China’s peaceful rise: Perceptions, policy and misperceptions

By Christopher Herrick, Zheya Gai and Surain Subramaniam

Adopting a constructivist approach, this book argues that China's prospects for achieving 'great power' status peacefully depend more on perceptions of the country's development than on concrete measures of power or economic benefits. Incorporating historical perceptions, survey data and general analysis, the authors explore Chinese foreign policies in international organisations, international trade, security relations and as a model for global governance, as well as the reactions to those policies within the context of China's relations with Asian neighbours (India, Japan and the states of South-east Asia), existing international powers (the European Union, Russia and the United States), and emergent trading partners (Africa).

• Language: English
• Publisher: Manchester University Press
• Release date: Sep 26, 2016
• ISBN: 9781526104809

Book preview

1

Introduction

Christopher Herrick, Zheya Gai and Surain Subramaniam

China’s spectacular economic growth has been arguably one of the most significant factors in shaping the world’s changing political and economic structure in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Some perceive China’s growth and its increasing economic and political influence to be akin to the problematic rise of Germany in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In part due to China’s very different cultural and historic experiences, others view China’s rise as a phenomenon with much less threatening implications for the international political and economic system and for both large and small states that function within that system. China’s rise has security, economic and governance implications for individual states and the international system as a whole. Those implications, in turn, are shaped by the feedback loop of perceptions, misperceptions and policy of China’s leadership and citizenry, as well as of the leadership and citizenry of those states with which it interacts. This book examines the interaction of perceptions, misperceptions and policy within the three broad dimensions of security, economics and governance, because they shape the prospects for China to successfully achieve ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’. The term ‘peaceful rise’ was introduced by the influential scholar and foreign policy advisor Zheng Bijian to characterize China’s economic expansion and increased international political influence. Zheng sought to emphasize China’s expanding influence as a peaceful process rather than a trigger for conflict between China and existing powers or lesser states in the international system. However, Chinese policymakers became concerned that characterizing China’s emergence as ‘peaceful rise’ could limit their flexibility in addressing the vexing issue of Taiwan; they also feared that ‘the term rise would actually engender more concern [and] … could incite populist nationalism’ (Bergsten et al. 2008, 49). As a consequence, ‘peaceful development’ was officially enshrined by the Chinese government as the preferred term for its grand national strategy in 2007. However, despite the preferences of the Chinese government, the term ‘peaceful rise’ has remained a common characterization of Chinese policy since its inception. Recognizing both of these positions, this book will refer to the grand strategy as ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’.

Public policy and the implications of that policy may be perceived by the leadership and groups of people within a state through a variety of lenses. Chapters 2–4 examine policy through three lenses. The first is public opinion. Within Western democracies and increasingly non-Western states and China, public opinion regarding the actions of a foreign state may have a significant effect upon the public policies of those states, particularly when opinions reflect a strongly held position by that public. Chapter 2, on Elite and Public Opinion, explores the extent to which public opinion regarding the implications of China’s economic and political rise has shifted or remained constant among the Chinese and the publics of states with which China interacts. This chapter also examines the degree to which the elites and publics of China and other states have common perceptions of the significance of key areas of agreement and disagreement on public policy. Lack of common perceptions is particularly important, since disjuncture in perceptions regarding the relative significance of particular issues and/or the tactics applied in support of public policies directed toward those issues could easily form the basis for emergent conflict between China and the targets of its foreign policies. This disjuncture of perceptions could be particularly problematic in the case of public reactions to the unintended practical implications of policy initiatives. As we note in Chapter 2 and in subsequent chapters, such disjunctures do exist, and they do have the real potential for complicating China’s prospects for achieving a ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’.

Chapter 3 introduces a number of perspectives in international relations theory. These include realism, power transition, liberalism and constructivism. Certainly, some of China’s actions and the reactions of states to those actions do reflect a realist application of power in service of policy aims and a belief that the application of balance-of-power theory may constitute an appropriate and effective policy response. To a degree, China’s actions in support of its interests in the South China Sea, as well as the counteractions of the United States’ (US) pivot, India’s and Japan’s moves to enhance their defensive capabilities and the actions of states like Russia, Vietnam and the Philippines to make use of tacit strategic alliances reflect realist considerations. Moreover, within the context of realist theory, the applicability of power transition theory as an explanation for, or predictor of, China’s ability to successfully achieve a ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’ may be of limited utility, except in highlighting power-projection considerations in China’s multifaceted attempts to portray its expansion and political and economic power in terms of a ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’. Counterbalanced against the realist perspective is the liberal perspective. The extent to which China has masterfully employed the actuality and prospect of mutually beneficial trade and cultural exchange both to enhance its influence and to soften its image may be explained from a liberal perspective. The use of enhanced economic ties with China by the US, Europe and Japan as a means of drawing China into a nexus of cooperative interests supportive of the existing international political and economic order is also reflective of, and may be explained by, liberal theory. However, as we note in subsequent chapters, concrete economic benefits may not be sufficient to overcome other strategic and identity considerations, which calls into question the extent to which reliance upon liberal theory will provide the most accurate lens for explaining or predicting China’s capacity to achieve a ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’.

Finally, we examine the applicability of constructivism as an explanatory and predictive theory within the context of China’s ‘Peaceful Rise/ Development’. With its emergent perspective that both realism and liberalism are only constructs of reality, as well as its emphasis upon constructed identity, the manner in which identities can shift both over time and within different contexts and the impact of identity upon perceptions and misperceptions, constructivism makes an important contribution to our understanding of China’s ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’. We argue that constructivism is important in that it highlights the ways in which pre-existing perceptual patterns, arising over a long period of time from the previous actions of a rising state and the continuous reinterpretations of those actions, could shape other countries’ future interpretations not only of China’s predicted position as the largest economic power but also its political, strategic and economic actions as the dominant economic power.

Chinese leaders have attempted to quell fears that China’s rise to power will be marked by overly aggressive policies in support of their basic interests. Specifically, these leaders have made more frequent reference to traditional Chinese norms as guiding their policies. Concurrently, a common perception among scholars and policymakers, especially outside of China, is that, based on China’s historic dominance in Asia and the China-centered hierarchical worldview in its cultural traditions, China would try to regain its dominance and cultural superiority once it rises. This interpretation of Chinese predispositions may not be entirely accurate. Chapter 4 explores the nuanced nature of the Chinese mindset, the ways in which it may reveal historic Chinese sensibilities and the extent to which that mindset may, in turn, serve as a lens through which to understand Chinese policy.

Chapters 5–10 focus upon the extent to which China’s relations with a number of states are strongly influenced by security considerations on the part of both China and the respective state. Clearly, economic concerns also play an important role in shaping, and potentially moderating, the extent to which security considerations dominate relations between China and the states. However, the nature and extent to which security concerns dominate that relationship differ widely from country to country. For example, in the case of US–Chinese relations, both countries are sensitive to the implications of the expanding presence of the other country’s military forces in East Asian waters, and both countries’ attitudes are to some degree shaped by self-images of exceptionalism. In addition, from the point of view of the US, dissatisfaction about currency manipulation and intellectual property rights protections, whether wholly or only partially valid, has limited the extent to which expanding trade relations have moderated its security concerns regarding China. Moreover, China’s failure to adequately grasp and consider in its policy the degree to which the US takes these concerns seriously has been and is likely to continue to be a constant irritant in US–Chinese relations.

Europeans do have significant security concerns, for example, in the area of China’s interpretations of international legal norms. However, in contrast to the US, they have been more willing to emphasize the moderating effects of international trade upon that relationship, as indicated by their willingness to contribute to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Nevertheless, as noted in Chapter 6, on China’s relations with the European Union, citizens of Germany, the country that has the most extensive trade ties with China, as well as a positive balance of trade with China, tend to have the least favorable opinions regarding China.

Among the issues addressed in Chapter 7, on Sino-Japanese relations, is the dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. This dispute clearly shows that there is a huge disjuncture in perceptions between China and Japan and, to a lesser extent, between elites and the general population in both countries. The dispute also raises more generalized issues regarding perceptions of existing international legal norms with respect to title to territory, which are also important in shaping attitudes of extra-regional powers such as the US.

In the cases of India (Chapter 9) and some states of Southeast Asia (Chapter 10), shared negative experience with colonialism, coupled with the prospect for trade advantages, may not sufficiently buffer the perceived, negative security relations between those countries and China. In the case of Russia (Chapter 8), perceived strategic complementarity in support of security interests may to a degree be undermined by historical enmities and/or distrust, plus underlying concerns regarding the potential longer-term negative impact of trade imbalances. When compounded by China’s increasing competition with Russia for market share in states which Russia has considered to be within its historic sphere of influence, this underlying distrust and these concerns may influence the extent to which trade complementarity may cushion security concerns.

The second section of the book, the Economic Dimension, examines both the perceived macro-level impact of China’s economic rise and its actual and perceived impact on its relations in two specific geographic areas, Africa and East Asia. Chapter 11, which addresses China’s impact upon the global economy, argues that China’s tangible effects on the global economy are not as great as is widely perceived. China remains a relatively small player in the global economy as compared to the US or Europe. Recognizing that for the developed world the rise of China has raised concerns, suspicion and even fear about a possible new period in world history when the West is no longer dominant, this chapter argues that China’s economic rise need not be a threat. The key to mitigating this threat is to reduce the mutual suspicion and distrust between China and its Western counterparts, especially the US, through more interdependence and multilateralism. Chapter 14, on the Developmental State model, examines China’s increasingly important role as a model of the successful developing state. Favoring the ‘Washington Consensus’ model, some critics among Western elites have dubbed China’s ‘state capitalism’ model anathema to free market capitalism. However, emerging markets and developing countries have looked to China’s rapid development, embodied in the so-called ‘China Model’, as a potential alternative model for developing their own economies in the globalized economy, much to the consternation of some elites in the West. This chapter argues that this unease on the part of Western elites is perceived by Chinese elites as yet another sign of the West’s anxiety over its rise. Rather than perceive China’s approach to development as providing an alternative pathway to development that may also work in other developing countries, some Western elites have viewed this approach as yet another example of China’s seeking to exert influence on the developing world on issues of governance and development, with clear implications for perceptions by China’s elites of its ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’.

Examining the extent to which the Chinese economic model may contribute to China’s capacity to achieve a ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’ or create conditions that could hamper its achieving this goal, Chapters 10 and 12 on China’s relations with East Asia and Africa provide mixed evidence. Recognizing both the origins of the East Asian model and the extent of its success, the East Asian chapter examines significant differences between China and other emerging economies in East Asia and discusses the need for China and emerging Asia to reconsider that growth model in the wake of the 2007–8 global financial and economic crises. The chapter examines whether and how China and emerging Asia should pursue more balanced growth, relying less on exports and domestic savings, and more on economic equity and environmental sustainability. Chapter 10 concludes with a discussion of the global implications of the growth model of China and emerging Asia and the challenges to the model since 2010. It argues that the challenges China faces in continuing its economic growth are serious; therefore, the perception that the Chinese economy would soon take over the world may be largely misconceived. On the other hand, the problems that China and emerging Asia face in the second decade of the twenty-first century are in many ways also the world’s problems. Chapter 12 on Africa examines China’s remarkably adept programs of foreign aid to African states that have supported their developmental objectives in concrete ways while, so far, avoiding activities that would cause existing major powers to actively do more than counterbalance its power within Africa. However, this chapter also explores the contrast between African perceptions of Chinese aid activities and African perceptions and misperceptions regarding Chinese investments and business activities not only in oil and resource extraction but also in general manufacturing and commerce. In particular, the chapter describes the actions and practices of Chinese-owned businesses in Africa and examines the extent to which the latter could potentially cause problematic relations between China and Africa in the context of China’s ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’.

The third section of the book, Global Governance, examines the extent to which China’s perceived and actual policies with respect to global governance conform to existing norms. Chapters 15 and 16 examine the role China has played in major international organizations and the extent to which this role is consistent with or different from that of other existing major actors. Chapter 15 examines China’s behavior in the United Nations Security Council, the preeminent institution that has managed international security in the post-Cold War period, and the perceptions of the role China has played and may yet play in the future in that international institution. The chapter challenges a common perception that China often behaves differently from major Western nations in international institutions, due to the authoritarian/communist nature of its political system and its desire to gain more economic and political power in the world as an emerging superpower. Instead, Chapter 15 argues first, that China has been a more constructive player in major international institutions than commonly perceived; and second, that China may not have behaved that much differently from major Western powers when perceived national interests are involved. Chapter 16, on the WTO, explores China’s role within this international institution charged with facilitating the growth of international trade. It argues that China is now behaving as a normal, large trading and leading emerging nation, and it has behaved largely as a ‘responsible stakeholder’, at about the same level as other key players in the WTO. Second, the evolution in China’s WTO behavior suggests that learning and socialization within the WTO has helped China to become a more active and constructive member in the global trading system. Third, China’s activism has boosted the role of developing countries in the WTO overall; while at the same time, China also poses a challenge to the long-standing dichotomy of developed countries versus developing countries in the global political economy. Analyzing the manner in which Chinese actions and ASEAN reactions to China’s actions have been perceived and potentially misperceived by ASEAN members and those states such as India, Japan and the US which are also seeking to deepen their relations with ASEAN, Chapter 17, on Chinese–ASEAN relations, examines the evolution of China’s interactions with ASEAN as an example of China’s efforts to demonstrate that it is a ‘good neighbor’ and supporter of multilateralism. Chapter 18, China and Global Democracy, examines the implications of China’s authoritarian system of government for the global debate over the ascendancy and universal applicability of liberal democracy. This chapter explores the extent to which, in the globalized era of the twenty-first century, the pluralism and hybridity that are beginning to shape issues of governance and development are better captured using a constructivist approach. Noting that models of democracy are perceived differently among Western elites and China’s elites, the chapter examines the extent to which this hybridity has clear implications for the global spread of pluralistic liberal democratic systems of government and for China’s ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’.

The concluding chapter explores the extent to which the mix of policies and policy reactions of both China and those states with which it is interacting, as well as the perceptions and misperceptions that lead to and flow from those policy interactions noted in previous chapters, have implications for the prospects of China’s successful attainment of its goal of a ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’. Although not unduly optimistic regarding the prospects for China to achieve this goal, this chapter outlines the extent to which China’s ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’ may be facilitated by an increasing recognition on the part of both China and those states with which it interacts of the necessity to move toward some form of mutual accommodation. At the same time, the chapter notes the mix of historically rooted, ideational misperceptions and potentially increasing public pressures within both China and those states with which it interacts that may make this effort more difficult.

References

Bergsten, C. F., Freeman, C., Lardy, N. R. and Mitchell, D. J., 2008. China’s Rise: Challenges and Opportunities. Washington D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics and Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Part I

Perspectives

2

Public and elite perceptions of China’s rise

Christopher Herrick

Introduction

The foreign policies of great powers are driven by perceptions of the risks and rewards or costs and benefits, coupled with assessments of the probability of avoiding the risk/cost or of achieving the reward/benefit. Each major theoretical perspective in international relations – realism, liberalism and constructivism – recognizes the significance of perceptions and their manipulation in influencing problem or opportunity recognition, policy response and/or the reaction of the target state to the policy initiative. However, each of these three theoretical streams views perceptions in a different manner. The constructivist perspective places greatest emphasis upon the critical importance of perceptions. Both the government of the initiating state and the government or population of a target state may vary widely in how they perceive the relative significance of particular issues and policy instruments. When the two populations hold differing or opposed opinions concerning the relative threat or opportunity presented by particular issues, interactions may be very complex. An initiating government may not recognize how its actions will be viewed by the target state. For example, when a particular policy instrument, such as a form of economic or military persuasion, is used against a target state, the government or population of the target state may react as if the instrument is highly provocative. The calculation may be further complicated when components of the private sector, such as a corporation, of an initiating state interact with the government or the private sector of a target state. The corporation and the target-state population may have distinctly differing perceptions regarding the degree to which the corporate actions are benign, hostile or beneficial.

There is a growing body of evidence that different sectors of the elites and general publics of both the US and China hold very different opinions about important aspects of their states’ policy interactions. A number of public opinion surveys of general publics of China and the other great powers interacting with China reveal that there are important differences in the views of the general publics of the states regarding the policy actions of other powerful states. In addition, surveys of elites of the US and China indicate that there are also important perceptual differences between the US and China about important policy issues that impact the ongoing relationship of the two countries. This chapter argues that these differing views concerning the significance of perceptions held by various sectors of society are of considerable importance in assessing the potential for China to successfully achieve a ‘Peaceful Rise/ Development’. The chapter will examine public opinion among the population of China toward the US, Japan and the European Union (EU), as well as public opinion in these latter three toward China. More significantly, the chapter will examine the shifting convergence and divergence of elite and popular opinion within populations of the two key great powers in this relationship, the US and China, regarding the other state.

Theoretical perspectives

Realist, liberal and constructivist international relations theories address the role that perceptions may play in influencing the behavior of state actors. Although differing to some degree in the relative significance of various components of power, realists and liberals share a belief that decision makers in all states apply relatively similar criteria in assessing the extent to which the general or specific actions of other states represent a potential threat or opportunity. Realists and liberals also share a belief that all states interpret the use of military or economic assets to respond to perceived threats or opportunities in a similar manner. Constructivist theorists, on the other hand, are more likely to accept the fact that elites in different states may have somewhat differing perceptions regarding the extent to which particular actions by another state represent either threats or opportunities. In addition, and to a somewhat greater extent than is the case for liberals, constructivists recognize that within a given society different groups having varying experiences and interests may have divergent perceptual orientations concerning a given interaction with another state.

Elite and popular opinion

Elite and popular opinion may be identified through various sources. One means of identifying the opinions of the political elite is through an observation of official governmental documents or pronouncements. However, such pronouncements reflect the views of particular components of the government or, where they are the pronouncements of the head of government/state, the views of that individual in the context of a particular foreign policy issue. In addition to reporting the opinions of political elites about specific issues, newspaper articles, articles in recognized foreign policy journals and, increasingly, blogs, also present the views of opinion leaders in the media and the opinions of other concerned portions of the elite, such as business interests. More generalized attitudes and opinions of the political elite and other components of the elite may be obtained from targeted opinion polls and focus groups, which will be the central concern of this chapter. Scientifically conducted public opinion polling represents an important initial reference point for contextualizing attitudes presented in other media. During the period 2005–15, it has become possible to conduct opinion polls in a wide number of countries and regions. Both polling and focus-group sessions with political elites that address relations with China are increasingly available to researchers. However, the bulk of the elite surveys/focus groups concentrate upon the US–China relationship, in part because it is perhaps the most important indicator of the international interactions associated with China’s ‘Peaceful Rise/ Development’.

General popular opinions

A high proportion of the public opinion polls provide information about national image. Scholars have subdivided national image into three components: ‘cognitive attributes by which the person understands the object in an intellectual way’; ‘an affective component representing a liking or disliking of the focal object [the state or citizen of that state]’; and ‘an action component consisting of a set of responses to the object that the person deems appropriate’ (Scott 1965, 72). Opinion polls of the mass publics of China, Japan, selected major states within the EU and the US regarding the general foreign policy stance, as well as specific foreign policy actions of the other great powers, provide data on each of these aspects of national image. However, ‘[Chinese] surveys … [usually have] focused on city residents in large metropolitan areas such as Beijing and Shanghai’ (Zhang 2011, 18). A number of the surveys have considerable credibility, based upon both survey sponsorship and rigor. Many surveys are somewhat limited, however, because they have not been replicated over a sufficient period of time to provide more thorough analysis of longer-term, potentially shifting elite and/ or popular attitudes. Consequently, our analysis will be limited largely to the period 2005–14 and focus to a greater extent upon the period 2010–13.

In assessing public opinion, analysts generally assume that the public is, in fact, an informed public about issues. How, then, does the public become informed of issues? The general publics of major countries have, from 1995 to 2015, gained increasing amounts of information from a wider variety of sources than in the twentieth century. Within the Western democracies, the number of television networks has increased significantly, as has the control of those outlets to include a broader range of media ownership beyond the national government. Within Britain, television news is available from various, independently controlled channels beyond the BBC. The US’s international coverage has declined, but the number of television networks has dramatically increased from the original three or four, including PBS, to include networks, such as Fox News and MSNBC, targeting specific ideological population subsets. Consequently, within these states sectors of the elites and general public may increasingly shelter themselves from more diverse, analytic perspectives, in favor of a perspective that conforms to their pre-existing ideological preferences. Moreover, within these states, increasingly, the general public is obtaining its news directly from like-minded Internet sources which reinforce their ideological orientations.

By 2008, significant portions of the Chinese population had access to the Internet and, therefore, potentially to a wider range of opinion, including blogs (Pew 2008, 32). At the very least, the Chinese urbanized general public was in the process of shifting its primary sources of information. That is, by 2008 survey data began to be better able to differentiate the extent to which various sectors of the Chinese population had the potential to obtain and were gaining an increasing volume of their information from the Internet, as opposed to either newspapers or state-run broadcast media (Pew 2008, 34). Growing Internet access creates a situation in which increasing portions of the Chinese population, largely based upon age and urban residency, can be influenced by positions adopted by bloggers. C100’s (2012, 48) additional polling data from 2007 and 2012 confirms this pattern of information acquisition by the Chinese population and elite.

The potential for the Chinese general public to be influenced by a wider range of sources of information takes on added significance when coupled with the fact that Chinese public opinion may increasingly have an impact on Chinese decision makers. Zhang (2011, 23) notes that ‘[T] he government is allowing public opinion to play a larger role in the policymaking process in order to achieve more policy legitimacy, whether in its domestic political life or foreign policy.’ Of perhaps greater significance, Zhang (2011, 23) notes the problematic nature of public opinion driven by Internet information that may be highly nationalistic and more radically oriented than suits the Chinese government, and the need for the government to ‘soothe such opinions’.

Virtually all polls assess the affective component of national image. Table 2.1 indicates that in 2005 China enjoyed a more favorable image in Europe than did the US, potentially due to dissatisfaction with US actions in Iraq (Pew 2005, 28). In line with the German and French publics, less than a majority of the Chinese public expressed a favorable opinion toward the US. Of perhaps greater significance, only a minority of the Chinese sample (17%) expressed a favorable attitude toward Japan. Of equal significance is the pattern of Japanese attitudes toward China expressed in Dong-A Ilbo’s (2005, 1) survey. Survey data indicated that although a considerably larger proportion of the Japanese public expressed general indifference toward China, the proportion of the public expressing unfavorable versus favorable attitudes toward China was nearly three to one, with younger Japanese having the most favorable perceptions. The sector of the Japanese public expressing the most unfavorable attitudes toward China was those in the age bracket over sixty years of age, who had experienced Japan’s conflict with China in World War II.

As indicated by Table 2.2, among the major powers in 2007 the Russian public was most favorably predisposed to China. The proportion of the American public with favorable views of China was relatively consistent with the average of views of the citizenry of member states of the EU. In contrast, the US public was considerably more favorably predisposed than the Japanese citizenry to China. This Japanese attitude reflects a variety of historical factors, including ongoing territorial disputes between the two countries and Japanese popular perception that China should do more to constrain North Korea from engaging in actions considered inimical to Japanese interests. A Pew (2008, 21) poll indicates equally low favorable Chinese public opinion toward Japan and attributes this low rating to ‘the fact that 76% of Chinese do not think Japan has apologized sufficiently for its military actions during the 1930s and 1940s’. Moreover, China’s world approval rating varies significantly; its highest favorability ratings are in Africa (72%), followed by Asia (58%) (Pew 2013, 25). On a hopeful note for Chinese prospects to achieve ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’, an analysis of the demographic breakdown of favorability ratings shows that in 2012–14 China enjoyed considerably more favorability among younger citizens of all regions (Pew 2013, 29; Pew 2014, 27).

Table 2.1 Publics rate major nations in 2005

Source: Pew Research Center, 2005. American Character Gets Mixed Reviews: U.S. Image Up Slightly, But Still Negative, 1–2.

Table 2.2 China’s favorability ratings, 2007–14

Source: Pew Research Center, 2013. America’s Global Image Remains more Positive than China’s: But Many See China Becoming World’s Leading Power. 10. Pew Research Center, 2014. Global Opposition to U.S. Surveillance and Drones, but Limited Harm to America’s Image. 28.

Evaluating China’s application of soft power

As we note in Chapter 3, China has made considerable use of soft power as an instrument to facilitate its peaceful relations with other states. In assessing China’s success in its application of soft power, we may analyze the extent to which it has been able to influence other countries’ views of China and its policies. The public opinion data noted above gives one such measure. However, more specific measures may be applied in determining China’s ability to mold a positive international image. An accurate understanding of how others perceive China is one measure.

Survey data (Pew 2008, 19) provides evidence of a troubling disjuncture of more than 50% between China’s self-image that it considers other countries as it forms its foreign policy (83%) and the image held by other countries that China does not often consider other countries as it forms its foreign policy (30%). In 2014, Foreign Minister Wang indicated that the Chinese still held this opinion (Tiezzi 2014); however, 2013 polling data (Drake 2013, 3) indicates that a number of Asian populations do not agree with Wang’s assessment. Other data provides a somewhat mixed picture of the extent to which China may have had success in molding its image abroad. Figure 2.1 presents a breakdown of perceptions of China’s willingness to consider other countries in its foreign policy in 2013. None of the following states – North American, European and the developed Asian states of Australia, South Korea and Japan, Russia, nor the majority of Middle Eastern states’ publics – perceive China to be considering their interests in its foreign policy actions. In contrast, African states and the emerging-economy states of South and Southeast Asia did perceive China as taking their interests into account. Consequently, one might conclude that China is having somewhat better success in molding its image in the latter states.

Figure 2.1 How much does China consider your country’s interests?

Source: Pew Research Center, 2013. America’s Global Image Remains More Positive than China’s: But Many See China Becoming World’s Leading Power. 31.

A 2013 survey provides some direct indications of China’s success in applied soft power in two regions: Latin America and Africa. Although this data did show that youth respected Chinese technological and scientific achievements (Pew 2013, 30), it also showed that ‘America enjoyed a soft power advantage over China among Latin Americans and Africans. American scientific and technological achievements, ways of doing business and popular culture are embraced by many’ (Pew 2013, 3). Potentially more problematic in terms of Chinese application of soft power, the survey indicates that the same populations largely disliked the Chinese spread of ideas and customs (Pew 2013, 28). Yet another measure of the successful application of soft-power techniques would be reflected in cultivating positive images of the country’s leadership. Figure 2.2 provides evidence that from 2007 to 2013, by this measure, China had not been particularly successful, in comparison to other world powers.

China’s perceived record with respect to human rights is also an area in which its soft-power efforts have resulted in mixed success. A strong majority of North Americans, developed Asian democracies and Europeans, with the exception of Russia, perceive that China does not respect citizen rights. In contrast, publics in Latin America, the Middle East and Africa are more willing to believe that China does respect its citizens’ rights (Pew 2013, 46).

Figure 2.2 Approval of leadership

Source: J. Clifton 2014. U.S. Tops Other Global Leaders in Approval: Russian global approval ratings remain lowest in world.

In the case of the US, both public and elite survey evidence indicate that China’s soft-power efforts have been less successful than China might have wished. Chinese elites indicated that ‘media tends to report on conflict and tension between countries, which likely influences the levels of trust that many elites and especially the public in a country have in another country’ (Carnegie Endowment 2013, 14). Despite considerable efforts by the Chinese and, to a lesser extent, Americans to provide citizens of the other country with an accurate depiction of their populations, 2012 survey results (Carnegie Endowment 2013, 21) indicated that, when presented with a common set of traits, Chinese and US respondents had significant differences in the traits that they ascribed to themselves versus citizens of the other country. From a constructivist perspective, one elite responded that ‘[v]iewed through the lens of social identity theory, this gap in perceptions on both sides could make each side more likely to view the other in conflictual terms’ (Carnegie Endowment 2013, 21).

Public attitudes regarding China’s growing power

Survey data (Pew 2013, 34; Pew 2014, 28) indicates that an increasing number of respondents from around the world believe that although America remains the world’s preeminent economy, China’s is the most dynamic economy. There is also considerable difference of opinion regarding the potential positive or negative impact of China’s economic and military rise. As indicated in Table 2.3, Indian opinion regarding the positive impact of China’s economy declined sharply after 2005. Public opinion within the US, Japan and selected EU members concerning the potential benefits or threats of China’s economic and military rise changed somewhat from 2005 to 2013. For the general populations of a number of countries, one potential explanation for the increase in favorability, of course, appears to have been public perceptions that China had been and could continue to be important in helping to maintain world economic stability in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. Moreover, in contrast to the mixed perceptions among the populations of the US, Japan and selected EU states about the potential beneficial nature of a growing Chinese economy, the general populations of these countries viewed growing Chinese military power as potentially problematic. This opinion, in turn, was in sharp contrast to the more positive opinions of the populations of many developing countries, with the exception of South Korea and potential great-power rival India, regarding growing Chinese military capabilities.

As indicated in Table 2.4, bordering states have major concerns regarding border disputes with China. Of interest is the finding that ‘61% of the public in the Philippines and 51% in Vietnam say they are very concerned about a possible military confrontation with Beijing’ (Pew 2014, 39). These territorial disputes are discussed in detail in Chapters 7–10.

Table 2.3 How China’s growing power affects your country

Source: Pew Research Center 2005, 33; 2008, 21; 2011, 7; 2013, 24.

Table 2.4 Neighboring states’ strong concerns about territorial disputes with China: concern that territorial disputes between China and neighboring countries could lead to a military conflict

Source: Pew Research Center, 2014. Global Opposition to U.S. Surveillance and Drones, but Limited Harm to America’s Image. 39.

Separate survey data (C100 2012) provides a description of US and Chinese public and elite favorability attitudes from 2005 to 2012. It show continuity of favorability ratings among the general publics of both China and the US. In contrast, Ma (2012, 3) notes ‘[T]he gap between Chinese elites’ opinion of the U.S. and that of the Chinese public’, specifically, the considerably more positive attitude toward the US held by Chinese elites in comparison to the Chinese public. Furthermore, the Chinese business elite consistently overestimated positive public attitudes toward the US. In contrast, American policymakers consistently underestimated the US general public’s positive attitudes toward China, and US business elites significantly underestimated favorability ratings of the general public. Such inaccurate perceptions regarding the public could, of course, have a significant impact upon current and future decisions of policymakers.

Realist theory (with its emphasis upon status quo powers versus revisionist powers) and liberal theory (with its emphasis upon shared values) on the function of the international system emphasize the beneficial effects of shared attitudes of the existing status quo as important for maintaining peace among major powers in a given international system, particularly between existing powers and the potential rising power.

Table 2.5 indicates the degree of consensus among the general publics of the great powers concerning two significant economic issues. From 2007 to 2010 there was stable, popular support for free-market economy and continued increases in trade and business ties between countries among the populations of the US, the major powers within the EU (Britain, France and Germany), Japan and, most importantly, China, where public support for free-market economy was the highest among the great powers sampled. This positive evidence, however, must be tempered by the recognition that these populations may have differently constructed interpretations of free market and trade.

Table 2.6 provides a more broad-based analysis of the way in which the publics of major powers interpret their relationship with China. With three notable exceptions, these publics see China to be neither a partner nor an enemy. The attitudes of the publics of these states appear entirely consistent with what many Chinese perceive to be the evolving multipolar system in which any given state is not perceived to be automatically an enemy or a friend at any given point in time. As might be expected, given the increasing ties between China and Russia noted in Chapter 8, a majority of Russians perceive China to be a partner. The two general populations with the highest proportions of their populations perceiving China as a potential enemy are Japan, with its long-standing popular enmity toward China, where the percentage considering China an enemy increased considerably from 2010 to 2013, and the population of India, which increasingly views China as a significant rival within East Asia and an obstacle to its aspirations for a permanent position on the UN Security Council.

Table 2.5 Support for free market and international trade

Source: Pew Research Center, 2010. Obama More Popular Abroad Than at Home, Global Image of U.S. Continues to Benefit: 22-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey. 40. Q23a and Q24.

Table 2.6 Is China more of a partner or more of an enemy?

Source: Pew Research Center, 2010. Obama More Popular Abroad Than at Home, Global Image of U.S. Continues to Benefit: 22-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey. 52. Pew Research Center, America’s Global Image Remains more Positive than China’s: But Many See China Becoming World’s Leading Power. 26. Q86.

Contrasting opinions of the general publics and selected elites of the US and China

The media play a large role in presenting the information that shapes both public and elite perceptions. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 provide information about the extent to which various groups consider media sources to be providing a reliable portrayal of China to Americans, or of the US to the Chinese. Figure 2.3 indicates a shift in Chinese and American opinion concerning the accuracy of Chinese media portrayal of the US and the substantial differential between various sectors of US and Chinese society regarding the accuracy of that coverage. The American general public and most categories of US elites perceived a modest improvement in the accuracy of Chinese media portrayal of the US, while opinion leaders perceived no change in the accuracy of portrayal. From the Chinese point of view, however, there is considerably less agreement among various groups in terms of the relative accuracy of media portrayal from 2007 to 2012. The Chinese general public perceives a significant increase in the accuracy of media portrayal from 2007 to 2012, whereas business leaders perceive a significant decrease in the accuracy of media portrayal. Chinese opinion leaders essentially see no change. Such differential opinions obviously would have some impact upon the perceptions of these groups about the US in general and specific US policy actions in particular. Figure 2.4 presents the contrasting perceptions of US and Chinese respondents regarding the accuracy of US depiction of China in 2012. Various sectors of Chinese society have more similar perceptions of the accuracy of US media depiction of China than those of US opinion leaders and other sectors of the US concerning the accuracy of media portrayals of China. There is, however, considerable difference between US and Chinese observers regarding the accuracy of the US media’s portrayal of China. In comparison to each comparable sector of the US public, all components of the Chinese public hold the opinion that the US media’s portrayal of China is less accurate.

Figure 2.3 Base question: Do you think that the Chinese media portrays an accurate picture of the US?

Source: C100, 2012. US-China Public Perceptions Opinion Survey 2012. 85.

Figure 2.4 Base question: Now, thinking about the US media, do you think they portray an accurate picture of China?

Source: C100, 2012. US-China Public Perceptions Opinion Survey 2012. 86.

General perceptions

Survey data of US and Chinese publics also provides important cognitive indicators of the character traits perceived in the other country’s citizens, which Americans and Chinese may use in assessing the motives and actions of the other country. Figure 2.5 indicates that there is a significant disparity in the ways in which both Chinese and Americans perceive themselves and citizens of the other country on important indicators of character traits. These differences, in turn, may underlie some of the later data about issues, such as trust, between the two countries.

To some degree, these ascriptive traits may impact perceptions of mutual trust between China and America. Perceptions of the level of mutual trust between the two states are important macro-indicators of the existence of a general factor that could moderate potential conflict over specific policy issues. Consequently, indications of an increase or decrease in trust or decline in positive perceptions regarding the trajectory of relations between the two states may be important measures of the potential for problematic relations between the two states and, thereby, the potential for China to successfully achieve its goal of a peaceful rise to great-power status.

Figure 2.6 provides an indication of the trust levels expressed by the general publics and elites of both China and the US toward the other country. Interestingly, the American public exhibited a significantly greater amount of high trust in China than the Chinese general public expressed toward the US. The Chinese general public was less likely to express trust in the US than was any category of Chinese elites.

Figure 2.7 provides clearly contrasting, potentially problematic differentials in the perceptions of Chinese and American elites regarding the appropriate methods that China might employ in order to improve trust between the two countries. There was only one overlap – improved communication/cooperation – in the top seven items cited as a means for improving trust between the two countries. Significant differences between the Chinese and American respondents concerned its priority, with 5% of American elites listing improving communication/cooperation, whereas for the Chinese elites this improved communication/cooperation was perceived to be the most significant mechanism for improving trust. Improving transparency, however, and improving/resolving human rights, which received considerable support from American elites, did not even appear on the list of the top seven Chinese mechanisms for improving trust. The lack of agreement upon the proper methods for improving trust indicates lessthan-ideal prospects for national improvement in trust levels between the two states in the immediate future, which does not bode well for a trouble-free Chinese rise to great-power status.

Figure 2.5 Percentage who say Chinese/American people exhibit these character traits

Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013. US-China Security Perceptions Survey: Findings and Implications.13.

Figure 2.6 Percentage who say China/America can be trusted a great deal/fair amount

Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013. US-China Security Perceptions Survey: Findings and Implications. 10.

There are also significantly contrasting perceptions on the part of American and Chinese elites concerning the appropriate steps that the US could employ in order to improve trust levels between the US and China. Figure 2.8 indicates that there is only marginal agreement between the elites of the two states about the five most important actions that could be taken to promote trust between the two states. Although elites from both China and the US agreed that improving communication between the two countries was among the most significant actions that could be taken to improve relations, a significantly higher proportion of Chinese elites emphasized this form of action in comparison to US elites.

Significantly, whereas American elites listed more specific types of actions, Chinese elites tended to emphasize more amorphous actions, such as showing greater respect for China and avoiding hegemonic actions on the part of the US, as ways of improving trust. Measurable numbers of Chinese elites cited avoiding interference in China’s internal affairs, a shorthand and less provocative way of mentioning the Taiwan, Tibet