The Corpses of Times Generations: Volume One

By RICHARD J. KOSCIEJEW

Anyone who has ever tried to present a rather abstract scientific subject in a popular manner knows the great difficulties of such an attempt. Either he succeeds in being intelligible by concealing the core of the problem and by offering to the reader only superficial aspects or vague allusions, thus of deluding the reader by arousing in him the deceptive illusion of comprehension; Or else he gives an expert account of the problem, but as the untrained reader is unable to follow the exposition and becomes discouraged from reading any further.

If these two categories are omitted from todays popular scientific literature, surprisingly little remains. But the little left is very valuable indeed. It is very important that the public is given an opportunity to experience-consciously and intelligently-the efforts and results of scientific research. It is not sufficient that each successive progression is taken up, elaborated, and applied by a few specialists in the field. Restricting the body of knowledge to a small group deadens the philosophical spirit of these people and leads to spiritual poverty.

THE CORPSES OF TIMES GENERATIONS represents a valuable contribution to popular scientific writing. The main ideas to Theory are extremely well presented. Moreover, the presents state of our knowledge in which the paradigms of science are aptly characterized. Mr. Kosciejew shows how the criterial growth of our factual knowledge, with the striving for a unified conception comprising all empirical data, has led to the present situation which is characterized -despite all successes by an uncertainty concerning the choice of the basic theoretical concept.

• Language: English
• Publisher: AuthorHouse
• Release date: Jan 9, 2014
• ISBN: 9781491850138

RICHARD J. KOSCIEJEW

Perhaps, a life is supposed to be lived, yet, it ought to be lived as it should be.

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© 2014 Richard J.Kosciejew. All rights reserved.

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Published by AuthorHouse 01/07/2014

ISBN: 978-1-4918-5012-1 (sc)

ISBN: 978-1-4918-5013-8 (e)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2014900258

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UNUSUAL ELEMENTS

After adaptive changes and equally in the brains and bodies of hominids made it possible for modern humans to construct some symbolic universe using complex language systems, something that critics have endlessly debated over the formidable contours that have had a dramatic and wholly unprecedented occurrence. We began to perceive the world through the lenses of symbolic categories, to construct similarities and differences in terms of categorical oppositions, and to organize our lives according to themes and narratives. Living in this new symbolic universe, modern humans had a large compulsion to codify and then re-codify our experiences, to translate everything into representation, and to seek out the deeper hidden logic that eliminates inconsistencies and ambiguities.

The mega-narrative or frame tale that served to legitimate and rationalize the categorical oppositions and terms of relation between the myriad number of constructs in the symbolic universe of modern humans was religion. The use of religious thought for these purposes is quite apparent in the artifacts found in the fossil remains of people living in France and Spain forty thousand years ago. These artifactual evidences that are inevitably evident to the forming or affecting part of something fundamental, of what is apparently a possibility, in that, as consisting of a developed language system and most generally, had given deliverance to the contemporaries, of an administrator or a diplomat, and/or an avid student of an intricate and complex social order.

Both religious and scientific thoughts were characterized by or exhibiting the power to think. As of these analytical contemplations are the act or process of thinking that sought to frame or construct reality through origins, primary oppositions, and underlying causes. This partially explains why fundamental assumptions in the Western metaphysical tradition were eventually incorporated into a view of reality that would later be called scientific. The history of scientific thought reveals that the dialogue between assumptions about the character of spiritual reality in ordinary language and the character of physical reality in mathematical language was intimate and ongoing from the early Greek philosophers to the first scientific revolution in the seventeenth-century. Nevertheless, this dialogue did not conclude, as many have argued, with the emergence of positivism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It was perpetuated in a disguised form in the hidden ontology of classical epistemology-the central issue in the Bohr-Einstein debate.

The appending presumption that sometimes that is taken for granted as fact, however, its decisions are based on the fundamental principles whose assumptions are based on or upon the nature of which were presented the surmise contained of the one-to-one correspondence having to exist between every element of physical reality and physical theory, this may serve to bridge the gap between mind and world for those who use physical theories. But it also suggests that the Cartesian division is inseparably integrated and structurally real, least of mention, as impregnably formidable for physical reality as it is based on ordinary language, that explains in no small part why the radical separation between mind and world sanctioned by classical physics and formalized by Descartes remains, as philosophical postmodernism attests, one of the most pervasive features of Western intellectual life.

The history of science reveals that scientific knowledge and method did not spring from a fully-bloomed blossom for which the minds of the ancient Greeks did any more than language and culture emerged fully formed in the minds of Homo sapiens sapient. Scientific knowledge is an extension of ordinary language into greater levels of abstraction and precision through reliance upon geometric and numerical relationships. We speculate that the seeds of the scientific imagination were planted in ancient Greece, as opposed to Chinese or Babylonian culture, partly because the social, political, and an economic climate in Greece was more open to the pursuit of knowledge with marginal cultural utility. Another important factor was that the special character of Homeric religion allowed the Greeks to invent a conceptual framework that would prove useful in future scientific investigation. However, it was only after the inherent perceptivity that Greek philosophy was wedded to some essential features of Judeo-Christian beliefs about the origin of the cosmos that the paradigm for classical physics emerged.

The Greek philosopher we now recognize as the originators of scientific thought were mystics who probably perceived their world as replete with spiritual agencies and forces. The Greek religious heritage made it possible for these thinkers to attempt to coordinate diverse physical events within a framework of immaterial and unifying ideas. The actions to one’s servicing practicability he assembling equality that state in its quality or state of being associated in close pretence that presuppositional foundations as taken by or based on bold and excessive self confidence—also, deferential submissiveness; yet to take something for granted or as true existent, especially as a basis for action or reasoning. Affirmed as fact the assumptions, that is to say, as something that is taken for granted or advanced as fact, e.g., decisions based on assumption about the nature of society, the conjecture that there are a persuasively influential underlying substance out for which everything emerges and into which everything returns are attributive to Thales of Miletos, as did Thales, he was apparently led to this conclusion out of the belief that the world was full of gods, and his unifying substance, water, was similarly charged with spiritual presence. Religion in this instance served the interests of science because it allowed the Greek philosophers to view ‘essences’ underlying and unifying physical reality as if they were ‘substances’.

The last remaining feature of what would become the paradigm for the first scientific revolution in the seventeenth-century is attributed to Pythagoras. Like Parmenides, Pythagoras also held that the perceived world is illusory and that there is an exact correspondence between ideas and aspects of external reality. Pythagoras, however, had a different conception of the character of the idea that showed this correspondence. The truth about the fundamental character of the unified and unifying substance, which could be uncovered through reason and contemplation, is, claimed, mathematical in form.

Pythagoras established and was the central figure in a school of philosophy, religion, and mathematics: Pythagoras was apparently viewed by his follower ss as semi-divine. For his followers the regular solids (symmetrical three-dimensional forms in which all sides’ have aligned themselves as by their use in the same regular polygon) and whole numbers became revered essences or sacred ideas. In contrast with ordinary language, the language of mathematical and geometric forms seemed closed, precise, and pure. Providing one understood the axioms and notations. The meaning conveyed was invariant from one mind to another. The Pythagoreans felt that the language empowered the mind to leap beyond the confusion of sense experience into the realm of immutable and eternal essences. This mystical insight made Pythagoras the figure from antiquity most revered by the creators of classical physics, and it continues to have great appeal for contemporary physicists as they struggle with the epistemological implications of the quantum mechanical description of nature.

Progress was made in mathematics, and to a lesser extent in physics, from the time of classical Greek philosophy to the seventeenth-century in Europe. In Baghdad, for example, from about A.D. 750 to A.D. 1000, substantial advancement was made in medicine and chemistry, and the relics of Greek science were translated into Arabic, digested, and preserved. Eventually these relics reentered Europe via the Arabic kingdom of Spain and Sicily, and the work of figures like Aristotle and Ptolemy reached the budding universities of France, Italy, and England during the Middle Ages.

For much of this period the Church provided the institutions, like the teaching orders, needed for the rehabilitation of philosophy. Nevertheless, the social, political, and an intellectual climate in Europe was not ripe for a revolution in scientific thought until the seventeenth-century. The continuative progressive succession had entered into the nineteenth century. The works of the new class of intellectuals we call scientists were more avocations than vocation, and the word scientist did not appear in the English until around 1840.

Copernicus would have been described economics and classical literature, and, most notably, a highly honoured and placed church dignitary. Although we named a revolution after him, this conservative man not set out to create one. The placement of the Sun at the centre of the universe, which seemed right and necessary to Copernicus, was not a result of making careful astronomical observations. In fact, he made very few observations while developing his theory, and then only to ascertain in his prior conclusions seemed correct. The Copernican system was also not any more useful in making astronomical calculations than the accepted model and was, in some ways, much more difficult to implement, what, then, was his motivation for creating the model and his reasons for presuming that the model was correct?

Copernicus felt that the placement of the Sun at the centre of the universe made sense because he viewed the Sun as the symbol of the presence of a supremely intelligent and intelligible God in a man-centred world. He was apparently led to this conclusion in part because the Pythagoreans identified this fire with the fireball of the Sun. The only positive support to favour activity in the face of opposition was to supply what is needed for sustenance and maintain to hold in position by the serving as a foundation or base for that which Copernicus could offer for the greater efficacy of his model was that it represented a simpler and more mathematically harmonious model of the sort than the Creator would obviously prefer.

The belief that the mind of God as Divine Architect permeates the workings of nature was the principle of the scientific thought of Johannes Kepler. Consequently, most modern physicists would probably feel some discomfort in reading Kepler’s original manuscripts. Physics and metaphysics, astronomy and astrology, geometry and theology commingle with an intensity that might offend those who practice science in the modern sense of what word. Physical laws, wrote Kepler, ‘lie within the power of understanding of the human mind. God wanted us to perceive them when he created ‘us’ in His image so that we may take part in His own thoughts… Our knowledge of numbers and quantities are the same as that of God’s, ast least insofar as we understand something of it in this mortal life’.

Believing, like Newton after him, in the literal truth of the word of the Bible, Kepler concluded that the word of God is also transcribed in the immediacy of observable nature. Kepler’s discovery that the mot planets around the Sun were elliptical, as opposed perfecting circles, may have made the universe seem a less perfect creation of God in ordinary language. For Kepler, however, the new model placed the Sun, which he also viewed as the emblem of a divine agency, more at the centre of a mathematically harmonious universe than the Copernican system allowed. Communing with the perfect mind of God requires, as Kepler put it, ‘knowledge on numbers and quantity’.

Since Galileo did not use, or even refer to, the planetary laws of Kepler when those laws would have made his defence of the heliocentric universe more credible, his attachment to the godlike circle was probably a more deeply rooted aesthetic and religious ideal. Nonetheless, it was Galileo, more than Newton, who was responsible for formulating the scientific idealism that quantum mechanic now forces ‘us’ to abandon. In, Dialogue Concerning the Two Great Systems of the World, Galileo said the following about the followers of Pythagoras: I know perfectly well that the Pythagoreans had the highest esteem for the science of number and that Plato himself admired the human intellect and believed that it participates in divinity solely because it has the functional distributed contributions that follow the dynamic abilities that understand the nature of numbers. I myself am inclined to make the same judgement.

This article of faith—mathematical and geometrical ideas mirror the most basic, significant and indispensable elements, is our belief that their be-all and end-all good nor evil’s essence of physical reality. Galileo’s faith is illustrated by the fact that the first mathematical law of his new science, a constant describing the acceleration of bodies in free fall, could not be confirmed by experiment. The experiments conducted by Galileo in which balls of different sizes and weights were rolled simultaneously down an inclining plane did not, as he frankly admitted, yield precise results. Since the vacuum pumps had not yet been invented, yield precise results. Vacuum pumps had not yet been invented, in that respect Galileo could not integrate of any free-falling objects, but subject to his laws were obligingly rigorous experimental proofs sustained within the seventeenth-century. Galileo believed in the absolute validity of this law in the absence of experimental proof because he also believed that movement could be subjected absolutely to the law of number. What Galileo asserted, as the French historian of science Alexander Koyré put it, was ‘that the real are in its essence, geometrical and, consequently, subject to rigorous determination and measurement.

By the later part of the nineteenth-century attempts to develop a logically consistent basis for number and arithmetic not only threatened to undermine the efficacy of the classical view of correspondence debates before the advent of quantum physics. They also occasioned a debate about epistemological foundations of mathematical physics that resulted in an attempt by Edmund Husserl to eliminate or obviate the correspondence problem by grounding this physics in human subjective reality. Since, to that place is a direct line as dissenting from Husserl to existentialism to structuralism to constructionism, the linkage between philosophical postmodernism and the debate over the foundations of scientific epistemology is more direct than we had previously imagined.

A complete history of the debate over the epistemological foundations of mathematical physics should probably begin with the discovery of irrational numbers by the followers of Pythagoras, the paradoxes of Zeno and Gottfried Leibniz. Both since we are more concerned with the epistemological crisis of the later nineteenth-century, beginning with the set theory developed by the German mathematician and logician Georg Cantor. From 1878 to 1897, Cantor created a theory of abstract sets of entities that eventually became a mathematical discipline. A set, as he defined it, is a collection of definite and distinguishable objects in thought or perception conceived as a whole.

Cantors attempted to prove that the process of counting and the definition of integers could be placed on a solid mathematical foundation. His method was repeatedly to place the element in one set into ‘one-to-one’ correspondence with those in another. In the apparent realization of integers, Cantor showed that each integer (1, 2, 3… n) could be paired with an even integer (2, 4, 6… n), and, therefore, that the set of all integers was equal to the set of all even numbers.

Amazingly, Cantor discovered that some infinite sets were larger than others and that infinite set formed a hierarchy of ever greater infinities. After this failed the attempt to save the classical view of logical foundations and internal consistency of mathematical systems, a major crack had obviously appeared in the seemingly solid foundations of number and mathematics. Meanwhile, many mathematicians began to see that everything from functional analysis to the theory of real numbers depended on the problematic character of number itself.

In 1886, Nietzsche was delighted to learn the classical view of mathematics as a logically consistent and self-contained system that could prove it might be undermined. His immediate and unwarranted conclusion was that all logic and wholes of mathematics were nothing more than fictions perpetuated by those who exercised their will to power. With his characteristic sense of certainty, Nietzsche derisively proclaimed, ‘Without accepting the fictions of logic, without measuring reality against the purely invented world to the unconditional and self-identical, without a constant falsification of the world by means of numbers, man could not live’.

The conditional relation, for which our conceptions of the ‘way things are’ given the implications of this discovery extended beyond the domain of the physical sciences, and the best efforts of many some thoughtful people will be required to understand them.

Perhaps the most startling and potentially revolutionary of these implications in human terms is a new view of the relationship between mind and world that is utterly different from that sanctioned by classical physics. René Descartes came to realize that in positing knowledgeable considerations that support something open to question gave sensible reasons for the proposed change. That for which was to realize that mind or consciousness in the mechanistic world-view of classical physics is seemingly to exist, that in the realm of separate distinction was closed away from nature. Soon, there after, Descartes formalized his distinction in his famous dualism, artists and intellectuals in the Western world were increasingly obliged to confront a terrible prospect. The prospect was that the realm of the mental is a self-contained and self-referential island universe with no real or necessary connection with the universe itself.

The first scientific revolution of the seventeenth-century freed Western civilization from the paralysing and demeaning the fields in forces of superstition, laid the foundations for rational understanding and control of the processes of nature, and ushered in an era of technological innovation and progress that provided the distinction between heaven and earth and united the universe in a shared and communicable frame of knowledge, it presented ‘us’ with a view of physical reality. That was totally alien from the world of everyday life.

Descartes, the father of modern philosophy quickly realized that on that point was nothing in this view of nature that could explain or provide a foundation for the mental, or for all that we know from direct experience as distinctly human. In a mechanistic universe, he said, to that place is no single privilege or function for mind, and the separation between mind and matter is absolute. Descartes was also convinced, however, that the immaterial essences that gave form and structure to this universe were coded in geometric and mathematical ideas, and this led him to invent algebraic geometry.

A scientific understanding of these ideas could be derived, foresaid by Descartes, with the aid of precise deduction, and claimed that the contours of physical reality could be laid out in three-dimensional co-ordinates. Following the publication of Isaac Newton’s Principia Mathematica, in 1687, reductionism and mathematical modelling became the most powerful tools of modern science. The dream that the entire physical world could be known and mastered through the extension and refinement of mathematical theory became the central feature and principle of scientific knowledge.

The radical separation between mind and nature formalized by Descartes served over time to allow scientists to concentrate on developing mathematical descriptions of matter as pure mechanisms in the absence of any concern about its spiritual dimension or ontological foundations. Meanwhile, attempts to rationalize, reconcile, or eliminate Descartes’s stark division between mind and matter became perhaps the most central feature of Western intellectual life.

This is the tragedy of the modern mind which ‘solved the riddle of the universe’, but only to replace it by another riddle: The riddle of itself. The tragedy of the Western mind, is a direct consequence of the stark Cartesian division between mind and world. We discover the ‘certain principles of physical reality’ said Descartes, ‘not by the prejudices of the senses, but by rational analysis, and that which possesses the prodigiousness of its evidence, in that we cannot doubt of their truth’. Since the real, or that which literally exists externally to ourselves, was in his view only that which could be represented in the quantitative terms of mathematics, Descartes concluded that all quantitative aspects of reality could be traced to the deceitfulness of the senses.

It was this logical sequence that led Descartes to posit the existence of two categorically different domains of existence for immaterial ideas-the res’ extensa and the res cognisant, or the ‘extended substance’ and the ‘thinking substance’. Descartes defined the extended substance as the realm of physical reality within which primary mathematical and geometrical forms reside and the thinking substance as the realm of human subjective reality. Descartes distrusted the information from the senses to the point of doubting the perceived results of repeatable scientific experiments, how this, he concludes that our knowledge of the mathematical ideas residing only in mind or in human subjectivity was accurate, much less the absolute truth? If, on that point, that in a state of mental, which is to say, in that of or relating to the mind, e.g., the mental aspects of the problem; in that which for some physical experience to meet with directly (as through participation or observation) or action it perseveres to no real or necessary correspondence between nonmathemaical ideas in subjective reality and external physical reality. How do we know that the world in which we live, breathe, love, and eventually decease, factually exists. Descartes resolution of this dilemma took the form of an exercise. He asked ‘us’ to direct our attention inward and to divest our consciousness of all awareness of external physical reality. If we do so, he concluded, the real existence of human subjective reality could be confirmed.

The present time is clearly a time of a major paradigm shift, but consider the last great paradigm shift, the one that resulted in the Newtonian framework. This previous paradigm shift was profoundly problematic for the human spirit. It led to the conviction that we are strangers, freaks of nature, conscious beings in a universe that is almost entirely unconscious, and that, since the universe is strictly deterministic, even the free will we feel considerations of concern, in feeling of deferential approval and liking to the account on mindful or thoughtful attention, as to the apparent movement of our bodies is an illusion. Yet going through the acceptance of such a paradigm was probably necessary for the Western mind.

The present, however, has no duration; it is merely the demarcation line between past and future. And yet we do have an awareness of periods through the intermittent intervals of time: We have an awareness of something taking a long time, and something else taking only a short time. How is such awareness possible? If that, which exists, namely, the present, has no duration, how can we be aware of ‘a long time’? How can we be aware of something that does not exist? Augustine’s response to the question is an insight into the nature of time. As we experience ‘a long time’, he writes, ‘It is not future time that is long but a long future is a long expectation of the future, the past time is not long, but a long past is a long remembrance of the past’. St. Augustine concludes: It is in my own mind, then, that I measure time, I must not allow my mind to insist that time be something objective’.

Meanwhile, the most fundamental aspect of the Western intellectual tradition is the assumption that there is a fundamental division between the material and immaterial world or between the realm of matter and the realm of pure mind or spirit. The metaphysical framework based on this assumption is known as ontological dualism. As the word dual implies, the framework is predicated of ontology or a conception of the nature of God or Being, that assumes reality has two distinct and separate dimensions. The concept of Being as continuous, immutable, and having a previous date as present is to its past, this accordance within a separate existence gratified from the celebrations that launched a world of change, now this dates from the ancient Greek philosopher Parmenides. The same qualities were associated with God of the Judeo-Christian tradition, and they were considerably amplified by the role played in Theology by Platonic and Neoplatonic philosophy.

Since science clearly cannot, in principle, describe the whole and that the divorce between mind and world formalized by Descartes is an illusion, we believe that of that location is a new basis for dialogue between members and the numbers of cultures. If this dialogue is open and honest, it could not only put a timely end to cultural criticisms and resuscitate the Enlightenment ideal of unifying human knowledge in the service of the customary morally justified. It could also promote a new era of cooperation and shared commitment between members of conflict, in that the effort to understand effectively and eliminate some very real threats of human survival.

Nevertheless, the Cartesian doubt is the method of investigating how much knowledge and its basis in reason or experience as used by Descartes in the first two Medications. It attempted to put knowledge upon secure foundation by first inviting us to suspend judgements on any proportion whose truth can be doubted, even as a bare possibility. The standards of acceptance are gradually raised as we are asked to doubt the deliverance of memory, the senses, and even reason, all of which can let us down. This is eventually found in the celebrated Cogito ergo sum: I think: therefore? I am. By locating the point of certainty in my awareness of my own self, Descartes gives a first-person twist to the theory of knowledge that dominated the following centuries. In spite of a various counter-attack for social and public starting-points, the metaphysics associated with this priority are the Cartesian dualism, or separation of mind and matter into bi-divisional points of dissimulation but an integration of interacting substances. Descartes calculably and calibrated the given aptitude for optimism, apart from optimizing of that which hinders the action or progressively in motion as onward in time or space, in that which takes to divine dispensation to certify any relationship between the ranging dimensions within the two realms. The integrating realm of ‘dimension’ presents itself as a physical property, such as mass, length, time or a combination thereof, regarded as a fundamental measure or as one of a set of fundamental, measures of a physical quantity, as velocity has the dimension of length, divided by time. Thus divided, and to prove the reliability of the senses invokes a clear and distinct perception of highly dubious proofs of the existence of a benevolent deity. This has not met general acceptance: A Hume drily puts it, to have recourse to the veracity of the Supreme Being, to prove the veracity of our senses, is surely making a very unexpected circuit.

By dissimilarity, Descartes’s notorious denial that non-human animals are conscious is a stark illustration of dissimulation. In his conception of matter Descartes also gives preference to rational cogitation over anything from the senses. Since we can conceive of the matter of a ball of wax, surviving changes to its sensible qualities, matter is not an empirical idea, but eventually an entirely geometrical one, with extension and motion as its only physical nature.

In spite of the fact, that the supportive construct where its structural base for which Descartes’s epistemology theory of mind and theory of matter have been rejected many times. Nonetheless, their relentless exposure of the hardest issues, their exemplary clarity and even their initial plausibility, all contrives to make him the central point of reference for modern philosophy.

According to Descartes the elements of actual existence are of two kinds-material and mental. These types of existence are different and incommensurate. The table that I see in front of me is material, while my intention to go on typing is mental; the two have nothing in common. This duality of mind creates enormous difficulties. For instance, how does my intention to lift my arm (a mental event) cause the actual lifting of the arm (a material event)? So, that, a self-consistent paradigm must be based on the hypothesis that there is one basic human-centered actual existence. That if and only if there is to the exclusion of any alternative or competitors, from which only one kind must be the nature of experience. The fact that existence exists cannot be denied. Not only are we certain that we do experience, everything we believe we know about the universe, matter, are deduced from our experiences.

That the methodology of science makes it blind to a fundamental aspect of reality, namely the primacy of experience. It neglects half the evidence. Working within Descartes’s dualistic framework of matter and mind as separate and incommensurate, science limits itself to the study of objectivized phenomena, neglecting the subject and the mental events that are his or her personal experiences.

Suppose for the moment, that is to say, of having accepted or advanced as true or real, based on less then conclusive evidence, the supposed efficiency in question is: If we give realism up, what will we replace it with? If when we try to encounter that which is establish between the evidences of our engaging upon concrete facts and abstractions, are found and the eventuality of fact that realism is an abstraction. The fallacy of misplaced concreteness, of which we have mistaken as an abstraction for a ready proof condition for which something that limits or qualifies an agreement, including the condition that would hold at rest of a concrete fact. As pointed out, this fallacy is a mistake that derailed Western philosophy.

The Cartesian doubt is the method of investigating how much knowledge and its basis in reason or experience as used by Descartes in the first two Medications. It attempted to put knowledge upon secure foundation by first inviting us to suspend judgements on any proportion whose truth can be doubted, even as a bare possibility. The standards of acceptance are gradually raised as we are asked to doubt the deliverance of memory, the senses, and eve n reason, all of which can let us down. In spite of a various counter-attack for social and public starting-points, the metaphysics associated with this priority are the Cartesian dualism, or separation of mind and matter into bi-divisional points of dissimulation but an integration of interacting substances. Descartes rigorously and rightly optimizes an ocular sight that it takes divine dispensation to certify any relationship between the two realms. Thus divided, and to prove the reliability of the senses invokes a clear and distinct perception of highly dubious proofs of the existence of a benevolent deity. This has not met general acceptance: A Hume drily puts it, to have recourse to the veracity of the Supreme Being, to prove the veracity of our senses, is surely making a very unexpected circuit.

By dissimilarity, Descartes’s notorious denial that non-human animals are conscious is a stark illustration of dissimulation. In his conception of matter Descartes also gives preference to rational cogitation over anything from the senses. Since we can conceive of the matter of a ball of wax, surviving changes to its sensible qualities, matter is not an empirical idea, but eventually an entirely geometrical one, with extension and motion as its only physical nature.

Despite the fact that the structure of Descartes’s epistemology theory of mind and theory of matter has been rejected many times, however, their relentless exposure of the hardest issues, their exemplary clarity and even their initial plausibility, all contrives to make him the central point of reference for modern philosophy.

According to Descartes the elements of actual existence are of two kinds-material and mental. These types of existence are different and incommensurate. The table that I see in front of me is material, while my intention to go on typing is mental; the two have nothing in common. This duality of mind creates enormous difficulties. For instance, how does my intention to lift my arm (a mental event) cause the actual lifting of the arm (a material event)? So, that, a self-consistent paradigm must be based on the hypothesis that there is one basic human-centered actual existence. That if and only if there is only one kind, it must be the nature of experience. The fact that existence exists cannot be denied. Not only are we certain that we do experience, everything we believe we know about the universe, matter, are deduced from our experiences.

That the methodology of scientific knowledge makes it blind to a fundamental aspect of reality, namely the primacy of experience. It neglects half of the evidence. Working within Descartes’s dualistic framework of matter and mind as separate and incommensurate, science limits itself to the study of objectivized phenomena, neglecting the subject and the mental event. as to change from a closed to an open condition.

Both the adoption of the Cartesian paradigm and the neglect of mental events are reason enough to suspect ‘blindness’, but there is no need to rely on suspicions. This blindness is clearly evident: Scientific discoveries, impressive as they are, are fundamentally superficial. Science can express regularities observed in nature, but it cannot explain the reason for their occurrences. Consider, for example, Newton’s law of gravity. It shows that such apparently disparate phenomena as the falling of an apple and the revolution of the earth around the sun are aspects of the same regularity:—gravity. According to this law, the gravitational attractions between two objects decrease in proportion to the square of the distance between them. Why is that so? Newton could not provide an answer. Simpler still, why does space in the extent or capacity have three dimensions? Why is time one-dimensional? None of these laws of nature gives the slightest evidence of necessity, they are [merely] the modes of procedure which within the scale of observation do in fact prevail.

It only follows that in order to find ‘the elucidation of things observed’ in relation to the experiential or aliveness aspect, we cannot rely on science, we need to look elsewhere. If, instead of relying on science, we rely on our immediate observation of natures, first that this [i.e., Descartes’s] sharp division between mentality and nature has no ground in our fundamental observation. We find ourselves living within nature. Secondly, in that we should conceive mental operations as among the factors which maker up the constitution of nature. Thirdly, that we should reject is the notion of idle wheels in the process of nature. Every factor which emerges makes a difference, and such that the difference can only be expressed to give expression to (as a thought, an opinion, or an emotion), in other words, as an ac t, process, or instance of expressing in words, such as in terms of the individual characterlogical aptitude of quality that sometimes has actual existence on or upon the elementary component as based in its cause of the determinant factors.

Any proceedings to analyze our experience is general, and our observations of nature in particular, and finishing within the mutual immanence’ as a central theme. This mutual immanence is obvious in the case of human experience: I am part of the universe, and, since I experience the universe, the experienced universe it is a part of me. For example, ‘I am in the room, and the room is an item in my present experience. But my present experience is what I am now’. Such that ‘the world is included within the given occasion in one sense, and the occasion is included in the world in another sense, that the idea that each actual occasion appropriates its universe and follows naturally from such considerations.

The description of an actual entity for being a distinct unit is, therefore, only one part of the story. The other, complementary part is this: The very nature of each and every actual entity is one of interdependence with all the other actual entities in the universe. Each and every existent entity is a series of actions, operations, or motions involved in the accomplishment of an end, in their preceding or being soon to appear or take place of approaching all the other actual entities and creating a new entity out of them all, namely, itself.

Suppose for the moment that is to say, of having accepted or advanced as true or real on the basis of less then conclusive evidence, the supposed efficiency in question is: If we give realism up, what will we replace it with? If not, it is only when our endeavoring pursuit that we establish that encountering between practical facts and abstractions, just as the engaging eventuality of fact for that which realism is an abstraction. The fallacy of misplaced concreteness, of which we have mistaken as an abstraction for a ready proof condition for which something that limits or qualifies an agreement, including the condition that would hold at rest of a concrete fact. As pointed out, this fallacy is a mistake that derailed Western philosophy.

The point is this: When we accepted the realist position, we feel that we cannot deny the ‘fact’ that objects exist ‘from their own side’, independently of consciousness. On the other hand, we cannot deny that we do have experiences, i.e., we cannot deny the existence of mind. Which is the more fundamental principle, mind or matter? Is one of them real and the other derivative? How do the two interact? A slew of unanswerable questions, unanswerable because the conceptual framework in which they arose is all wrong, all base on the fallacy of misplaced concreteness.

If the concrete fact is not the independent existence of objects, what is it? It is the experience that is concrete, for instance, by analyzing a concrete fact, ‘I see a building over there’. Where is this fact taking place, and what is the relation of the fact to the presumed location of the building?

Where is the fact taking place? It is my experience. It is taking place right here, where I am. But is the building right here, so as well, the building may not even exist. How does the place where the building seems to be entering the experience? It enters it as a place of reference. My experience, which is here, where I am, has reference to the place where I see the building. I see the building in the mode of having location where it seems to be. Does it follow that something is happening at that place of reference?—Not at all-, the question of whether something is happening there or not is a separate issue. All we are trying to do now is being of a clearer cause of a start, about what is concrete and what is abstract, and, second, about the location of the concrete and the place or places it refers to. Then:

For you at ‘A’ there will be green, but not simply green at ‘A’ where you are. The green at ‘A’ will be green with the mode of having location at the image of the leaf behind the mirror. Then turn around and look at the leaf. You are now perceiving the green in the same way you did before, except that now the green has the mode of being located at the actual leaf.How does the fallacy of misplaced concreteness apply to the enigma of inequalities? In the derivation of inequalities one assumes the independent existence of two particles having their own properties, which include all three spin components. The assumption of realism, which is an abstraction even when applied to people, buildings, and cars, is certainly of dubious validity when applied to subatomic entities.

Can the realization that realism is an abstraction shed light of inequalities in correlation? When using the language of realism, this language seems appropriate to situations involving measurements in the domains of classical physics and Special Relativity. In analyzing such measurements, realism is an appropriate abstraction, and the principle that ‘Nothing moves faster than light’. Perhaps that ‘something’ seems to propagate faster than light because what is going on is not described in the proper language, as, too, the abstraction of realism no longer applies. If this is so, then the difficulties of understanding the significance of correlating inequalities are due to the application of the abstraction of realism outside of its domain of validity. Is precisely the message one can deduce from Neils Bohr’s framework of complementarities?

Nonetheless, we can derive a scientific understanding of ideas with the aid of precise deduction, as Descartes continued his claim that we could lay the contours of physical reality out in three-dimensional co-ordinates. Following the publication of Isaac Newton’s ‘Principia Mathematica’ in 1687, reductionism and mathematical modeling became the most powerful tools of modern science. The dream that we could know and master the entire physical world through the extension and refinement of mathematical theory became the central feature and principals of scientific knowledge.

The radical separation between mind and nature formalized by Descartes served over time to allow scientists to concentrate on developing mathematical descriptions of matter as pure mechanisms without any concern about its spiritual dimensions or ontological foundations. Meanwhile, attempts to rationalize reconcile or eliminate Descartes’s merging division between mind and matter became the most central feature of Western intellectual life.

Philosophers like John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, and David Hume tried to articulate some basis for linking the mathematical describable motions of matter with linguistic representations of external reality in the subjective space of mind. Descartes’ compatriot Jean-Jacques Rousseau reified nature as the ground of human consciousness in a state of innocence and proclaimed that ‘Liberty, Equality, Fraternities’ are the guiding principles of this consciousness. Rousseau also fabricated the idea of the ‘general will’ of the people to achieve these goals and declared that those who do not conform to this will were social deviants.

The Enlightenment idea of ‘deism’, which imaged the universe as a clockwork and God as the clockmaker, provided grounds for believing in a divine agency, from which the time of moment the formidable creations also imply, in of which, the exhaustion of all the creative forces of the universe at origins ends, and that the physical substrates of mind were subject to the same natural laws as matter. In that the only means of mediating the event-horizon that situates the extrication between mind and the importance of matter was to ascertain the quality, mass, extent or degree of in terms of a standard unit of fixed distributions of pure reason, causative by the traditional Judeo-Christian theism for which had previously been based on both reason and revelation. The answer for its challenge of deism is the debasing of traditionality (in that, of or relating to tradition, a traditional interpretation of th e Bible) in which its test of faith and the embracing idea that we can know the truths of spiritual reality only through divine revelation. This engendered a conflict between reason and revelation that persists to this day. And laid the foundation for the fierce completion between the mega-narratives of science and religion as frame tales for mediating the relation between mind and matter and the manner in which they should ultimately define the special character of each.

The nineteenth-century Romantics in Germany, England and the United States revived Rousseau’s attempt to posit a ground for human consciousness by reifying nature in a different form. Goethe and Friedrich Schelling proposed a natural philosophy premised on ontological Monism. (The idea that coherent manifestations that govern evolutionary principles have grounded the evincing inseparability toward a spiritual Oneness) and argued God, man, and nature for the reconciliation of mind and matter with an appeal to sentiment, mystical awareness, and quasi-scientific attempts, as he afforded the efforts of mind and matter. Nature, of course, loves to hide within the worm-holes of time. Yet, seemly confronting the mindful agencies of loves’ illusion and shroud’s man in her mist and presses his or her heart and punishes those who fail to see the light. Schelling, in his version of cosmic unity, argued that scientific facts were at best partial truths and that the mindful creative spirit that unities mind and matter is progressively moving toward ‘self-realization’ and ‘undivided wholeness’.

The British version of Romanticism, articulated by figures like William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor Coleridge, placed more emphasis on the primary of the imagination and the importance of rebellion and heroic vision as the grounds for freedom. As Wordsworth put it, communion with the ‘incommunicable powers’ of the ‘immortal sea’ empowers the mind to release itself from all the material constraints of the laws of nature. The founders of American transcendentalism, Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Theoreau, articulated a version of Romanticism that commensurate with the ideals of American democracy.

The fatal flaw of pure reason is, of course, the absence of emotion, and purely explanations of the division between subjective reality and external reality, of which had limited appeal outside the community of intellectuals. The figure most responsible for infusing our understanding of the Cartesian dualism with our contextual understanding with emotional content was the death of God theologian Friedrich Nietzsche 1844-1900. After declaring that God and ‘divine will’, did not exist, Nietzsche reified the ‘existence’ of consciousness in the domain of subjectivity as the ground for individual ‘will’ and summarily reducing all previous philosophical attempts to articulate the ‘will to truth’. The dilemma, forth in, had seemed to mean, by the validation, . . . as accredited for doing of science, in that the claim that Nietzsche’s earlier versions to the ‘will to truth’, disguises the fact that all alleged truths were arbitrarily created in the subjective reality of the individual and are expressed or manifesting the individualism of ‘will’.

In Nietzsche’s view, the separation between mind and matter is more absolute and total than previously been imagined. Underpinning, as to supply or serve as a base for the assumption that there is no really necessary correspondence between linguistic constructions of reality in human subjectivity and external reality, he deuced that we are all locked in ‘a prison house of language’. The prison as he concluded it, was also a ‘space’ where the philosopher can examine the ‘innermost desires of his nature’ and articulate a new message of individual existence founded on ‘will’.

Those who fail to enact their existence in this space, Nietzsche says, are enticed into sacrificing their individuality on the nonexistent altars of religious beliefs and democratic or socialists’ ideals and become, therefore, members of the anonymous and docile crowd. Nietzsche also invalidated the knowledge claims of science in the examination of human subjectivity. Science, he said. Is not exclusive to natural phenomenons and favors reductionistic examination of phenomena at the expense of mind? It also seeks to reduce the separateness and uniqueness of mind with mechanistic descriptions that disallow and basis for the free exercise of individual will. Reducvtionism, as an attempt or tendency to explain a complete set of facts, entities, phenpmena, or structures by another, smpler set, "Fo r the last 400 years science has advanced by reductionism… The idea is that you could understand the world, all of nature, by examining smalle r and smaller pieces of it. When assembled, the small pieces would explain the whole.

Nietzsche’s emotionally charged defence of intellectual freedom and radial empowerment of mind as the maker and transformer of the collective fictions that shape human reality in a soulless mechanistic universe proved terribly influential on twentieth-century thought. Furthermore, Nietzsche sought to reinforce his view of the externalized subjective descriptions as the notability of character of scientific knowledge by appealing to an epistemological crisis over the foundations of logic and arithmetic that arose during the last three decades of the nineteenth century. Through a curious course of events, attempted by Edmund Husserl 1859-1938, a German mathematician and a principal founder of phenomenology, wherefor to resolve this crisis resulted in a view of the character of consciousness that closely resembled that of Nietzsche.

The best-known disciple of Husserl was Martin Heidegger, and the work of both figures greatly influenced that of the French atheistic existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre. The work of Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre became foundational to that of the principal architects of philosophical postmodernism, and deconstructionist Jacques Lacan, Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. It obvious attribution of a direct linkage between the nineteenth-century crisis about the epistemological foundations of mathematical physics and the origin of philosophical postmodernism served to perpetuate the Cartesian two-world dilemma in an even more oppressive form. It also allows us better to understand the origins of cultural ambience and the ways in which they could resolve that conflict.

The mechanistic paradigm of the late nineteenth century was the one Einstein came to know when he studied physics. Most physicists believed that it represented an eternal truth, but Einstein was open to fresh ideas. Inspired by Mach’s critical mind, he demolished the Newtonian ideas of space and time and replaced them with new, relativistic notions.

Two miraculous theories are unveiled of our world-without-end, as there be to it the over-flowing emptiness of continuatives that nothing is actualized for being or owing to its phenomenon, yet for ‘us’ too discovered or rediscovered. The launching celebrations gasifying to a greater degree that for Albert Einstein’s coincidence that conjoining the phenomenal ponderosity that was appropriately appreciated in that of the special theory of relativity (1905) and, also the calculable arranging temperamental qualities of being to withstand the fronting engagements that quantify nature by its amending to encourage the finding resolution upon which the realms of its secreted reservoir of continuous phenomenons, are for ‘us’ to discover or rediscover. In additional the continuatives as afforded efforts that prey on or upon the imagination, however, were it construed as made discretely available to any of the unsurmountable achievements, as remaining obtainable. Through with these cryptic excavations are the profound artifactual circumstances that govern of those principles categorized of derivative types of ‘form’ or ‘type’, involving the complex and the given complications so implicated by evolutionary principles that complement or acclaim that of the general theory of relativity (1915). Where the special theory gives a unified account of the laws of mechanics and of electromagnetism, including optics, before 1905 the purely relative nature of uniform motion had in part been recognized in mechanics, although Newton had considered time to be absolute and postulated absolute space.

If the universe is a seamlessly interactive system that evolves to a higher level of complexity, and if the lawful regularities of this universe are emergent properties of this system, we can assume that the cosmos is a singular point of significance as a whole that evinces the ‘progressive principal order’ of complementary intercourse with its parts. Given that this whole exists in some sense within all parts (Quanta), one can then argue that it operates in self-reflective fashion and is the ground for all emergent complexities. Since human consciousness evinces self-reflective awareness in the human brain and since this brain, like all physical phenomena can be viewed as an emergent property of the whole, it is reasonable to conclude, in philosophical terms at least, that the universe is conscious.

But since the actual character of this seamless whole cannot be represented or reduced to its parts, it lies, quite literally beyond all human representations or descriptions. If one chooses to believe that the universe be a self-reflective and self-organizing whole, this lends no support whatsoever to conceptions of design, meaning, purpose, intent, or plan associated with any mytho-religious or cultural heritage. However, If one does not accept this view of the universe, there is nothing in the scientific descriptions of nature that can be used to refute this position. On the other hand, it is no longer possible to argue that a profound sense of unity with the whole, which has long been understood as the foundation of religious experience, which can be dismissed, undermined or invalidated with appeals to scientific knowledge.

Uncertain issues surrounding certainty are especially connected with those concerning ‘scepticism’. Although Greek scepticism entered on the value of enquiry and questioning, scepticism is now the denial that knowledge or even rational belief is possible, either about some specific subject-matter, e.g., ethics, or in any area whatsoever. Classical scepticism, springs from the observation that the best methods in some area seem to fall short of giving us contact with the truth, e.g., there is a gulf between appearances and reality, it frequently cites the conflicting judgements that our methods deliver, with the result that questions of truth surmounting among measures that are profoundly undefinable. In classic thought the various examples of this conflict were systemized in the tropes of Aenesidemus. So that, the scepticism of Pyrrho and the new Academy was a system of argument and inasmuch as opposing dogmatism, and, particularly the philosophical system building of the Stoics.

As it has come down to us, particularly in the writings of Sextus Empiricus, its method was typically to cite reasons for finding our issue undecidable (sceptics devoted particular energy to undermining the Stoics conception of some truths as delivered by direct apprehension or some katalepsis). As a result the sceptics conclude eposhé, or the suspension of belief, and then go on to celebrate a way of life whose object was ataraxia, or the tranquillity resulting from suspension of belief.

Fixed by its will for and of itself, the mere mitigated scepticism which accepts every day or commonsense belief, is that, not s the delivery of reason, but as due more to custom and habit. Nonetheless, it is self-satisfied at the proper time, however, the power of reason to give us much more. Mitigated scepticism is thus closer to the attitude fostered by the accentuations from Pyrrho through to Sextus Expiricus. Descartes himself was not a sceptic, despite the fact that the phrase ‘Cartesian scepticism’ is sometimes used, however, in the ‘method of doubt’ uses a sceptical scenario in order to begin the process of finding a general distinction to mark or take note of its point of knowledge. Descartes trusts in categories of ‘clear and distinct’ ideas, not far removed from the phantasiá kataleptikê of the Stoics.

For many sceptics have traditionally held that knowledge requires certainty, artistry. And, of course, they claim that specific knowledge is not possible. In part, nonetheless, of the principle that every effect it’s a consequence of an antecedent cause or causes. For causality to be true it is not necessary for an effect to be predictable as the antecedent causes may be numerous, too complicated, or too interrelated for analysis. Nevertheless, in order to avoid scepticism, this participating sceptic has generally held that knowledge does not require certainty. It has often been thought, that any thing known must satisfy certain criteria as well for being true, except for alleged cases that are evident for just by being true. It is often taught that anything is known must satisfy certain standards. In so saying, that by ‘deduction’ or ‘induction’, there will be criteria specifying when it is. As these alleged cases of self-evident truths, the general principle specifying the sort of consideration that will make such standard in the apparent or justly conclude in accepting it warranted to some degree.

Besides, there is another view-the absolute global view that we do not have any knowledge whatsoever. In whatever manner, it is doubtful that any philosopher who frivolously, as in disposition, appearance or manner takes to entertain of an indefectable, note-perfect and unflawed scepticism. Even the Pyrrhonist sceptics, who held that we should refrain from accenting to any non-evident standards that no such hesitancy about asserting to ‘the evident’, the non-evident are any belief that requires evidences because it is warranted.

René Descartes (1596-1650), in his sceptical guise, never doubted the content of his own ideas. It’s challenging logic, inasmuch as of whether they ‘corresponded’ to anything beyond ideas.

All the same, Pyrrhonism and Cartesian form and actualized essence, yet its fundamental difference is so near that the difference is negligible, however, the comprehensive generalizations are given to globalized scepticism, in having been held and defended, that of assuming that knowledge is some form of true, sufficiently warranted belief, it is the warranted condition that provides the truth or belief conditions, in that of providing the grist for the sceptic’s mill about. The Pyrrhonist will suggest that there are no non-evident, empirically deferring the sufficiency of giving in but warranted. Whereas, a Cartesian sceptic will agree that no empirical standard about anything other than one’s own mind and its contents is sufficiently warranted, because there are always legitimate grounds for doubting it. The essential difference between the two views concerns the stringency of the requirements for a belief being sufficiently warranted to take account of as knowledge.

A Cartesian requires certainty, but a Pyrrhonist merely requires that the standards in case are more warranted then its negation.

Cartesian scepticism was unduly an in fluence with which Descartes agues for scepticism, than his reply holds, in that we do not have any knowledge of any empirical standards, in that of anything beyond the contents of our own minds. The reason is roughly in the position that there is a legitimate doubt about all such standards, only because there is no way to justifiably deny that our senses are being stimulated by some sense, for which it is radically different from the objects which we normally think, in whatever manner they affect our senses. Therefrom, if the Pyrrhonist is the agnostic, the Cartesian sceptic is the atheist.

Because the Pyrrhonist requires much less of a belief in order for it to be confirmed as knowledge than do the Cartesian, the arguments for Pyrrhonism are much more difficult to construct. A Pyrrhonist must show that there is no better set of reasons for believing to any standards, of which are in case that any knowledge learnt of the mind is understood by some of its forms, that has to require certainty.

The underlying latencies that are given among the many derivative contributions as awaiting their presence to the future that of specifying to the theory of knowledge, is, but, nonetheless, the possibility to identify a set of shared doctrines, but, identity to discern two broad styles of instances to discern, in like manners, these two styles of pragmatisms, clarify the innovation that a Cartesian approval is fundamentally flawed, nonetheless, of responding very differently but not arrangingly displaced.

Repudiating the requirements of absolute certainty or knowledge, insisting on the connection of knowledge with activity, as, too, of pragmatism of a reformist distributing knowledge upon the legitimacy of traditional questions about the truth-unconductiveness of our cognitive practices, and sustain a conception of truth objectives, enough to give those questions that undergo of a unifying cluster in their own purposive latency, yet we are given to the spoken word for which a dialectic awareness sparks the aflame from the ambers of fire.

Pragmatism of a determinant revolution, by contrast, relinquishing the objectivity of youth, acknowledges no legitimate epistemological questions over and above those that are naturally kindred of our current cognitive conviction.

It seems clear that certainty is a property that can be assembled to either a person or a belief. We can say that a person, ‘S’ are certain, of constituting an independent and otherwise unidentified part of a group or whole, whereby we can say that one being such beyond a doubt that certain likeness of this survives. It’s infallible and, perhaps, a confirmable alinement is aligned as of ‘p’, is certain. The two uses