Pacific Victory

By Paul Kennedy

A look at the events leading up to Japan’s surrender in World War II, from the New York Times–bestselling author of Engineers of Victory.
 
By the spring of 1943, Japan had a tight grip on the countries and territories of East Asia and the Western Pacific. But the Allies had won decisive victories at Midway and Guadalcanal, and they were coming for the rest of Japan’s conquests. Now the empire of Japan would be on the defensive.
 
Featuring a new introduction by the author, this book picks up where Pacific Onslaught left off, providing a detailed, step-by-step account of the Allies’ unstoppable rally across territories annexed by the Japanese in a brutal two-pronged attack across New Guinea and the Philippines, and the islands of the central Pacific. Here you’ll find detailed contemporary accounts and strategy, from the epic battles of the Gilberts and Marshalls to the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and Japan’s final surrender on the decks of the USS Missouri.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Mar 1, 2014
• ISBN: 9780795335686

Paul Kennedy

Paul Kennedy is Professor of History and Director of International Security Studies at Yale University and author of the international best-sellers, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers’ and ‘‘Preparing for the Twenty-First Century’.

Book preview

Conquest in the Pacific 1943–1945

Introduction by Barrie Pitt

In the spring of 1943 the Rising Sun still fluttered proudly over the extensive domains of the newly-acquired Japanese Empire. The area of Japanese dominion had been enlarged in a ridiculously short time by the capture of Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, Burma and the Philippines; the Japanese army had spread over the Far East like ink over a particularly absorbent blotting paper and for a time appeared virtually invincible. It had taken its objectives, often opposed by numerically stronger forces, carried along on a wave of confidence in ultimate victory and utterly convinced of the rightness of its cause. With morale high, its soldiers well-trained and well-disciplined, the Japanese army stood in marked contrast to the forces which tried so desperately to oppose its advance. They appeared pathetically Canute-like in the face of the fast-rising Japanese tide.

But by spring 1943 the Japanese had themselves tasted the bitterness of defeat. Twelve months earlier, in June 1942, they had suffered a major reversal of fortune in conflict with the United States Navy at the Battle of Midway. The Americans followed their success at sea with an attack on Guadalcanal in August—the first muscle-flexings of a young giant which in time would grow into the major force in the Pacific. Now began what Dr Kennedy calls the ‘Third Phase’ of the Pacific war—the reconquest of Japanese-annexed territories.

Which route should the Americans follow? Should they pursue a line New Guinea/Philippines, or should they strike through the central Pacific capturing the various island groups of Micronesia? Which of these axes would prove most effective in bringing the new Japanese Empire to its knees? Each route had its advocates and at the Trident Conference held in Washington in May 1943 the decision was taken to advance along both routes, which, in the event, turned out to be a wise and profitable choice. With its new possessions so well-spread, it was difficult for the Japanese to anticipate the direction of the next American blow and with two lines of advance to follow, the Americans were able to perpetuate Japanese uncertainty.

The amassing of sufficient forces and matériel for the two-pronged offensive was in itself a task of mammoth proportions. That the United States had the industrial resources to produce the necessary weapons of war in sufficient quantity to provide her with an overwhelming material strength was obvious. When this huge industrial capacity was allied to the native genius for organisation, then it could be argued that the eventual outcome of the Pacific war, inevitable defeat for Japan, was a foregone conclusion.

To produce a full picture of the Far Eastern War, the operations of the British in Burma and the campaigns in China must be included. As elsewhere, the Japanese in Burma fought with courage and dogged determination and the campaign was a hard and bitter one. The British had experimented in this theatre with such innovations as the use of ‘Chindits’, brainchild of Orde Wingate, who operated in independent columns fighting a guerrilla-type war behind the enemy lines and receiving their supplies by air-drop. Attempts to develop this mode of warfare with the establishment of Chindit-held enclaves deep in enemy territory were less successful, but air supply of ground troops became a well-proven ploy and contributed to such British victories as Imphal and Kohima when conventional forces were resupplied by this means.

Important though the operations by the British in Burma were, and undoubtedly they made a considerable contribution to the war against Japan, it was the Americans who would operate the grand strategy and bring the war ever closer to the Japanese homeland. They fought the Japanese navy to a standstill in a series of great sea battles in which Midway and the Battle of the Philippine Sea were probably the most strategically important. In this last battle the Japanese lost three fleet carriers, had many more of their ships damaged, and, perhaps most important of all, lost practically their entire naval air arm. It was this decisive defeat which left the Philippines open to American assault.

So the war crept nearer the islands of Japan itself and the realities of modern warfare were brought home forcefully to the Japanese people by constant air attack. When the Americans changed their bombing tactics and turned to low-level attacks at night, Japanese cities began to suffer their most grievous damage. In order to hit small and scattered targets, incendiary bombs were employed in preference to high-explosive with devastating results. A single B29 Superfortress carried forty clusters of thirty-eight incendiaries which represented a frightening destructional potential. In a raid on Tokyo, almost sixteen square miles of that city were destroyed in a holocaust of consuming fire which caused an unknown number of casualties—later estimates have put the number killed at 83,000 and injured at 102,000.

Throughout this period of almost continuous setbacks, unable to match the enormous capacity of American industry for the production of munitions, the mercantile marine decimated by submarine and air attack, the armed forces of Japan nevertheless fought on with undiminished vigour and stubborn courage. Kamikaze suicide attacks were made in an endeavour to reduce the numerical superiority of the huge American fleets, Japanese soldiers threw their lives away in self-destructive charges which could not possibly affect the outcome of the battle; such sacrifice was all to no avail. For Japan the war was lost, and she was now given the face-saving excuse to capitulate when the first nuclear bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. That she did not immediately surrender resulted in the Allies repeating their demonstration of mass destruction with a second bomb dropped on Nagasaki. Japan yielded, although there were still militaristic voices advocating the rejection of Allied terms, presumably prepared to suffer total annihilation.

This book is a worthy sequel to Pacific Onslaught in which Dr Kennedy told the remarkable story of Japanese conquest. He has continued that story, relating with his usual lucidity the vicissitudes encountered by the Allies in the Pacific theatres leading eventually to the surrender ceremony on the deck of USS Missouri. The dramatic finale which marked the end of the Second World War.

Preparing for the comeback

In the spring of 1943 the third phase in the Pacific war was just about to open. The first had seen Japan, triumphant everywhere, conquer the whole of South-East Asia and the western Pacific. The second had seen her attempt to extend this control still further, in the direction of Australia and Hawaii, and to be defeated decisively at the battles of the Coral Sea, Midway, Guadalcanal and Papua. Due to the loss of four fleet carriers at Midway, two battleships and many smaller naval craft at Guadalcanal, and of hundreds of aircraft and crews in all four campaigns, it was clear that Japan would be mainly on the defensive in this third phase; indeed, operational orders to the Japanese commanders in the south-west Pacific stressed that they were ‘to retain all positions in the Solomons and New Guinea’. For the first time in the war in the East, the Allies had the initiative, if they could use it. But this is hardly to say that the end was in sight for Japan. In fact, going on the defensive in early 1943 was only to assume the policy which had been originally advocated before the Imperial Navy’s optimism had tempted it to go further, against Midway and the Solomons. This policy—stoutly defending a strongly-fortified ring of island bases and throwing back all American attacks until Washington finally agreed to negotiate a peace that would recognise the essential parts of Japan’s conquests—was now to be put to the test.

Whatever route (or routes) the Allies chose for their comeback seemed to promise a host of military difficulties. Japan, by her early conquests, had surrounded herself with concentric rings of defence which would slow down any offensive and allow her, exploiting her internal lines of communication, to rush reinforcements to the threatened area. On the map the possibilities seemed many, but most of them could be quickly discounted. An offensive from Russia was excluded by Stalin’s blank refusal to wage war in Asia until Germany had been defeated. An attack from China was also ruled out, after much discussion, because of supply difficulties and the general unreliability of the Chinese. The North Pacific route, geographically the most direct from the United States, suffered from a lack of bases and was constantly subjected to storms and fogs. A return route through South-East Asia was a possibility but could hardly be contemplated since the British troops and equipment were totally inadequate for this task, and there was little prospect of any large-scale reinforcement; in any case, a campaign to seize Burma, Sumatra, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies might take years and would still leave the Allies many thousands of miles from Tokyo. With all these possibilities so patently unsuitable or impossible, there remained only a counteroffensive across the vast expanses of the Pacific itself.

General Douglas MacArthur, C-in-C South West Pacific Area

Such a route had long been regarded as the most likely for another reason—the fact that from the time the possibility of a comeback was first discussed, it had been obvious that the United States would play the decisive role. Still far from settled, however, was the question of whether this American-led thrust would be along a New Guinea-Philippines axis, or along a Central Pacific axis, driving straight through the various island groups of Micronesia. Both routes had their advocates.

General MacArthur, C-in-C South-West Pacific, led the call for the New Guinea jump-off. This was, he claimed, the more logical not only because it was already under way through the Guadalcanal and Papua campaigns, but also because such a route would place the Allies most quickly in the position to cut Japan’s recently-acquired southern empire from the homeland, thereby halting her war production. MacArthur passionately held that the United States had a moral duty to reconquer the Philippines as quickly as possible—indeed, this often seems to have been more important to him than invading Japan—and the way to Manila would be clear once New Guinea had fallen. The alternative route did not appear to offer any vital strategic objective and would be a most dangerous operation, exposing invasion forces to attacks from a cluster of sea and airbases which the Japanese had constructed in the mandated islands. Finally, to leave the enemy forces holding New Guinea and the Solomons would alarm America’s allies, Australia and New Zealand.

Escorted carrier task forces, which enabled the US Navy to press for a Central Pacific thrust in opposition to MacArthur’s plans for island hopping

On the other hand, the US navy could see much value in a Central Pacific thrust. First of all, it would enable it to employ its rapidly-growing numbers of fast carriers much more effectively than in the crowded waters of the Solomons and the Bismarcks. It rejected the notion that this route would be any more dangerous, pointing out the very important development of the carrier task forces—which had the striking power to isolate and dominate an island group, and to protect the invasion convoys—and of the floating fleet supply system—which removed the need for the carriers to return to port at frequent intervals. Moreover, to leave untouched the Japanese forces in the mandates would be to expose the proposed New Guinea-Philippines line of communications to powerful flank attacks. In any case, a Central Pacific thrust would probably reach the Philippines and cut Japan’s links to the south faster than a step-by-step battle up the Solomons-Bismarcks-New Guinea ladder, which, being predictable, gave the enemy the chance to prepare for the next assault and would involve heavy fighting. And secretly, of course, the US navy disliked the prospect of placing their precious carriers under MacArthur’s control while he in turn did not want the South-West Pacific Command to be a subsidiary theatre, nor the army to be employed solely for ‘mopping up’ operations.

Correspondents with Churchill and Roosevelt after the Trident Conference at which both plans were accepted

The solution ultimately decided upon—mainly at the Trident Conference at Washington in May 1943—was to advance along both routes, for this would keep the Japanese uncertain of where the real thrust would be, it would disperse the enemy’s forces, and it would prevent any flank attacks or reinforcement from the mandates to Rabaul—or vice-versa. In any case, both routes would end off the Philippines. Technically, it was a defeat for MacArthur’s monopolising tendencies; strategically, it was to prove to be a very wise decision indeed. On the other hand, such a vast two-pronged offensive needed enormous preparation and for some months a comparative stalemate existed in the Pacific war while units were being trained, bases and airfields constructed, landing-craft and shipping obtained, new warships worked up and final plans laid. It was during this ‘stalemate’ that the United States recovered the western Aleutians.

Although the impracticality of major operations in this area was obvious to all who knew it, both sides were