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Greek Rhetoric Before Aristotle
Greek Rhetoric Before Aristotle
Greek Rhetoric Before Aristotle
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Greek Rhetoric Before Aristotle

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Recent archaeological discoveries, coupled with long-lost but now available epigraphical evidence, and a more expansive view of literary sources, provide new and dramatic evidence of the emergence of rhetoric in ancient Greece. Many of these artifacts, gathered through onsite fieldwork in Greece, are analyzed in this revised and expanded edition of Greek Rhetoric Before Aristotle. This new evidence, along with recent developments in research methods and analysis, reveal clearly that long before Aristotle’s Rhetoric, long before rhetoric was even stabilized into formal systems of study in Classical Athens, nascent, pre-disciplinary “rhetorics” were emerging throughout Greece.
LanguageEnglish
Release dateNov 29, 2011
ISBN9781602352155
Greek Rhetoric Before Aristotle
Author

Richard Leo Enos

Richard Leo Enos is Professor and Holder of the Lillian Radford Chair of Rhetoric & Composition - History of Rhetoric at Texas Christian University. David E. Beard is Associate Professor of Writing Studies at the University of Minnesota, Duluth.

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    Greek Rhetoric Before Aristotle - Richard Leo Enos

    Foreword to the Revised and Expanded Edition

    Significant advances in the field of classical rhetoric have been made since the 1993 publication of Greek Rhetoric Before Aristotle. These advances—some of which are mentioned later in this preface—have contributed not only to several new chapters but also to new theoretical, methodological, and critical perspectives. For example, research done on the diverse manifestations of women’s rhetorics has not only expanded the history of rhetoric but also the rigid parameters of what we have considered rhetoric to be for women and other previously excluded or marginalized groups. Similarly, postmodern rhetorical theory has revealed the benefits of recognizing political, social, and psychological factors that influence not only rhetorical situations but also the very mentalities involved in the cognition and expression of rhetorical discourse. New primary material on rhetoric in the ancient world is becoming available annually, and advances in technology in the last few decades have made the distribution of such material available in a breadth and with an ease that earlier historians of rhetoric never could have imagined possible. An especially good illustration of such innovative work that both synthesizes and analyzes the most current research in rhetoric is The Sage Handbook of Rhetorical Studies (2009). Given such advances in the field of rhetoric, we would do well to pause and reflect on our starting points. One of the primary points of reflection should be our preference for research methods and our sources of inquiry. In many ways, the sources that we select to use for our history are tied to the selection of our research methods. Our traditional avenue for knowledge of classical rhetoric has been the descent of manuscripts passed along through Antiquity, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and Modern periods of the book tradition. The selection of these sources has influenced our methods of research, and it is this condition that the preface addresses.

    Classical rhetoric is enriched annually by new information that is not from the book tradition—particularly from the areas of archaeology, epigraphy, fine arts, and new media refinements in archival studies. With all of this abundance of potential information, however, we continue to research classical rhetoric by traditional approaches. That is, many scholars believe that classical rhetoric should be studied by classical approaches. Unfortunately, classical approaches are not really classical at all but rather Victorian; that is, the methods of studying classical rhetoric have been based on the methods used in classical studies for the last two centuries. We have, over those two centuries, so strongly co-existed Victorian methods with the study of classical rhetoric that those Victorian methods have been inextricably wedded to (and confused as being) something that grew out of Antiquity. As a result of this confusion, the newest, and often the most sensitive and insightful, theoretical perspectives and innovative historiographical methods are dismissed for no other reason than that they lack the (Victorian) tradition. Scholars have so closely co-existed classical rhetoric with long outdated Victorian research practices that they are unwilling to risk being unfaithful by departing from long-established methods (Enos, Classical 285 et passim). While there is no doubt that well established research approaches have much to offer, this revised and expanded edition examines and assesses innovative theoretical gains and attendant research heuristics that offer fruitful new approaches in the historiography of classical rhetoric that complement long-established research practices. One of the primary new approaches grounding this volume is archaeological rhetoric, a method and a mentality that seeks to excavate and reconstruct any and all artifacts indigenous to the contextual environment that help to provide a sensitive explanation of the relationship between thought and expression.

    Given the volume’s orientation toward archaeological rhetoric, we would do well to review the starting points of this approach by discussing the inherent limitations of traditional research methods in classical rhetoric. No arguments need to be advanced (again) that warrant the benefits of historical research in rhetoric. Rhetoric has already been clearly established as a social, political and educational force in Antiquity. What does need to be argued are the ways that we try to advance sensitive understandings of the nature and impact of rhetoric. Current insights from work in postmodern and critical theory have called to question the presumptions that drive conventional research methods and even what is considered rhetoric. If, as mentioned in the earlier example, we consider rhetoric to be only overtly agonistic acts of persuasion that occur in civic centers, then we constrain our view to only one (predominantly male) dimension of rhetoric in social interaction and, by default, exclude others, such as women (see, e.g., Bizzell passim). However, because women were normally not given equal access to civic functions, should we presume that they had no rhetoric of their own, or that they never used their rhetoric to social ends? Postmodern work has caused us to reflect on our own starting points and, in this instance, cautions not to exclude rhetorics that do not conform to the hegemonic rhetoric of the period and within the culture being examined.

    If we are to consider archaeological rhetoric as important to the research methods of historical rhetoric, and that the validity of our methods (as well as the theory driving those methods) is adjudicated by our academic community, then the evidence that we use to marshal our argument is of paramount importance. Research in historical rhetoric involves more than what is printed on a page. Rhetoric, to be sure, may have been recorded on a page, but the rhetoric itself came to life in a real, dynamic situation occurring at a moment in time. Understanding the context that initially prompted the rhetoric is critical if we are to advance meaning beyond what appears on a page. To attain knowledge of that context, we must try to reproduce the environment within which that piece of discourse was created. To re-create that scene we must look to any and all artifacts that offer insight to the cultural context of the rhetoric under examination.

    The same myopic constraints that have traditionally limited our research methods in classical rhetoric could also be applied to self-imposed cultural constraints. Athens was a dominant site for rhetoric. So dominant, in fact, that we both tend to generalize Athenian rhetoric as (Pan-)Hellenic and to use Athenian rhetoric as a standard for judgment of other contemporary rhetoric(s) of the Hellenic world. Yet, postmodern work has shown that every society has a rhetoric, but not all of these rhetorics are manifested in a similar fashion, as is convincingly revealed in the edited volume of Carol S. Lipson and Roberta A. Binkley, Rhetoric Before and Beyond the Greeks (2004). For example, because Athenian and Spartan societies are so dramatically different, a Spartan rhetoric would understandably appear to be far different than an Athenian rhetoric because their respective rhetorics would be fashioned to meet the needs of their own respective cultures. That being the case, it would make sense to first determine the features of the rhetoric under study—whether by indigenous gender or polity—and then design historiographical methods that would be most sensitive to analyzing the rhetoric of that culture. In short, if every ancient rhetoric was judged by the standards of Athenian-based rhetoric, each (non-Athenian rhetoric) would be found wanting because each polis was different, and features that were important in Athens may not be relevant in the civic practices of another Greece city-state.

    Archaeological rhetoric seeks not only to discover physical artifacts, but also to reconstruct the mentalities of the time and within the situation. It is this point that Bronislaw Malinowski made when he wrote: What I have tried to make clear by analysis of a primitive linguistic text is that language is essentially rooted in the reality of the culture, the tribal life and customs of a people, and that it cannot be explained without constant reference to these broader contexts of verbal utterance (305). Such a task necessitates going beyond the physical evidence of extant literature and reconstructing the epistemic nature upon which the discourse is grounded. Unlike Malinowski’s work in anthropology, historians of rhetoric cannot perform ethnographies. That is, anthropologies can observe discourse as a living activity during the dynamic of the social situation. This edition of Greek Rhetoric Before Aristotle reconstructs the social context as best as possible in order to make inferences about the situatedness of the discourse. These methodological constraints that historians of rhetoric have when compared to anthropologists can be reduced by including such (non-traditional) archaeological evidence as part of their historical work. That is, incorporating the findings of archaeology and other such related disciplines as epigraphy and architecture can provide invaluable information that can be used by historians of rhetoric to reconstruct the dynamics of the situation within which rhetoric occurs (see Enos, Rhetorical). If we take rhetoric to mean a process of choosing and selecting discourse as a means of constructing reality, then rhetorical methods must account and include archaeological and epigraphical evidence in their research methods.

    To be sure, scholars of philology have told us much about oral and written discourse in the ancient world based upon only the remains of these documents. While other such documents are still being discovered, such observations that are predicated upon textual analysis, particularly in studies which rely on content analysis, permit only a restricted inquiry into the study of Hellenic discourse and, as I. J. Gelb has revealed, offer little attention to the relationship of writing and language (64). In brief, considering rhetoric as a conceptual, generating process in Hellenic discourse is outside the traditional methodologies used for such historical research. Yet, knowing the epistemological basis and social situations upon which discourse is predicated is essential to understanding the contextual meaning—and the process used to help create that shared meaning—of the discourse itself. Furthermore, the most sensitive way to understand the epistemological basis of discourse is to recognize that the process of rhetoric is inherent in the conceptual structuring of discourse, and that this process must be accounted for by theories of rhetoric and employed in analysis by their attendant methodological heuristics.

    If research on rhetoric’s past is to be sensitive to historical mentalities, then a sensitive theory of rhetoric ought to account for all relevant, contextual phenomena—even those which can be classified as unobservable notions outside the parameters of content-analytic methodologies but instrumental in the process of language development. Yet, as Jerrold Katz wrote, An assumption about the existence of an unobservable system puts a weight on our credulity that can only be supported by proportionally strong evidence, by evidence strong enough to bear the strain (18). This sort of evidence clearly is not traditional, but neither is it empirical or even analytical, although both of the latter play a part in its formulation. Rather, this formulation is best understood as a synthesized argument for an interpretation of the notions, presumptions, and presuppositions that reveal the conceptual idea that grounds the discourse (Lane 17). Noam Chomsky has been one of the strongest proponents for inquiry into mental processes for the study of language and believes that a rather convincing argument can be made for the view that principles intrinsic to the mind provide invariant structures that are a precondition for linguistic experience (243). In other words, methods are needed in historical research in rhetoric that provide a sensitive explanation of psychological and epistemological presumptions upon which language-constructs are developed and generated. This explanation cannot come from the traditional methods of philological research indicated above, but rather must consider a rhetorical vector, since what is being examined is an epistemic process of grounding articulation and expression.

    In the last several decades, rhetoricians (most notably Robert L. Scott) have argued that epistemic processes can be considered rhetorical both in generating discourse and constructing cognitive processes for the transformation of meaning (Scott, On Viewing 9–17; Scott, Ten Years Later 258–66; cf. Cherwitz, 207–19). Considering the epistemic capacity of discourse as rhetorical and advancing theories that account for this generative process, as I have argued, does not diminish the classical notion of rhetoric as persuasion, but rather reveals a deeper structuring of persuasion—as interpretative choice and construction of how one comes to acquire knowledge and view the world (Enos, Structuring 4). In essence, as Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca posit, it is this fundamental rhetorical process which grounds the structure to establish a solidarity between accepted judgments and others which one wishes to promote (261). Thus if we recognize that sensitive explanations of Hellenic discourse necessitate an understanding of the psychological and epistemological presumptions that ground Hellenic discourse, and if we recognize the process as rhetorical, then we must acknowledge the indispensability of theories which can account for these rhetorical vectors.

    Research dealing with historical development of language-use must account for the psychological consciousness of the rhetor beyond the descriptive data of text if the relationship of form and meaning is to be epistemologically understood. Nowhere in Hellenic discourse is this need more apparent than in the distinction between analogical change and analogical creation of discourse. By an isolated comparison of discrete, synchronic analyses of internal evidence into frozen periods and dialects (e.g., Homeric and Attic Greek), we may be able to account not only for orderliness and regularity in language evolution, but also for the anomalous creation of new language forms by accounting for the conceptual processes which generate new form and meaning. The discovery procedures of the discourse clearly cannot be limited to explanatory powers of observation but must account for the evolving concepts and generative competency. In Homeric Greek, for example, there are several words that appear only once (hapax legoena): the Iliad has 1097 and the Odyssey has 868 such occurrences (Pharr xxvi). One would be hard-pressed to account for these 1965 creations synchronically but, more importantly, explanatory powers in such a traditional approach would fail in attempting to account for the conceptual creation of these new forms and meanings.

    Understanding the grammatical structure of discourse does not in itself explain the epistemic processes that developed the techniques. This latter step has not been fully dealt with in traditional studies of classical rhetoric and, consequently, the larger role of theoretical synthesis in Hellenic discourse has been neglected. These views on researching Hellenic rhetoric apply directly to this revised edition. Rhetorical theory analyzes and synthesizes evidence in order to interpret the epistemology and articulation of Hellenic discourse, discourse that is both situated in time and influenced by the social contexts within which it is involved. The implications of this perspective reveal not only the importance of rhetorical theory driving historical research, but the methodologies employed in that research as well. In Homeric literature, to refer to the extended example used here, there is ample evidence to illustrate that eloquence was viewed as a gift from the gods and not a technical skill (e.g., Homer, Iliad 1.247–49; 3.200–24; 9.433; Odyssey 8.165–85; Hesiod, Theogonia 74–103). Moreover, conviction is attained by a persuasion of the heart of Odysseus and insight is endowed to Telemachus by such mentors as Athena and referred to as a divine gift (Homer, Odyssey 9.33, 2.267). Furthermore, to the epic poet Hesiod, Prometheus personified the human capacity to create (techne) (Pucci 82–101). Yet, Prometheus’s disclosure of divine knowledge to man led directly to Zeus’s revenge: Pandora’s release of the god’s gift to men, including divine eloquence (Hesiod, Works and Days 90–105). The loss of this divine power of eloquence led man to a self-conscious techne of discourse and a rational approach to language development. Although these mythic notions are grounded in irrationality, and are not revealed by the metrical patterns of formulae, they do reveal some presumptions on the part of Homer and Hesiod—if nothing else than how they believed their characters believed eloquence was attained and how individuals were persuaded.

    In a similar respect, as Pre-Socratic philosophers moved from an accounting to acts via personified forces to such dialectic terms as logos and dissoi logoi, they revealed a corresponding shift in the presumptions of the acquisition of knowledge. In fact, the debate about the nature of rhetoric between Sophists and Socrates is best seen as a debate about epistemological presumptions; that is, the presumptions of what constitutes reality and the grounding of discourse in relativistic or ontological terms. When Antiphon employs the notions of probability, intent, presumption, and motive he is revealing an epistemic shift in the notion of what constitutes effective discourse from predominantly emotive utterance to rationalism. In brief, rhetorical theories are needed to account for the notions, presumptions, and presuppositions that went into the structuring of such discourse. This position may not seem unreasonable to researchers of contemporary rhetoric or postmodern theoreticians, but it is unknown—or at least unrecognized—to all but a few historians of rhetoric. Among the more standard, long-established works in classical rhetoric, few have dealt with the mentalities of ancient rhetoric. Some of the best of these exceptions include Charles Segal’s Gorgias and the Psychology of the Logos, E. R. Dodds’s The Greeks and the Irrational, Helen North’s Sophrosyne: Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature, and Eric Havelock’s Preface to Plato. Many others in the canon of our classical scholarship, however, do not consider the epistemic process or more importantly, recognize its rhetorical nature in their explanations.

    More recently, however, scholars have begun to depart from Victorian methods and offer new, insightful contributions both to the social and cultural contexts and also to the mentalities driving classical rhetoric. Such innovative works include Cheryl Glenn’s Rhetoric Retold: Regendering the Tradition from Antiquity through the Renaissance, Edward Schiappa’s The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece, Susan C. Jarratt’s Rereading the Sophists: Classical Rhetoric Reconsidered, John Poulakos’s Sophistical Rhetoric in Classical Greece, Jeffrey Walker’s Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity, Ekaterina V. Haskins’s Logos and Power in Isocrates and Aristotle, Debra Hawhee’s Bodily Arts: Rhetoric and Athletics in Ancient Greece, and James Fredal’s Rhetorical Action in Ancient Greece: Persuasive Artistry from Solon to Demosthenes. All of these more recent scholars range widely in their topics and orientations, but all share similar traits: they all have broadened the range of evidence in order to make new insights to the mentalities creating rhetoric, to the context of the environments within which that rhetoric was produced, and to the cultural consequences of their historical interpretations. Once again, accounting for such evidence compels researchers to go beyond the drawing of philological inferences from the text alone, and necessitates inquiry into the epistemic presumptions that structure rhetorical discourse within its historical contexts. Such an orientation expands our range of evidence in a manner that complements textual analysis with an archaeological perspective that includes cognitive and physical elements into our history of classical rhetoric.

    The above discussion has presented concerns about syntactic change (the alteration and evolution of discourse) and philological change (the preservation of sound patterns). It is clear that earlier efforts have emphasized observation and limited study to an examination of performance. If the objective is to understand the idea of discourse, then emphasis should be placed on the generative competency for the discourse within its context. This understanding requires an examination of both the epistemic processes of rhetoric that formulate meaning and theories that account for the phenomenon of its performance in the context of its utterance (see Enos, Emerging). The position presented here argues for such a point and that methods of retrieval of such data must inevitably turn to archaeological rhetoric and, in that sense, reveal its legitimacy and necessity as a sensitive tool for the analysis of Hellenic discourse. Inherent in this approach to methodology is that all artifacts of the situation within which that discourse was produced constitute—directly or indirectly—evidence of the context for that discourse. Pottery, epigraphy, architectural remnants and even the physical topography of the site are all sources for providing a more sensitive awareness of the rhetorical situation. To be sure, traditional historiographical procedures that draw inferences strictly from textual analysis provide important contributions, but those contributions are limited. Traditional methodologies for research in the history of rhetoric should be viewed as a prologue or means to discover the fundamental processes for the conceptualization of Hellenic discourse. For a thorough understanding of Hellenic rhetoric, epistemic processes need to be considered, and we must recognize these processes both as rhetorical and also situational by providing theories that account for such notions, presumptions, and presuppositions as evidence that stands beside physical remains from the past. All such sources, when studied in synthesis, provide a richer interpretation of Hellenic discourse than textual analysis alone can hope to provide. This orientation is the basis for the research presented in this revised and expanded edition of Greek Rhetoric Before Aristotle.

    One of the most important observations readers should take from this work is that discussions and definitions of rhetoric should be explanatory but not restrictive. Recent work in cultural rhetoric confirms what is evident through this revised edition: efforts to express thoughts and sentiments are inherent in communities but manifested in a variety of ways. Despite the range of expression exhibited in Hellenic discourse, discursive practices share important features. In order to be effective, communication must become systematic in the sense that symbolic expression can be both understood and shared socially. Long before rhetoric was stabilized into a formal system of study in the Classical Period, nascent, pre-disciplinary rhetorics in ancient Greece emerged out of this dynamic, public activity. Despite their variety, all such modes of expression share in the intent of meeting needs specific to their respective communities. These manifestations of rhetoric take on many symbolic forms, some that are neither oral nor literate in the common sense of those terms, but nonetheless meaningful in their intent to communicate. If we understand this general but sensitive starting point we can better understand how Greek communities developed rhetorics necessary and desirable to their needs and preferences. A history of Greek rhetoric should be directed toward explaining these early, varied manifestations of rhetoric. This mission, however, presents daunting challenges to the researcher. As this work makes clear, we are in need not only of new primary evidence but also of methods of analysis. Many variations of these early Hellenic rhetorics grew out of oral communities and have been lost; others, whose remains have been discovered and whose histories have been recorded, have survived for study. The most notable of these communities is Athens, and our efforts in Greek rhetoric largely have been devoted to enriching our understanding of this dominant rhetoric community. At the same time, however, our efforts at rhetorical archaeology have sought to recover and thereby bring to light early, lost rhetorics. An understanding of these pre-disciplinary manifestations of rhetoric, in all of their varied forms, enriches both the history and the nature of classical rhetoric as a formalized discipline. From this perspective, this revised edition of Greek Rhetoric Before Aristotle is both (and at the same time) a pre-history or prelude to classical rhetoric, as conventionally known and understood as a formal discipline, as well as a critical part of the history of rhetoric.

    Preface

    Popular accounts assert that rhetoric emerged as a discipline in the fifth century BCE in Greece. The attention that rhetoric received from Plato and Aristotle, in addition to its malleable utility, assured its preservation for both the intellectually curious and the pragmatic. There is currently debate among historians of ancient rhetoric about the specific time that rhetoric was recognized as a discipline. Legend places that occurrence in Syracuse, Sicily and credits Corax and Tisias with its founding in 467 BCE; others argue that rhetoric emerged as a discipline at a much later date (see Schiappa, Portagoras). Attempting to pinpoint a precise moment in history muddles the more important goal of understanding the processes that led to the establishment of rhetoric.

    Rhetoric did not originate at a single moment in history. Rather, it was an evolving, developing consciousness about the relationship between thought and expression. This sensitivity about thinking, speaking and (later) writing happened in a variety of ways, at different times, and in a number of different areas of Greece. This awareness of the ancient Greeks resulted from what we now view as a variety of modes of expression and often because of factors that were not exclusively rational but frequently political, social and expedient. We do know that at some point ancient Greeks considered rhetoric to be a discipline, accepted it as a part of their education and—particularly in those cities that were governed by democracies—saw it as practical for the workings of their communities.

    Both criticism and praise of rhetoric as a discipline centers on the subject of invention. That is, rhetoric offers systematic methods for creating artful and articulate discourse in both spoken and written forms. Aristotle focused on the ability to create proofs; reasoned discourse could be articulated in an effort to resolve situations that required popular judgment of opinion. Yet the invention of discourse is not limited solely to the creation of rational proofs. The task of this book is to illustrate the various types of discourse that developed in Greece and the methods used to refine them. An examination of these various approaches should provide a more expanded—and representative—view of the notion of invention. Such an understanding should help to sharpen our perspective on Plato’s criticism of rhetoric, Aristotle’s characterization of what rhetoric is (and ought to be), the nature and impact of the Sophists, and the use of rhetoric in other genres.

    There is one other point that is particularly important to note before reading this book. Current accounts of rhetoric in ancient Greece typically ignore the introduction of written composition to rhetoric or treat it as an after-thought, occurring long after systems of oral communication were firmly established. While there is no argument that speech preceded writing, this volume will make it clear that systems of written expression were in operation and shaping discourse before rhetoric emerged as a popular discipline. Moreover, it will also become apparent that the composition of Homeric literature and the evolution of prose writing through logography (written speech) were integral events in the development of rhetoric. We will see that as rhetoric became specialized into discrete functions—such as historical, legal, political, and ceremonial expression—systems of logography correspondingly moved to specialized modes of writing. Rhetoric became established and popular as a discipline because of the Sophists of the fifth and fourth centuries BCE; their presentation of rhetoric included both oral and written composition. In short, this book will make it apparent to the reader that oral and written systems of composition were in operation long before rhetoric was recognized as a discipline, that they inextricably evolved to establish rhetoric, and that their persistent unity helped secure its popular reception and perpetuation. To study the history of Greek rhetoric without recognizing the inherent relationship of oral and written composition produces an incomplete and imprecise understanding of the forces that developed rhetoric into a discipline.

    Examining the confluence of the ideas and events that shaped rhetoric into a discipline is the purpose of this book. From this perspective, the Hellenic recognition of rhetoric as a discipline did not mark its beginning or origin but rather the consequence of a series of occurrences. The evolutionary process of rhetoric has frequently been discussed in broad terms, a generalized sweep of historic events preceding the emergence of rhetoric. Such an overview will happen indirectly, for major events and individuals will be discussed in order to provide a context for understanding topics under discussion. However, it is not the intent of this book to provide such a broad statement. If we are to have a sensitive understanding of the activities that foreshadowed rhetoric’s emergence, it is imperative that we examine discrete occurrences in detail—particularly since they had such a profound impact on the way in which ancient Greeks viewed discourse and its creation. These events established paradigms about the relationship between thought and expression that created attitudes toward discourse that the ancient Greeks eventually assimilated into systems. Some of these paradigms reveal nascent sensitivity to self-created eloquence. Others were shaped by the expediencies of the moment and still others by the influence of technologies such as writing. The rationality of rhetoric is the product of a number of these events, and presenting them in a coherent manner is the objective of this book. If this objective is attained, the reader should be able to begin the study of ancient rhetoric with a context that will promote a better understanding of rhetoric and its place in the societies of ancient Greece.

    The bibliography at the end of this volume incorporates a considerable amount of scholarship in the history of rhetoric, particularly over the last few decades. Much of the work about the classical period of rhetoric has sought to refine, elaborate and adjust views of rhetoric that were formed over the last century. This fine-tuning of ideas has come about by a closer reading of texts, such as Aristotle’s Rhetoric, as well as a more substantial integration of standard sources. Some of the most notable contributions have been in general histories of rhetoric, which have helped to produce and to foster this resurgence of interest, particularly in the classical period. A greater sensitivity to social and cultural issues has also refined our ideas about classical rhetoric. As we learn more about the world of ancient Greeks and their worldview, we can posit more perceptive interpretations about their rhetoric. Scholarship over the last century has helped to advance this understanding in a number of ways: our sophistication over philological issues has increased, our understanding of Hellenic culture has likewise deepened, and our notion of the history of rhetoric has been more coherent and thorough than the patchwork accounts of our Victorian forefathers.

    Yet, for all this scholarly advancement, there are still areas of need. Some of the more recent histories of rhetoric are not so much the result of newly discovered evidence but new perspectives for examining the same sources. While these perspectives are refreshing and often insightful, they do not in themselves provide new material for the study of ancient rhetoric. The attitudes about doing history also echo some of the predispositions of our forefathers. We tend—despite some re-orientations of characters and trends—to march through events in roughly the same fashion, forgetting that chronicles are not natural acts but only the perspectives of earlier historians that may or may not accurately reflect reality. Lastly, our work tends to start and finish at about the same time, and these parameters unconsciously set up boundaries that (by default) exclude other periods, topics, issues and individuals that do not fit the format.

    This volume seeks to resolve

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