The French Army in the Great War

By David Bilton

A history of the fighting and day-to-day lives of French soldiers on the Western Front in World War I, filled with rare archival photos.
 
Few books have been written in English about the French Army during the Great War, and those that exist feature very few illustrations. This book aims to provide a highly readable and succinct account of the work of the French Army on the Western Front, as well as provide the reader with a wealth of photographs that show the daily life of the French soldier both in and out of the trenches.
 
All of the images are contemporary, many coming from wartime and postwar magazines, interspersed with many previously unpublished images. The book aims to give a concise overview of the war seen through French eyes and includes the casualties incurred. Although the May 1917 mutinies were an important but brief part of the story, they are not dealt with at length because they can distract from the main story of the valor shown by the French troops in battles where the casualties were extremely high. Also included is a lengthy introduction that explains the structure of the army at the onset of the war and some of the problems it faced, as well as a section that looks at the uniforms worn and how they changed during the war.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Jun 30, 2019
• ISBN: 9781473887268

David Bilton

David Bilton is a retired teacher who spends his time looking after his family, working as a University lecturer and researching the Great War. He is the prolific author of numerous books about the British Army, the Home Front and the German Army. His first book, The Hull Pals, became the BBC 2 series The Trench. Since he started writing he has contributed to many television and radio programmes. His interest in the Great War was ignited by his grandfather's refusal to talk about his experiences in Gallipoli and on the Western Front.

Book preview

Introduction

The subject of the French army in the First World War is vast, far too vast, to cover in a book of this size. The illustrations herein help tell of some of the battles fought and some of the changes that took place during the conflict. It is not possible to deal with any battle in detail; there are other books which do that. However, the French army has been sadly under-examined by English historians.

I have provided a general history of the main events of the war on the Western Front, the main theatre of French activity, but have also included some photos taken on other fronts: the French also fought in Africa and in Italy, Salonika and in the Dardanelles. There is no attempt to analyse or place it in the context of other aspects of the war; the text focuses on the French story in France and Belgium.

Any mistakes are solely my responsibility.

Acknowledgments

Once again many thanks to Anne Coulson for reading the draft and to The Prince Consort’s Library for giving me access to their books.

Background

The evolution of the army that fought in 1914 began in 1868 after the unsuccessful campaign in Mexico on behalf of the Emperor Maximilian. Before that, the army had fought successfully for almost thirty years, in North Africa, the Crimea and northern Italy. The failed Mexican campaign, coupled with the knowledge that the Prussian army numbered around 1,200,000 men (including reserve), meant not only a restructuring but also an increase in manpower was necessary. As a result, although opposed by both the Right and the Left political wings, compulsory military service was introduced. Senior officers favoured a professional army undiluted by conscripts, and the future draftees, mostly factory and farm workers, objected to being forced to join the army.

This was all too late to prevent defeat during the Franco-Prussian war. By this time the army had increased in number from 288,000 to 393,000, but many were spread across Mexico, Algeria and Rome. After reserves had been called up it amounted to 567,000, but this was still less than half the strength of the combined German states. The disparity in numbers was made worse by a defective mobilisation process in which men were often called up to units some distance away. After a long journey the men would arrive to find their units had mobilised without them.

In Paris, left without a government (which had moved to Bordeaux during the fighting), the National Guard and a provisional municipal government – known as the Commune – took over. With the return of the French government to Versailles, fighting broke out between released prisoners of war and the Communards. Little quarter was given during the fighting; vicious savagery besmirched Paris, the City of Light. It is estimated that government forces killed between 20,000 and 25,000 men and women.

With the suppression of the Commune, the rebuilding of the army began. Defeat brought the realisation that a stronger army was necessary to fight Germany again, either to repel further invasion or regain the lost provinces. The army became more popular with the middle and upper classes, while the working classes accepted their military obligation.

Many young and ambitious officers feared that if they served abroad they would miss the next war, and would be at a disadvantage when war did start. However, those who had done colonial service where they were engaged on active service had not only gained valuable fighting experience, but also won decorations and distinction.?

This resurgence in popularity was short lived. Two sensational affairs involving the army did considerable damage to its status. The first involved Général Boulanger, who, having appeared to be on the point of leading a right-wing coup, fled to Brussels and there committed suicide on his mistress’s grave.

More damaging still was the Dreyfus affair. This, a conspiracy against an innocent Jewish artillery officer, ‘caused a great revulsion of feeling against the army when the truth became known’. The revulsion destroyed the perpetrators and also many who had no connection with the conspiracy, shattering public confidence in the army. However, despite an anti-militarist spirit amongst intellectuals, and leaders of the Left, the strengthening of the army continued.

These affairs had a profound effect on the officer corps. The number of applicants for officer training at Saint-Cyr dropped and many career artillery and engineer officers resigned. The absence of quality applicants was soon felt in theÉcole supérieure de la guerre,which supplied men for the general staff, and this undermined the quality of the officer corps in the early years of the twentieth century.

Nevertheless, efforts were made to increase manpower. By 1893 this had been achieved: the French and German armies were almost at comparable strengths. Initially it was envisaged that the army would be used to defend France along specific lines and at fortifications at Épinal, Toul and Verdun. However, by 1889 it was decided that, when war came, the army would go over to the offensive, leading to attacks on Metz and Strasbourg – Plan 10.

When it was discovered that the German birth rate was growing quicker than the French, an alliance with Russia was formed to further boost the number of men who would be available to fight the Germans, and ‘national service was fixed at three years for all’. For some reason national service was cut to two years in 1905, reverting to three years only in 1913. This last ‘change gave France more men under arms in peace-time than Germany’ although Germany was more populous.

Changing the length of service had an unintended consequence: a lack of quality NCOs. Many of the best were commissioned – before the war half the officers had come from the ranks – others found administrative positions. Others not so able left after fifteen years’ service to become minor civil servants. Although two years’ national service was sufficient time to train a soldier, the third year had given them time to develop into NCOs. As a result, the army’s tactical efficiency was reduced.

Added to the Metropolitan troops were those from the colonies, a further 90,000 men, both European and native, many known for their picturesque uniforms. Included among the colonial troops were the men of the Foreign Legion, volunteers from around the world and troops from Africa and Indochina. At the start of the war ‘there were twenty-one battalions of Senegalese in Northern and Western Africa, as well as ten battalions of Malagasies and one of Somalis; two regiments of Congolese in Equatorial Africa; and five Indochinese Regiments.’ Five battalions of Senegalese troops in North Africa were sent to France at the beginning of hostilities. Many other new Senegalese battalions were raised for overseas service during the war. Most of the Indochinese and Malagasy troops served at depots, although some did see combat. ‘In all, the empire produced 600,000 soldiers for the war effort and sent 184,000 workers to French industry.’

The use and employment of these colonial men was governed by racial stereo-typing. ‘Indochinese troops, though intelligent, were assigned almost exclusively to armaments and aviation factories; the Hovas of Madagascar were sent to the ambulance corps, but also to the artillery; North African and Senegalese infantry were thrown into almost all of the major offensives, but even Mangin (a colonial soldier) divided his black troops into warrior races – those from the savannah – and the rest, who were employed as workers or replacements.’ There was an element of mistrust. While North Africans fought in their own regiments, black