U.S.-Vatican Relations, 1975–1980: A Diplomatic Study

By P. Peter Sarros

This book explores the bilateral relations between the United States and the Vatican from 1975 to 1980, a turbulent period that had two presidents, three presidential envoys, and three popes. This previously untold story shows how the United States and the Vatican worked quietly together behind the scenes to influence the international response to major issues of the day. Peter Sarros examines the Iran hostage crisis, the tensions of the Cold War, the Helsinki process, and the Beagle Channel dispute, among other issues. These interactions produced a tacit alliance in the foreign policies of the United States and the Vatican even before the establishment of full diplomatic relations. This unique book is based largely on official documents from the archives of the Office of the U.S. Special Envoy of the United States to the Vatican, supplemented by Sarros's contemporaneous diaries, notes, and other unpublished sources.

The confidential consultations at the Vatican by three special envoys and by Sarros in his role as chargé and ambassador at the Vatican were critical in obtaining Vatican support on major international issues. The Vatican also derived substantial benefits from the partnership through U.S. support of Vatican initiatives in Lebanon and elsewhere, and by U.S. policies that gave Vatican diplomacy the flexibility to play a larger role in the international sphere. Sarros concludes that American diplomacy was successful at the Holy See during this period because it took advantage of the Vatican's overarching international strategy, which was to increase its influence through support for the global balance of power while blocking the expansion of Soviet power and communism in Europe. U.S.-Vatican Relations, 1975–1980 will be of interest to students and scholars of history and political science, especially in the fields of diplomatic relations and church history.

• Language: English
• Publisher: University of Notre Dame Press
• Release date: Jan 31, 2020
• ISBN: 9780268106836

P. Peter Sarros

P. Peter Sarros is a retired Senior U.S. Foreign Service officer whose career spanned four decades. From 1975 to 1980 he served as chargé and ambassador of the Presidential Mission at the Vatican. He was Diplomat-in-Residence at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and taught diplomacy at George Mason University.

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U.S.–VATICAN RELATIONS, 1975–1980

 ADST-DACOR DIPLOMATS AND DIPLOMACY SERIES

Series Editor: MARGERY BOICHEL THOMPSON

Since 1776, extraordinary men and women have represented the United States abroad under widely varying circumstances. What they did and how and why they did it remain little known to their compatriots. In 1995, the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST) and DACOR, an organization of foreign affairs professionals, created the Diplomats and Diplomacy book series to increase public knowledge and appreciation of the professionalism of American diplomats and their involvement in world history. In this 67th series volume, PETER SARROS shows how the United States and the Vatican worked quietly together behind the scenes in a turbulent period to influence the international response to major issues of the time.

SOME OTHER SERIES TITLES

HERMAN J. COHEN, Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent

PETER D. EICHER, Raising the Flag: Adventures of America’s First Envoys in Faraway Lands

BRANDON GROVE, Behind Embassy Walls: The Life and Times of an American Diplomat

CAMERON R. HUME, Mission to Algiers: Diplomacy by Engagement

DENNIS C. JETT, American Ambassadors: The Past, Present, and Future of America’s Diplomats

RODGER MCDANIEL, In the Eye of the Storm: The Life and Times of U.S. Senator Gale McGee

WILLIAM MORGAN and C. STUART KENNEDY, American Diplomats: The Foreign Service at Work

DAVID D. NEWSOM, Witness to a Changing World

DAVID RAWSON, Prelude to Genocide: Arusha, Rwanda, and the Failure of Diplomacy

RAYMOND F. SMITH, The Craft of Political Analysis for Diplomats

JEAN WILKOWSKI, Abroad for Her Country: Tales of a Pioneer Woman Ambassador in the U.S. Foreign Service

For a complete list of series titles, visit adst.org/publications.

U.S.-VATICAN

RELATIONS, 1975-1980

A Diplomatic Study

P. PETER SARROS

An ADST-DACOR Diplomats and Diplomacy Book

University of Notre Dame Press

Notre Dame, Indiana

Copyright © 2020 by University of Notre Dame

Notre Dame, Indiana 46556

undpress.nd.edu

All Rights Reserved

Manufactured in the United States of America

Library of Congress Control Number: 2019952798

ISBN-13: 978-0-268-10681-2 (Hardback)

ISBN: 978-0-268-10684-3 (WebPDF)

ISBN: 978-0-268-10683-6 (Epub)

The opinions and characterizations in this book are those of the author and do not necessarily represent official positions of the United States government, the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, or DACOR.

This e-Book was converted from the original source file by a third-party vendor. Readers who notice any formatting, textual, or readability issues are encouraged to contact the publisher at [e-mail]

To my parents, Basil and Helen Sarros,

and to my Geneva High School teacher and mentor,

Katharine F. White

CONTENTS

Preface

Acknowledgments

OneThe Year of Three Popes and the Transformation of U.S.–Vatican Relations

TwoBeagle Channel Mediation: Diplomacy and War Prevention

ThreeThe Vatican, Italy, and Eurocommunism

FourVatican Ostpolitik: Diplomacy of Rapprochement with Communism

FiveThe Vatican and the Helsinki Process, 1975–1980

SixThe Pope, the Neutron Bomb, and NATO Modernization

SevenThe President, the Pope, and the Crown of St. Stephen

EightThe Vatican, the United States, and Lebanon’s Civil War

NineThe United States, the Vatican, the Middle East, and Jerusalem

TenThe Pope and the Iranian Hostage Crisis: The Limits of Papal Power

ElevenThe Vatican, Liberation Theology, and the Central American Imbroglio

Epilogue

Notes

Bibliography

Index

PREFACE

This book recounts U.S. diplomatic efforts to enlist the power of the pope and Vatican diplomacy in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives from 1975 to 1980. I describe and analyze, by firsthand observations, eleven specific diplomatic encounters. These engagements were conducted by the U.S. special mission to the Vatican, using extensive exchanges of information and numerous official consultations with the pope and senior Vatican officials.

The study focuses on diplomatic activities, such as reporting, consultations, and representations, in pursuit of the presidential mandate that established the special mission to the Vatican in 1970 under Amb. Henry Cabot Lodge: The President wishes Ambassador Lodge to discuss issues on which clarification of the US position is desirable, on which Vatican support might be helpful, or on which the Vatican might be able to play a useful role.¹ I participated in these activities for more than five years when I was in charge of the special envoy’s office in Rome as assistant to three presidential envoys,² representing two presidents³ to three popes.⁴ Because our reporting, our consultations, and our activities at the Vatican were frequent, continuous, and extensive, it is not practical to address all of the matters we handled. Accordingly, I have selected for extended discussion and analysis the consultations relating to eleven vignettes, or diplomatic encounters, which illustrate the role of the special mission to the Vatican as observer and reporter, as advocate of U.S. foreign policy objectives, and as seeker of Vatican support for these objectives.⁵ Furthermore, in describing a variety of U.S.–Vatican interactions, I call attention to various perceptions and assessments of important international issues or events (e.g., détente, balance of power, Eurocommunism, Middle East peace efforts, liberation theology).

These diplomatic encounters were significant in the context of the international relations of the period, were important to the U.S. national interest, and deserve to be more widely known by scholars and practitioners of U.S. diplomacy—and by the American public. Certain chapters, such as those relating to the Vatican and Italy, Vatican Ostpolitik, Vatican participation in the Helsinki process, and liberation theology, illustrate primarily the role of the special mission in providing to the U.S. State Department and the White House political reporting based on the information gathered from Vatican sources. These chapters demonstrate the Vatican’s value as a listening post, one that collects information from its vast global network, consisting of its diplomatic service, numerous religious organizations, and the stream of official and nonofficial visitors to the Vatican.

Other chapters, such as those concerning the encounters on the crises in Lebanon, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, emphasize the role of the mission as an instrument for advancing U.S. foreign policy objectives by convincing the pope and the Vatican to undertake convergent or parallel public or diplomatic policies on international issues of importance to the president and the secretary of state.

Chapter 7, relating to the return of the crown of St. Stephen to Hungary in 1977, in the first year of the Carter presidency, deals with the important role the Vatican played in the administration’s major initiative towards Eastern Europe. The account of this episode in U.S.–Vatican relations illustrates the mission’s usefulness to the president on an issue at the intersection of domestic politics and foreign policy. It demonstrates how the president increasingly used the mission to enlist the Vatican’s help in diminishing domestic political opposition to the return of the crown, an important foreign policy initiative of the Carter administration.

The chapters concerning the Beagle Channel mediation, the Iran hostage crisis, Middle East peace efforts, the neutron bomb, and NATO modernization chronicle the démarches made at the express request of the president and the secretary of state to enlist the pope’s enormous power to influence the course of international relations on strategic matters of peace and war.

The chapters on the Iran hostage crisis and the crises in Nicaragua and El Salvador also illustrate the limits of papal power and Vatican diplomacy. In the Iran case, a non-Western, non-Christian nation essentially ignored the pope’s appeal for the release of the hostages. In the Central American case, papal power and diplomacy were buffeted by internal discord within the Catholic Church. This episode highlights an interesting and important contrast to other U.S.–Vatican encounters. In the Central America of the late 1970s, the Vatican had limited control or even influence over its clergy, including bishops, archbishops, and religious orders, such as the Jesuits. Although the senior Vatican officials agreed with U.S. positions supporting moderate forces, ideological and political divisions within the Church over liberation theology made it difficult for the Vatican to provide significant assistance.

Our consultations in several encounters, especially those on the Beagle Channel, the Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty, the crises in Nicaragua and El Salvador, and the Iran hostage crisis, took place in a context unique in several respects. In the first place, they were conducted during a new papacy (John Paul II) and by a new special envoy (Amb. Robert F. Wagner), with an expanded presidential mandate.⁶ Second, they took place within the framework of a more robust relationship brought about by the U.S. response to the events relating to the transfer of power between papacies.⁷ Third, they were strongly reinforced by high-level attention, including direct participation by the president, the secretary of state, and other senior U.S. officials. The president, for example, had a wide-ranging exchange of views with John Paul II during their meetings at the White House in November 1979 and at the Vatican in June 1980. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance had three personal encounters with Vatican Foreign Minister Casaroli: two in Washington (in January 1978 and November 1979) and one at the Vatican (May 1979). Vance also met John Paul II in May 1979 at the Vatican, when he became convinced that the pope was extremely well informed about world affairs, energetic and anxious to be helpful on key issues of importance to us. These high-level contacts strongly reinforced the mission’s consultations at the Vatican and contributed greatly to our ability to obtain desirable, parallel Vatican public or diplomatic action in support of U.S. diplomatic efforts on important international issues.

I am convinced that this study of the record of the diplomacy conducted by the special mission to the Vatican in 1975–80 documents the establishment of a tacit political alliance between the United States and the Vatican on major international issues. This brought the United States by 1980 to the threshold of establishing full diplomatic relations with the Holy See.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am especially grateful to Amb. Henry Cabot Lodge for designating me, at age forty, to begin handling a number of extremely important foreign policy issues. He enhanced my performance of the mission’s delicate diplomatic duties by including me in the initial discussions between President Ford and Paul VI on June 3, 1975, and conveyed to senior Vatican officials that he considered me his alter ego when he was absent from Rome. I used the entrée he provided and gradually developed relationships of confidence and personal rapport with the pope’s most senior foreign policy advisors. In addition, Ambassador Lodge’s prestige within the White House and the U.S. Department of State guaranteed that the mission had high-level visibility in the foreign policy bureaucracy, which ensured that the mission had timely and reliable support for its activities.

I am also grateful to Amb. Ellsworth Bunker for enhancing my career opportunities by choosing me to be his assistant while he was ambassador to the Organization of American States. This gave me the opportunity to observe, at close range, his legendary diplomatic skills during the 1965–66 negotiations on the formation of a provisional government in the Dominican Republic following the 1965 U.S. military intervention. Finally, I am grateful to Amb. Robert McClintock, who, as ambassador to Venezuela in 1971–73, when I was the desk officer for Venezuela, tutored me by letting me observe his masterly diplomatic and bureaucratic skills, during the complex multiyear negotiations between the United States and Venezuela on a new commercial treaty and petroleum agreement.

In the evolution of my professional career, I am grateful to a number of gifted teachers at Geneva High School, Hobart College, and Princeton University who challenged me to always do my very best at any task and inculcated in me the values and traditions of Western civilization. Among these are Alexander Campbell, who taught me to fiercely avoid dangling modifiers; John Farnsworth and Norman Kurland, who taught me European, Russian, and world history; Dr. John G. VanDusen, who taught me American history and supervised my honors thesis on FDR’s Brain Trust; and Dr. Maynard Smith, an expert on the Federalist Papers, who taught me political theory and whose friendship has been a lifelong one, as both mentor and adviser. Dr. Gordon Craig, the preeminent diplomatic historian, whom I met at Princeton, provided valuable advice for the overarching design of the study.

At Princeton, I appreciated the Woodrow Wilson School’s unique interdisciplinary course of studies, and I am grateful to the following: Gabriel Almond on comparative politics; Harold Sprout on geopolitics; Klaus Knorr on defense policies and war potential; and John Whitton on international law and organization. I am especially grateful to Dr. Edgar S. Furniss, my PhD thesis adviser on Congress and the New Diplomacy, who taught international politics and American foreign policy, and encouraged my aspiration to join the American Foreign Service.

My wife, Mary Alexander Patton Sarros, and our daughter, Alexis, were my constant companions and supporters during my tenure at the Vatican. Mary shared with me a multitude of representational activities and accompanied me to many diplomatic functions and ceremonies. Alexis was a source of perpetual joy; her effervescence in all her undertakings was a constant inspiration and pride.

I also thank four officers in the Bureau of European Affairs for backstopping my efforts at the Vatican: Brunson McKinley, James W. Swihart Jr., and Vittorio Brod, who were both Italian and Vatican desk officers, and Amb. Robert Barbour, who as director of West European affairs and later as deputy assistant secretary for European affairs took an active interest in the operations of the U.S. mission to the Holy See and also encouraged my reporting.

I am greatly indebted to three Foreign Service colleagues, longtime friends, for reading and commenting on the manuscript, particularly Thomas M. Tracy, who assisted me extensively and intensely by reading, criticizing, and revising the final manuscript; Frank Seidner, who painstakingly lent his admirable editorial skills in reading and conceptualizing the study throughout the process of its preparation; and Harry M. Montgomery, for encouraging me to publish my Vatican memoir and providing a plethora of ideas and intellectual stimulation during its composition over several years.

I also thank the following colleagues and friends for their comments on several drafts: Amb. Samuel R. Gammon, who, having served as political counselor in Rome and having followed Vatican affairs in the 1960s, also brought to his critique his decade-long experience as executive director of the American Historical Society; and Damian Leader, who served recently as political counselor of the U.S. embassy to the Vatican. Thanks also to Peter Eicher, former Foreign Service officer (FSO) and author of two books, who, in addition to reading several chapters, advised in preparing the prospectus and introduced me to the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST) to help advance the publication of my book. I am also deeply indebted to two other colleagues: Daniel Sheerin, who lent me his superb drafting skills in the initial drafts of the study; and Peter Tierney, who expertly formatted the final manuscript. Special thanks to the Office of the Historian of the Department of State, which expedited the declassification of my 1980 telegrams, and to Margery Thompson, the ADST director of publishing and series editor, who most efficiently and expertly coordinated the final text of the manuscript, arranged for two independent readers, conducted the initial contacts with publishers, and expertly negotiated the contract with the University of Notre Dame Press for its publication.

Chapter One

THE YEAR OF THREE POPES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF U.S.–VATICAN RELATIONS

This chapter describes the momentous events at the Vatican in the second half of 1978 surrounding the death of two popes, the conclaves to elect two new popes, and their inaugurations. It also analyzes the effect of these events on the Vatican as an institution, its foreign policy structure and posture, and its bearing on U.S.–Vatican relations.¹ Since 1978 was the midpoint of my tenure as the Rome-based U.S. envoy to the Vatican, the discussion serves two purposes. It provides the focus for analyzing the U.S.–Vatican relations retrospectively and prospectively, and it also offers an opportunity to provide a synopsis of the major contours of the past and future of these relations in their historical context.²

The events of 1978 underscore the uniqueness of the papacy as an international institution, which, during most of its two millennia of existence, has exerted enormous spiritual and temporal power.³ Although the papacy’s territorial and temporal power has significantly decreased since 1870, when the Papal States disappeared, the pope’s spiritual power has progressively increased. It has continued to be felt in the international arena. In the 1970s, the pope was the spiritual leader of more than 700 million faithful and exercised temporal power over the Vatican city-state, comprising 108 acres and a population of fewer than 1,000. Under international law, by virtue of the pope’s spiritual power and certain accoutrements of sovereignty, such as sovereignty over Vatican City and the papal diplomatic corps, the pope plays a unique role in international politics. In this context, the events of 1978, though essentially ecclesiastical in nature, also had important political dimensions and interesting international ramifications. The focus in this chapter is on their influence on international relations, with special attention to an analysis of how the U.S. presence and the diplomatic encounters of U.S. and Vatican officials at these four events led to a significant transformation of U.S. relations with the Vatican. They provide the institutional setting for the conduct of the other ten diplomatic encounters that form the core of this book.

THE YEAR OF THREE POPES IN THE CONTEXT OF U.S.–VATICAN RELATIONS

In the annals of Christianity––and perhaps of Western civilization––the year 1978 will be known as the year of three popes. During that year, in Rome, there unfolded in sequential solemnity the drama of two papal funerals, the intrigue of two conclaves for the election of new popes, and the pageantry of the inaugurations of two new popes. Only one other time in the last millennium, in 1503, were there three popes in one year, and the last time a non-Italian was elected pope was in 1522. Although these events were essentially ecclesiastical, they also had unique and important political dimensions and strategic international ramifications of relevance to the U.S. government. When these events began to unfold in mid-1978, I had been posted at the Vatican for more than three years. In 1974, Amb. Henry Cabot Lodge, the president’s special envoy to the Vatican, had selected me to be his assistant. In May 1975, I assumed charge of his Vatican office in Rome.⁴ It fell to me, as the officer in charge of this small mission, to observe and report on the evolution of the historic Vatican events during the year of the three popes. It was a unique opportunity and the most treasured of my thirty-two-year diplomatic experience as a Foreign Service officer (FSO).

The special mission to the Vatican represented a rare bright episode in a historically turbulent and irregular relationship between the United States and the Vatican. For most of its history, the United States had followed a policy of benign neglect of the Vatican.⁵ Up to 1975, the U.S. government had normal diplomatic relations with the Vatican for a span of under twenty-three years, 1846 to 1868. During most of its history, the United States maintained consular relations with the Holy See, but it adopted a policy of benign neglect or established limited, quasi-diplomatic relations with the Vatican. A synopsis of those relations reveals six different phases: exclusively consular relations (1797–1846); normal diplomatic relations (1846–68); benign neglect (1868–1939 and 1950–70); and quasi-diplomatic relations (1939–50 and 1970–84). The following sections describe the principal contours of these relations.

U.S. Consular Relations with the Papal States

The United States maintained reciprocal consular relations with the Papal States from 1797 to 1870.⁶ There were eleven consuls general accredited to the Papal States. Among these was the colorful and notorious Nicholas Brown (1845–49). His pro-republican virtues led him to welcome the takeover of Rome by Giuseppe Garibaldi and his Italian troops in November 1848 and the proclamation of a republic in February 1849 under Giuseppe Mazzini. Brown, concurrently serving as chargé of the American Legation in Rome, defended his unauthorized and undiplomatic act, defiantly informing the U.S. secretary of state in his dispatch of February 12, 1849: I thought it my duty as an American citizen to do homage to the principle of popular sovereignty, of which our glorious republic is the living incarnation. Accordingly, I accompanied the splendid procession [of the Constituent Assembly to the Cancelleria] in my official uniform and witnessed the proclamation at the Capitol of the Roman Republic.⁷

One other consul general deserves mention, David M. Armstrong. It fell to him as the last U.S. official in Rome to report, in his last dispatch of September 23, 1870, the fall of Rome to the Italian troops and the demise of the Papal States, which had occurred on September 20, 1870.⁸

During the years of consular relations,⁹ the Holy See accredited six consuls general to the United States: Ferdinand Lucchesi (1826–27); N. Edward Fowls (1827–29); Giovanni Sartori (1829–33); Peter A. Hargons, (1833–41); Daniel J. Desmond (1841–50); and Louis B. Binsse (1850–77).¹⁰

Era of Diplomatic Relations of the United States and the Vatican

The election in 1846 of the reformist Pius IX, who liberalized his government by naming a lay prime minister and introducing a liberal constitution for the Papal States, encouraged President James K. Polk to establish diplomatic relations with the Holy See with overwhelming congressional approval. Polk’s action was supported 36–7 in the Senate, and 137–15 in the House of Representatives. In the twenty years of diplomatic relations, from 1848 to 1868, the United States accredited seven ministers¹¹ to the Papal States: Jacob L. Martin¹² (1848); Lewis Cass Jr. (1849–58); John P. Stockton (1858–61); Andrew W. Randall (1861–62); Richard Blatchford (1862–63); and Gen. Rufus King (1863–68). From the very beginning, the United States made it clear that it had established diplomatic relations with the pope in his capacity as temporal head of the Papal States, not as head of the Catholic Church. Thus, Secretary of State Buchanan instructed U.S. diplomats to Rome that in carrying out their functions in Rome, they should avoid engagement in any ecclesiastical activities. During this period, there were two major bilateral issues: one relating to the U.S. attitude towards the Papal States during the revolution of 1848–49 and the effort at Italian unification; and the other relating to the Holy See’s position regarding the U.S. Civil War and the attempt of the Confederacy to gain recognition from the pope. The United States did not recognize the Roman Republic. The U.S. chargé d’affaires, Lewis Cass Jr., arrived in the midst of the revolution in early 1849 but deferred the presentation of his credentials until November, when the pope was restored to power in Rome by French troops.¹³ During the U.S. Civil War, the American Legation deflected the pope from recognizing the Confederacy, and after the war obtained the extradition of John A. Surratt, who was accused of being involved in the assassination of President Lincoln.¹⁴ Despite these acts of loyalty and friendship, the American Legation near the Holy See ceased operations at the end of 1867. The U.S. Congress on February 28, 1867, acting on misinformation that the American Protestant church was forced to move outside the Roman walls, terminated funding for the maintenance of a diplomatic mission in Rome beyond June 13, 1867.¹⁵ Secretary of State Seward wrote Minister King that the action left the mission still existing but without compensation. King agreed to serve, hoping that his reports on the religious situation in Rome would bring congressional reconsideration. King informed Seward on May 7, 1867, that the pope characterized the action as hasty and . . . groundless and an unkind and ungenerous return for the goodwill the pope always manifested for the U.S. government and the American people.¹⁶ King finally left Rome at the end of the year and tendered his resignation on January 1, 1868. Leo Francis Stock, an American historian, characterized the termination of relations this way: It was neither a courteous exit nor a dignified ending of this chapter of American diplomacy.¹⁷

Era of Benign Neglect I: 1868–1939

The controversial manner in which diplomatic relations were suspended, marked by the closure of the American Legation in Rome, ended the first diplomatic rapprochement between the United States and the Vatican, and there followed a long period when the Unites States adopted a policy of near-total benign neglect. The only major official contact in the next seventy years was the uneventful visit of President Woodrow Wilson to the pope at the Vatican in 1919.¹⁸ Wilson made the visit to the pope reluctantly, mostly to mollify American Catholic opinion. Moreover, Wilson had consented to the decision by the Allies not to invite the pope’s participation in the Versailles Conference in 1919. This accorded with the terms of a secret provision in the 1915 Treaty of London on the entry of Italy on the side of the Allies in World War I. Wilson also had been the spokesman for the Allies in rejecting Benedict XV’s 1917 appeal for peace, because the Allied powers felt that the pope was pro-German and wanted to preserve the Austro-Hungarian Empire. During the period of benign neglect, there was also a clash in values between the United States and the Vatican,¹⁹ symbolized by the adoption in 1864 of the Syllabus of Errors, which had denounced liberalism, democracy, and modernity, and the pope’s 1899 denunciation of the Americanism movement within the American Catholic Church, because of its liberal orientation and its acceptance of the principle of the separation of church and state.

Era of Quasi-diplomatic Relations, 1940–1950

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) initiated a new era in U.S.–Vatican relations in December 1939, when he appointed Amb. Myron C. Taylor as his personal representative to Pius XII,²⁰ thereby ending seventy years of official neglect of the Holy See. Despite some opposition by Protestant elements, FDR justified his appointment as a temporary measure to enlist the pope’s parallel efforts in a diplomatic campaign to stop the spread of World War II, particularly to dissuade Mussolini from entering the war as an ally of Germany. Taylor presented his credentials to the pope in February 1940. He then established an office in Rome with his assistant, FSO Harold Tittmann. Taylor served as the representative of FDR and then Harry Truman until January 18, 1950, when he resigned for health reasons.²¹ In December 1941, after Mussolini declared war on the United States, FDR upgraded Taylor’s assistant, Tittmann, to chargé d’affaires, so that he could move into the Vatican until June 1944, when Rome was liberated by the Allies.²² It is interesting to note that one of the principal reasons for upgrading the status of Tittmann was the wide reputation of the Vatican as a prime diplomatic listening post. Attesting to this reputation was the fact that in 1939, thirty-nine countries had diplomatic representatives at the Vatican, and the Holy See was represented in seventy-two foreign countries.

Ambassador Taylor resigned on January 18, 1950, for health reasons.²³ He had made six visits to the Vatican under President Truman (1946–49). Truman’s nomination of Gen. Mark Clark as ambassador to the Vatican, October 20, 1950, was not acted upon by the Senate because of strong Protestant opposition to the appointment as breaching the wall between the separation of church and state, and the personal opposition of the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Clark’s nomination was withdrawn January 13, 1952.²⁴

Another Era of Diplomatic Neglect: 1950–1970

From 1950 to 1970, the United States adopted a second era of benign diplomatic neglect towards the Vatican. Upon closer investigation, however, it was not as nearly total as the 1868–1939 period. The United States did not have diplomatic relations with the Holy See, but the papacy and the Vatican continued to exert influence in international politics. Moreover, this influence increased dramatically with the accession of John XXIII (1959) and then Paul VI (1963), and the opening of the Catholic Church to the world with the reforms of Vatican II. The United States, therefore, could not ignore the Vatican or its opinions.²⁵ Although the Vatican did not allow U.S. diplomats accredited to Italy direct access to its officials, the American Embassy to Italy gradually developed discreet informal contacts at the Vatican, which enabled the Political Section of the embassy to provide the U.S. Department of State with periodic reports on important Vatican developments (e.g., the Vatican role in Italian politics or the convening of Vatican II).²⁶ On occasion, the U.S. ambassador to Italy transmitted messages between the pope and the president (e.g., John XXIII’s message to President Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, and exchange of messages between President Johnson and Paul VI on the search for peace in Vietnam). Moreover, Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson were granted private audiences by the pope.²⁷ Eisenhower and Kennedy also sent presidential delegations to papal funerals and inaugurations.²⁸ Johnson had met Pope Paul twice and also sent many special emissaries to confer with the pope on Vietnam peace efforts.²⁹

THE GENESIS OF THE SPECIAL AMERICAN MISSION TO THE VATICAN

President Richard M. Nixon, imitating FDR, reestablished direct contacts with the Vatican in 1970.³⁰ After a hiatus of twenty years, Nixon named Amb. Henry Cabot Lodge as his special envoy to the pope. Lodge was a U.S. statesman, a war hero, had served two terms in the Senate, and ran as Nixon’s vice presidential candidate in 1960. Lodge had also served in important diplomatic posts: UN ambassador under Eisenhower, ambassador in Saigon under Kennedy, ambassador to Saigon (for a second time), and ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany under Johnson.³¹ He had met with the pope in 1965 and 1967 to explore paths to peace in Vietnam, had collaborated closely with the papal nuncio in Saigon on peace initiatives, and had a special appreciation of Vatican diplomacy. Nixon, by creating this channel for a dialogue with the pope and the Vatican, recognized that the pope’s observations, judgments, and opinions were accorded extensive international prestige,³² which was reinforced by powerful Catholic institutions, both ecclesiastical and secular, throughout the world. Nixon’s mandate to Lodge also imitated FDR’s mandate to Ambassador Taylor. Lodge was to visit the Vatican from time to time to exchange views on international issues of common concern to the United States and the pope and the Vatican.³³ Lodge was authorized to maintain a permanent office in Rome, staffed by an FSO and a secretary.³⁴ The mission remained tiny throughout 1975–80 and operated inconspicuously, but it was highly valued by the Vatican. The pope explicitly stated his satisfaction with the special envoy channel during his audience for Vice President Mondale on January 27, 1977.³⁵

Lodge was succeeded in October 1977 by President Carter’s appointee, David M. Walters, a successful Miami lawyer, prominent lay Catholic, and important fundraiser for Carter during the election of 1976.³⁶ He was named personal representative of the president³⁷ and entrusted with visiting the Vatican from time to time. Walters resigned in August 1978, and in December 1978 was succeeded by Robert F. Wagner, the former mayor of New York City. Walters and Wagner both retained me as their assistant.³⁸ The Office of the Special Mission, although physically separate from the American Embassy to Italy in Rome, depended on it for administrative support, and collaborated closely on matters that affected the Vatican’s and the Catholic Church’s activities in Italy.

As the officer in charge of a mini-embassy, in addition to assisting the special envoy in his comprehensive periodic exchanges of views with the pope and senior Vatican officials, I maintained day-to-day Vatican contacts, exchanged information on important international events, reported on Vatican policies on international issues, and as instructed consulted with the Vatican to obtain its support for specific U.S. policies. I also arranged papal audiences for senior U.S. officials and congressional delegations and accompanied them to the Vatican.

Among our major activities during my first three years were assisting in the visit of President Ford to the pope on June 3, 1975; reporting on the Vatican’s role in drafting the Helsinki Final Act (HFA),³⁹ which marked the reemergence of the Holy See as an active participant in the European political scene for the first time since the Congress of Vienna in 1815; and monitoring and reporting on Vatican’s Ostpolitik, which endeavored to expand the modus vivendi (the accommodation) of the Church with the Communist governments in Eastern Europe that was inaugurated by John XXIII in 1961, preceding the Nixon/Kissinger policy of détente by more than fifteen years. We also reported on the reengagement of the Vatican in the Italian elections of 1976. This helped prevent the Communists from achieving their historic compromise of entering into the government of Italy. This important Vatican effort paralleled our own strong and publicly enunciated policy against the historic compromise. Furthermore, I was active in persuading the pope not to condemn the neutron bomb. President Carter initially considered it as a means of restoring the military balance in Europe in the aftermath of the Soviet development and deployment of the SS-20 medium-range missiles that could hit targets throughout Europe. The other mission achievements related to coordinating with the Vatican the resettlement of Southeast Asian refugees and promoting U.S. foreign policy objectives in the Middle East and Lebanon, the war on drugs, and the Panama Canal Treaties.⁴⁰

Notwithstanding the success of our diplomatic activities, the mission maintained a very low public profile.⁴¹ As instructed by Lodge, I carried on my activities with extreme tact and circumspection and religiously avoided press interviews.⁴² We avoided discussion of ecclesiastical matters pertaining to the Catholic Church in the United States. This reflected the religious sensitivities in our country and also accorded with long-standing U.S. diplomatic tradition.⁴³ The mission operated in relative obscurity, sub rosa, and by stealth. The entry to our office on the fourth floor of an old palazzo at Via di Porta Pinciana, no. 4, was not adorned by the American eagle or the U.S. flag; we had no letterhead paper for our communications. These precautions successfully kept the mission off the public radar. This was reinforced by the State Department’s replies to the public regarding the mission. The boilerplate replies emphasized the obscurity of the mission by stating that Lodge had no official title, received no official salary, and his exchanging of information with the pope did not represent U.S. recognition of the sovereignty of the pope or the Vatican.

Nevertheless, the office pleasantly overlooked the beautiful Villa Borghese gardens and had one more extra benefit. It was near the Jesuit compound (at no. 1) that housed the intellectual powerhouse that was the staff of its journal, La Civiltà Cattolica. The Vatican’s Secretariat of State closely vetted the contents of the journal, and it therefore often represented Vatican positions on important issues. This proximity enabled me to seek clarifications of Vatican pronouncements or to get their observations on Italian political events.⁴⁴

The Vatican accorded Ambassador Lodge, given his preeminence as a U.S. statesman, former ambassador, and ex-senator, unprecedented access to Vatican officials and to the pope. The pope insisted on seeing Lodge whenever he was in Rome. I, as Lodge’s alter ego, had unprecedented access to two of the pope’s highest officials in the Secretariat of State:⁴⁵ the sostituto, or deputy secretary of state, Archbishop Giovanni Benelli (1975–77), and his successor, Giuseppe Caprio, in 1977, and the foreign minister (Archbishop Agostino Casaroli).⁴⁶ The Secretariat of State acted as a combination of the office of a prime minister and that of the Foreign Ministry. Furthermore, our diplomatic profile was consonant with Vatican demands for strict observance on confidentiality. We strove to be discreet at all times, and the effectiveness of our consultations were commensurate: We conducted friendly liaison with Vatican officials on emerging or developing international issues or events, and we made discreet and precisely timed representations on behalf of the highest level of U.S. officials.⁴⁷

The Historic Significance of the Year of Three Popes

The year 1978 was both ecclesiastically historic for the Roman Catholic Church and transformative in U.S. relations with the Vatican. It was historic because the last time there were three popes in one year was in 1503, and it was also historic because there had not been a non-Italian pope elected since 1522. All within a bit more than ninety days, we saw (1) a papal funeral (Paul VI); (2) a conclave to elect a new pope (John Paul I); (3) the inauguration of a new pope; (4) the death of the new pope; (5) the funeral of a second pope; (6) the conclave to elect a third pope (John Paul II), and (7) his inauguration. At the same time, the special mission’s public profile and its activities at the Vatican increased dramatically.

The other year of three popes, 1503, was also very significant in Vatican history. The first pope to die that year was the corrupt Renaissance pope Alexander VI, the infamous Borgia pope. The conclave of September 16 deadlocked over the choice of an Italian or Spanish cardinal. The Sacred College looked for a compromise candidate, one who was not expected to survive for long. They elected Cardinal Francesco (Tedeschini) Piccolomini, who as Pius III reigned for only twenty-six days, an even shorter period than the thirty-three-day papacy of John Paul I, who was elected in August 1978. Piccolomini was succeeded by a very consequential pope, Julius II, who is famous for having established in 1506 the Swiss Guards—a very small military corps. In 1978, the Swiss Guards consisted of about 130 men and still retained the colorful uniforms, pikes, and halberds, reportedly designed by Michelangelo. They accompanied Julius II on military campaigns, but in more modern times they control access to Vatican City, the Vatican Museums, and the Papal Palace and act as bodyguards to the pope. Julius is also remembered for having recruited three artistic giants, Raphael, Bramante, and Michelangelo, who produced magnificent masterpieces that still adorn the Vatican, including the Sistine Chapel ceiling, the Raphael Logia, and St. Peter’s Basilica. Because of these masterpieces, Julius II is considered in the art world as a most discriminating patron of the arts.

A comparison of the Holy See’s world position during the conclave of 1878 and that of the conclaves 100 years later is also very interesting. In 1878, the pope was––since 1870 when the Kingdom of Italy incorporated Rome to its domain—the prisoner of the Vatican. Only four nations in the world maintained diplomatic representatives at the Vatican, and the Church was burdened with the legacy of the Syllabus of Errors, which had condemned progress, liberalism, and modernity. In 1978, in stark contrast, ninety nations accredited ambassadors to the Holy See; the pope had undertaken international journeys through many continents, received the homage of millions of people, and had been applauded by world statesmen at the UN for his address on no more wars. The papacy was popular, as it enjoyed the legacy of the theological, liturgical, and governmental reforms of Vatican II, started by John XXIII and astutely expanded and managed by Paul VI. Furthermore, in 1978 there was no overt or covert intervention by any nation in the conclave, but in 1878 it was widely believed that three great powers—Austria, Prussia, and France—exercised a veto over certain candidates that constrained the liberty of the College of Cardinals in choosing the successor to Pio Nono (Pius IX).

As these developments relating to the death and election of new popes evolved in the late summer and early fall of 1978, the mission performed four tasks: (1) monitor events by keeping close contacts with Vatican officials; (2) provide the State Department and the White House with information on planned activities; (3) advise on possible delegations;⁴⁸ and (4) coordinate with the Vatican the attendance of four U.S. delegations to the ceremonies. An important task was to persuade the Vatican to make exceptions to its rigid protocol, especially on the number of people in our delegations. The task of accommodating the president’s wishes required, in addition to good relationships with Vatican officials that I carefully nurtured over the previous three years, a great deal of creativity and imagination. In this effort, I was impressed by the success of a small number of monsignori⁴⁹ to stage-manage such elaborate, large events.

The Vatican’s ability to stage impressive ceremonies is legendary. Vatican officials are masters at public relations. The monsignori did this almost effortlessly, demonstrating exceptional competence and professionalism in accommodating the incredibly large number of delegations from around the world while complying with stringent protocol requirements. This gained them the admiration of the diplomatic corps to the Vatican and the belated respect of thousands of journalists who covered the event.⁵⁰ In terms of the pageantry, perhaps only the British and possibly the Chinese can compare with the Vatican in stage-managing large public events. In addition to the throngs of pilgrims⁵¹ amassed in St. Peter’s Square, around 800 journalists covered the first conclave and the election of John Paul I in August 1978, and nearly 2,000 covered the inauguration of John Paul II in October 1978.

THE DEATH AND FUNERAL OF PAUL VI

In late July 1978, Lillian Carter, mother of President Carter, had an audience with Pope Paul at Castel Gandolfo⁵²—a rare exception, which I painstakingly arranged. The pope normally would not give any private audiences at his summer residence. She was on her way to the Sahel region in Africa to demonstrate U.S. concern for the misery caused by a severe drought. President Carter thought that an audience with the pope would enhance her effort to call world attention to the draught’s humanitarian disaster. My wife and I accompanied Miss Lillian to her audience with the pope on July 23, 1978. He wholeheartedly endorsed her trip to Africa, and the audience was a dignified and touching human affair, as two octogenarians talked about their deep commitment to alleviating human suffering.⁵³ We also enjoyed her wit and sharp intelligence during the afternoon when we accompanied her to visit the Sistine Chapel, St. Peter’s Basilica, and other Vatican sites.

After this worthwhile inspirational and memorable audience with the pope, I departed Rome at the end of July.⁵⁴ I returned to the United States to attend my twenty-fifth high school reunion in Geneva, New York, a rural community of 15,000.⁵⁵ On the evening of August 5, while attending my class dinner, the deputy assistant secretary for European affairs, Richard Vine, informed me that the pope was seriously ill. I offered to return immediately to Rome, but he advised me to stay put and promised to give me periodic updates.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, I immediately made plans to return to Rome.⁵⁷

Pope Paul died on August 6, 1978, and for two consecutive days thousands of the faithful streamed into Castel Gandolfo to pay their respects to a saintly figure who was much loved for his weekly general audiences on Wednesdays, and his perennial Sunday Angelus blessings of the crowds assembled in St. Peter’s Square from his apartment at the Vatican palace, which had taken place regularly for fifteen long and sometimes agonizing years. Then a special cortege began its descent from Castel Gandolfo, along the famous Appian Way, first to the Basilica of St. John Lateran, the pope’s cathedral as the bishop of Rome, and, as tradition dictated, the cortege was turned over to the mayor of Rome, who then conducted it to the outskirts of St. Peter’s Square, on the border of Italy and the independent Vatican City.⁵⁸ The pope’s body lay in state at St. Peter’s for an additional seven days, as prescribed by the Constitution for the Election of a New Pontiff, which Paul VI himself had promulgated in 1975, codifying and updating long-standing Vatican practices. In accord with the document’s provisions, while the body lay in state, there would be nine days of high Mass at St. Peter’s. According to press estimates, tens of thousands of pilgrims made their way to pay their respects to the pope.⁵⁹

President Carter designated First Lady Rosalynn Carter as head of the presidential delegation to represent him at the funeral. In this, the president followed precedent: other presidents had sent representatives to papal funerals and inaugurations. President Eisenhower, for example, had sent Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to the funeral of Pius XII in 1958, and President Kennedy had sent Vice President Lyndon Johnson to represent him at the funeral of John XXIII in 1963. In addition to Rosalynn Carter, the other delegates were Sen. Ted Kennedy, Gov. Hugh L. Carey of New York, Rep. Robert N. Giaimo, INS Commissioner Leonel J. Castillo, Walters, and I.⁶⁰

The Vatican organized two formal ceremonies: a state funeral and a ceremony to offer condolences to the College of Cardinals. The state funeral on August 12 was attended by 95 cardinals and 600 delegates representing 106 states and international organizations. At the last moment, it was moved from the inside to the outside of St. Peter’s in order to accommodate 150,000 pilgrims.⁶¹

Among other high-ranking representatives were UN Secretary-General Waldheim; the vice presidents of East Germany, Hungary, Poland,⁶² Switzerland, and El Salvador; and prime ministers from Belgium, Ireland, Italy, and Spain. Also present were representatives of all the Christian Churches, showing respect for the pope’s ecumenical efforts.⁶³ In addition, all the East European Communist states and the Soviet Union allowed religious delegations to attend the funeral. Eight leaders of European Communist nations, including Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev, sent condolence messages. These gestures confirmed their appreciation for Pope Paul’s conduct of Vatican Ostpolitik.

The funeral was a solemn, low-key, and somber affair. The impending conclave to elect a new pope generated an immense interest in the world’s press, including the 600-strong American press contingent, to report via print and broadcast all the details of the events surrounding the conclave and the election of a new pope. The media was saturated with reports on the events of the August conclave, which elected the new smiling pope, the charismatic John Paul I. In the midst of these events, Ambassador Walters resigned, and I carried on as the acting special envoy until early December 1978, when the president’s new special envoy arrived.

THE CONCLAVE, ELECTION, AND INAUGURATION OF JOHN PAUL I

Following Pope Paul’s death, Vaticanologists, diplomats, journalists, and other observers began a stream of speculation as to who were the papabile––that is, the likely candidates for election as pope.⁶⁴ The mission dutifully reported some of these speculations, including the confidential analysis by the Italian Embassy to the Holy See, which caused considerable embarrassment to the Italian ambassador when it was leaked to the press.⁶⁵

The principles governing the conclave had evolved prudently over a millennium, and its procedures were updated by Pope Paul in early 1975 in the apostolic constitution Romano pontifici eligendo. Paradoxically, the selection of a pope entails essentially democratic means for a nondemocratic end, such as using a vote by secret ballot. However, the elected pope becomes the absolute monarch of the Holy See, Vatican City, and the Roman Catholic Church.

Because the operations of the conclave are secret and cardinal electors are sworn not to reveal what happens within the locked doors of the Sistine Chapel, everything published regarding the proceedings there on August 25 and 26 was merely speculative. Among Vatican observers, however, there was consensus on two criteria that the cardinals would look for in electing a pope: (1) a candidate with pastoral rather than curial experience, and (2) someone older than fifty so that the next pontificate would not be too long. This indicated someone unlike Pope Paul, who was associated with Vatican diplomacy for more than thirty years. There was also a maverick group that lobbied for selecting a pope who can smile. In retrospect, it seems that the College of Cardinals chose the archbishop of Venice on the third or fourth ballot on the first full day of the conclave.⁶⁶

Most observers were surprised with the rapidity of the election.⁶⁷ This was one of the shortest conclaves in history. According to some, the Holy Spirit was at work. In a surprise and historic innovation, the new pope took the name John Paul I, partly, as he said, to honor John XXIII, whom he had succeeded in Venice, and partly to honor Paul VI, who elevated him to be a cardinal. No previous pope had chosen a double name. In choosing it, John Paul I signaled that he would continue a programmatic policy in the spirit of Vatican II, which John XXIII had opened and Pope Paul astutely ended and expanded.⁶⁸ Those who had predicted the election of a pastoral pope were on target––the cardinal had not served in any curial positions in Rome and had not been a Vatican diplomat.⁶⁹

THE PAPACY OF JOHN PAUL I AND THE UNITED STATES

The new pope was humble, ever-smiling, and democratic. As an additional surprise to his choice of a double name, John Paul I chose not to be crowned or to wear the papal tiara. He chose to be inaugurated in a simple, non-regal ceremony as the supreme pastor of the Church, thereby breaking, according to Peter Nichols,⁷⁰ one of the best Vaticanologists, with about a thousand years of tradition. His smile and initial public demeanor electrified public opinion around the world and instantly seemed to elevate the Vatican’s global spiritual and political influence. His initial public behavior and pronouncements enhanced the papacy’s worldwide prestige, which historically has had both a spiritual and political dimension.

With the election of the new pope, the activities of the special mission shifted to making arrangements for the usual presidential letter of congratulations and the preparations for U.S. representation and attendance at the inauguration ceremonies.⁷¹ There was, of course, also an interest in Washington for us to report on the personality and programmatic trajectory of the new pope. We complied. Our reporting on the conclave included the following reports: Conclave 1978: Election of New Pope;⁷² "Conclave 1978: Papal