Kamikazes, Corsairs, and Picket Ships: Okinawa 1945

By Robin L. Rielly

The untold story of ferocious air and naval combat during the WWII Battle of Okinawa—drawn from primary sources and survivor interviews.
 
This is the story of an overlooked yet significant aerial and naval battle during the American assault on Okinawa in the spring of 1945. While losses to America’s main fleet are well recorded, less well known is the terrific battle waged on the radar picket line, the fleet’s outer defense against Japanese marauders. Weaving together the experiences of the ships and their crews—drawn from ship and aircraft action reports, ship logs, and personal interviews—historian Robin L. Reilly recounts one of the most ferocious air and naval battles in history.
 
The US fleet—and its accompanying airpower—was so massive that the Japanese could only rely on suicide attacks to inflict critical damage. Of the 206 ships that served on radar picket duty, twenty-nine percent were sunk or damaged by Japanese air attacks, making theirs the most hazardous naval surface duty in World War II. The great losses were largely due to relentless kamikaze attacks, but also resulted from the improper use of support gunboats, failure to establish land-based radar at the earliest possible time, the assignment of ships ill-equipped for picket duty, and, as time went on, crew fatigue. US air cover during the battle is also described in full, as squadrons dashed from their carriers and land bases to intercept the Japanese swarms, resulting in constant melees over the fleet.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Casemate Publishers
• Release date: Sep 5, 2008
• ISBN: 9781935149910

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Published in the United States of America and Great Britain in 2010 by

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Copyright © Robin L. Rielly 2008

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface and Acknowledgements

Introduction The Nature of Radar Picket Duty

Notes

Bibliography

To Emma Kaitlyn Rielly

Preface and Acknowledgments

My initial interest in the ordeal of the radar picket ships at Okinawa was aroused during previous research on the LCS(L) gunboats in the Pacific theater. Many had served on the radar picket stations at Okinawa; however, the books about the battle for Okinawa hardly mentioned them. I began to realize that no historian had made a complete study of the radar picket ships’ ordeal at Okinawa. In the few works that touched upon the subject, destroyers were the focus of attention. With this in mind, I began a study to look further into the events surrounding the radar picket ships’ story.

As the project began, I had preconceived notions that the primary focus would be on the activities of the ships assigned to the radar picket stations. It soon became evident that there was another aspect to the ordeal, the flyers of the combat air patrols. At first the easiest and most obvious sources to find were those covering the activities of the navy and marine squadrons. After much research, occasional references to army air force planes began to show up, leading me down new paths. Within the first year of the study, the project had grown to include several classes of ships as well as the activities of navy, marine and army pilots as they worked in conjunction with the ships below them.

Since the fighting around the picket stations involved the kamikazes, it also seemed necessary to briefly describe their activities as well. Much of the informative material came from interrogations conducted by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, the Far Eastern Bureau of the British Ministry of Information, the Advanced Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, and the Military Intelligence Section of the General Headquarters Far East Command. The Japanese Monograph series was quite useful, providing information about various activities. As a result of the ULTRA program, numerous Japanese communications intercepted during the war were translated by American intelligence and are available as Magic Far East Summaries. In addition to supplying information about Japanese preparations and military movements, the summaries also helped to pinpoint the locations of various air units. Through these diffuse sources I have been able to write about the kamikaze’s activities as they relate to the picket ships.

Throughout the reports generated by American forces, as well as post-World War II literature, the kamikazes have continually been referred to as suicide pilots and I have used suicide throughout the text in order to keep some consistency in the writing. I do not, however, believe that this is an accurate descriptor for the actions of the men who flew special attack missions. When faced with the invasion of their country, these men were convinced by a militaristic government that the only way to save their homes and families was to use their aircraft, boats and other weapons in the most effective way, by crashing them into an American ship. Many did not believe their government to be correct in this assertion, but they did what men frequently do in combat, they followed orders and sacrificed themselves for their family, friends and country. This is quite different from committing suicide. I feel it important to make this distinction at the outset since I have, of necessity, quoted many reports describing their activities as suicidal. The Japanese themselves never considered these missions to be suicidal. They viewed the tactic as a special type of weapon borne of necessity. In spite of my disagreement with the term, it has been necessary to use that term continually as all of the official records contain it. Mixing terms would lead to confusion.

In an interview after the war, Lt. Gen. Masakazu Kawabe, who served as commanding general of the General Air Army noted:

You call our Kamikaze attacks suicide attacks. This is a misnomer and we feel very badly about your calling them suicide attacks. They were in no sense suicide. The pilot did not start out on his mission with the intention of committing suicide. He looked upon himself as a human bomb which would destroy a certain part of the enemy fleet for his country. They considered it a glorious thing, while suicide may not be so glorious.¹

To which his interrogator, Col. Ramsay D. Potts, replied, We call it suicide because we cannot find any other word in our vocabulary to describe those certain tactics.

Throughout the text, I have used the Allied code names for Japanese aircraft. The most famous of them was the Mitsubishi A6M5 Zero. However, all action reports filed by ships and aircraft squadrons use the allied code name of Zeke. To avoid confusion, I have used this code name throughout the text. Other aircraft are best known to Western readers by their code names. Japanese names are given in the western style, that is, surname first and family name last. Although it is not Japanese practice, it is more familiar to American readers. Ranks for individuals mentioned are contemporaneous with the event. Throughout the reports utilized in this work, times of the day have all been given in military time, i.e. 0-24 hours. In addition, all times are Item, which is Greenwich Mean Time minus 9 hours.

American ships have a class designator and hull number after their name. To make the text more readable, I have only included them in the full list of radar picket ships in the appendix. In a few cases I have included them for lesser known types of civilian ships or auxiliaries.

The overwhelming majority of the text is based on original source material, including unit war diaries, action reports, ship logs, interviews, correspondence, interrogations, and official documents. In many cases I have been able to access private diaries kept by men involved in the action as well as those who personally communicated their stories to me. A number of self-published books by participants have also been written, providing the reader with eye-witness accounts of the action.

I have tried to avoid a journalistic style in my writing; however, in order to understand the extent of the carnage on the radar picket stations it was sometimes necessary. Ship action reports do not describe the grisly aftermath of a kamikaze attack. In contrast there were torn limbs, decapitated bodies and terrible burns suffered by the men who experienced the kamikaze’s crash. By comparison, aircraft action reports frequently read as though they were written by journalists. In order to keep some semblance of continuity in writing style, I have attempted to bridge the gap between both writing styles in my own prose. In regard to the many quotes from action reports and other primary sources, I have not made any alterations to their text. In many cases the reports are terse, slang ridden, missing words, and not always grammatically correct, having been produced under conditions that might conservatively be described as difficult. The term for unidentified aircraft, bogeys, is frequently spelled as bogies in many of the official reports and the plural for various ships usually is spelled using an apostrophe s. In order to maintain accuracy, I have not altered the originals even though many are grammatically incorrect. I have also refrained from constantly inserting [sic] to indicate these errors in order to maintain readability. In a few instances it was necessary to insert a word to enhance clarity.

I have organized the text in chronological order and discussed the activities on each radar picket station in turn. The reader will note that there are no entries for some days or for activity at some of the stations. Although the picket ships were on station at all times, in many cases there was little action to report. Simply listing that ships were present did not seem practical. This does not mean, however, that the ships on station during those times had it easy. They suffered from frequent calls to general quarters whenever unidentified planes approached. In many cases they simply fired on an enemy aircraft and drove it away. The discussion of such incidents did not lend great interest, so they are not included.

Historians whose forte is social, political, or economic history sometimes note that military historians seem inordinately fond of describing the hardware used in battle. In a broad sense, the history of war is also a history of technology, and it is difficult not to include the details of various ships, planes and weapons that are an integral part of the story. Technology, as it relates to war, is an important facet of military history and in many cases determines the outcome of a particular battle. Certainly, in the story of the radar picket stations, technological advances in aircraft, aircraft detection and the comparative performance of various aircraft are important to note.

Historians cannot operate alone. They are continually dependent upon the good will and cooperation of others as they search for numerous materials. Accordingly, it is with great appreciation that I must acknowledge the support and assistance of many individuals. During my frequent trips to the National Archives in College Park, Maryland, I have benefited greatly by the expert help given to me by Barry Zerby of the Textual Reference Branch. In many instances, he has helped to locate records of an obscure nature buried within the vast collection housed there. As the reader will observe, I like to use historic photos and maps to illustrate various events whenever possible. While this is most definitely not a pictorial history of the radar picket ships, I believe that the use of photographs is invaluable in helping the reader to better understand the ordeal. In the Photographic Reference Branch of the National Archives, Sharon Cully and Rutha Beamon have been most generous with their help. There were many instances where I felt that a particular illustration would be impossible to find, but their patience in finding the desired photographs always provided positive results.

The staff of the Navy Historical Center in Washington, D.C. has always been helpful in locating various materials in their collection, both textual and photographic. Edward Finney was able to locate a number of photos not in the collection at the National Archives, thereby completing the illustrations. At one point, toward the end of my research, I came to realize that I had managed to obtain virtually every photo for which I had searched. In the Operational Archives Branch of the Navy Historical Center are the collected papers of the National Association of USS LCS (L) 1130. Many rare photos and personal documents are in the collection and help to bring added detail to some of the actions described herein. At the United States Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, the staff of Dr. Richard Sommers were helpful in searching through various collections for material relating to my subject. The archives of the Tailhook Association in San Diego proved to be of significant value as well. Lieutenant Commander Doug Seigfried directed me to miscellaneous records for the Navy squadrons that I had not seen elsewhere.

In our modern age, the computer has proven to be an invaluable tool for researchers. In addition to providing contact with various libraries and research facilities, it has also made it possible to quickly find veteran’s groups with individual members who served on the radar picket ships. Although I have been able to meet with many individually, the number has been increased through the use of e-mail, giving me access to many veterans who might otherwise have been impossible to contact. Numerous veterans of World War II have willingly shared their personal papers, photographs and recollections with me. Their contributions have helped bring life to the text. For their assistance, I am indebted to Robert Augustad, Dr. Donald Ball, John L. Barkley, Raymond Baumler, Earl Blanton, Otis Wayne Bennett, Robert Blyth, Harold H. Burgess, William R. Christman, Frank M. Davis, Sr., Willis A. Bud Dworzak, Melvin Fenoglio, David Gauthier, Paul Glasser, John Huber, Curtis Irwin, Lawrence Katz, Harold Kaup, James W. Kelley, Lee Kendall, Doyle Kennedy, Robert W. Landis, Wendell Larson, Stanley E. Logan, Walter Longhurst, Dr.William Mason, Captain Richard M. McCool, Marvin Pederson, Robert F. Rielly, John Rooney, L.R. Russell, Mark Sellis, Tom Spargo, Robert Sprague, Joseph Staigar, Donald H. Sweet, Harold Tolmas, Douglas Towner, Robert H. Tyldesley, Lieutenant Colonel Harry B. Vaughan, Colonel Durwood B. Williams, Colonel David B. Weisman, Gordon H. Wiram, and Dr. Robert Wisner.

Ronald Mackay, a researcher whose field of expertise is the LSM (R) ships, willingly shared his information about these rocket ships which suffered great losses on radar picket duty. Mike Staton, author of The Fighting Bob A Wartime History of the USS Robley D. Evans (DD-552), shared materials and leads on the Evans and also on VMF-441, his current research project.

I must thank my friends John Rooney, Clifford Day and my wife Lucille for their help in proofreading the manuscript and making valuable suggestions. In spite of their diligent efforts, the final responsibility for the quality of the manuscript rests with the author.

Robin L. Rielly – April 2008

Introduction: The Nature of Radar Picket Duty

The invasion of the island of Okinawa represented the largest amphibious landing in the Pacific theater of operations. The assault engaged 1, 213 U.S. Navy vessels of all types, with an additional 104 in supportive roles. Committed to the battle were a total of 451, 866 navy, marine and army personnel. During the assault phase and in the ensuing weeks, the waters around the invasion beaches were covered with ships of all description landing men and supplies, firing on selected targets on the beaches and screening the area against attack from the land, sea and air.

This huge assembly of ships was an irresistible target for the aircraft of the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Force and the Japanese Army Air Force. As the invasion developed, the men, their equipment, and the ships supporting them were ready targets for Japanese planes bent on their destruction.

Okinawa was considered crucial by both sides and would prove to be extremely costly to the Japanese and Americans alike. Located about 350 miles south of Kyushu, the island was in Japan’s back yard. Were the Americans to capture Okinawa, Japan would be subject to increased air attacks and the island would be a perfect staging area for the invasion of the Japanese home islands.

To defend Okinawa, the Japanese had eighty thousand troops ashore and the ability to strike the American forces there from bases in Taiwan, Kyushu and some of the islands just to the south of Kyushu, such as Kikaigashima and Tokuno Shima.

Since the distances were not so great and the missions of the kamikazes one-way, the Japanese could use a variety of plane types that might not normally be used for regular combat missions. Pilots who flew these kamikaze missions were usually not well trained. As the last year of war began the crush of time and fuel shortages precluded extended pilot training.

Above is an overall view of the geographic areas surrounding the battle for Okinawa. Japanese aircraft were able to attack American forces from Taiwan and Kyushu as well as a number of islands between them and Okinawa. Adapted from CINCPAC–CINCPOA Bulletin No. 77-45. Daito Shoto. 20 March 1945.

The invasion of Okinawa, code named Operation Iceberg, began about 08:32 on 1 April 1945 as American troops landed on the beaches. For several days prior to the landings, the Americans bombarded Okinawa and seized islands of the Kerama Retto group west of the southern coast of Okinawa. On 1 April American forces quickly moved inland and captured the airfields at Kadena and Yontan. Within a few days they were operational and served as bases for marine fighter squadrons. These squadrons were instrumental in defending the ships on the radar picket stations around Okinawa and formed an important part of the combat air patrol.

To protect the troops ashore and their support ships, the planners of Operation Iceberg set up a ring of radar picket stations around Okinawa to give advance notice of air raids headed for the Hagushi beachhead. Low flying planes, in particular, were a serious threat as shipboard radar might not be able to pick them up. Patrolling on each of these stations was a specially equipped destroyer with a fighter director team aboard. Flying overhead was a combat air patrol of American aircraft from the carriers and shore bases which were prepared to intercept the incoming enemy aircraft. As the fighter director team detected aircraft approaching their station, it vectored the combat air patrol toward the Japanese intruders. This coordinated team of ships and planes provided the primary defense for the invasion fleet at Okinawa. If all went according to plan, the enemy aircraft would be shot down before they could inflict damage on the troops and vessels in the landing area. The commander of Task Force 51, Vice Adm. Richmond K. Turner, asserted that The bulk of the defense of the OKINAWA amphibious operation evolved around the raid reporting and fighter direction exercised by the exposed Fighter Director ships and their supporting elements in the Radar Picket Stations.¹

A study of any subject must have limits. The author’s goal is not to cover the actions of every ship at Okinawa that encountered kamikazes. The ships on the radar picket stations were not the only ships involved in protecting the Okinawa area. Various other screens were set up around the Hagushi anchorage and other critical areas to patrol against submarines and aircraft and to protect various task forces and task groups. They all used radar or sonar to detect the approach of the enemy. While many of these screens suffered from the kamikaze’s attacks, they are not included in this work. Of necessity, I have had to limit the ships covered herein to those on the actual designated radar picket stations. These numbered 206 ships and their tale alone takes much telling.

Radar picket ships had been used before, but in a different way. In the earlier stages of the war, single picket ships had been stationed at a distance from the main force. Their primary mission was to detect Japanese surface and air units. After the campaign for the Philippines, it became increasingly evident that the threat from Japanese warships had diminished considerably. However, another peril had arisen; Japan’s newly developed Special Attack Corps sent its pilots to crash their planes into American ships. Since the ships on the radar picket stations might be the first that the kamikazes encountered, they were in grave danger. This meant that the picket destroyer needed additional support in the form of other destroyers or gunboats. The commanding officer of the destroyer Dyson, Comdr. L.E. Ruff, explained the rationale for using additional ships on the picket station:

The picket of old – the lonely sentinel who frequently took station just within range of high frequency voice communication with the mother force - enjoyed a certain security which the present picket does not enjoy. If this picket ship encountered a strong enemy surface force, he was expected to report and then retire to the shelter of the heavier ships. Any enemy aircraft which he detected was probably more interested in sinking a carrier, battleship, or cruiser than in chalking up a light naval unit.

The Kamikaze Corps made its entry with much the same thought in mind - to attack the heavy ship. The suicide boys soon discovered that while they might bruise one of the heavies they could, with the same expenditures of material and personnel, sink a light vessel. Destroyers and lighter units became the chief pieces de resistance.

Under coordinated suicide attack the single picket was a very vulnerable target. Planes attacking simultaneously from different bearings compelled the control officer to divide his battery, shifting some guns to the Mark 51 director with the consequent reduction of accuracy. It was most evident that the radar picket required additional vessels to support his station. Supporting ships were added until the station reached the present strength.²

For most of the period that the radar picket stations were patrolled, from one to three additional destroyer types and several smaller support ships covered each station. The majority of the ships consisted of eighty-eight Landing Craft Support (Large) (Mark 3) ships or LCS (L)s and eighty-six Destroyers (DD). Other ships assigned to the duty included nine Light Mine Layers (DM), six High Speed Minesweepers (DMS), eleven Landing Ships Medium (Rockets) (LSM (R)s), four Patrol Motor Gunboats (PGMs) and two Destroyer Escorts (DEs). Some of them were better equipped for the support role than others, and those that were not paid a heavy price. In all, 206 ships and more than 36, 000 men served on the designated radar picket stations ringing the island.

Although the original plan called for a total of fifteen radar picket stations, a sixteenth was soon added with additional intermediate stations created as the situation demanded. Thus, Radar Picket Stations 15A and 16A were also included on later maps. Although fifteen stations were shown on early maps, the addition of a sixteenth along with A variations on some others meant that by the end of the war there were actually twenty-one locations where the ships might have been assigned to patrol. The radius of the hub was located at Point Bolo (Zampa Misaki). This point of land was just north of the invasion beaches at Hagushi and the airfields at Kadena and Yontan. In his Operation Order of 16 March 1945, Vice Admiral Turner indicated that he had originally planned to use Radar Picket Stations # 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, and 14, but by the time of the invasion this had been changed.³ As the campaign developed and the Japanese became familiar with their locations, some flexibility was needed. Ships frequently occupied day and night stations with the positions of some stations, such as # 3, 5, and 9, shifted at night to confuse the Japanese. As losses began to mount, the actual locations of the day stations were eventually moved as well. During the operation, the locations of RP Stations # 9 and 15 were adjusted for greater safety and efficiency in detecting incoming raids and became 9A and 15A respectively. Radar Picket Stations # 11 and 16 were changed to 11A and 16A. Radar Picket Stations # 6, 8, and 13 were not used at all.

Radar Picket Station # 11, situated twenty-one miles to the west of Point Bolo, was the closest and RP Station # 8, ninety-five and one-half miles to the southwest, was the farthest. The average distance from Point Bolo to a radar picket station was fifty-two and one-half miles. Most crucial were RP Stations 1, 2, 3, and 4 as they were to the north of the island and stood directly in the path of planes coming from Japan. Of these, the most dangerous was RP Station # 1. Eighteen of the sixty ships sunk or damaged on radar picket duty were hit while patrolling this station.

Although the original plans called for the occupation of RP Stations # 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, and 14, as the campaign developed RP Stations # 7 and 12 were filled as well. These were the active posts from 24 March until mid-May 1945. In time, concern was raised over increasing attacks from Taiwan and on 1 May RP Station # 9, which had been used briefly at the end of March, was put back into use.

During the invasion of Iheya Shima, from 3 June to 7 June, a special radar picket station was set up just to the north of the island to protect the invasion forces. On my chart I have designated this as Radar Picket Station S, since no number was assigned to it.

Radar picket stations surrounding the island were a necessity, since some of the outlying islands that might be good sites for radar installations were in enemy hands. The desirability of having radar installations on shore was great, particularly since the radar picket ships began to take a severe beating from Japanese air attacks. Vice Admiral Turner reported:

Due to the severity of the radar picket losses CTF 51 requested that the planned radar installations at HEDO-MISAKI, on the northern tip of Okinawa, and an installation at BISE on the tip of the MOTOBU Peninsula be established on a high priority basis. Although these points were under Marine control by 13 April, the site at HEDO-MISAKI was not operational until 21 April, and four additional days were required to establish satisfactory communications. The emergency station at BISE was not established. With the capture of IE SHIMA an SCR-527 Radar and an SCR-602 Radar were set up and in operation by 23 April.⁴

By mid-May 1945, some of the eastern islands and Tori Shima had been occupied and new radar installations had been established that relieved the radar picket ships of some of their duties. As a result, the ships no longer had eight stations to patrol, the number was reduced to five. Some of the stations were only patrolled at night.

One of the controversies surrounding the ordeal of the radar picket ships was the failure on the part of Iceberg’s planners to consider the capture of outlying islands first, which could have served as ideal radar posts thus eliminating the need for ships to patrol on the radar picket stations. This would have been a relatively simple matter as some of the most important islands were eventually taken with no opposition. Radar set up on Tori Shima, occupied on 12 May with no opposition, could have covered the area patrolled by ships on RP Station # 10. Radar was eventually installed on Aguni Shima, captured on 9 June and nearby Kume Jima on 26 June. Both were captured without opposition and could have eased the burden of the radar picket ships at RP Stations # 9 and 11A. Iheya Jima, also undefended, was taken on 2 June. Radar there would have significantly eased the plight of the ships at RP Stations # 1, 2, and 3. One can only speculate as to why the capture of these islands was not accomplished earlier.

Some of the stations were close to islands which the Japanese planes used to cover their approach. Lieutenant Comdr. J.F. Miller, commanding officer of the destroyer Pritchett, noted: Radar Picket station #11A is considered by this command to have been very poorly located. The SC-2 radar scope was so thoroughly blocked by land echoes that it was of little use either in fighter direction or in early warning of approaching raids. It was felt that when on that station the safety of the ship and the mission was at a low ebb.⁵ A change to RP # 3 was recommended by Comdr. R.D. Fusselman, commanding officer of the destroyer Wadsworth. He recommended shifting the station ten miles to the east since nearby land also interfered with radar.

Initially, the plan was to have the destroyer types directly on the station with the support gunboats between stations. This requirement led to some problems as the campaign developed. Support gunboats stationed that far from the fighter director destroyer were at too great a distance to lend their firepower in case of attack. This quickly became evident during the first of the Kikusui attacks in early April 1945. Commander Ruff noted that: A divergent policy of a few OTCs [Officer in Tactical Command] would place the fire support craft 5 miles from the destroyer body at all times, thus relegating the LCS group to the role of medical assistants and fire fighters.⁶

The early stages of the radar picket operation were problematic, with only one to three ships assigned to an RP station. Usually there was one destroyer type (DD, DM, or DMS) with two LCS (L) gunboats acting as support vessels. Ideally, the gunboats were supposed to add their firepower to that of the destroyer in an attempt to intercept incoming aircraft. However, the area to be covered was so great that they might be stationed miles apart and only occasionally be able to support each other. By 10 April 1945, more ships became available and one or two destroyers and two to four of the LCS (L) gunboats were on each station. At times they were also supplemented by LSM (R)s and PGMs. By 19 May 1945, more ships had arrived from the states and other areas of the Pacific theater and on each radar picket station there were usually three of the destroyer types and four of the LCS (L) gunboats.

In order to have the most effective reporting of incoming raids, specially equipped destroyer types were used. At the beginning, nineteen were designated as fighter director ships and had fighter director teams with supporting radio and radar equipment. This enabled them to identify incoming raids and vector combat air patrol fighters to intercept the planes.

Unidentified aircraft approaching the ships were referred to as bogeys. Once a positive identification became possible, the bogey was identified as either a friendly or a bandit. Bandits came under immediate attack and, on occasion, friendly’s were fired upon before they were identified as such.

As the operation progressed, and ships were hit by kamikazes and put out of action, their fighter director teams were transferred to other destroyer types. Some of these were also sunk or damaged but by 17 May 1945 the number of manned radar picket stations was reduced from eight to five. By the end of July and the beginning of August 1945, American land forces had captured many outlying islands and established radar installations. Only two of the radar picket stations were in use at that time.

The danger to ships from Japanese aircraft was terrible, but fatigue and frayed nerves took their toll as well. One of the many problems plaguing the picket ships was the lack of rest resulting from constantly being called to general quarters with unidentified planes approaching the station. It was not unusual for tired and jumpy gunners on the ships to open fire on friendly aircraft.

Charles Thomas, a crewman on the LCS (L) 35, wrote:

After the stresses of the invasion and ten days on the picket line, our capacity to endure is waning. Our nerves are at a breaking point. Close friends snarl at one another. I went below this morning to get something from my locker. As I opened my locker door, someone working on one of the guns dropped a heavy wrench on the steel deck above. I jumped like I had been jolted with high voltage electricity.⁷

Pilots assigned to fly combat air patrol missions above the radar picket stations were well aware of the situation below. Hellcat pilot James W. Vernon later wrote that the VF-87 planes stayed out of range of their hair-trigger gun crews.⁸

The campaign for Okinawa officially ended on 21 June 1945, however, ships continued to patrol the remaining radar picket stations until 13 August 1945 with resultant casualties. Totals for the ten Kikusui raids between 6 April and 22 June 1945 were 1, 465 suicide aircraft, with numerous other planes flying conventional missions and serving as escorts for the kamikazes. Still other raids occurred before and after the period 6 April to 22 June 1945. In all, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey estimated that approximately 4, 000 Japanese planes were destroyed in combat, of which 1, 900 were suicide planes…. of 28 ships sunk by air attack, 26 were by Kamikaze planes; of 225 damaged by air attack, 164 were by this means.⁹ Of the numbers cited above, fifteen of the ships were sunk on radar picket duty and forty-five damaged.¹⁰ These figures alone would be indicative of the danger inherent in the duty, however, when one considers that a total of 206 ships served on the radar picket stations, it means that radar picket ships endured a 29 percent casualty rate. Others suffered on the radar picket stations as well. The pilots who flew combat air patrol missions and the radar picket patrols whose mission it was to protect the picket ships were also at great risk. Numerous fatalities and plane losses occurred on this duty as well.

Why were the losses on the radar picket stations so great? A superficial analysis of the radar pickets’ ordeal would seem to indicate that kamikaze aircraft were simply difficult to stop. No matter what happened, the kamikazes were bound to take their toll. To a certain extent this is true, however, other factors came into play as well. Among them were the improper use of the support gunboats, failure to establish land-based radar at the earliest possible time, assignment of ships ill-suited to the task, and crew fatigue.

Kamikaze attacks, rather than being fanatical missions launched by madmen, were actually the only possibility for the Japanese to prevent the invasion of their homeland. They were the only rational means by which it could be demonstrated to the Americans that an invasion of Japan would be too costly. As a result, the Japanese committed a large percentage of their aircraft and available pilots to the one-way missions. Kamikaze numbers far in excess of those encountered in the Philippines’ campaign ren dered the planning for Operation Iceberg’s air defenses insufficient. Support gunboats, conceived as an added protection for the fighter director destroyers were, in many cases, not used to their full advantage. Among the ships assigned to the duty were the LSM (R)s. As specialty ships designed to attack shore targets, they lacked the best armament for fighting aircraft. In addition, they were large and slow. Fatigue also played a role in the losses. Officers and men, worn out by continual calls to general quarters and constantly on alert, were probably not capable of making the best tactical decisions.

Radar Picket Stations at Okinawa. Adapted from Enclosure 6 to Appendix K COM PHIBS PAC OP PLAN A1-45.

What was the experience of men assigned to the ships and how did the action unfold? The following is an attempt to put together the story of the ships and planes of the navy, marines and army air force and the men who drew, what may arguably be described as, one of the most hazardous naval duties of World War II.

CHAPTER 1

Tin Cans and Gunboats

Assigning ships to picket duty was not a new concept in the United States Navy. Such assignments were a regular part of any major operation and usually involved stationing pickets at some distance from the main unit to warn of approaching enemy air or sea forces. This had been a standard practice in the Pacific for some time. The increasing availability of destroyers made their use by fast carrier task groups possible. Destroyers were particularly useful at night for early warning of enemy aircraft and ships. What differed at Okinawa was the close proximity to the home islands of Japan and the magnitude of the forces involved in the invasion. The vast numbers of ships and troops required more than a few single pickets, and the previous experiences in the Philippines’ campaign had alerted the Navy leadership to the probability of more intense kamikaze attacks. Special, more extensive, picket coverage was needed for the invasion of Okinawa.

The ships that manned the radar picket stations at Okinawa were under the command of Capt. Frederick Moosbrugger, who served as the commander of Task Group 51.5. At the beginning of Operation Iceberg, Moosbrugger was the Amphibious Force Area Screen Commander (CTU 51.1.13). His unit was assigned to screen the Western Islands Attack Force as it made its way from Leyte to Kerama Retto. On 1 April 1945, as the invasion of Okinawa proper began, his unit became Task Group 51.5 and was responsible for the radar picket destroyers and their support ships, as well as the maintenance and control of the anti-submarine and anti-aircraft screen around Okinawa.

Other tasks that fell under his direction were the screens that intercepted suicide boats and other small craft, local hunter-killer groups, the escorting of various elements of the seaborne forces, and rescue missions. In this capacity, he reported directly to Vice Adm. Richmond Kelley Turner (CTF 51) who was headquartered on Eldorado AGC 11. For most of the campaign, Eldorado was anchored in the Hagushi area and had overall control of the fighter direction at Okinawa. Moosbrugger made his headquarters aboard the amphibious assault ship Biscayne AGC 18. Biscayne would spend much of her time anchored in the Hagushi area near Eldorado, directing the various screens under Moosbrugger’s command. From 29 May through 11 June 1945, Moosbrugger temporarily shifted his command to Panamint AGC 13, since Rear Adm. L.F. Reifsnider needed Biscayne for the invasions of Iheya Shima and Aguni Shima. On 1 July, Moosbrugger left the ship for a conference in Pearl Harbor and the Biscayne departed Okinawa for Leyte.

Captain Frederick Moosbrugger. NARA 38 MCN 377.

Coordinating the Combat Air Patrols

Operating over Okinawan waters at any given time were aircraft from the various carriers, as well as those from the fields on Okinawa and Ie Shima. Coordinating their efforts was the task of the combat information center on board the Eldorado. As the force fighter director ship at Okinawa, the Eldorado controlled all defensive air activity. The Fighter Director Officer in the CIC determined the size of the combat air patrols and assigned them to the various radar picket destroyers which controlled them. Each of these radar picket destroyers had a fighter director team aboard.¹

The CIC on board the Eldorado had to coordinate the activities of various CAPs from Task Force 58, Task Group 52.1 and the shore-based aircraft of the Tenth Army Tactical Air Force. Control of these CAP units could be transferred to local fighter director teams, such as those on board the fighter director ship at a radar picket station. Night fighters on combat air patrol first reported in to Eldorado and were then assigned a sector. One was usually retained under the control of Eldorado and a second placed under the control of Panamint, Teton AGC 14, or one of the fighter director destroyers on the radar picket stations. On nights when additional night fighters were aloft, they would be assigned to the Estes AGC 12or to one of the fighter director destroyers. Through this process, the activities of the numerous American aircraft flying combat air patrols over the skies at Okinawa were coordinated.

On 17 May 1945, Vice Adm. Harry W. Hill took over command of Task Force 51, relieving Vice Admiral Turner. As a result, Ancon AGC 4became the new amphibious force flagship and assumed control over the skies for the remainder of the operation.

Vice Admiral Richmond K. Turner — January 1945. NARA 80G 302369.

An Overview of the Picket Ships

In preparation for the task of covering the radar picket stations, special fighter director teams were trained to identify incoming aircraft and work with the combat air patrols. Nineteen ships were outfitted with special equipment to perform the task, each with a fighter director team assigned to them. The ships were the destroyers Bennett, Bennion, Brown, Bryant, Bush, Cassin Young, Colhoun, Cowell, Gregory, Halligan, Hudson, Luce, Mannert L. Abele, Pritchett, Stanly, Wickes, and the light mine layers, Aaron Ward, Robert H. Smith, and Shea. One of the destroyers, Halligan, never served on radar picket duty. She struck a mine and sank on 26 March 1945, several days prior to the invasion. Still others made it through invasion day