is every reason why you should have this work in your collection, as it is a complete history of these ships. Of most interest to me was the analysis of how the limitations of the French industrial infrastructure impacted the design of these ships, along with a close examination of the damage these ships received at Mers-el-Kebir, Dakar and Casablanca at the hands of France's erstwhile allies.