Radical Apophasis: The Internal “Logic” of Plotinian and Dionysian Negation

By Todd Ohara and Cyril O'Regan

This book exhibits the richness and sophistication of Plotinian and Dionysian apophatic theologies by explicating their respective internal "logics." It articulates the unique metaphysical status and explanatory role that the One and God, respectively, play in Plotinus's and Dionysius's reflections, showing the way in which apophasis is generated and sustained by the metaphysical-explanatory lines of thought in which the One (Plotinus) and God (Dionysius) function as the ultimate, unconditioned source of everything else. In the context of explanation, negation serves to convey the incomparable reality of the One or of God as beyond being. However, the metaphysical and explanatory lines of thought are themselves situated within the broader context of the soul's ascent to mystical union with the One or with God. From this broader perspective, the discursive practice of negation constitutes the basis of preparing the soul for mystical union. Preparation for mystical union involves the cognitive and trans-cognitive practice of negation, which enables the soul to progress towards and become united with the One or God. This study is motivated by the desire to more deeply understand apophasis as deployed in different philosophical, theological, and religious contexts, including the work of contemporary thinkers such as Jean-Luc Marion.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Pickwick Publications
• Release date: Aug 17, 2020
• ISBN: 9781725264359

Todd Ohara

Todd Ohara is a freelance editorial proofreader. He has interests in Christian mysticism and mystical theology, Continental philosophy, modern theology, and Christian spirituality.

Book preview

Introduction

The primary task of this project is to exhibit and articulate the internal logic and deep structure of the apophases and negative theologies operative in the philosophical and theological reflections of two thinkers in late antiquity: Plotinus and Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite.¹ Having set forth the task in that way, I would like to state upfront that the approach this study takes is not primarily historical: I do not, for example, examine the social and/or cultural history surrounding either the texts or persons of Plotinus and Pseudo-Dionysius. Nor do I attempt to analyze Plotinian and Dionysian apophases primarily in terms of, say, the history of ideas: for example, the way(s) in which Plotinus’s conception of the One is related and indebted to Plato’s notion of the Good beyond being. Nor do I engage in a specifically philological examination of the texts and terms. Rather, the approach I intend to take is primarily systematic, conceptual, and excavatory in character, interrogating—by way of a deep reading of the texts themselves—the internal structure, logic, and rationale(s) that drive and underwrite apophasis in both Plotinus and Dionysius. To be sure, where germane to the analysis, I do in fact present relevant historical observations in order to help establish the proper interpretive and systematic context for understanding Plotinian and Dionysian apophatic theologies.

More specifically, I will exhibit the way in which apophasis is generated by and deployed because of the particular metaphysical and explanatory role that the One and God play in Plotinus’s and Dionysius’s respective philosophical and theological reflections.² In both cases, claims concerning the incomprehensibility and ineffability of the One or of God are, in turn, supported by lines of thought concluding to the peculiar metaphysical status of the One or of God as beyond being. Because being and knowledge are understood to be coextensive, that which is beyond being is, the reasoning goes, also beyond knowledge, speech, and discourse. Furthermore, understanding the metaphysical and explanatory lines of thought with respect to the One (Plotinus) and God (Dionysius) lays the necessary foundation for understanding Plotinian and Dionysian semantics where the One and God, respectively, are at issue. In turn, a basic understanding of Plotinian and Dionysian metaphysics and semantics enables the reader to better understand the content and function of negative statements concerning the One (Plotinus) and God (Dionysius).

It turns out, however, that in the cases of both Plotinus and Dionysius, the project of metaphysical explanation, while crucial as an end in itself, also serves the broader goal of preparing the soul for mystical union with the One (Plotinus) or with God (Dionysius). So while apophasis is initially deployed to emphasize the unique metaphysical status of the One or of God in the context of explanation, it is also employed as negative, cognitive and trans-cognitive strategies that prepare the soul for mystical union.³ Moreover, the metaphysical convictions that guide the practice of negation in the context of explanation—in view of the One’s (Plotinus) or God’s (Dionysius) reality and metaphysical status—also inform the practice of negation in the context of mystical union. An important, though unemphasized presupposition and conviction of the approach this study takes is that the structures, rationales, and internal logics of Plotinian and Dionysian apophatic theologies, as well as their richness and sophistication, are best exhibited by taking into account both the key, operative metaphysical conceptions and the broader context of the soul’s ascent toward mystical union.

While it may seem prima facie that this study of Plotinian and Dionysian apophases is motivated strictly by interests in the philosophy and theology of late antiquity, that is not in fact the case. Rather, this investigation is motivated by systematic interests in the distinctive nature, character, structure, function, and rationale of apophasis as deployed in different philosophical, theological and religious reflection(s). Indeed, one motive of the task of this project is to understand the deep background of what I take to be the relatively recent revival of interest in apophasis and negative theology, exemplified for example in the works of, and conversation between, Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion. It should be noted that the works of, and conversation between, Derrida and Marion have their beginnings, respectively, in the late 1960s (Derrida), and in the late 1970s/early 1980s (Marion). In his highly influential essay, Différance, Derrida distinguishes différance, for instance, from the most negative of negative theologies.⁴ In Marion’s case, his first two books—The Idol and Distance and God Without Being—contain analyses and deployments of apophatic strategies, influenced in large part by the theology of Pseudo-Dionysius.⁵

The conversation can be construed to begin with Marion’s text The Idol and Distance, in which Marion attempts to read Dionysius in a way that circumvents or eludes both the nihilism and conceptual atheism of the death of God philosophy as well as Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics as onto-theo-logical.⁶ The conversation can be understood to continue with Derrida’s essay, How to Avoid Speaking, in which Derrida not only (deconstructively) analyzes and evaluates Dionysian negative theology, but also indirectly presents that analysis and evaluation in response to Marion’s interpretation of Dionysius.⁷ At a conference at Villanova University in 1997, Derrida and Marion engaged in a public dialogue over several issues surrounding their respective work (as well as their conversation), one of which involved disagreement over the nature and status of negative theology and mystical theology in the texts of Pseudo-Dionysius.⁸ More recently, Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenological investigations into the nature of phenomenality and into what he identifies as saturated phenomena have led him to revisit the role and status of apophatic theology and mystical theology in the texts of Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite.⁹

This revival of interest in apophasis and negative theology exemplified in the work of Derrida and Marion—as well as in that of scholars engaging the constellation of issues engendered by their work—raises questions about its (i.e., apophatic/negative theology’s) historical background.¹⁰ If, as I believe it to be, the debate between Derrida and Marion is primarily, though not exclusively, rooted in the deeper question(s) of whether or not (and in what respects) Dionysian apophatic and mystical theology is finally susceptible to Heidegger’s critique that philosophy-qua-metaphysics is onto-theo-logically constituted (as well as being susceptible to the implications of that critique, such as, for example, the issue of presence vis-à-vis consciousness that Derrida emphasizes), then it would be extremely beneficial for anyone interested in these kinds of issues to examine again the texts of Pseudo-Dionysius in order to exhibit and articulate as explicitly as possible the character, structure, function, and rationale of the apophatic and mystical theology of Dionysius.

To state the benefit of reexamining the apophatic and mystical theology of Dionysius in that way is not to be committed to the position that its importance lies merely in the ways that it has been recently treated of or appropriated. One long-range goal of the present project is to determine whether and in what respects the type of apophatic and/or mystical moves made by certain contemporary thinkers is finally sustainable without the kinds of conceptual and explanatory machinery employed by figures such as Pseudo-Dionysius and Plotinus, particularly when those moves involve, for instance, a retrieval and appropriation of Dionysian apophatic and mystical theology.

Consider, for example, Jean-Luc Marion’s multi-faceted retrieval and appropriation of Dionysius’s apophatic and mystical theology. Consider, more broadly, Marion’s non-metaphysical interpretation of Dionysian theology in The Idol and Distance.¹¹ Part of Marion’s strategy is to read Dionysius’s texts in such a way that Dionysian theology does not fall prey to Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics as onto-theo-logically constituted.¹² Such an interpretation would presumably be the first step in retrieving and appropriating Dionysian theology for his (Marion’s) own contemporary project. Without close analysis, however, it is not immediately clear whether Marion’s non-metaphysical interpretation is ultimately sustainable without the conceptual, explanatory, and metaphysical machinery that I contend is fundamental to and constitutive of Dionysian theology (including Dionysian apophatic and mystical theology).

Consider, more specifically, Marion’s recent reflections on what he calls saturated phenomena. According to Marion, there is class of phenomena that does not operate under the antecedent, enabling conditions which have heretofore been identified as the basis for the appearance of phenomena: namely, saturated phenomena.¹³ What makes saturated phenomena unique is that there is an excess of intuition with respect to any corresponding concept (rather than either an adequation between an intuition and a corresponding concept, or a deficiency of intuition with respect to a corresponding concept). Marion formulates his conception of saturated phenomena by appealing to Kant’s schema: Kant identifies four ultimate types—namely, Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality—and uses them to derive his table of judgment, and thereby, the twelve categories or pure concepts of the understanding/Verstand.¹⁴ Marion argues that saturated phenomena are phenomenalized in such a way and at such a fundamental level—that of the four ultimate types rather than at the more derivative level of the concepts of the understanding—that the typical process of the constitution of knowledge is disrupted. What Marion emphasizes about this epistemic condition is that the incapacity to constitute knowledge on the part of the human, knowing subject is due to an excess, rather than deficiency, of intuition.

Marion initially classifies four kinds of saturated phenomena according to the respects in which he understands such phenomena to exceed normal phenomena governed by each of the four, Kantian ultimate types. However, he goes on to identify a fifth kind of saturated phenomenon, which instantiates a saturation of saturation, or a saturation in respect of all four ultimate types: formally considered, this is what Marion claims transpires in the case of divine revelation.¹⁵ Although Marion appropriates Dionysian apophatic and mystical theology in several ways, the one I wish to highlight momentarily is the way in which one aspect of mystical union with God seems to involve a cognitive and epistemic condition in which there is an absence of vision, due to an excess, rather than deficiency, of light.¹⁶ There is an obvious, structural isomorphism between Dionysius’s conception of the aspect of mystical union just cited and Marion’s conception of divine revelation understood as a saturated phenomenon. Might it be that Dionysius’s conception of mystical union is what clued Marion to conceptualizing divine revelation in terms of a saturated phenomenon?¹⁷ But what if Dionysius’s conception of mystical union in fact hinges upon prior metaphysical convictions and reflections on the divine nature, convictions that would apparently be implicated by Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics: for instance, the line of thought concluding to the view that God remains incomprehensible because God’s reality is excessively hyper-essential/hyper-ontological?¹⁸

Although the issues above remain beyond the scope of the present project, part of the larger question raised by this project is that of discerning the particular, defining structure, rationale(s) and internal logic that underwrite the family of claims that typically seem to be part and parcel of any given negative theology: God is ineffable, incomprehensible, and so forth. In this broader context, it seems fair to ask the following sorts of questions: How extreme can an apophasis and negative theology be without the kinds of metaphysical convictions that are operative in and constitutive of the respective reflections of Plotinus and Dionysius?¹⁹ Conversely, are there, for example, ineluctable limitations to the deployment of any post-Heideggerian (or otherwise) phenomenological methodology attempting to avoid ontotheology? If so, would—and how would—those limitations constrain the kind and degree of negative and apophatic claims offered on strictly phenomenological bases?

Consider the following example: If, as Marion and Dionysius both seem to believe, an encounter with God—whether by way of divine revelation or mystical union—results in a cognitive and epistemic condition analogous to blindness which disallows the constitution of knowledge, and if that cognitive and epistemic condition is supposed to be due to an excess of God’s reality (or intuitive givenness, to use a phenomenological term), rather than a deficiency of some kind, then how would one have any independent means to actually determine whether that cognitive and epistemic state is in fact the consequence of excess rather than lack? It is not immediately clear how Marion would have the means to answer this question, at least based on what he has presented thus far.²⁰ In Dionysius’s case, he would have recourse to the metaphysical and explanatory line of thought that concludes to the view that God’s reality is indeed excessively superabundant and hyper-essential/hyper-ontological.²¹

I believe that part of what makes the apophasis and negative theology of figures such as Plotinus and Pseudo-Dionysius so rich and sophisticated are the convictions and lines of thought that involve, entail, and/or constitute metaphysical explanation. Therefore, on the very broadest of levels, a key component of the task of the present project is to exhibit the way(s) in which such convictions and lines of thought contribute to the richness and sophistication of Plotinian and Dionysian apophases and negative theologies, inasmuch as they comprise an essential element of the structure, rationale and internal logic of those apophases and negative theologies. That is also to say, one of the aims of this study is to articulate and display, in the cases of both Plotinus and Pseudo-Dionysius, the integrity of the relationships between apophasis as deployed in metaphysical explanation and apophasis as deployed in the service of mystical union, and by implication, the integrity of the relationship(s) between metaphysical explanation and mystical union.

To be sure, the significance of the relationship between Plotinus and Dionysius—at least for the purposes of this project—lies in the systematic and conceptual connections between their respective apophases and negative theologies. On the one hand, to my knowledge, there is no explicit, direct historical evidence definitively supporting the view that Dionysius read either the Enneads or Porphyry’s biographical essay on the life of Plotinus.²² On the other hand, there is at least one metaphor that both Plotinus and Dionysius deploy as a conceptual model: both employ a sculpting metaphor in order to illustrate by analogy the practice of aphairesis—that is to say, the practice of denial understood, among other things, in terms of subtraction.²³ Historically speaking, the figure whose thought links Plotinus and Dionysius is Proclus, from whom Dionysius seems to appropriate several Neoplatonic conceptualities.

Why, then, go back to Plotinus? Well, again for the purposes of this project, there are several reasons. First, historically speaking, Plotinus can arguably be understood to be the first thinker who deploys apophasis in such a systematic, philosophically-nuanced, and relentless manner, and therefore is a key figure for any student hoping to understand and appreciate apophasis and negative theology. Second, like Dionysius, Plotinus employs apophasis and negative theology in two ways: more narrowly in the service of metaphysical explanation, and more broadly as a means of preparing the soul for mystical union. Third, Plotinus’s pagan Neoplatonic, apophasis and negative theology serve as a fascinating and fruitful point of contrast with that of Dionysius, who takes himself to be articulating a specifically Christian logos.

Finally, I would like to add a few, brief remarks about the fruit and contribution of the present study. First and perhaps foremost, I believe that the present analysis of the deep structure and internal logic of both Plotinian and Dionysian apophases and negative theologies will provide illuminating and probing ways of understanding and evaluating the kinds of, and ways in which, apophasis and negative theology are deployed in various philosophical, theological, and religious contexts, including those of modern and contemporary philosophy and theology, such as in the case of Jean-Luc Marion.

Second, the interpretations of Plotinus and Dionysius elucidated in this study submit fresh and freshly illuminating ways of understanding their respective apophases: for example, the kind of metaphysical reading propounded exhibits facets of the structure and internal logic of Plotinian and Dionysian apophasis that a consideration of each thinker’s epistemology and/or negative language alone would not accomplish.

Third, this book intends to fill the following gap in scholarship: there has been no sustained examination in the secondary literature comparing and contrasting the negative theologies of Plotinus and Pseudo-Dionysius, two important historical figures whose texts have been significant for various areas of research in philosophy, theology, and religion: e.g., classical conceptions of God in late antiquity and the middle ages, as well as more recent philosophers and/or theologians whose work may build on or distance themselves from Plotinus’s view of the One or Dionysius’s view of God. Given the varying conceptions of divine simplicity in Plotinus and Dionysius, as well as the distinctive senses of their uses of the language of negation and denial in light of those conceptions, the present study might be used to raise further questions, for instance, concerning the types of models of divine aseity and divine simplicity conceptualized by Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure, Meister Eckhart, and Nicholas of Cusa. Likewise, these metaphysical considerations may well have fascinating systematic consequences for understanding their respective conceptions of union with God, considered in via or in the eschaton.²⁴ Take as a momentary example, the thought of Meister Eckhart. While Eckhart was clearly influenced by Pseudo-Dionysius—and as a well-accepted commonplace, Proclus as well—there may be reasons to consider the view that in some important respects his apophasis bears a strong, systematic family resemblance to what I take to be Plotinus’s radical deployment of apophasis.

In addition, the interpretations of Plotinus and Pseudo-Dionysius presented might be utilized more broadly to shed further light upon the complex relations not only between non-Christian and Christian Neoplatonism in late antiquity, but also between late-antique Platonism and late patristic theology.

Fourth, the kind of metaphysical reading of Dionysius presented might be employed to apply a bit of critical pressure to those interpretations which take him to have thoroughly domesticated whatever Neoplatonic conceptualities he has appropriated, presumably in the service of Christian doctrine and praxis. This study shows how Dionysius’s adoption of certain Proclean conceptualities bear directly and forcefully upon his deployment of apophasis, and therein, upon his view of God and of the God–world relation.

Finally, the explication and conceptual analysis of the cognitive and trans-cognitive practices of negation and denial in Plotinus and Dionysius might profitably serve as the basis for other historical and/or contemporary research in the areas of mysticism and mystical theology, such as for example the epistemological and/or philosophical-/theological-anthropological implications of such practices. In addition, the present study may serve as a resource for contributions to discussions concerning the rapprochement between certain forms of mysticism/mystical theology and contemporary philosophy/theology.²⁵

Having addressed the basic motives of this study, the general approach it takes, as well as its potential contributions, we can proceed to layout the structure of the book. Broadly speaking, the book is divided into two parts. The first part consists of three chapters, and is an examination of Plotinus’s apophasis and negative theology as it relates to his understanding of the One. The second part consists of four chapters, and is an examination of Pseudo-Dionysius’s apophasis and negative/mystical theology as it relates to his understanding of God. In each case, I exhibit the richness and sophistication of Plotinus’s and Dionysius’s apophatic theology by articulating its deep structure and internal logic in two respects: first, those metaphysical and explanatory lines of thought which generate and sustain the requirement for negative statements concerning the One (Plotinus) or God (Dionysius); and second, the broader context in which negation functions in cognitive and trans-cognitive ways to prepare and enable the soul for an eventual union with the One or with God. However, while there are similarities between the apophases and negative theologies of Plotinus and Dionysius, the respective analyses do not consequently produce the same results.

In Plotinus’s case, I show why and how I judge Plotinian apophasis and negative theology to be perhaps the most extreme and radical of such practices. Correlative to the two respects identified above—metaphysical explanation and mystical union—there are two respects in which I characterize Plotinian apophasis and negative theology as radical and extreme. First, Plotinus’s convictions about the unusual metaphysical status of the One as absolutely simple and absolutely independent ultimately lead him to the following conclusion: the most appropriate way of understanding the One—which is to say, the way that acknowledges the peculiar and unique reality of the One—is to conceive of the One as utterly disconnected from and unrelated to everything else produced by it. In effect, Plotinus is asking his audience to sever the very relations that permit one to regressively reason back to the One so as to establish it as the unconditioned condition of all else. Second, with respect to mystical union, Plotinus argues that in order for the soul to prepare itself for union with the One, it must cease from all noetic activity, and, as Plotinus adamantly exhorts, Take away everything!²⁶

In Dionysius’s case, I begin by showing how the kinds of metaphysical intuitions, convictions, and lines of thought operative in Plotinus’s negative theology function to generate apophasis. Unlike Plotinus, who is explicitly working to present a philosophical account of reality, Dionysius’s stated theological task is to properly interpret the biblical symbols of God in light of God’s reality. On the supposition that Dionysius appropriates several Proclean, metaphysical and explanatory conceptualities, I show that there is good reason to conclude that the priority Dionysius ultimately gives to divine unity suggests that the persons of the Trinity are themselves derivative, divine differentiations that proceed from an undifferentiated divine ground. This implies therefore that there is not only an apophasis correlative to the God–world relation, but also perhaps another, yet deeper, more extreme apophasis correlative to, and required by, the relationship between the trinitarian persons and that undifferentiated divine ground. With regard to mystical union, I exhibit the way in which the ordered denial of aphairesis functions anagogically as a necessary but not sufficient condition preparing the soul for union with God.

In chapter 1, I establish a framework from within which to understand the demand for apophasis with respect to the One: the conceptual milieu of Plotinian apophasis. I propose that it is ultimately the unique metaphysical status of the One that leads Plotinus to make such radical negations. In order to understand how the demand for apophasis with respect to the One is initially generated, I present the basic structure of dependence in Plotinus’s view of reality, discussing two key metaphysical conceptualities: first, the notion of participation understood as non-reciprocal likeness and dependence; and second, a constituent ontology, according to which an entity is dependent upon and thus explained by its constituent parts. Given Plotinus’s explanatory framework and its demands, the conclusion is that only what is absolutely simple can be absolutely independent, so as to function explanatorily as that which ultimately accounts for everything else: The One. A further implication is that that which ultimately accounts for everything else—i.e., the One—will also be outside of or beyond being. In the next section, I explain that the need to say something about the One derives from the explanatory role that it must play as the source and ground of everything else. I conclude by suggesting that Plotinus’s statements concerning the One are context-sensitive and have more than one functional role to play in his thought.

In section 1.4, I pick up the theme of the concluding suggestion in the previous paragraph, sketching the ways in which the project of metaphysical explanation—as a subset of rational discourse about the One—serves the ultimate goal of the preparing the soul for union with the One. Presenting the broader context enables us to do two things. First, we see that Plotinus’s philosophical project of metaphysical explanation, while an end in itself, also serves the ultimate goal of mystical union. Second, we see the way in which Plotinus’s statements concerning the One can function with a view to explanation as well as with a view to motivating his audience to pursue union with the One. I conclude the first chapter by explaining why Plotinus believes that it is necessary for the soul to move beyond rational discourse, reasoned knowledge, and noetic awareness: for the soul to be involved in rational discourse, reasoned knowledge, and noetic awareness is for the soul to be in an epistemic and ontological condition of multiplicity. In order for the soul to become united to the One, it must transcend that condition of multiplicity, by becoming like unto the One—i.e., it must become more simple.

The bulk of chapter 2 is devoted to an analysis of various types of representative statements concerning the One. The aim of the analysis is not only to properly understand Plotinus’s statements about the One, but also to show the various ways in which Plotinus would have the reader understand his statements and hence his conception of the One in exclusively negative terms. In the first section, I examine the inherent limitations of discourse and knowledge with respect to the One. I examine in some detail a passage in which Plotinus suggests that even negative discourse is finally inadequate to representing the One: indeed, that the very structure of discourse itself disqualifies it from reflecting the simplicity of the One. Plotinus presents another kind of analysis, which exhibits the inherent limitations of knowledge with respect to the One. In section 2.2, I discuss the basic structure of Plotinus’s view of knowledge based on the eternal Forms, and the implications of that view where the One is at issue. Heuristically deploying the concepts of extension and intension, the basic purpose of the analysis is to show the epistemic and semantic consequences of that appropriation. I indicate a few of the problems raised by Plotinus’s adoption of the Platonic conceptuality of participation. I suggest that perhaps statements that appear to predicate some attribute of the One ought to be understood in terms of an identity statement in which the predicate functions like a name: for example, the One is the ultimate source and principle of the instantiated property fx. Even if this is the case, there remains the question of how one ought to understand the notions of principle and source.

I proceed in section 2.3 to examine the difficulties of naming the One, taking as representative cases, the designations Plotinus seems most often to use: the Good and the One. At issue, again, are the extension and intension of the name the Good. I offer the two following conclusions about the name the Good. First, by the Good, Plotinus would have his audience understand that the Good is the ultimate source and cause of goodness in entities. Second, as odd as it may appear at that point in the analysis, Plotinus believes that it is less appropriate to think and speak of the Good in ways which are relative to any of its products than to attempt to think and speak the Good itself. I conclude the explication of the name the Good by observing the way in which that name finally resolves into a negative expression with little or no content: that which neither needs nor depends on anything whatsoever. I bring section 2.3 to a close by examining the name the One, exhibiting in a perhaps more explicit manner the way in which that name ultimately resolves into a negation: namely, a negation of complexity and/or multiplicity.

I take the opportunity in section 2.4 to step back a bit, and examine somewhat schematically Plotinus’s apophatic strategies in the context of explanation: apophasis or negation/denial; aphairesis or subtraction/abstraction; locutions featuring the term "hyper; locutions featuring the term epekeina"; and silence. This discussion serves to introduce to the reader two key strategies that are necessary to help understand what makes Plotinian apophasis so extreme (the content of chapter 3): practices of apophasis and aphairesis. In sections 2.5 and 2.6, I address a couple of questions surrounding the family of statements that have sometimes been construed to function apophatically through the use of paradox. Although Plotinus does make statements that have the grammatical form the One is P and not P—and therefore may prima facie have the appearance of paradox—I contend that such statements are more accurately rendered by recourse to his metaphysical convictions. Section 2.6 presents reasons in support of the view that Plotinus’s conception of the simplicity of the One ought not to be understood in terms of eminence or virtuality.

In sections 3.1 and 3.2 of chapter 3, we reach what I believe to be the heart of Plotinian negative theology. Here I argue that what finally makes Plotinian apophasis with respect to the One so radical and extreme is Plotinus’s conviction concerning the absolute independence of the One. Although the One is in fact the origin of all things, there is a sense in which it is not their origin. Part of the task of the analysis of Plotinus’s discussion of the free will of the One is to show that his emphasis on the absolute independence of the One implies that the One does not have to produce anything at all; second, the One is completely unrelated to anything, because it is what it is before them.²⁷ In section 3.2, I discuss Plotinus’s rationales for conceptualizing the One as solitary and utterly unrelated to anything. From the perspective of explanation, the absolutely simple, independent, and unique reality of the One is such as to demand conceptualizing it as alone and unrelated to anything else. Only in this way, Plotinus believes, can one truly recognize, acknowledge, and appreciate the incomparable reality of the One. It turns out, however, that anything one can think or say at all pertains to what is posterior to the One. This is why Plotinus emphasizes the need to take away everything! This raises two questions: If what Plotinus says here is the case, then what do our thoughts and words refer to when we speak or think about the One? What does conceptualization of the One amount to, if we take away everything?

In section 3.3, I respond to the first question by examining the way that Plotinus takes mystical union to authorize speech concerning the One. I frame the discussion by roughly and heuristically deploying two philosophical conceptualities: first, the distinction between discourse de dicto and discourse de re; second, Bertrand Russell’s distinction between knowledge by description and knowledge by acquaintance. The conclusion I claim Plotinus would have us draw is this: mystical acquaintance with the One is what allows one to speak de re about the One. In section 3.4, I examine the cognitive and trans-cognitive functions of negation in preparing the soul for union with the One. I propose that the injunction to take away everything functions to transpose the soul from the order of discourse to that of noetic, intellectual, contemplation at the level of Nous, and finally to that of union with the One. What is finally required is the cessation of noetic activity on the part of the soul, by taking away everything and negating negation. But is it consistent to advocate a negation of negation, since it looks like doing so involves the kind of noetic activity that needs to cease in order for union to occur? I identify a passage supporting the view that taking away everything and negating the negation ultimately does not involve another noetic act. Rather, taking away everything and negating negation at this level takes the form of letting go of everything. In section 3.5, I close chapter 3, and Part One, by offering a few concluding remarks on Plotinian apophasis.

Because apophasis is best and more concretely understood as an essential component of Dionysian theological practice, I begin by sketching Dionysius’s understanding of the nature, function, and practice of theology in section 4.1 of chapter 4. I explicate what Dionysius calls the dual aspects of theology: the exoteric, philosophical dimension; and the esoteric, mystagogical dimension. Although Dionysius views both dimensions as necessary components of a theology that involves anagogy—i.e., the uplifting of the soul towards God—it is the ultimate task of mystagogy to enact union with God by situating the soul in the presence of God. I explicate the kinds of views that Dionysius opposes. This brings out the importance Dionysius attaches to an accurate understanding of God’s reality as beyond being, his contention that people who hold such views are unfit and unprepared for mystagogical initiation, and his conviction that outside assistance is necessary not only throughout the process of mystagogy, but especially at its culmination: union with God. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 present the way in which the rationales and roles of negation are contextualized by theological practice understood in terms of symbology and anagogy. Symbology is the discursive practice of properly employing, interpreting, and understanding the symbols of God for the sake of the soul’s being uplifted to union with God. The practice of properly rendering biblical symbols of God also functions doxologically as a way of praising God. Dionysius’s understanding of God’s reality as beyond being requires the use of negation with respect to interpretation and doxology. I also describe theological practice as anagogy with a view to union with God: negation enables the soul to cease from transacting with beings, dis-orienting it away from beings, and re-orienting it towards God.

Chapter 5 deals with two, important preparatory issues: the isomorphism between Dionysius’s texts and metaphysics; and the question of Proclus’s influence on Dionysius. Section 5.1 clarifies Dionysius’s understanding of a biblical symbol. The conclusion Dionysius would have us draw is that using a created entity to symbolize something about God requires both the user and the interpreter to acknowledge that all such entities are related to God as their source and cause. For Dionysius, symbology has a kind of negative or apophatic function, insofar as symbols can both reveal and conceal. I show how the metaphysical dynamic and hierarchical structure of all reality are mirrored in Dionysius’s texts: The Theological Representations; The Divine Names; The Symbolic Theology; and The Mystical Theology.²⁸ According to Dionysius, the first three texts can be taken as one extended argument of affirmative theology that explicates the various biblical names, symbols, concepts, and attributes of God. The argument of The Mystical Theology reflects the way(s) in which all created things return to God. Because the soul is moving towards the transcendent God, the relatively increasing proximity to God implies the increasing inadequacy of language and concepts. For human souls desiring union with God, the return to God involves a corresponding reversal of the affirmations previously made, by means of negation and denial. The implication is that God’s reality as beyond being governs in specific ways the role of negation with respect to both properly interpreting symbols of God and the soul’s anagogical ascent.

Section 5.2 addresses the crucial hermeneutical question of Proclus’s influence on Pseudo-Dionysius. I acknowledge Proclus’s influence on Dionysius, even as I also acknowledge the difficulties of determining the precise nature, location, and degree of that influence. The approach I take is to work more concretely from the ways in which Dionysius actually uses the conceptualities he adopts from Proclus. Because of some of the ramifications of Dionysius’s appropriation of certain Proclean conceptualities, however, I offer a few, relevant remarks on Proclus’s understanding of the triad remaining/procession/reversion in the Appendix, taking statements in The Elements of Theology as representative of his view.

Chapter 6 examines negation in the context of explicating the names of God, focusing on The Divine Names. In section 6.1, I begin by acknowledging the seeming aporia of explicating the names of God in light of God’s transcendent reality. The question is: what is it about God that not only allows us to speak about God, but also requires such speech to be qualified by means of negation? Section 6.2 develops Dionysius’s response to this question, by examining divine causation as the basis on which God is initially understood. Taking the conceptual name Beauty as an example, I show that God is named Beauty because God is the ultimate cause of the constituent property of beauty in some particular entity. In effect, Dionysius holds a view of participation much like that of Proclus, in