The Diary of Terror: Ethiopia 1974 to 1991

By Dawit Shifaw

This book is about the rise of a military dictatorship that overthrew an African kingdom that ruled the country for centuries. Emperor Haile Sellassie claimed to be King of Kings, the lion of the tribe of Judea, crumbled before both his peoples who hated and who worshipped him.
The military that overthrew the emperor did not have the wisdom to give leadership that the people had expected. To learn how to lead the people, the military council that was called Transition Military Council or Derg embraced the intellectuals who returned home from Europe and North America. The educated Ethiopians advised the military leaders how to deal with former officials and what kind of policy they need to setup. Taking this advice, the Derg allowed several political parties to form. As soon as this was done, the educated Ethiopians advised the military to step down by giving power to the political parties. But the military refused to do this.
In the power struggle between the educated class and the military, the military turned to the muzzle of the gun while the intellectuals turned to the people to get mass support. But mass support did not help against the gun.
In the meantime, the struggle between the military and organized political parties encouraged ethnic conflict for secession, which already existed in several regions. They included TPLS of Eritrea, OLF of the Oromo, TPLF of Tigray, and others. In the struggle between these forces between 1974 and 1991, millions of people lost their lives. This book is about how this happened in Ethiopia.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Trafford Publishing
• Release date: Jul 24, 2012
• ISBN: 9781466945258

Dawit Shifaw

The author was in the navy when the military came to power in Ethiopia. Some of the officers who formed the military council that overthrew the emperor of Ethiopia and ruled the country were his classmates and coworkers who shared him what they were doing. The author was a university graduate of political science and one of the 250 officers and men who were sent to the former USSR in 1979 for training in party political work. He was a head of research and documentation in the armed forces and a newspaper editor.

Book preview

THE DIARY OF

TERROR

ETHIOPIA 1974 TO 1991

Dawit Shifaw

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© Copyright 2012 Dawit Shifaw.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the written prior permission of the author.

ISBN: 978-1-4669-4524-1 (sc)

ISBN: 978-1-4669-4523-4 (hc)

ISBN: 978-1-4669-4525-8 (e)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2012911423

Trafford rev. 07/12/2012

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Contents

1. Introduction

2. The Mass Uprising

3. Derg Election and Power Struggle

4. Toppling the King of Kings

5. summary Execution of Former Officials

6. Consolidation of Power

7. The Creation of a Monster

8. Reign of White Terror

9. The Reign of Red Terror

10. Campaign on Maeson

11. Invasion of Somalia

12. The Eritrean Offensive

13. Betraying Woz League

14. COPWE—Party of a Dictator

15. Losing the Support of Supporters

16. Shengo—The Republic of a Dictator

17. The Reign of the Rebels

18. The Beginning of the End Coup against Mengistu

19. The Aftermath of the Coup

20. Witnessing the Final Days

21. Life After Mengistu

Dedication

This book is dedicated to the innocent people who were executed by the Derg between 1974 and 1991. It is also for the victims of famine and cholera of 1985. My mother and brother were among them. When the international community volunteered to save the lives of the victims of cholera, Derg denied the existence of the disease and suspended foreign assistance to save foreign currency from tourism.

Acknowledgment

I WOULD LIKE to thank my daughter Adriana for encouraging me to complete this book for publication. I also thank Etagegn Gebremariam, my former coworker, who was Mengistu’s secretary when the dictator executed General Teferi Banti and other Derg officials and Colonel Tadesse, Mengistu’s former buddy, for their invaluable information. Finally, I would like to thank the soul of my passed-away friend Major Kedu Dule who has been elected a Derg member together with Mengistu from the Third Army Division in Harar for the information he provided me on the election and background of the dictator.

Introduction

EVER SINCE GENERAL Mengistu Neway attempted a bloody coup in December 1960 and failed, I prayed for a successful coup in Ethiopia for nearly fourteen years. I was still a teenager in high school when it happened. Most of us cheered when the crown prince Asfawosen was forced by General Mengistu to announce social and political changes. The general and his brother, Germame, sponsored democratic changes that had never been attempted before. The crown prince promised to modernize and democratize the country over the national radio, promises that did not last long.

For young men, especially for the few educated Ethiopians of those days, the call for change was more than welcome. But for the decadent feudal landlords and aristocrats whose lives were tied to the emperor, it was not good news. They fought and foiled it. As they realized that they were not succeeding, the two brothers cleared the obstacles of democratic changes for the future generation. That generation came in 1974 for the same role in a different form.

The teenage generation of 1960 matured in 1974. People like me who have been fascinated by the coup always dreamed about a sudden blast of a loudspeaker with martial music that may accompany the announcement of another coup on national radio. But that did not happen in nearly fourteen years. And when it happened, it took a new tactic that made the coup irreversible.

In the fourteen years that followed the 1960, the aristocracy became aggressive against the peasantry and the insignificant number of working class. As a reward for their support, the emperor took lands from peasants and gave them to the aristocrats. Such lands were used for commercial farms that required the eviction of the peasants. For the first time, they had no land for farming, for grazing, and even for building their homes on. And this deeply touched not only the people who were attached to peasantry but also students, teachers, and even soldiers. It was because of this situation that peasants and those related to the peasantry revolted against Emperor Haile Sellassie in mid-1960s, though it was not a threat to his throne like the military coup.

The major peasant uprising erupted in the Bale and Gojjam regions. The struggle in Arsii-Bale was led by men like Haj Yissehak, Wako Gutu, and others. They waged war against the Ethiopian Army and slipped into Somalia when the army was too powerful to face. It was not difficult for the regime to downplay the rebellion because it was from one or two ethnic groups at a time. Though the Oromo and Gojjam peasants boldly voiced against the oppression, it does not mean other peasants and workers accepted it. The tyranny was everywhere especially in the south where everyone was waiting for the best opportunity to revolt.

Meanwhile, there was a powerful Oromo community in Mogadishu, Somalia, that exploited the Somali authorities for support in their struggle against the regime in Ethiopia. I knew this community when I defected to that country in 1962 with a group of schoolboys following a student movement. The community had contributed a lot in spreading the propaganda of hatred against the emperor and his supporters. But it lacked political leadership.

At about the same time, there were a couple of dissidents who identified themselves as Ethiopians rather than calling themselves in the name of their ethnic group. They were exiled to Somalia following the 1960 military coup. The leader was Getachew Garedew who worked in the Amharic service of Radio Mogadishu. It was over this airwave that he always condemned the emperor. His aim was to set up an Ethiopian opposition party in exile, but it became difficult for him for lack of supporters. There were no Amhara exiles in Mogadishu who could have identified themselves as Ethiopians to support him. Oromos ignored him because he was an Amhara, assuming that his struggle was on behalf of the Amhara, which would extend the oppression of the Oromo people. Getachew was a determined man who fought the emperor over the radio daily. But he did not have supporters in Somalia except his coworker, Petros. At one time, the Somali authorities reprimanded him for insulting the king over the airwaves. Though he was not able to organize anyone in Somalia, Getachew had large listeners in Ethiopia, even as the government tried to jam it.

The Oromo community, led by Hussein, had rejected Getachew’s leadership, but it was not well organized enough to form a political party that would give a viable leadership for a strong political struggle. Of course it was recognized by Somali authorities and helped Oromo refugees in communicating their complaints to government officials.

In the mid-1960s, the rebellion in Bale influenced the refugees in Somalia when Haj Yissehak and Wako Gutu went to Somalia with hundreds of armed men. It was this time that a meeting was held to discuss ways and means of forming a strong liberation front. The Somali authorities also played a role in this meeting and volunteered to offer help. The offer was to help the front if it adapts the name Somali Abbo Liberation Front. That would help the Somali government annex lands held by the Oromos and ethnic Somalis of the Ogaden. But there was a split. Wako Gutu accepted the offer to call his front the Somali Abbo Liberation Front in an effort to receive military and financial assistance. But other leaders including Jarra Abba Gadaa rejected the offer and left the meeting. They did not want to be used by President Siad Barre for his motives.

While this was going on in the field and in Somalia, Oromos in Addis Ababa were getting organized into a regional association known as the Mecha and Tulema Self-Help Association. The founders were Oromos from Mecha and Tulema regions of Oromia. The association was led by General Tadesse Birru of the police force. This association grew into an Oromo political force that went close to threatening the emperor. But they could not succeed when the leaders including General Tadesse were arrested and sent to prison. Those who escaped arrest were exiled and forced to live in foreign countries.

When the Oromo uprising against oppression was fairly significant in 1960s, the authorities tried to cover up its intensity. Even when there were major clashes that could make news, the media was not allowed to cover them. The regime tried to tell the people that it was an Oromo problem emanating from being bad citizens. Meanwhile, scholars, students, and teachers raised questions that the emperor never heard since he seized political power. They were social, political, and land reforms.

The Oromo struggle in the 1960s was antioppression. It was against being second-class citizens when they were numerically the majority in the country. Oromo nationalists had two alternative goals in their minds. If there were chances for democratic reforms in the country that would bring about equality of all citizens, they would be comfortable to join. If such chances were not in sight, they would fight for the liberation of Oromia. And in the 1970s, Oromos were not the only people in the country who had complaints against the oppression. Most of the ethnic groups in southern Ethiopia also began to feel.

While this was going on in the south, the Eritreans were already fighting against the regime. But their struggle had nothing to do with the oppression. They had been fighting for independence.

I was returning to Ethiopia from a military training in the United States toward the end of January 1974 when I bumped into several mass rallies in Addis Ababa and other towns where they openly expressed discontent for the first time in Ethiopian history and demanded higher pay. Taxi and bus drivers together with students and teachers turned the capital into a battlefield without blood. I observed the violent demonstration in Hadamaa (Nazereth) where students and unemployed people smashed commercial centers and government offices. The army and the police watched the demonstrators closely but did not arrest anyone. Soon soldiers joined the civilian population in the demand for higher pay and forced the emperor to increase their salaries. General Mengistu Neway tried but failed in 1960.

When the civilian population was in the street to condemn the government, the military was relatively calm. But it was not silent. Something was going on in the barracks in all armed units from east to west and north to south. I was surprised to see the police and army not arresting the demonstrators in Adama who destroyed public property. Of course they later joined the civilian population in demanding higher pay rather than political change. The objective of the military to rise against the regime in 1974 was not to take political power as in 1960. There was no plan by a single or a group of officers to overthrow the king. It was only for economic reasons. It was to request the emperor to increase their salaries. When they succeeded with the salary, they jumped to politics, still persuading the king to get rid of his officials. Of course it was not easy for them to give leadership in the chaos that followed the uprising from demanding for a higher pay to detaining the officials and then deposing the emperor, but they did not give up until they succeeded.

I was lucky to work closely with Derg officials and keep thousands of pages of journals from 1974 to 1990. Of course it is not common to keep diaries in Ethiopia. But I did. Sometimes it is risky to keep a diary in such a country during turmoil. I took the risk and took notes that I still read after more than thirty years.

In my diary, I entered the facts I observed and heard from the original sources of each story. I also interviewed some Derg officials informally and wrote in my diary without telling them that I was taking notes. Today those who gave me the first-hand information may not remember telling me anything. But I do.

Of all my observations of the terror, I will never forget the dead bodies thrown at street intersections that I stepped over every morning as I went to work. At some places, as many as ten bodies were piled up where big posters said Key shibbir yiffafam, meaning Let Red Terror blaze. The posters were stapled on the collections of corpses. My children of two and three also walked over these dead bodies as they went to kindergarten every day.

As the leader of the state that wedged terror against its own citizens, Mengistu Haile Mariam was responsible for the bloodshed during his rule. That was the reason his enemies considered him a monster whose mission was to kill. From my interview with the people who worked with him before he became dictator, he was also a kind and generous person who tried to help people. Some people also think that Mengistu was smart who unified the soldiers and formed the Derg that finally overthrew the emperor. In fact, it was General Aman Andom who was the chief architect of the Derg until Mengistu executed him.

If he was not assassinated, Aman could have avoided the bloodshed in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Of course Mengistu was not the only one to be blamed for the killings. The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP) who started the assassination of rival political party leaders, activists, and Derg members as well as Maeson leaders who advised Mengistu were also equally responsible. They all had strong determination to carry out the killings.

By eliminating his political opponents, Mengistu changed the Ethiopian political culture of gizot or longtime detention of dissidents without trial. In nineteenth century, Emperor Thewodros of Ethiopia did not kill young Minilik, the son of the rebellious king of Shawa, but kept him in prison. Haile Sellassie detained the sons of Emperor Iyasu and later the sons of Haile Sellassie Gugsa of Tigray to keep them from claiming the throne. But Mengistu did not trust even his own prison. For him, killing his opponents was the only solution. That was the reason he was given the name Turuuraa. It is an Oromo word, which means the terminator.

Some of the killers including Mengistu really thought that they have been doing the right thing. They believed that the assassination of their opponents would help the country. But others were taking orders from someone at the top. No doubt that they fought for something they believed in. There were others who fought for their own political agenda. Yet they all failed after exterminating each other and innocent people. They ruled the capital by bullets, denying the people the ballots they fought for. Today they are either dead or retired to the central prison or exiled in foreign countries, perhaps forever. This is a good lesson for any government officials who will rule Ethiopia. Unfortunately, they will not learn from history.

The Mass Uprising

FOR THE FIRST time in the history of Ethiopia, the people in the capital and other towns staged demonstrations against the government in February 1974. In Addis Ababa, it was the Anbessa bus drivers, the only bus service in the city who walked out to paralyze commuting and public transportation in general. It was owned by the royal families. Their demand was higher pay. On the same day, taxi drivers went on strike demanding lower gas prices. Students and teachers swarmed the city streets protesting the new policy of education. Student demonstration also continued in other major cities in the country. Students destroyed some buildings including commercial centers at some places. But the police and the army were not arresting the demonstrators, as it was feared. They watched and advised them not to damage private property.

When the civilian uprising started, something was already brewing in the military behind the barracks. For the first time, noncommissioned officers demanded higher pay and benefits. Using the military communication radio, they asked all armed forces personnel including the army, the air force, and the navy to raise their demands without fear. They pledged that they would not obey if the authorities wanted to punish the soldiers for mutiny. This initial mutiny was totally the work of noncommissioned officers of the armed forces, the army, the air force, and the navy.

Just like many other armed forces officers, Mengistu did not get involved in the initial military uprising. He did not know how far the uprising would go. Any support he may have given to the soldiers during the February uprising was only as retaliation against the senior officers who had bothered him earlier. Although he finally became the leader of the revolution, Mengistu did not play a role in the military or civilian uprising of February 1974. He was dragged into it.

Initially the mutiny started in the base of the Fourth Brigade of the Fourth Division stationed in Neghelle Borana in southern Ethiopia. It was over the poor living condition in the base. The soldiers demanded from their commander to provide them with proper uniforms and improve the dirty food and water in the base. The commander reported the matter to his superiors in the capital, but they ignored him. The soldiers requested the commander of the ground force to come to the Neghelle Borana Army Base and see their living condition for himself. Following this request, the commander, General Derese Dubale and his staff went to Neghelle. The soldiers detained the general and his staff and offered them the food they ate. To resolve the standoff toward a peaceful ending, the army sent mediators who would discuss the matter and get the release of the general. The man who has been dispatched to the mutiny for mediation was the commander of the air force, General Aberra Abebe. He flew to Neghelle and negotiated a peaceful ending. The army commander agreed to meet their demands. But upon return to Addis Ababa, he ordered the arrest of the leaders of the mutiny. The brave and daring soldier who pushed this matter to the end until the commander arrived in the base was among the men who had been arrested. This happened on January 10, 1974. Those who had not been arrested vowed to continue fighting against the general who lied to them saying he would improve their living condition and would not take any actions against those who led the mutiny. They communicated with the Fifth Brigade in the Ogaden, in Gode, Deghehabur, Kellaffo, and other places to support them in their new demand to get the release of the detained soldiers. They threatened that if the detained men in Neghelle were not released right away, they would stage another mutiny.

Indeed the arrested soldiers had been released, but the words that reached thousands of soldiers stayed in the hearts and minds of everyone who had similar problems. The soldiers realized that they could do more if they are united. They also knew that not only the unity of the army, but also the unity of the entire armed forces was necessary to force the government to bring about some form of changes.

After the initial army mutiny at Neghelle Borana, the center of rebellion moved to Bishoftu Air Force Base South of Addis Ababa. It was just one month after the standoff ended in Neghelle. The air force started by threatening to stage a strike. They distributed leaflets on Sunday, February 10, 1974, in which they stated that they would not go to work on the next day if their demands were not met. The papers were also distributed in all air force bases including Asmara and Dire Dawa as well as in the army and naval bases. They asked their salaries to be raised by something like a triple fold. They also asked free medication for civilian employees who worked for the military. The organizers may have known the outcome. They knew that the government would not consider such a demand, but still there were individuals who had expected positive results out of the demand. Positive expectations gave strength to everyone to support the organizers.

On Monday, February 11, they went to work as usual in the morning but later walked out and assembled outside the cinema hall. Base authorities informed the minister of defense, General Kebede Gebre, who arrived a few hours later. When they refused his orders to go back to work, he ordered a police commando unit to surround the air force base and returned to Addis Ababa. The organizers persuaded the police not to attack the base because their victory would be helpful for them too. Before ordering the police to attack, the defense minister sent the chief of staff, General Asefa Ayene, who has been the commander of the air force a few years back. The air force knew that the man was dangerous, who would not hesitate to crash the mutiny. So they returned to work without any results. But the leaders including Girma Zeleke, Getachew, Dejene, and others did not stop the struggle. Some of them took a vacation and left the base to awaken the people, including students, army, police, and workers, which were drastically different from the army mutiny in Neghelle Borana.

While the army communicated using communication radio, the air force prepared clandestine leaflets and distributed. They carried such papers during their flights and distributed them to the army and the navy. And this was solely the work of the noncommissioned officers. Perhaps, some junior commissioned officers knew what was going on, but they did not want to report.

Junior commissioned officers were reluctant to report the underground movement because they also wanted social changes. They wanted changes because the rich aristocrats and feudal landlords became arrogant against poor people. They mercilessly exploited poor peasants by controlling land together with the royal family, high-ranking military and civilian officials. Junior officers were aware that they also were victims because most of them came from the families of poor peasants and workers.

Of course it was normal for the minority that included the royal family and high-ranking civilian and military officials to carry out the policy of the emperor. They formed the aristocracy that firmly supported the monarchy. The aristocracy came from the musketeers who fought for the royal family during the annexations of different ethnic groups. Later they married into the royal family and became permanent authorities. Their children and grandchildren also became the defenders of the aristocracy. It may look normal for poor peasants who were born and raised in the system but not for students and junior officers who had some form of education. For officers in the air force and the police who were more conscious than the army, navy, and territorial army officers, it was a good opportunity to support the underground movement that was led by the NCO. They knew what was going on but chose not to get involved directly because punishment would be harsh against them if they were found supportive.

Unaware of what was going on in the military, the royal family trusted the officers, regardless of their ranks. They were sure that officers would not turn against the royal family even if the NCOs had frustration against the regime. Even if one unit rebels, other units would suppress swiftly, as they did in December of 1960 when General Mengistu Neway of the Imperial Body Guard tried to overthrow the emperor. But they were wrong this time.

The army had learned a lot from the attempted coup of 1960. Whenever they raised demands, such as improvement of living condition or higher pay in 1974, they communicated with other units and asked them not to interfere in their demands by taking actions against them if their commanders ordered them to do so. In this manner, they helped each other and avoided bloodshed throughout the underground movement.

While this was going on for months, Mengistu Haile Mariam was not in the picture. He was doing his job in Harar. His unit, the Third Division did not raise their voices. They were silent although they may have learned the matter through radio communications. Other units insulted the Third Division for being a coward. A miniskirt came in the mail and was posted on their mess hall notice board. This was an insult for members of the unit.

Of all the armed forces, the air force was persistent in their push for a result even if they had been watched by security. They were determined to go ahead until they saw changes in the system. They also communicated with the civilians, mainly the university students and teachers who mobilized the civilian population for demonstration in major cities in the country. The mass rally in Addis Ababa by taxi and bus drivers, students and teachers paralyzed the capital. This created an opportunity for the Second Army Division, the air force, police, and the navy in Asmara, Eritrea, to seize state-controlled radio station and announce their demands to the emperor, which was to increase their salaries. The emperor made a raise of $15 right away. They also demanded for the removal of commanders they hated, such as the grandson of the emperor, Admiral Alexander Desta, the commander of the navy. Their demands were of course met without resistance from the emperor.

The demand that was announced over Radio Asmara was crafted in such a way that it could divide the royal family and high-ranking officials from the rest of the population. It blamed the officials for corruption and left out the king as though he did not know what was going on. The king was comfortable with the demands because he was not blamed. He appointed a new prime minister, Endalkachew Tesema,