The Forts & Fortifications of Europe 1815-1945: The Central States: Germany, Austria-Hungry and Czechoslovakia

By J. E. Kaufmann and H. W. Kaufmann

“Extremely well written and presented and gives you every scrap of information you’ll ever need on cupolas, embrasures and cloches.”—War History Online
 
After the Napoleonic Wars, the borders of Central Europe were redrawn and relative peace endured across the region, but the volatile politics of the late nineteenth century generated an atmosphere of fear and distrust, and it gave rise to a new era of fortress building, and this is the subject of this highly illustrated new study. The authors describe how defensive lines and structures on a massive scale were constructed along national frontiers to deter aggression. The Germans, Austro-Hungarians and Czechs all embarked on ambitious building programs. Artillery positions, barbed-wire networks, casemates, concrete bunkers, trench lines, observation posts all sprang up in a vain attempt to keep the peace and to delay the invader. The strategic thinking that gave rise to these defensive schemes is described in detail in this study, as is the planning, design and construction of the lines themselves. Their operational history in wartime, in particular during the Second World War, is a key element of the account.
 
“A useful introduction for those wishing to develop a knowledge of fortifications and their impact on the conduct of war.”—Firetrench
 
“The maps and plans, especially the plans, are numerous and extremely helpful. They show the arrangement of fortifications in a way that simple text would have found impossible. For those with an interest in European land fortifications of the 19th and 20th centuries, this book is an excellent general survey.”—The Coast Defense Journal

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Jul 2, 2014
• ISBN: 9781473838550

Book preview

To Willy, Junior, Alphie, Bubbles, Stella,

Leo, Jerry, and Callie

First published in Great Britain in 2014 by

Pen & Sword Military

an imprint of

Pen & Sword Books Ltd

47 Church Street

Barnsley

South Yorkshire

S70 2AS

Copyright © J.E. Kaufmann and H.W. Kaufmann 2014

ISBN 978 1 84884 806 1

eISBN 9781473838550

The right of J.E. Kaufmann and H.W. Kaufmann to be identified as the Authors of this Work has been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

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Contents

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the following people for their assistance in this project: Jens Andersen* – curator at the Hanstholm Museum (documents and archival illustrations), Libor Boleslav (data on Czech fortifications), Clayton Donnell (photos of German fortifications), Dale Floyd (various articles), Bernard Bour (information and photos of Feste Kaiser Wilhelm II), Alain Chazette (documents on German fortifications), Martyn Gregg (photos German forts), Tom Idzikowski* (information on the Austrian fortifications), Alex Jankovic-Potocnik* (information and photos and drawings of Yugoslav and Italian fortifications), Patrice Lang (photos of German fortifications), Bernard Lowry (photos of Czech fortifications from the Czech Museum in Prague), Bernard Paich (his fortification drawings and photos), Hans Rudolf Neumann (material and photos of German fortifications), Taras Pinyazhko (Austrian fortifications), Rudi Rolf* (data on German and Austrian fortifications), Neil Short (photos of German fortifications), Geoff Snowden (photos), Kurt Stigaard (photos and data), Lee Unterborn (Internet research and reference books), and Terrance Zuber (information on Schlieffen plan and the role of fortifications in German planning). Also, other members of Site O https://sites.google.com/site/siteointernational/ who helped locate and provide information. We hope we have not overlooked anyone.

Martin Rupp provided valuable assistance in translating German wartime terms. Additional help in translating some German wartime material came from Jens Andersen, Hans-Rudolf Neumann, and Rudi Rolf.

Note on Illustrations

Photos are credited to the individual source. Most wartime photos come from German wartime documents and have been modified for reproduction. Drawings and maps not by the authors either come from non-copyrighted material, most of which has been modified and includes changes and additions by the authors, or are from sources noted on them or in the caption.

Note to Reader

Due to the scope of the subject of this book, it is impossible to include sufficient illustrative material in a book of this size. We advise the reader to refer to additional maps, from an atlas or on the Internet, to identify many of the locations mentioned that could not be included on the few maps in this book. In addition, for further information and plans of German bunkers of the Second World War see our books: The Atlantic Wall: History and Guide (Pen & Sword, 2011) and Fortress Third Reich (Da Capo, 2003). In addition, a few Internet sites are referenced, but these often change address or shut down, so we recommend using an Internet search engine to find supplementary information and illustrative material.

* Those whom the authors relied upon for much information not presently available in books or other sources.

Glossary of Terms

Two drawings from Colonel Fiebeger’s book Permanent Fortifications (West Point, NY, US Military Academy Press, 1916) showing parts of fortifications using a Belgian fort of the 1860s as an example.

Drawing from an old Sandhurst textbook showing the parts of a typical German fort of the 1870s.

Mougin plan for an armoured fort and turrets used at the Bucharest Competition of 1886.

A Grüson armoured battery and turret made of chilled iron.

Various types of Grüson and Schumann turrets.

Various types of fortress weapons from Colonel Fieberger’s book Permanent Fortifications (1916, West Point, NY, US Military Academy Press).

Chapter 1

Introduction

The Central Position

Before the outbreak of the First World War, the Triple Alliance held sway in Central Europe from the North Sea/Baltic coast to the Adriatic with the Italian Peninsula serving as a major divider in the Mediterranean region. The geographical position occupied by the ‘Central Powers’ (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy) offered advantages as well as disadvantages. The central position favoured leaders engaged in wars of conquest based on a policy of ‘divide and conquer’, especially during the 1930s. However, the main drawback of this same position was it presented two major ‘fronts’ that required these nations to split their military resources. A quick examination of the situation before August 1914 highlights these problems.

Germany faced its traditional Slavic nemesis – Russia – in the East and its Latin rival – France – in the West. When these two nations formed an alliance at the beginning of the century, the Kaiser’s Imperial Army had to prepare for a war on two fronts. The late eighteenth-century partitions of Poland had removed a major buffer between Germany and Russia.

Austria-Hungary’s problem was not as thorny as its German ally’s was because it had mostly mountainous, easier to defend borders. On the other hand, Austria had to contend with a large and diverse non-Germanic population that included Magyars, Slavs (Czechs, Slovenes, and Poles in the north and Slovenes, Croatians, and Bosnians in the south), and Italians. Internal upheavals beginning with the revolutions of 1848 in the nineteenth century had led to the creation of the Dual Monarchy in 1867 giving Hungary its own government and King – in the person of the Austrian Emperor – and an equal status with Austria. The main threat was from Russia in the East as the Turks began to lose their grip on the Balkans, especially in the 1870s. The Russians and Austrians had wrested control of the Balkans from the Turks during the latter half of the nineteenth century and Austria-Hungary had virtually taken over Bosnia-Herzegovina provoking the Serbians’ ire. Thus, before the First World War the empire had to prepare for a second front facing Serbia while the position of Rumania remained unclear. The possibility of a third front on the Italian frontier was theoretically eliminated with the Triple Alliance. The problem for Austria was not so much the two major fronts facing their two Slavic enemies – Russia and Serbia – but the terrain that inhibited the rapid movement of large armies between these adjacent fronts. The Danube Basin offered good lines of communication within the empire, but the mountain ranges that formed much of its border from the Carpathians to the Italian border were extensive and had few railroads and good roads. In addition, in some areas, such as occupied Polish and Italian territories, its borders lay beyond these mountains. Germany, on the other hand, had excellent transportation systems unhindered by geography that allowed it to move troops from one front to the other, but the distances were greater and its two fronts were widely separated.

Finally, Italy, which had a relatively small land frontier and a long coastline, was in an excellent position for defence but not for offence. Like Germany, it had emerged as a nation in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The nationalist urge for unification fuelled the Italian government’s interest in annexing territories with large Italian populations like French-controlled Savoy, the coastal area around Nice, as well as Austrian-controlled lands in the Alps and the coastal areas around Trieste. The Triple Alliance theoretically focused Italy’s attention on France despite the formidable Alpine barrier, and created a single land front. The Italian Peninsula served as an effective barrier between France and the Balkans. Like Germany, Italy had few colonies in Africa. Thanks to its possession of Sicily and Libya, it stood to control the Mediterranean and put a spoke in France’s efforts to support Serbia. Thus, only the two Germanic members of the Triple Alliance had to consider the possibility of a two-front war.

When war eventually came, Italy changed sides, leaving Austria-Hungary with a three-front war. The addition of the Turkish Ottoman Empire to the Triple Alliance partially counter-balanced Italy’s defection, but it did not alleviate the problem of a multi-front war for the two Germanic nations. In addition, the Turks themselves faced a four-front war in the Balkans, the Levant, the Caucasus, and Mesopotamia.

A multi-front war was not a new phenomenon, but in the twentieth century, it presented a new conundrum. Land warfare had changed drastically since 1870 and the character of armies and their use had altered. During the Middle Ages, European armies had been rather small and impermanent. When they formed, normally at the command of a member of the nobility, they existed for weeks or even months but seldom for years. Generally, they moved from one point to another living off the land, requiring little more than forage to meet the needs of both men and animals. The only obstacles in the path of these armies were defended positions often including wood and stone fortifications (castles, fortified towns, etc.) that dotted the European landscape. If they could not bypass such a position, medieval armies had to reduce it. Long sieges could and often did lead to the disbanding of an army. The death or capture of an army’s leader in battle could lead to an even quicker dissolution. A few battles or sieges could quickly end a war. Towards the end of the Middle Ages, with the appearance of cannon and the emergence of nation states, feudal obligations began to dissolve. These technical and social advances increased the vulnerability of fortifications and magnified the logistical problems armies faced, often limiting how far they could advance by bypassing obstacles and fortified sites. By this time, armies were less likely to fall apart at the loss of a leader and ‘regular armies’ inspired by nationalism began to emerge. The numerous fortifications from previous periods remained throughout Europe and many were updated. In addition, ‘modern’ forts that could deal with gunpowder artillery were built. Armies also increased in size, but mostly continued to forage when they were on the move. In the nineteenth century, during the Napoleonic era, new and large national armies requiring greater logistical support continued to move as they had done in the past, bypassing obstacles when possible.

Since the Medieval era, the objectives of an army had been to capture a location, destroy an enemy army, or both. Often, with numerous routes of advance available, a commander must eliminate any defended site in his path, which, as Ian V. Hogg pointed out, was much like a game of chess. Battlefields – whether they involved sieges or confrontations in open terrain – were relatively small so that commanders were able to observe most of the battleground often from a single position. This was still true at Borodino, a major battle of Napoleon’s Russian campaign in 1812, as well as at the battle of Waterloo in 1815. The only departure from the past was that Napoleon’s campaigns were not marked by great sieges. Instead, he opted for decisive battles, avoiding expending his forces in costly sieges. Even though armies that took the field in the nineteenth century were more extensive than in the past, they still concentrated on relatively small battlefields compared to the next century. As in previous centuries, a few battles could end a campaign or war.

The situation began to change in the mid-nineteenth century, particularly during the last year of the American Civil War. The armies that took part in this war were relative modern. They were equipped with modern artillery, used railroads for rapid movement, included new methods of communication, and had sophisticated logistical support that considerably reduced their dependence on foraging. Between 1861 and the summer of 1864, as the Union Army tried to take Richmond, the ability of large armies to move freely through enemy territory decreased. A series of forts and trenches forming an almost continuous line was built from Richmond to Petersburg. The engagement dragged out and did not become another Antietam or Gettysburg fought on a rather small battlefield lasting a few days. The battlefront stretched for about 40 to 50 miles and the lines held from the summer of 1864 to the spring of 1865.

The Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871 saw even better equipped armies. Both sides in this war fought along the traditional invasion routes between France and the German states. Their armies, numbering well over a quarter of a million each, deployed along a front of over a hundred miles. By comparison, during the Richmond/Petersburg Campaign the combined armies of both sides totalled less than ¼ million. After a few initial defeats, the French Army of the Rhine, which covered a wide front, was split. Instead of retreating and maintaining a continuous front, part of the army concentrated around the fortress of Metz. The other part withdrew to the west, formed the Army of Chalons, and tried to relieve the force at Metz. Both were surrounded – the Army of Chalons at Sedan – and forced to surrender. The next time massive modern armies formed, the strategy had changed drastically.

The end of the Franco-Prussian War brought a dramatic change in military strategy and tactics. The combination of new weapons – and some not so new – and massive armies, now with a more advanced recruitment, training, and support systems, meant that armies could no longer roam enemy territory freely looking for battle. One of the most fundamental changes was that a nation had to prepare to defend its entire land border. In the case of the Franco-Prussian War, the French did not attempt to hold their border. Instead, their troops concentrated on a few large engagements while most of the front was held by a number of weak isolated positions. The solution was to fortify the frontier, a stratagem used for over 2 millennia. However, in the past, frontier regions were dotted with forts or castles and fortified cities, which may have appeared to form a line. In some cases, such as the Roman Limes, they were even called a line, but no one expected them to be impenetrable. An enemy could usually pass through these lines and even overrun a few positions. Often the campaign could evolve into a single siege for one of these positions. The Franco-Prussian War demonstrated that if the defender concentrated his forces on one or two positions, his modern army could not survive for long. Few countries had the luxury of a vast territory where they could afford to trade space for time allowing them to pull back if they could not hold the frontier.

After 1871, the French started building a ‘Barrière de Fer’ under the direction of General Raymond Adolphe Séré de Rivières. Following up on the ideas of Sebastian Vauban over a century before for securing the frontier with forts, the general created a system of forts stretching from Dunkirk to Nice. The objective was for the forts, which sometimes created fortress rings around key cities, to make it impossible for an enemy to bypass them. Field armies would hold the gaps between the fortified areas. The enemy would be unable to avoid the forts without a fight. In addition, modern weapons would prevent either side from concentrating huge forces on a small battlefield. The belligerents would no longer be able to draw the majority of their forces together to fight battles like Waterloo, Gettysburg, or Sadowa. The continuous front became the standard after 1871. If it was broken, it could mean defeat.

France is ideally situated in Europe. The Mediterranean, Atlantic, and North Sea coasts cover much of its natural borders. The Pyrenees form a land barrier with Spain and are relatively easy to defend, especially in the late nineteenth century when Spain was not considered a serious threat. The Alps present a formidable obstacle on the borders with Italy and Switzerland. Since Italy had territorial claims on land it had ceded to France earlier in the century, this front was well defended at the key mountain passes, which were already protected by many older fortifications. Although Belgium was neutral, the border area continued to receive fortifications albeit on a smaller scale than along the Franco-German frontier where the main defences were built. Alsace-Lorraine had been a battleground between the French and Germanic people for centuries. When most of that region fell into German hands after 1871, the French heavily defended their new border expecting to fight the next war there. They concentrated their main efforts on their northeast front with Germany.

Russia’s situation was different yet similar in