Cavalier Generals: King Charles I & His Commanders in the English Civil War 1642-46

By John Barratt

Previous studies of the Royalist high command have concentrated largely upon a handful of notable individuals such as King Charles himself and Prince Rupert. In this ground-breaking study, John Barratt re-examines these key figures, but he also explores the careers and characters of some of the lesser-known, but equally able Royalist officers. These men played decisive roles in the war, but hitherto they have received little attention.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Sep 30, 2004
• ISBN: 9781473813038

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Cavalier Generals

Cavalier Generals

King Charles I and His Commanders in the

English Civil War 1642–46

John Barratt

Pen & Sword

MILITARY

First published in Great Britain in 2004 by

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Copyright ©John Barratt, 2004

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Contents

Preface

PERHAPS inevitably, the victors in Britain’s Civil Wars of 1638–1651 have received much greater attention than their defeated opponents. While there have been a number of studies of such luminaries of the Parliamentarian cause as Oliver Cromwell and Sir Thomas Fairfax, Sir William Waller, and Sir William Brereton, the Royalists, with the inevitable exceptions of Charles I, Prince Rupert and Montrose, have been less well served.

This book looks at the careers, personalities and battles of a dozen Royalist commanders during the First Civil War of 1642–46. It attempts to assess their performance and their impact on the Royalist cause, and examines in more detail a key battle of their career.

My selection, while including most of the major commanders and some who are undeservedly less well known, is inevitably a personal one, and I am conscious of the ghosts of omitted Cavaliers such as ‘Blind Harry’ Hastings, Sir William Vaughan – ‘the Devil of Shrawardine’ – and the fearsome Charles Gerard peering angrily over my shoulder. I hope that one day they too will find their chronicler.

Any researcher into seventeenth-century history will be both amused and irritated by the many vagaries of spelling and punctuation in use at the time. For the sake of ease and consistency here, I have, in all but one example, which deserved quoting in its original form, put the words of my commanders and their contemporaries into modern English.

Thanks are due to a large number of individuals and institutions for their unfailing help and advice. The staff of the Sydney Jones Library, University of Liverpool, the British Library and the Bodleian Library, Oxford, have, as ever, been highly efficient in coping with my demands. Rupert Harding and the team at Pen and Sword have helped with ideas and encouragement in putting this book together, while Derek Stone has produced maps to his usual high standard.

Over the years, many researchers into the English Civil War have provided invaluable information and assistance. Among them are Ivor Carr, John Lewis, Les Prince, Stuart Reid, Keith Roberts, Dave Ryan, John Tincey and Alan Turton. Some of their research and discoveries may be found in this book: the inevitable mistakes and omissions are mine.

John Barratt

June 2004   

Chronology

Chapter One

All the King’s Generals

ENGLAND in the mid-seventeenth century was a hierarchical society, and though the outbreak of civil war in the summer of 1642 divided influential sections of society between king and Parliament, the great majority on both sides had no desire to overturn the nation’s basic fabric.

This innate conservatism was reflected in the initial choice of commanders for the opposing armies. Both Royalists and Parliamentarians preferred, unless unavoidable, to appoint generals drawn from the ‘natural’ ruling class of aristocrats and gentry. During the first year of the war, of six Royalist regional commanders, five were leading magnates of the areas concerned, and the sixth, Lord Capel, came from the same background, and was appointed to command on the Welsh Border because of the lack of any suitable local figure.

The Parliamentarians, to only a slightly lesser extent, followed the same policy. However, by the end of 1643 both sides were coming to recognize that the nobly-born commanders had largely failed in their task. Of the Royalists, only the Marquis of Newcastle, in the north of England, retained his old command. By force of circumstance, rather than through choice, king and Parliament recognized the need to give greater responsibility to less nobly-born men who had practical experience of warfare or had proved their ability since the outbreak of fighting.

A popular misconception is that the armies of the English Civil War consisted almost entirely of amateurs who learnt the art of warfare by hard experience as they went along. This is a major over-statement. Although there was no standing army in Britain, the religious wars which had been in progress on the Continent throughout the period had attracted thousands of men from the British Isles, mainly, though not entirely, fighting for the Protestant cause. For many young English gentlemen, a few years’ service with the long-established English Brigade in the Netherlands was seen as a normal part of their education.

For many others, particularly younger sons with no prospect of inheriting the family estates, the life of a soldier became a full-time career. Hundreds of Englishmen, and even greater numbers of Scots followed this course, serving with most of the major European armies. On the outbreak of Civil War many of these, either scenting profitable employment or through personal conviction, returned home and enlisted with king or Parliament.

The result was that most regiments raised in the opening months of the war contained at least a sprinkling of officers with previous military experience of some kind. While most of the rank-and-file may have had no more than some form of training with their local Trained Band, there were enough veterans available to fairly rapidly inculcate them with military basics.

However in 1642, on the Royalist side, only the king’s principal field force – known to historians as the ‘Oxford Army’ – had professional soldiers in most of its key positions. None of the regional commanders, with the partial exception of the Earl of Newcastle, had any previous experience, and this would be amply demonstrated by their inadequate performance during the first year of war. By the end of 1643 a process had begun by which men from slightly humbler backgrounds, but with greater military experience and proven ability, began to assume more senior commands. The trend was paralleled in the Parliamentarian armies, and ultimately, with the formation of the New Model Army in 1645, carried further than in the Royalist forces.

The majority of the king’s most able generals were men with military experience prior to the war. Of the thirteen individuals discussed here, only King Charles and Newcastle were relative military innocents on the outbreak of war. Of the rest, Princes Rupert and Maurice, Sir Richard Grenville, George Goring, Jacob Astley, Henry Wilmot and the Earl of Forth were effectively professional soldiers. John Byron, Ralph Hopton and Montrose had more limited, but significant, previous experience. This pattern was echoed among the rest of the king’s senior commanders.

The reasons for their appointments varied. Although they had some European service behind them, Prince Rupert and Maurice owed their rapid rise initially to their royal birth, and both were arguably eventually promoted too far. Men like Newcastle, Byron, Montrose and Hopton were important more for their regional and local influence than for their previous military experience, though that was an added advantage. Forth, Goring, Wilmot and Astley were professional soldiers appointed for their expertise and experience. Sir Richard Grenville, ever the exception, was a thoroughgoing professional soldier who also had huge influence in his native Cornwall.

It is worth spending a little time in examining the role of a seventeenth-century general. Few specialized in the modern sense. Though each might have individual talents – Rupert, Maurice, Goring, Wilmot and Byron as cavalry commanders, Astley in leading foot – a Civil War army commander was expected to fulfill a variety of responsibilities. In theory, all of the Royalist generals came under the ultimate command of King Charles I as Captain General. In practice, because of the slowness and uncertainty of communications between Oxford (Royalist capital for most of the war) and the more distant regions under Royalist control, most commanders enjoyed a great deal of independence. Newcastle in the north was indeed recognized as having authority virtually equal to that of the king. While Charles and his Council of War might issue general strategic directives or wishes, they could have little control over frequently fast-moving operational matters. Given this, and the defects of Charles’s own personality, it was easy for an independently-minded general like Goring or Grenville to operate largely to his own agenda. Even in the north Newcastle had little direct control over some of his more distant commanders, such as the Earl of Derby in Lancashire and ‘Blind Harry’ Hastings, Lord Loughborough, in the Midlands.

It was normal practice, before a general took any major decisions, for him to consult a Council of War made up of the senior officers in his command. Yet there was no onus on a general to follow the advice given to him. Prince Rupert, for example, often ignored or overrode the suggestions of his subordinates, with disastrous results at Marston Moor, and perhaps Naseby. The king’s own Council of War was frequently so riddled with dissent as to be ineffective.

This degree of independence was a major test of a commander. Some, like Rupert, were not in any case ‘team players’ and flourished best when operating away from the king’s direct control. Others, such as Prince Maurice, and to a lesser extent, Ralph Hopton and John Byron, faltered when given near-absolute authority. Some among our subjects, principally Goring and Grenville, exploited such situations for their own benefit.

Few generals had all-round ability. Rupert, Wilmot and Maurice were primarily cavalry commanders. Rupert had some success in army command, and was a notable strategist, but Maurice fared badly in higher command. Byron proved to possess the qualities required in a successful cavalry commander and governor of a besieged town, but was less suited to lead a field army. Goring was one of the outstanding cavalry leaders of the war, but a disastrous army commander. King Charles proved, apart from a brief interval in 1644, unsuited for the role of Captain General, and has a major responsibility for the Royalist defeat.

Of our generals, perhaps Astley and Montrose fared best. Astley displayed all-round competence in most roles he was asked to fill, while Montrose, though not without significant weaknesses, proved a generally capable independent commander in a testing situation.

As well as leading their troops in the field, Civil War generals were frequently expected to run the military administration of the areas under their command. This involved them in the delicate task of maintaining good relations with civilian authorities and populations. The Royalists, with less territory under their undisputed control than their opponents had, found this increasingly difficult as the war went on. In the short term, some of our generals, notably Rupert, Astley, Newcastle and Hopton, had qualified success in this role, though eventually their demands grew too great for the limited resources available. Others, like Byron, were usually on uneasy terms with the civilians who came under their control. Goring and Grenville, among our examples, had the usual disregard of professional soldiers for civilians, and placed the well-being of their troops above all else. Montrose regularly ravaged actual or potentially hostile territory, partly in an attempt to ensure its inhabitants’ obedience and partly, lacking a secure base, as the only way in which he could maintain his soldiers.

Civil War armies, and consequently the battles in which they were engaged, were generally smaller than contemporary Continental examples. Only a handful of engagements of the First Civil War – Marston Moor, Edgehill, the two Newburys and perhaps Naseby, approached the scale of some of the battles of the Thirty Years War. Consequently it was often possible, at least until his vision was obscured by the dense clouds of smoke produced by the use of black powder, for a general to be able to survey the entire battlefield. Before fighting began, usually in consultation with his senior officers, a general would deploy his troops, normally in accordance with a battle plan drawn up at the start of the campaign, and give orders for the broad conduct of the battle. However, once fighting actually began, a commanding general’s ability to influence the course of events was usually limited. There were no clear rules regarding where he should position himself. While subordinate generals commanding foot or horse would be stationed with their own troops, a senior general often had a less clear role. Sometimes, as with Charles I at Naseby, he would be with his reserve, but it was common for him to become closely involved in the fighting. Rupert, at both Edgehill and Naseby, charged with his horse, while at Marston Moor neither he nor Newcastle were able to gain overall control of events.

It was in any case difficult for a commanding general in the fast-moving confusion of pitched battle, and usually with only a small staff, to exercise overall control. Most demanding in such situations was the role of a cavalry commander. He needed to be able to spot and exploit fleeting opportunities in battle, and the post might therefore seem more suited to younger men, like Rupert, Maurice and Goring. But in practice there were a number of successful older cavalry commanders. For the Royalists both Lord Byron and the 6o-year-old Sir William Vaughan did well, while the best-known example of all is of course Oliver Cromwell.

Physical fitness was almost essential for a Civil War general. As well as fighting in battle, a commander had to be able to withstand the rigours of long marches in all kinds of weather. Rupert was well-known for his physique and strength, and King Charles overcame childhood disabilities to prove himself able to stand up to arduous campaigning. Other generals, however, found their careers ended or blighted by illness or injury. Prince Maurice was struck down by serious illness on at least two occasions during the war, and Ralph Hopton seems never to have regained his confidence after being injured in a powder explosion. Rather more prosaically, the elderly Earl of Forth, a notorious imbiber, eventually succumbed to the effects of gout, deafness and a fall from his horse. Goring’s great talents declined largely because of the effects of drink, although he also suffered from lameness and possibly attacks of malaria contracted in Europe.

With most armies relatively small, there were plenty of opportunities for a commander to display his qualities of personal leadership, which might sometimes be enough to change the course of an action. So George Goring, noted for his readiness of mind in an emergency, was able to stem the advance of Cromwell’s horse at Second Newbury by leading a well-timed counter-charge. Rupert was in the thick of the action on a number of occasions, though his intervention at Marston Moor, where he temporarily rallied his own fleeing Regiment of Horse with a cry of: ‘Zwounds, do you run? Follow me!’ was ultimately in vain. Byron was in his element in small-scale, hand-to-hand encounters. The elderly and unflamboyant Jacob Astley encouraged his foot at Edgehill with a well-chosen prayer. Montrose was able to rally wavering troops on more than one occasion, although King Charles’s passive and remote personality made little impression on fleeing soldiers at Second Newbury and Naseby.

Despite their frequent involvement in righting at close quarters, fatalities among Civil War generals were fairly rare. Although several of our subjects – including Maurice, Grenville, Byron and Wilmot – were wounded on one or more occasion, none were killed. Only one Royalist army commander – the 1st Earl of Northampton – was killed in action, although losses among officers at brigade level and below were much heavier. This was due in part to the inaccuracy and unreliability of firearms. Rupert, who was only wounded in the final days of the war, on more than one occasion escaped injury when an opponent’s pistol misfired. Commanding generals probably often wore better body armour than inferior officers, making edged weapons less effective against them, or, being mounted, were able to get clear of difficult situations. Significantly most injuries seem to have occurred to the head, if a helmet was lost, or to the thighs or legs, unprotected by armour.

Ultimately, a general’s success rested largely upon how he was viewed by his men. Rupert and Maurice were admired and emulated by the younger officers and men who served under them, mainly because of their dash and bravery in action. Goring and Wilmot gained popularity through a combination of charm and good fellowship. Montrose had their charisma and personal magnetism without their wild living. Hopton, Grenville and to a lesser extent Byron, though tough disciplinarians, were known to endeavour to take care of their soldiers’ needs. The dour and fearsome Langdale won the devotion of his Northern troopers by sharing their hardships and their stubborn independence. Charles, as always, was lacking in the necessary qualities. His officers might revere his role as monarch, but few had warm affection for the man, while his common soldiers hardly knew him.

One of the most enduring popular historical legends is of the plumed and ribboned roistering devil-may-care ‘Cavalier’. It is interesting to consider just how few of our commanders actually fitted that image. Astley and Forth were hard-bitten professional soldiers, with little of the romantic about them. Byron was noted for his learning and love of books, as was Newcastle. Hopton was a devout and solid middle-aged man. Montrose had considerable charisma, but was no roisterer. King Charles’s private life was exemplary, and his inspirational qualities virtually nil. Prince Maurice was regarded by many as boorish, while Rupert, often held up as the epitome of the Cavalier of legend, while certainly brave and dashing, was apparently generally restrained in his personal life, fairly humourless and intolerant of dissent.

Only three of our subjects seem even partly to conform to the popular image. Grenville, with his love of sparkish dress, and sardonic wit, has some resemblance to a dark version of the legend. Goring certainly possessed in abundance the charm and love of wild living, but he lacked generosity of spirit and loyalty of character. Closest of all, perhaps, was Harry Wilmot, that slightly buffoonish figure, who loved horses, drink, women and good fellowship, who fought with foolhardy bravery, quarrelled and duelled, and through all the trials and tribulations of a chequered career, remained to the end a dedicated if sometimes confused servant of the House of Stuart.

Chapter Two

King Charles and Lord Forth

THE sculptor Bernini is said to have commented of a portrait of Charles I that he had never seen a face ‘which showed so much greatness, and withal, such marks of sadness and misfortune’. Charles seemed to have been born to misfortune. A delicate and sickly child, with a stammer which he never fully overcame, Charles, as second son to King James I, had never been expected to ascend the throne. Only the unexpected death of his charismatic elder brother, Prince Henry, in 1612, thrust him into a role for which by character and training he was singularly ill-equipped.

Few who knew Charles doubted either his sincerely-held beliefs or his good intentions. By nature deeply religious, serious and a patron of the arts, Charles, through sheer determination, overcame physical disadvantages to become a skilled horseman, who during the Civil War rode hundreds of miles in all weathers. Few questioned his personal courage either. Although never a fighting soldier, Charles invariably displayed calmness and resolution on the battlefield, while his conduct at his trial and execution in 1649 won admiration from eye-witnesses.

Unfortunately Charles never developed any real skills in relating to those outside his close intimate circle. His natural shyness was masked by an aloof formality which often seemed cold indifference. Small and slight, and always impeccably dressed, Charles maintained the dignity and aura of monarchy, but gave it little warmth or appeal. His underlying lack of self-confidence and his poor personal skills made Charles rely heavily on the judgement of his current favourite, or to be unduly influenced by the views of the last person he spoke with, and to be duplicitous in order to avoid unpleasant confrontations. This made for intrigue and unclear policy in peace, and lack of firm decision-making in war.

Although usually deeply loyal to the handful of people whom he really trusted – his wife, Queen Henrietta Maria, his first favourite, the Duke of Buckingham, Strafford (for whose execution by Parliament Charles never forgave himself) and, until 1645, his nephew, Prince Rupert – Charles never developed many other close relationships. He tended to treat the service of others as a right, not as something to be earned and nurtured, and the queen warned her husband: ‘If you do not take care of those who suffer for you, you are lost.’

Approach to war

Charles’s actions in the years leading up to Civil War lie outside the scope of this study, except in so far as they impinge on military matters. Most of the king’s policies were influenced by his belief in the Divine Right of Kings – that monarchs were appointed by, and ultimately only answerable to, God. This led to the development of a centralized, paternalistic system of government which eventually attempted to dispense with the services of a frequently obstructive Parliament and became known as ‘Personal Rule’.

As a result of unsuccessful foreign adventures, legally dubious methods of raising revenue, and above all, a religious policy which could easily be misrepresented by opponents as an intention to reintroduce Catholicism, Charles managed to alienate many of the country’s most influential interest groups.

Matters came to a head in 1638 with the king’s attempt to impose the English Prayer Book on his predominantly Presbyterian kingdom of Scotland. The result was a national uprising, and two brief conflicts – known as the Bishops’ Wars – ensued after the king’s attempts to impose his will by force. The two wars provided Charles, as nominal Captain General (commander-in-chief) of the English army, with his first practical military experience. They were an object lesson in how not to fight a war, but the problems encountered provided invaluable lessons for some of the king’s future Civil War commanders, if not necessarily for Charles himself.

The humiliation of defeat in the Bishops’ Wars brought confrontation between the king and his English opponents much closer. The crisis had forced him to recall Parliament, which, sensing its advantage, pushed through increasing numbers of measures that would remove most of the monarch’s real powers.

The war begins

By the summer of 1642, thanks in part to a reaction by many moderates against the Parliamentarian radicals’ more extreme proposals, Charles had increased his support. As violence spread, Civil War was formalized by the raising of the Royal Standard at Nottingham on 22 August.

Almost as much as in medieval times, a monarch was expected to provide personal leadership. On 23 October, the morning of the Battle of Edgehill, Charles told his troops: ‘your King is both your cause, your quarrel and your Captain!’ One modern writer suggests that he actually welcomed the outbreak of war:

Ultimately Charles found war a simple answer to a complex problem; it brought the relief that always seemed to come from action. War was direct; it did not engender the same sense of guilt that compromise produced; it was a matter of black and white, of friend and foe.¹

Charles himself stated baldly at the start of the war; ‘My aim is to fight for my crown and my dignity’², and in October, before Edgehill, an eyewitness remarked: ‘I never saw the King look better, he is very cheerful’.

But this perhaps over-simplifies Charles’s complex personality. Politically, he had no aim other than to vanquish his opponents. But he found the reality of