Ambassador for Peace: How Theodore Roosevelt Won the Nobel Peace Prize

By Stanley Wien

This is the little known story of how Theodore Roosevelt, as president, used his mediation and diplomatic skills to end the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. Culminating in the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, this journey describes how TR’s unrelenting determination bridged the inflexible divide between Japan and Russia—two countries who could not muster the moral courage to embrace peace. The treaty fulfilled his foreign policy vision of a global balance of power among the major international nations at the turn of the twentieth century. Acclaimed worldwide as a peacemaker, he was recognized with the Nobel Peace Prize for his unique personal style of diplomacy of “speaking softly” rather than “carrying a big stick.”
Highly relevant to the state of world affairs today and the challenge of America’s leadership role in global foreign policy.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Lulu Publishing Services
• Release date: May 2, 2017
• ISBN: 9781483463773

Book preview

Ambassador for

Peace

How Theodore Roosevelt Won the

Nobel Peace Prize

Stanley Wien

Copyright © 2017 Stanley Wien.

Second Edition

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored, or transmitted by any means—whether auditory, graphic, mechanical, or electronic—without written permission of both publisher and author, except in the case of brief excerpts used in critical articles and reviews. Unauthorized reproduction of any part of this work is illegal and is punishable by law.

ISBN: 978-1-4834-6378-0 (sc)

ISBN: 978-1-4834-6377-3 (e)

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Lulu Publishing Services rev. date: 03/27/2017

Dedication

To my father, Walter, who taught me,

While countries have borders,

We are all part of one human race.

Contents

Introduction

Author’s Note

PART ONE

SETTING THE STAGE (JUNE 1903 - APRIL 1905)

1. Russia Has Been Made by Bayonets, Not Diplomacy

2. As If I Was Flinching a Plain Duty

3. Overtures for Peace

4. Peace Terms

PART TWO

NEGOTIATIONS AT PORTSMOUTH (MAY - AUGUST 1905)

5. A Good Deal of Tact and Judgment

6. Washington in the Summer Is Not Favorable to Cool Judgment

7. A Difficult Road

8. A Just and Lasting Peace

9. The Effort’s Worth It

10. Afterglow and Backlash

PART THREE

NOBEL PEACE PRIZE

11. Deservedly So?

12. The Pioneer of a New Era

Epilogue

Acknowledgements

Appendix

Glossary of Key Names

Bibliography

Illustration Credits

Notes

Introduction

I f modern day observers were asked how would they portray Theodore Roosevelt, many undoubtedly would describe him as Rough Rider, militarist, conservationist, President, intellectual, cowboy, cartoon caricature, a broad smiling face with squinty bespectacled eyes, mustache and glaring teeth on the verge of boasting—Bully!

And yet, Edmund Morris, the Pulitzer Prize biographer of Theodore Roosevelt, reveals another lesser known side in reference to a book that chronicled Roosevelt’s foreign policy, I recommend the book to anyone interested in the record of one of the master diplomatists of the 20th century.¹ An accolade not typically attributed to the former President.

TR (*) was a polygonal man²—many sides and dimensions, contradictory and frustrating to the casual eye, yet fascinating in their complexity and appeal. But it would be misleading and less than even-handed, if one understands his record carefully enough, to paint his persona by today’s partiality for sound bites. He has been a President more remembered than studied, especially in the arena of foreign affairs.³ Carefully reviewing TR’s life and his achievements, the one side of him that has received less attention is his success as both a peacemaker and skilled international diplomat. Based on the garden-variety media depiction of TR, that may sound oddly counter-intuitive to the average American’s image of him. The reader, it is hoped here, will walk away with a more balanced view and greater appreciation of his considerable skills in navigating his country through the complex delicate matters of foreign affairs.

This is a story of TR’s persuasive brand of personal diplomacy and conflict resolution skills, as he mediated the 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth that settled the bloody Russo-Japanese War. More precisely, it describes the how of his accomplishments at Portsmouth. His unrelenting determination, so much a part of his character, bridged the inflexible divide between two countries that could not muster the moral courage to embrace peace.

Other books written about the Portsmouth Treaty are well researched and provide a complete chronology of the key events. Missing is the human narrative; the emotions that lay near the surface that heavily influenced how TR and other key individuals acted and reacted—why they were driven to make certain fateful decisions. The book also undertakes a deeper review of his use of the technique, back channel diplomacy. His adroit use of this network of well-placed allies is a model that, while unaware to him as a formal process in his time, is currently applied in many international negotiations including the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Useful even today, these behind-the-scenes steps can sensibly be applied in such venues as business dealings, social settings and one’s interpersonal relations.

The important role the Portsmouth, New Hampshire community itself played, before and during the conference, highlighted the citizen diplomacy of a group of dedicated civilians who believed peace was attainable. These social events, orchestrated by both local politicians and influential local citizens, were a key factor in broadening the personal perspectives of both the Russian and Japanese negotiators. Arranged to foster feelings of détente between the antagonists, they proved highly instrumental in maintaining the urgency of continuing the talks. It became a low key, yet critical component of the back-channel process.

It seems to this author the value of studying history is what we, the average citizen, can discover from it and how it is relevant to our lives today. If we invest in the premise that the past is prologue, then the opportunity to learn and better our lives today is worth the effort. While the study of history can weave an entertaining story, it also provides us practical insights; and, yes, tools, we can have available to improve shortcomings and avoid the repetition of mistakes. These tactics in resolving conflict, used so skillfully at Portsmouth, provide the reader an opportunity to learn from them.

During my research, I was struck by the lack of in-depth coverage of the Nobel Peace Prize TR won in 1906 for his work at Portsmouth. It was a hot topic of debate in its day, but over the years historians have given this esteemed recognition only passing entry. This book explores the reasons why the award was given to TR by the Nobel Institute, the debate within the Nobel committee in reaching its decision, public reaction to the prize, and how his controversial acceptance speech in Oslo, Norway illuminates TR’s own vision for international affairs.

As a final note—historian Frederick Marks, in his book Velvet on Iron, captures well the author’s challenge in writing about TR:

Too often, he has been dismissed as a colorful character, full of fire and fury, who managed by some combination of good luck and good advice to contain the force of a bellicose personality. Too often, we have been intent on the outward appearance of the Rough Rider to the neglect of his fundamental caution and cleverness. If the following essays succeed in laying bare some of the less obvious traits when at the same time revealing the complexity of his approach to international relations, they will have served a useful purpose.⁴

In telling the story of Portsmouth, it is the intent of these pages to strive to the same goal.

* The acronym, TR, is used for Theodore Roosevelt throughout the whole book. TR, the first President to be known by his initials, often signed his correspondence this way.

Author’s Note

T heodore Roosevelt utilized the back channel process as part of his mediating role at Portsmouth. For the uninitiated reader of foreign relations diplomacy, it may become apparent that an explanation of these methods would be useful. There are actual concrete steps that comprise this approach. It behooves the reader to at least have a basic understanding of what these steps are, and how they are typically used. In the Appendix, a reference summary of the back channel method is provided as an aid to those who may want to more closely follow TR’s footsteps in using his network of close advisors.

Also, the Appendix provides a list of the key players in the Portsmouth journey with a description of their individual roles.

Image01NobelPeacePrize.jpg

Nobel Peace Prize

PART ONE

SETTING THE STAGE

JUNE 1903 - APRIL 1905

Image02RoughRidertoPeacemaker.jpg

Rough Rider to Peacemaker

Russia Has Been Made by Bayonets, Not Diplomacy

In one year they sent a million fighters forth

South and North,

And they built their gods a brazen pillar high

As the sky

Yet reserved a thousand chariots in full force—

Gold, of course.

O heart! oh blood that freezes, blood that burns!

Earth’s returns

For whole centuries of folly, noise and sin!

Shut them in,

With their triumphs and their glories and the rest!

Love is best.⁵

T he world, along with America, was changing rapidly—maybe too much so. The dawn of the 20 th century’s modern age introduced inventions and innovations that fundamentally transformed the lives of countless millions, as well as their personal expectations. Communications forever shortened the globe’s distance. A deluge of immigration swept away old cultures and traditions—and, with it, the tranquility of what had been familiar for many. As the time and space between nations narrowed, governments struggled to understand this new order. Gradually, societies grew more interdependent, but also more contentious which enflamed a willingness to wage conflicts fanned by territory, honor or greed.

President Theodore Roosevelt was changing too, particularly in his attention to events outside his country’s borders. Despite his reputation for brandishing the big stick,⁶ he no longer overreacted to foreign intrigues impetuously. TR possessed a particular clarity of vision that could predict when trouble was on the horizon. His concern for America’s national interests encompassed the broad spectrum of international affairs across both oceans. We ourselves are becoming, he foresaw, more and more the balance of power of the whole globe.⁷

As he scanned the Asian Pacific region in 1903, he was increasingly troubled by the smoldering rivalry between Japan and Russia.

Japan, the fledgling upstart, and Russia, the aged warrior, were headed toward war. TR knew this conflict would upset the balance of power in Asia with negative repercussions for the European continent as well. He watched the unfolding events carefully, ready to intervene when asked, or when he believed the risks were too high for inaction.

Both countries were on a collision course. Russia flexed her imperialist muscles as she expanded her borders into China and Korea. Japan, having set its sights on joining the select club of major powers, could only view Russia’s aggression as a direct threat to her security. Diplomacy was the last vestige of hope to avoid the first war of this new century, and one that would make full use of man’s advancements in modern killing machines. In an attempt to defuse this escalating set of events, Japan took the initiative to begin a six-month diplomatic effort to settle the two nation’s differences in the summer of 1903.

Regrettably, like many similar times in history, it would take a prolonged and bloodstained conflict, with nearly 200,000 casualties, to convince the adversaries to return to the peace table.

~

Russia’s history and foreign policy decisions were usually based on geopolitical considerations. A large sprawling country that for all intentions has been land locked, it has striven mightily over the centuries to gain access to warm water ports in all directions—Baltic Sea, Black Sea, Mediterranean, Persian Gulf and the Pacific.⁸ Ever expanding eastward into Siberia and then Chinese territory, Russia, for the 50 years prior to the start of the Russo-Japanese War, acquired strategic lands through both sheer intimidation and opportunism.⁹

Image03RussoJapaneseTheatreofWar.jpg

Russo-Japanese Theatre of War

All the battlefronts were fought on neutral territories,

mostly in China and Korea

China was a weak, inwardly focused country in the early 1900’s. The major powers, France, England, Germany, and Russia took full advantage of this vulnerability to amass their colonial empires. Cartoon caricatures of the day often depicted the carving of China like a pie, slicing and dicing territory to greedily add land to their regional dominions—all in a race to balance the scales of power among its rivals.¹⁰

Russia’s aggression was designed to become a Pacific Power, not in a modest way as when she held Alaska, but by the appropriation of as much of the Chinese empire southward toward the Yangtze (river) as she could get.¹¹ To fulfill this prophecy, it negotiated a long-term agreement to lease Port Arthur, a year-round warm weather port in Manchuria. This strategic naval base gave Russia easy access to the borders of other eastern Asia countries, including Japan.

Her warlike nature included many exploits of military adventurism such as the building of the naval port of Vladivostok that was a scant 500 miles from Japanese territory; the retention of over 200,000 troops on China’s soil despite being asked to leave; and the forcible capture of the island of Sakhalin that had a long history as Japanese territory.¹²

~

Japan, an island nation, always considered itself vulnerable to potential aggression by both Asian and European countries. An aspiring nouveau riche among world powers, its economy needed an outlet to international markets to feed a burgeoning population and industrial base.¹³ In her liberating evolution from centuries of isolationism, Japan chose to assimilate Western customs and cultural mores during the second half of the 19th century. Modernizing its army and navy to defend itself whenever necessary was a top priority as well.

As a proud ambitious nation, Japan held no disillusionment about Russia’s aggressive empire-building. In 1894, it had already been victimized by European colonialism at the end of the Sino-Japanese war.

Having defeated China handily, Japan had to relinquish many of its war spoils when France, Germany and Russia enforced their collective will to protect their overseas interests in China.¹⁴ Japan never forgot this humiliation as it prevented her from exerting a free hand with Korea, a possession coveted dearly.

Japan’s leadership now feared, if Russia was left to its own devices, she will rapidly occupy Manchuria, invade Korea, and in the end will threaten our country with great violence and act tyrannically towards us.¹⁵ Japan wanted revenge—but revenge was illusory and self-defeating. Its determination to be an equal among equals would not be deterred. Author Professor Asakawa describes Japan’s plans as both calculating and unmistakable:

Japan suddenly awoke to an absorbing desire which left her little room for the question of revenge. It became to her as clear as daylight that the new position she had acquired in the Orient by her victory over China could be maintained, and even her independence must be guarded, only by an armament powerful enough to give her a voice among the first Powers of the world. If she would not retire within herself, and finally cease to exist, she must compete with the greatest nations, not only in the arts of peace, but also those of war. Moreover, a far vaster conflict than she had ever known in her history. . . was seen to be awaiting her.¹⁶

To further protect against foreign intrusion, Japan signed a military alliance pact with England in 1902. A turning point in Japan’s international diplomacy had arrived, resulting in a rising tide of more hawkish politicos inside the hallways of power. The voice of the military would further dominate over time, as important strategic foreign policy decisions were made.

The embers of war visibly drifted skyward—but hostilities would wait for now. Japan, putting its Western ways to the test, wished for a diplomatic solution if possible.

~

On June 23, 1903, nine members of Japan’s political inner circle including the military, met with the Emperor (Mikado) to agree on a policy for negotiations.¹⁷ Following a full month of deliberations, Foreign Minister Komura, who will represent Japan as chief negotiator at Portsmouth two years hence, sent a lengthy message to its Ambassador Kurino in St. Petersburg. Delivered to the Russian Foreign Minister Lamsdorff, it said, in part:

the Imperial Government is led to believe that Russia has abandoned the intention of retiring from Manchuria. . . her