Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military

By Dennis J. Quinn

The role of the United Nations as the major international organization chartered to preserve peace and discourage aggression has broadened steadily since the Cold War ended. Regional security concerns are concomitantly replacing global ones as the superpower standoff fades from the world stage. The role of the military—particularly the United States military—is changing both to support UN efforts and to meet a spurt of regional instabilities that could affect U.S. national interests.

The military may be called upon to support the United Nations in five mission areas: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcing, and peace building. Two questions are paramount: How the military should carry out such missions, and, indeed, whether the military should be involved in some of them. To provide an appropriate forum for addressing the question of how and debating the matter of whether, the Institute for National Strategic Studies hosted the Symposium from which these Proceedings have emerged.

After officials, authorities, and scholars had discussed the five missions, they analyzed UN operations in Bosnia, Somalia, Cambodia, and the Middle East. Using the lessons learned in those operations, they then projected two important considerations: (1) how existing international organizations and coalitions might support future UN missions, and (2) what the implications would be for the U.S. military. These Proceedings collect the very timely papers presented at the Symposium as well as summaries of the cogent analysis and lively debate that followed.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Barakaldo Books
• Release date: Nov 19, 2020
• ISBN: 9781839746642

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Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military

Edited by

Dennis J. Quinn

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

DEDICATION 6

Foreword 7

Introduction — Dennis J. Quinn 8

Part I: Peace Support Operations: Military Perspectives 12

U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS — Barry R. McCaffrey 12

PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS: DEFINITIONS AND IMPLICATIONS — Dennis J. Quinn 19

PEACEKEEPING IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. MILITARY: SUPPORTING THE UNITED NATIONS — John O. B. Sewall 30

THE CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: THE ATLANTIC COMMAND CHALLENGE — Paul David Miller 35

THE U.S. MILITARY ROLE IN A MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK — Steven R. Rader 40

PEACE SUPPORT ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING: A DANISH PERSPECTIVE — Kjeld G. H. Hillingsø 46

PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS: SENIOR MILITARY PERSPECTIVES — Jerome H. Kahan 55

Part II: Peace Support Operations Policy Perspective 59

THE PROPER UNITED STATES ROLE IN PEACEMAKING — John McCain 59

PEACEKEEPING AND THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE — Joseph Kruzel 65

PEACE ENFORCEMENT AND THE UNITED NATIONS — Sarah Sewall 69

PEACEKEEPING: WHITHER U.S. POLICY? — William H. Lewis 76

Part III: Peace Support Operations: Regional Perspectives 81

WESTERN HEMISPHERE SECURITY: CAUTIONS ON NEW MILITARY MISSIONS — Luigi Einaudi 81

ASEAN AND THE UNITED NATIONS — Jusuf Wanandi 87

UN AND THE U.S. MILITARY ROLES IN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST — Dent Ocaya-Lakidi 97

EUROPEAN ORGANIZATIONS AND INTERVENTION — Richard M. Connaughton 116

MANAGING THE CRISIS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA — Andrew S. Bair 135

About the Editor 144

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 145

DEDICATION

To the 18 brave American servicemen who sacrificed their lives on 3 October 1993 trying to bring peace to a war-ravaged people in Somalia.

Foreword

The role of the United Nations as the major international organization chartered to preserve peace and discourage aggression has broadened steadily since the Cold War ended. Regional security concerns are concomitantly replacing global ones as the superpower standoff fades from the world stage. The role of the military—particularly the United States military—is changing both to support UN efforts and to meet a spurt of regional instabilities that could affect U.S. national interests.

The military may be called upon to support the United Nations in five mission areas: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcing, and peace building. Two questions are paramount: How the military should carry out such missions, and, indeed, whether the military should be involved in some of them. To provide an appropriate forum for addressing the question of how and debating the matter of whether, the Institute for National Strategic Studies hosted the Symposium from which these Proceedings have emerged.

After officials, authorities, and scholars had discussed the five missions, they analyzed UN operations in Bosnia, Somalia, Cambodia, and the Middle East. Using the lessons learned in those operations, they then projected two important considerations: (1) how existing international organizations and coalitions might support future UN missions, and (2) what the implications would be for the U.S. military. These Proceedings collect the very timely papers presented at the Symposium as well as summaries of the cogent analysis and lively debate that followed.

The National Defense University was pleased to support such a comprehensive and intellectually challenging Symposium and gratified with the gravity, good will, and pragmatism of the discussions, as well as the very large attendance at the sessions.

PAUL G. CERJAN

Lieutenant-General, U.S. Army

President, National Defense University

Introduction — Dennis J. Quinn

The world is staggering towards its new order. The United States is searching for its role in this new world. The U.S. Armed Forces is husbanding its resources, honing its capabilities, and awaiting its orders. One of the many possible major missions for these forces in this new world order is that of peace support operations.

Beginning with the destruction of the Berlin Wall, half of the old world order began to crumble and soon lie in ruins. With the disappearance of this old counterweight, the remaining half of the old world structure at times seems to be tottering. Many of the Western world’s political, economic, and military policies were driven by the existence and the goals of the Soviet Union and its Communist empire.

The disappearance of the Soviet Empire requires a reordering of Western and Third World interests, goals, and policies. New political and social engineers with new designs and new materials are needed to first shore up the world structure and then redesign it, reorder it, and reinvigorate it with new purposes and methods.

As occurred after past world wars, the United States is leaning towards world government as a means to help achieve its global goals of political and economic democracy. After World War I, the U.S. and many other countries looked to the League of Nations to secure a new world order. It was not to be. After World War II, the U.S. and many other countries looked to the United Nations to secure a new world order. Again it was not to be. Now after the Third World War, i.e. the Cold War, the United States and many other countries are again looking to a world organization, again the UN, to ensure peace and stability in the world.

In 1992 the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Gali, aware of the new opportunities for the UN, wrote a forceful pamphlet titled, An Agenda for Peace. In this pamphlet he exhorted the countries of the world to take a strong hand, under UN leadership, in fashioning world peace. There was even a call for the use of military might, under the UN flag, to enforce, or even to force, peace in situations where the world community thinks it necessary.

The United States for its part, both in word and deed, seemed to support this agenda. Both Presidents Bush and Clinton and their leading administration spokesmen gave speeches or drafted policy papers indicating strong U.S. support for these new UN peace policies. Even more dramatically, U.S. forces engaged in or led major UN operations in three different regions of the world: in the Gulf, in Somalia, and in ex-Yugoslavia.

A new major mission, peace support operations, was evolving for the U.S. Armed Forces. As should occur with newly evolving missions, a national debate began over the use of U.S. forces in UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. This debate became more focused and intense as a result of events in Somalia on 3 October 1993. It was on that date that U.S. forces, operating under UN orders, suffered 18 soldiers killed in action and more than 70 wounded.

One month later, on 2 and 3 November, the National Defense University held a previously scheduled symposium on UN military coalitions and what implications such UN operations had for the U.S. military. This book you are reading, Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military contains many of the papers and presentations prepared for or delivered at that symposium. The subject matter in this book is organized into three parts: military perspectives, policy perspectives, and regional perspectives on peace support operations.

Part I provides a wide spectrum of military perspectives. The first article, the symposium’s keynote presentation, by LTG McCaffrey provides a big-picture snapshot of the present condition of UN peace operations, U.S. force structure and capabilities, and the opportunities and challenges of using U.S. forces in support of UN peace missions. The remaining articles in Part I, as well as those in Parts II and III, address particular aspects of General McCaffrey’s keynote presentation.

At the high end, or the strategic end, of this spectrum of military perspectives, General Sewall evaluates the command and control assets needed by the UN, the Department of Defense, and the major U.S. commands, if peace support operations are to be conducted effectively. He makes specific, clear, and low-cost recommendations on ways to satisfy some of these command and control needs. Other strategic views are presented in Dr. Kahan’s article in which he synthesizes the presentations of British Argentinean, and American generals, all of whom had experience commanding forces in peace support operations. Admiral Miller, Commander of USАСОМ, discusses the challenges involved in mobilizing, equipping, and training troops for global peace support operations. He does not support the creation or earmarking of specific units for peace support operations. Rather he supports the concept of selecting units from a wide array of available forces and placing these units in ad hoc force packages specifically designed to achieve the particular mission goals of individual peace support operations.

At the other end of this spectrum of military perspectives are two articles which address, both directly and indirectly, the U.S. military’s approach to peace support operations at the operational and tactical levels. Colonel Rader’s article discusses the U.S. approach to operational-level planning and execution of peace support operations. He suggests that perhaps the U.S. ought to take a less unilateral approach to conducting these multilateral operations. General Hillingsø’s article provides a glimpse at how Denmark supports peace operations and offers a training and organizational model from which other nations may choose whatever they think useful for their own peace support planning. General Hillingsø’s article also presents two specific ideas that are worth repeating here: first, the most critical element of success for these peace support missions is to change the individual officer’s and soldier’s attitude from that of being primarily a warrior to that of being primarily a peacemaker and second, once the peacekeeping force draws blood, their special status as being above the conflict is about to collapse and with it their only source of authority in the operations area.

My own article on peacekeeping definitions and implications is meant to serve as a touchstone piece for the reader on the various terms in use when discussing peace support operations. One of the many problems in developing both perspective and policy on peace support operations is the confusion of terminology. People are often using the same terms to mean different things, while at other times they are using different terms to mean the same thing. Within the pages of this book the reader will find many examples of authors meaning different things in their use of the words peacekeeping, peacebuilding, peacemaking, and peace enforcing. Establishing a common lexicon of terms will go a long way in helping develop a common understanding of the problems and a common approach to finding some solutions. Many DoD staff officers are now compiling such a lexicon. General Sewall and Dr. Lewis also present good definition reviews in their articles.

Part II provides perspectives on developing U.S. policy concerning the use of U.S. forces in multilateral or coalition peace support operations. Three constituencies are represented: congress (Senator McCain), the administration (Secretaries Kruzel and Sewall), and academe (Professor Lewis). Senator McCain endorses peace support operations as a mission, but this endorsement is conditional. He believes that the congress and the American people will support such operations when they are conducted for the right reasons, at the right time, in the right place, and under the right conditions. Senator McCain highlights what he believes some of these conditions to be.

Ms. Sewall tackles the tough problem of peace enforcement. Her article provides a clear definition of peace enforcement and the conditions under which U.S. forces should become involved in such missions. In one insightful section she points out that, relative to peace enforcement operations, we should not too quickly become overly elated with their successes or overly discouraged by their failures; because peace enforcement is still very much a new endeavor which will require much effort to get right, but, in her opinion, the benefits for mankind will be well worth this effort.

Dr. Kruzel provides an interesting slant on the benefits of U.S. involvement in peace support operations. His article discusses the use of such operations in the context of the NATO Alliance. Peace support operations could be a way to revitalize the alliance and its relevancy to the post-Cold War world.

Professor Lewis’ article reviews the development of U.S. policy relating to peace support operations. For him, 3 October 1993 is a watershed date in this development process. That is the date the American people weighed in on the policy debate. Professor Lewis believes their vote was a qualified thumbs up for peacekeeping but an unqualified thumbs down for peace enforcement.

Part III presents several regional perspectives on U.S. involvement in peace support operations, as well as one discussion on a specific strategy to solve the crisis in ex-Yugoslavia. These articles highlight the problems faced by U.S. policy makers in dealing with peace support operations on a global scale. Several authors suggest more involvement by U.S. military forces in their specific regions, while others propose less involvement. Of those that seek more U.S. involvement, some want the U.S. to lead the effort, while others want the U.S. to act more like a partner among equals. Whatever the specific beliefs of these authors, their articles reveal the fact that peace support operations and the U.S. role in these operations are issues that have moved towards center stage in the political and social psyches of nations around the globe.

The National Defense University symposium on the implications of an increased role for U.S. forces in UN peace support operations occurred at a crucial moment in the national debate over this issue. Over 600 persons attended the symposium, ranging from soldiers who had participated in such operations, to staff officers writing manuals and doctrine on such operations, to policy makers preparing decisions on the future of such operations, to concerned Americans, in and out of the military, who are interested in the Armed Forces’ role in such operations. Discussion and debate were direct and frank. The symposium made a significant contribution to the development of national policy and doctrine relating to the future role of U.S. forces in peace support operations.

Contributors to the symposium and to this book are all recognized experts in their fields. Many work for government departments or for civilian organizations and institutions associated with national or international security policy development. It should be understood that the views presented at the symposium and in this book are the individual views of the authors and do not necessarily represent their government’s or organization’s official positions.

As mentioned at the beginning of this introduction, the world does seem to be staggering towards its new order. The United States is still searching for the best ways to achieve its goals and interests within and for this new world order. As a major element of U.S. national power, the military remains ready to carry out all constitutionally assigned missions in support of national interests and objectives, including the mission of increased peace support operations. The authors in this book highlight the opportunities and challenges associated with the acceptance of such a mission.

Part I: Peace Support Operations: Military Perspectives

U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS — Barry R. McCaffrey

Effective multilateral approaches are in the American national interest. By sharing the burdens with other countries—through the UN and in other ways—we can save both lives and money. The key is to give the UN tools to move in quickly to defuse tensions before they escalate.

Bill Clinton, campaign speech

Dramatic Increase in UN Peacekeeping Operations

As NATO SECRETARY GENERAL MANFRED WOERNER recently noted, The collapse of Soviet communism has left us with a paradox: there is less threat, but also less peace. Regional instabilities in the Persian Gulf, the periphery of the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia, and the Korean peninsula are symptomatic.

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, refugee and humanitarian crises, and threats to new and evolving democracies are also serious concerns. While they may not equate to the former Soviet nuclear and conventional threats, their cumulative impact is ominous.

Barry R. McCaffrey is a Lieutenant-General in the U.S. Army and the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy for the Joint Staff. Prior to his present assignment, he served as Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General McCaffrey commanded the 24th Infantry Division (Mech) in combat operations during Desert Storm. General McCaffrey received a BS from West Point and an MA from American University.

Accompanying this new world order has been a virtual explosion of UN involvement within the last few years. The statistics tell the story:

• Average of one UN Security Council resolution per month during the UN’s first 44 years; average of 5 to 7 per month since 1991. Fourteen passed in June 1993.

• In 1990, the United Nations had five peacekeeping operations involving about 10,000 troops, not counting Korea. In 1993, there are 24 operations with over 75,000 troops, 5,600 of them U.S. military personnel.

• Peacekeeping costs have skyrocketed from $800M to almost $4B during the same period, with the United States paying approximately one-third of these costs.

We are now dealing with the problems and growing pains of this rapid expansion of UN activity. Among those problems has been trying to pin down our terminology when discussing UN operations.

Spectrum of UN Operations

Most people are familiar with the concept of traditional peacekeeping involving the deployment of a UN or regional organization presence with the consent of all the parties concerned. Traditional peacekeeping operations are non-combat military operations (exclusive of self-defense) that are undertaken by outside forces designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement to the dispute.

We also understand the term peace enforcement, which is armed intervention involving the use of force or the threat of the use of force. Pursuant to authorization by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, peace enforcement entails the coercive use of military power to compel compliance with international resolutions, mandates, or sanctions to maintain or restore international peace and security, or address breaches to the peace or acts of aggression. The clear examples, of course, are the Gulf War and Korea, although the term peace enforcement was probably not in use at that time.

The difficult operations are those that fall in between traditional peacekeeping and large-scale peace enforcement. They are neither Chapter VI peacekeeping in the traditional sense nor all-out Chapter VII enforcement actions. To be quite honest, we are groping in the fog between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

We are calling these operations aggravated peacekeeping, defined as military operations undertaken with the nominal consent of all major belligerent parties, but which are complicated by subsequent intransigence of one or more of the belligerents, poor command and control of belligerent forces, or conditions of outlawry, banditry, or anarchy. In such conditions, peacekeeping forces are