Non-philosophy and Aphilosophy

By Lance Kair

This essay discusses the foundations of an object ontology and its cohorts of the new Realism. It offers a counterpartial view to the ontological orientation that faces toward real objects.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Lulu.com
• Release date: Jun 17, 2015
• ISBN: 9781329222809

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Non-philosophy and Aphilosophy

Non-Philosophy and Aphilosophy

Non-Philosophy and Aphilosophy

By Lance Allan Kair

eBook

Lance A. Kair

2015

Copyright © 2015 by Lance A. Kair

All rights reserved. This book or any portion thereof may not be reproduced or used in any manner whatsoever without the express written permission of the publisher except for the use of brief quotations in a book review or scholarly journal.

First eBook printing: June 2015

ISBN 978-1-329-22280-9

Lance A. Kair

Louisville, Colorado, 80027. U.S.A.

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This book is the first of a series called The Philosophical Hack.

Contents

Non-Philosophy and Aphilosophy

THE SITUATION.

PHILOSOPHY and NON-PHILOSOPHY.

THE ISSUE.

KANT.

HEGEL.

THE ANTE-APOLOGISTS:

Marx, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.

MARX.

KIERKEGAARD.

NIETZSCHE.

APHILOSOPHY AS A CRITIQUE OF NON-PHILOSOPHY: The Apologists.

THE APHILOSOPHICAL CASE.

REITERATION.

AFTERWORD: Object Orientation.

Notes.

Selected Bibliography.

Noted Authors.

What happened ??

Here then is the only expedient, from which we can hope for success in our philosophical researches, to leave the tedious lingering method, which we have hitherto followed, and instead of taking now and then a castle or village on the frontier, to march up directly to the capital or center of these sciences, to human nature itself...

David Hume. A Treatise On Human Nature.

THE SITUATION.

1.

The situation is what is happening; the situation is the issue. Non-philosophy presents the situation in its absolute truth through discourse. Though the idea of a non-philosophy has arisen in at least a few texts, we will center our concern and discussion with the manner that non-philosophy, the idea, has been transcribed into a more formal setting by the philosopher Francois Laruelle. So as we begin, for this short essay, the terms of discourse themselves as indicators of a constant, relatable and universal reductive potential, cannot be taken to reflect an absolute truth, for the terms are also the issue; this is the non-philosophical situation. While this situation arises at many significant occasions of discourse, and particularly upon philosophical discourses, the proof of non-philosophy becomes evident through two mutually exclusive routes. The topic of non-philosophy is the description of itself, that is, of the situation coming to bare upon its own condition of being inherently involved with two routes, and in this way non-philosophy is unique with respect to its structure of meaning, what can be called axiomatic or requiring of no proof, because non-philosophy is involved with the presentation of the proof that is itself. The discernment of what can be said to be the axiomatic non-philosophical situation occurs with the issue of method and what can be seen as the antithesis of such method, a type of aphilosophical route.

2.

The problem inherent to the discursive representation of non-philosophy can be described in terms of experiment, method and results. Within the experiment, the method can achieve and argue to its result, but the result does not necessarily argue any particular method, rather, the result itself could be achieved through many possible methods. The non-philosophical result thereby can be said to bring into question the philosophical method. Where method is seen as inseparable from result, where any result is automatically referred to one particular method, there we have a non sequitur. The distinction that arises is between result and method. So likewise this essay proposes that the result that is non-philosophy arguing or otherwise proposing itself as a method is non sequitur; that is, as an assertion of a proper mode over or through an apparent contradiction it is a move of bad faith, in a usual sense meaning a betrayal of truth, but likewise in the sense that Jean-Paul Sartre discusses. The meaning that is non-philosophical is a result that necessarily disengages or is already disengaged from the method that brought it, so it is that the author of Non-Philosophy, Francios Laruelle, is involved in an effort that contradicts itself so much as he proposes that it, Non-Philosophy, this particular result, might be learned through its method, which is, for a term, the non-philosophical philosophical method. Further we say that this is possible because he has been involved with the development of his ideas through an ideological investment, and thus understands his development as due to this given, proper and unimpeachable methodological institution; in general, what is called the academy. The meaning of non-philosophy as method thereby requires of him, in the end, to back pedal and restate his terms to be consistent with the institution from which non-philosophy would otherwise break from. This can be to say that the method called 'philosophy', or that method by which philosophy finds itself and through which it operates as such, yielded a result called 'Non-Philosophy' that proposes to describe a method by which non-philosophy can be arrived at philosophically to mean something other than philosophical; which is to say, something non-philosophical. This proposal is non sequitur, and thus contradictory in-itself. It is this apparent contradiction, found in a predominance of philosophical texts, but most clearly in Laruelle’s Non-Philosophy statement, that implies as it requires a revolution to occur for its completion in real meaning.

PHILOSOPHY and NON-PHILOSOPHY.

3.

The veracity of the non-philosophical situation is self evident because and while it is describing the situation that occurs within the significant occasion of certain discourses; its involvement with philosophy is through a kind of, what we can call, radical agency. Philosophy, as an object of investigation, is seen to evidence a lack, and this lack, as Laruelle identifies, is in its decisional structure, which is to say, based in a prior decision upon an already operational method for reconciling the various and discrepant facets of world. This method, which we shall call the conventional method, allows for and implements real agency, what it means to be an active member of world, which by now is thus the world, reality. In as much as the philosophical method can be said to have yielded non-philosophy as a result, there do we notice an historically significant mark.

4.

Like a Janus, non-philosophy reflects two truths by its arrival, one in potential and one in actuality. The meaning of each of these true situations arise from one another in the act that is the making of meaning, and the meaning of either removes itself from the truth of the other necessarily since the one always reduces the meaning of the other to itself as to annihilate all dissension and contradiction. This method or route of meaning evidences its own fault. Analogous to the situation at hand – the situation in which we find ourselves, the situation we consider and address here – the figure itself, of the Janus, can be viewed as indicating a 'one' truth, but it is a oneness that can never be realized; this is to say, the view upon the figure itself is subject to the situation it represents such that the knowing of the figure overcomes a sort of gap. This particular overview thus defines a transcendental event, an event of knowing that is more than its terms suggest and therefore that cannot be conveyed in its actuality. The supposition, proposal or assertion that suggests that a grand unity is indicated through the meaning of the terms of the conveyance, where the terms are taken to reflect or otherwise refer to or indicate this unitive truth of things, is thus concordantly based in a redundant function, consistently conferring the state of meaning to that of the True State of Reality, in general segregating aspects of the redundancy through an effective ignorance of the gap and deferring those elements to what we have called the True Object, as in the case of our analogy, the state that is proposed upon the figure of the Janus instead of what the Janus represents ; which, in a religious frame, can be the basis for what can be called idolatry. What this means then is that if the figure is understood for what it represents then the figure itself represents a blank spot, a gap, between the view and what is possible of the view; not between the opposite facing views but between the two views and the presumption that these views together might constitute or otherwise represent an obtainable whole view. This limit is, for all purposes of truth, between the view and what is said of it, for once something is spoken of a thing and a question is asked into that thing as it has been spoken of, the world of deduction arises in potential to become the route that leads inevitably to the one world that is then deduced from the objects obtained from it, a redundant move that ignores the problem of the initial induction of terms. The question has always to do with whether or not an object is associated in any essential way to the term of its referencing. This is the condition of which thus returns us to the initial situation posed by the non-philosophical manifestation of discourse: The reconciliation of two apparently different aspects of reality.

5.

As suggested, the two truths are not reducible to some one truth, but remain eternally suspended in essential separation, together indicating only their individual truths, i.e. unilaterally dual in nature. This as opposed to and in contrast