Out of Darkness-Light: A History of Canadian Military Intelligence

By Harold A. Skaarup

Intelligence is a key element of operations, enabling commanders to successfully plan and conduct operations. It enables them to win decisive battles and it helps them to identify and attack high value targets. Intelligence is an important part of every military decision. Military intelligence is the knowledge of a possible or actual enemy or area of operation. It encompasses combat intelligence, strategic intelligence, and counterintelligence, and is essential to the preparation and execution of military policies, plans, and operations.

The objective of military intelligence is to minimize the uncertainties of the affects of enemy, weather and terrain on operations. The decisive factor in warfare has often been the utilization of good intelligence. A glimpse of how this has been done in the Canadian Forces is contained in this reference book on the Intelligence Branch history.

• Language: English
• Publisher: iUniverse
• Release date: May 16, 2005
• ISBN: 9780595797004

Harold A. Skaarup

Major Hal Skaarup has served with the Canadian Forces for more than 40 years, starting with the 56th Field Squadron, RCE and completing his service as the G2 (Intelligence Officer) at CFB Gagetown, New Brunswick in August 2011. He was a member of the Canadian Airborne Regiment, served three tours with the Skyhawks Parachute Demonstration Team, and worked in the Airborne Trials and Evaluation section. He served as an Intelligence Officer overseas in Germany and Colorado, and has been on operational deployments to Cyprus, Bosnia, and Afghanistan. He has been an instructor at the Tactics School at the Combat Training Centre in Gagetown and at the Intelligence Training Schools in Borden and Kingston. He earned a Master's degree in War Studies through the Royal Military College, and has authored a number of books on military history.

Book preview

Out of Darkness—Light

A History of Canadian Military

Intelligence

Volume 1,

Pre-Confederation to 1982

Harold A. Skaarup

iUniverse, Inc.

New York Lincoln Shanghai

Out of Darkness—Light

A History of Canadian Military Intelligence

Copyright © 2005 by Harold A. Skaarup

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Contents

List Of Illustrations

Foreword

Preface—Writing the Sequel to Scarlet to Green

Acknowledgements

Introduction

Volume 1 Pre-Confederation To 1982

CHAPTER 1 Canadian Military Intelligence—Early History

CHAPTER 2 World War I

CHAPTER 3 Canadian Military Intelligence between the wars

CHAPTER 4 Canadian Military Intelligence during WWII

CHAPTER 5 Canadian Military Intelligence—Post World War II

CHAPTER 6 The Cold War

CHAPTER 7 Canadian Intelligence Corps, 1963–1968

CHAPTER 8 Integration—Security Branch, 1968–1982

Afterword

About The Author

Appendix A Colonel Commandants of the Canadian Intelligence Corps

Appendix B Senior Intelligence Biographies

Abbreviations

Bibliography

E Tenebris Lux

Many significant elements of the history of Intelligence in the Canadian Forces remain classified and cannot be included here. For this reason, the story is incomplete. The material found within this collection of stories, reports and articles generally

      reflects most (but not all) of the activities of past and current members of the CF Intelligence Branch within the experience of the author. In many cases, the information presented reflects the personal observations of a handful of our Intelligence Corps and Intelligence Branch veterans, many of whom are no longer with us, and therefore much of it is only as accurate as collective memories can provide. The aim of this book is to preserve at least some of the story while it is still relatively fresh in the minds of serving and recently retired Intelligencers. It is also intended that some light be shed on the valuable work being done even now, by the Intelligence Officers and the Intelligence Operators of the present-day CF Intelligence Branch.

E Tenebris Lux.

This book is dedicated to the men and women who have served with the

Canadian Intelligence Corps, with the Canadian Forces Intelligence Branch

or in Canadian Military Intelligence related duties, past, present and future.

Because what we do makes a difference.

Invictus

Out of the night that covers me,

Black as the Pit from pole to pole,

I thank whatever gods may be

For my unconquerable soul.

In the fell clutch of circumstance

I have not winced nor cried aloud,

Under the bludgeonings of chance

My head is bloody, but unbowed.

Beyond this place of wrath and tears

Looms but the horror of the shade,

And yet the menace of the years

Finds, and shall find me, unafraid.

It matters not how strait the gate,

How charged with punishments the scroll,

I am the master of my fate:

I am the captain of my soul.

William Ernest Henley¹

List of Illustrations

1913, Mounted Corps of Guides Officer, artwork by Maj Gary W. Handson

1916, Officers of the 4th Division Cyclists Battalion, Toronto, March

1914–1918, Cyclist Badges

1942, Maj Gustave D.A. Bieler

1944, MI1 Section, DMI, Ottawa

1948, 2 Intelligence Training Company, Toronto, Summer Camp

1942, OCdt Bill Gray and OCdt Reg J.G. Weeks, Victoria, BC

1963, Trades Badges and Accoutrements of the C Int C

1966, 3 Int Trg Coy with Insinger Trophy, Crerar Trophy and 3D Trophy

1964, Intelligence Platoon, Cyprus

1967, CWAC Captain Qualification Part II, Camp Aldershot

1967, C Int C Staff, Mobile Command HQ

1967, No. 6 Int Trg Coy, Edmonton

1968, Intelligence Officer Training, CFSIS

1969, Intelligence Operator 6A Course 6901

1969, CFSIS Summer Concentration

1972, Militia Combat Intelligence Course 7201

1973, Intelligence Operator 6A Course 7301

1973, Air Photo Interpretation Training, CFSIS

1973, CISA AGM

1974, Intelligence Operator 6A Course 7401

1975, 1 CBG HQ Staff, Calgary, Alberta, June

1975, CFSIS Militia Intelligence Officer training

1975, CFSIS Militia Intelligence Concentration

1976, Former Commanding Officers of 3 Int Coy, Halifax

1975, 3 Int Coy, Camp Aldershot, November

1975, CFSIS Int Training Company Staff, December

1976, Intelligence Operator 6A Course 7601

1976, Draft Design for a Canadian Tudor Rose Intelligence Badge

1976, FMC Intelligence and Security Section

1977, Intelligence Operator 6A Course 7701

1977, CFSIS, TQ3 and TQ4 Courses

1977, Militia Captain Qualification Course

1977, Acorn Intelligence Conference, FMC, St Hubert, Quebec

1979, Intelligence Operator 6A Course 7901

1979, Militia TQ 3 Course

1980, Militia Intelligence Concentration, Winnipeg

1980, Acorn Intelligence Conference

1981, SSF Intelligence Staff augmentation, Oct 1980–Mar 1981

1982, Intelligence Operator 6A Course 8201

1982, Militia TQ 3 and TQ 4 Int Op R111 Course 8201

1982, Militia Area Pacific Int Section, Vancouver

1982, Acorn Intelligence Conference

1982, Intelligence Branch Re-badging ceremony, CFB Borden

1982, Col Victor V. Ashdown

1945, General Harry D.G. Crerar, CH, CB, DSO, CD, ADC

1945, Col Peter E.R. Wright, OBE, Commander, Order of Orange Nassau (with Swords)

1945, Col William W. Murray, C Int C

Colonel C.R. Raefe Douthwaite, MBE, Officer, Order of Orange Nassau (with Swords), Croix de Guerre avec Etoile de Bronze, Medaille de la Reconnaissance Française

LCol Robert H. Tex Noble, OBE

Foreword

This book is neither amusing nor entertaining; but then it is not intended to be amusing or entertaining. It is intended to be an accurate factual account of the history of Military Intelligence and the people involved in it in Canada for most of the 20th Century. And that is what it is; complete and in detail. It is in fact a work of reference.

Major-General (Retired) Reginald J.G. Weeks

Ottawa, 12 February 2005

Preface

Intelligence Branch History—Writing the Sequel to Scarlet to Green

During an Intelligence Branch reunion at CFB Borden in October 1992, the author spoke with Major (Ret’d) Robert Elliot about the possibility of writing the sequel to Scarlet to Green. A month later, Major Elliot wrote the author from his home in Surbiton, Surrey in the UK with some additional thoughts on the subject:

There is no doubt that a sequel will have to be written, but at the age of 70, I am not the person to write it. Scarlet to Green took me about nine years to research and write; the CISA took until 1981 to print it and minor administration is still going on.

You will need to ask yourself, What would be involved? Looking at the job itself, I consider that one should be able to dig out what paper there may be covering the major developments over the past 30 years and talk to those of the participants who may still be alive, in about a three year period; less if you were lucky enough to find the odd shortcut through the jungle. Obviously, the activities would be less complex; describing them would less time-consuming. There would be a good deal of pressure on the author to suppress some of the games that were played—the debate over these could be time-consuming. The Security aspects should be less restrictive, although there would no doubt be moves to hide areas which could prove embarrassing to individuals or institutions. On the other hand, many who played in the early unification days are sadly no longer with us. The critical factor would be the time an author might have to produce the text. It might take an additional two years at most, for a grand total of four to five years.

Professional guidance and support is essential to a project such as this. This is particularly important when one considers that, of necessity, much of the subject matter of a sequel will revolve around the bureaucratic ploys which took place in and around the hallowed halls of the Cartier Square temporary buildings. Most readers want action.

What about the author himself? I suppose a basic ability to string literate sentences together is a good start. Some experience in journalism would be helpful in this. Reasonable marks in one’s English courses would be an indicator. I think that what one needs as much as anything else is the desire to do something like this. Then comes the ability to dig and check what one finds, to be able to keep on digging when there appears to be nothing more but that instinct that tells you there should be, or something does not hang together, or make sense. Patience is needed—there are times one thinks one will never get the job done. In addition, of course, there is always the problem that one’s personal life has its own demands. A supportive wife is a key element in all this!

Unfortunately, many key people in the story will have passed on. I doubt much of the story was committed to paper and human memory is fallible. The stories must be recorded, cross-checked and lines of possible confirmation followed up. This is just the first overview of what I think the writer of a sequel is going to have to think about. Even if you do not take the job on yourself, I think you would do us all a favour if you could get in train a fairly active program of oral history interviews and tapes. (Great practice for Interrogation and information gathering techniques!)." Bob Elliot.¹

The author wrote back to inform Major Elliot that he intended to follow-up on the sequel. In the process, it became very clear that Major Elliot was right on all counts about the pitfalls and the extraordinary amount of time involved in conducting the necessary research to compile the story. Major Elliot commented, the fact that you have already taken steps to accumulate odd items of information gives you a lead in any such activity and would reinforce any bid to take the job on you might wish to make.

It seems to me that the time to catch up on what has gone before and to produce the story of ‘how we got here from there,’ would be useful at a time when the Intelligence business is again ‘respectable’ in the eyes of Authority. Certainly it is essential to give new members, officers as well as men, somenotion of the way their Corps has come to be. Scarlet to Green is too long ago, too much a picture of a distant, and fading, past. This is not to say it can be ignored, but a lot has happened since 1963. The need to make sure it does not happen again the way it did is also important—or should be.

"You would have to spell out, very clearly and simply, just what this Historywas intended to do. There were many changes in the Corps in the 1960s;

therefore, some coverage of that period is essential in order to show how farthe Corps has been rebuilt in the subsequent changes. Those who helpedrebuild it would, no doubt, be very happy to see" the story told. By its verynature this will be a history of a bureaucratic battleground, far more than ahistory of battlegrounds themselves. Times and circumstances have changed.

Warfare itself has changed, although certain aspects of it remain the same.

One can still get oneself killed wandering about in areas where other peopleare trying to do each other a mischief. The story should be something for our."²own.

It is the author’s intention to record what Canadians engaged in Military Intelligence have been doing since Major Elliot’s book ended with the story up to 1963, and to fill in a few of the gaps in the earlier story. The major difference in Canadian Intelligence Branch activity from that era to the present time has been the explosive expansion in overseas peacekeeping and peacemaking missions. The factual details of the more recent Intelligence Branch history are described in the words of the men and women who have lived it—particularly those who continue to do so. Much of what Major Elliot had to say about his experiences in the Canadian Intelligence Corps are echoed in Intelligence Branch stories up to the present day.

Out of Darkness—Light! is primarily written for those of us who have been ‘in the trade,’ so to speak, but it should also open a window for the interested reader on Canada’s Military Intelligence history. E Tenebris Lux.

Acknowledgements

Virtually everyone who has served in Canadian Military Intelligence has an incredible a story to tell, many of which you will find in these and subsequent volumes. The story would be almost impossible to tell by just one person, since there are so many different viewpoints, particularly at decision-making times both in crisis and in peacetime. The author is therefore indebted to his colleagues in the trade, and hopes the details and the contents of this collection of intelligence reports is seen through the collator and analyst’s discerning eye in an understanding light.

Much of the information found here has been extracted from various Intelligence Branch Journals, unclassified Intelligence news bulletins, and from people who have forwarded their stories, observations and comments based on their career experiences within the Intelligence Branch. It would be difficult to name all of them, but I would particularly like to thank those who offered valuable advice or shared the specific stories that you find in the pages that follow:

Major-General Reginald J.G. Weeks, Brigadier-General James S. Cox, Brigadier-General Patricia M. Samson, Colonel Victor V. Ashdown, Colonel Gordon S. Graham, Colonel Jeff S. Upton, Colonel Patrick D.R. Crandell, Colonel R. Geoff St John, Colonel C.S. Hamel, Lieutenant-Colonel William Bill Tenhaaf, Lieutenant-Colonel David M. Robb, Commander M. Josh Barber, Lieutenant-Colonel Susan F. Beharriell, Lieutenant-Colonel Ray J. Taylor, Lieutenant-Colonel J.R.Y. Mike Foucreault, Lieutenant-Colonel Greg W. Jensen, Lieutenant-Colonel Mike R.J. Ouellette, Lieutenant-Colonel Rhedegydd ap Probert, Lieutenant-Colonel David W. Wiens, Lieutenant-Colonel Robert S. Williams, Major Gerry C. Mayer, Major Rick A. Mader, Major Ivan J. Ciuciura, Major J.A.E. Kent Dowell, Major Stephen P. Desjardins, Major S. Robert Elliot, Major Mark D. Godefroy, Major James

D. Godefroy, Major Gary W. Handson, Major John Pappy MacKinnon, Major Alex C. Chambers Major Pericles Metaxas, Major Ron Roach, Major Elaine E. Mellor, Major Colin A.J. Kiley, Captain Alfred G. De Boda, Captain William D. Ellis, Captain Lisa Elliott, Captain Andrew Morrison, Captain Rick G. Stohner, Captain Penelope Whiston (Noble), Lieutenant E. Bruce Worrall, CPO1 William J. Lindsay, CWO Collin Ed Affleck, MWO John Paul Michael Parsons, PO1 J.L. Dennis Goulet, PO2 S.A. Irskine, WO R. Grant Oliver; WO Andrew J. A.J. Krause, WO Chris K. Buczynski, Sgt Anna Marie Langlois, MCpl S.P. Prendergast, LAC Don Detweiler, Marilyn McLellan, Robert Neilson, Dan R. Jenkins, Melissa Parsons, Edmond Cloutier, Dr Joel J. Sokolsky, Dr David A. Charters, and Dr Marc Milner.

Introduction

A great part of the information obtained in War is contradictory, a still greater part is false, and by far the greatest part is of doubtful character. What is required of an officer is a certain power of discrimination, which only knowledge of men and things and good judgement can give. The law of probability must be his guide.¹

Intelligence. The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines it as information, News; (persons employed in) collecting information, especially that of military value.² The persons referred to, are often called Intelligence officers, operators, or analysts. Although the personal characteristics of these people are varied, they often have much in common. Brigadier-General Oscar W. Koch, the G2 Intelligence officer for General George Smith Patton Jr., noted that each of the Intelligence officers he worked with, Possessed imagination, initiative and mental flexibility. Each was a willing worker, a methodical detail man and organizer. Each was able to work quietly and in harmony with others; none was a worrier, unable to relax. Every one got along well with and could supervise others, and was able to think on his feet and express himself well.³

Koch stated, Liaison visits and the exchange of ideas with other headquarters were essential to the gathering of first hand Intelligence. He put his strongest emphasis on the key ingredient necessary for an Intelligence officer, matter-of-fact feet-on-the-ground common sense.⁴ Koch noted that theconcept of a G2 Intelligence team was of critical importance, as no one individual could handle all Intelligence affairs and provide all the answers to all the questions that required answers.⁵

The fact is that although success in battle can most readily be won by accurate information about the enemy, and disaster stumbled into by ignorance, the chances and perils of human life rule the battlefield. There is no sure road to success. In no part of a warrior’s work is this truer than in Intelligence. There are those who believe that perfect Intelligence is always possible, and that commanders are entitled to have it. If they do not receive it, then someone in Intelligence has blundered. In WWII, sources of Intelligence were better than they have previously been, this side of treachery. However, they left questions unanswered and unasked. That is what war is. The soldier and Intelligence officer must do the best he can with what he has. Yet weather and whim, deception, total security and the accidents and hazards of dangerous life may speed or arrest the wheel of fortune in great affairs as they do in little.⁶

The successful Intelligence officer must be cool, courageous, and adroit, patient and imperturbable, discreet and trustworthy. He must understand the handling of troops and have a knowledge of the art of war. He must be able to win the confidence of his General, and to inspire confidence in his subordinates. He must have resolution to continue unceasingly his search for information, even in the most disheartening circumstances and after repeated failures. He must have endurance to submit silently to criticism, much of which may be based on ignorance or jealousy. And he must be able to deal with men, to approach his source of information with tact and skill, whether such source be a patriotic gentleman or an abandoned traitor.⁷

He had that supreme quality—-possibly one of which is essential in a first class intelligence officer—of always knowing exactly what he couldn’t do and, paradoxically, taking strength from this to tackle many awkward problems which he felt he could do, even if others baulked at them. ⁸

Colonel Peter E.R. Wright, who was the senior Army G2 Intelligence Officer in the First Canadian Army overseas during World War II noted, The primary duty of Intelligence is to give the Commander whatever information he requires about the enemy and to bring any significant changes to his notice immediately.⁹ He further noted that Intelligence in any formation is based on confidence, and that there must be direct access to the Commander and his principal staff officer. This in turn means the Intelligence Officer, who is as subject to error as anyone else, must always be prompt and clear in admitting his mistakes.¹⁰

Military decisions…carry more weight than those of other professions…when a general, admiral or air marshal blunders, soldiers and civilians die, sometimes in appalling numbers.¹¹

The idea of teamwork and Intelligence sharing at the tactical level is not a new one, nor is defence cooperation between allied nations at the strategic level. Intelligence sharing between Canada and the United States however, is not often discussed in the literature presently available. Military cooperation between the two nations officially began in 1940, when the Prime Minister and the President met to discuss their mutual problems of defence in relation to the safety of Canada and the United States. The two leaders agreed to set up a Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD).¹²

Intelligence cooperation with the United States, Britain and Australia is conducted on a regular basis. The Quadripartite Working Group provides an excellent means of exchanging information on operational and technological advances and challenges in the area of Intelligence."¹³ National presentations at these meetings include updates on matters of mutual Intelligence concern.

There are a great number of participants within the American Intelligence Community, each of which may offer a widely varying (and often conflicting) assessment of specific events requiring Intelligence analysis. This is a major reason why Canada must make its own determinations and judgements concerning the validity of all shared Intelligence products. Shared information may be provided not necessarily because it meets the end user’s needs, but because it may also suit the provider’s best interests. Canada has been made acutely aware that when data is exchanged between nations, political, military, economic and practical concerns must be considered. This is particularly true whenever decisions that are made based on the data provided, involve a risk in lives, national security or the commitment of scarce resources.

Although Canada’s Armed Forces have a long military history, historians have largely ignored the subject of military Intelligence organizations within them. Perhaps because of its secretive nature, Intelligence must play a less than visible role in the eyes of the nation. There are many advantages to this state of affairs, but also certain drawbacks. The Canadian government for example, continues to deploy its Armed Forces personnel on increasingly dangerous missions overseas. To carry out these various missions with any degree of success, requires a considerable amount of foreknowledge, planning and preparation to deal with the variety of life threatening situations likely to be found when they get there. This in turn means that there is an even greater need for the provision of thoroughly analyzed information, which has been processed and disseminated in a useful form of Intelligence to the Canadian government and its military decision makers. If the means available to aid in the decision making process are not acknowledged and utilized, then decisions made to deploy forces overseas will be based on a weak information foundation. This endangers the lives of the personnel being sent.

[There is} a particular hell…reserved for [those who]failed to disseminate intelligence to those who really needed it…those unfortunate commanders who just didn’t know, because someone with the information failed to pass it on.¹⁴

Canada has enjoyed a high level of security in the past and continues to maintain it, both for the nation and for the thousands of servicemen and women it has currently deployed abroad. This is partly because Canada and its leaders have been forward looking and forward thinking in their decisions to gain and maintain military cooperation in the field of military Intelligence. When Canada and the United States set up formal ties for military cooperation in the form of the Permanent Joint Board of Defence in 1940, both nations began to progressively set in place a series of bi-lateral agreements to exchange Intelligence information without either nation sacrificing a significant degree of sovereignty. Similar agreements are also in place with other allies, including the UK, Australia and New Zealand. The result has been a higher degree of security for the participating nations.

Major S. Robert Elliot, who served in the Canadian Intelligence Corps from 1952 to 1972, compiled an in-depth history of Canadian Army Intelligence from 1903 through to 1963 in his book Scarlet to Green. It is not the intention of this book to completely reiterate this detailed history, although a few of the key details covering Canadian Military Intelligence activities which summarize the period prior to 1963, are included in later chapters for general reference. The primary focus of Out of Darkness, Light, is on the modern era of Canadian Military Intelligence covering the period from 1963 to the present day. A number of first person interviews and observations, as well as extracts from various Unclassified Intelligence Quarterlies and Intelligence Journals are included here. The aim is to highlight the major stepping-stones in the recent record of the Canadian Forces Intelligence Branch, and the significant contributions its members have made and continue to make, towards the preservation of Canada’s security, well-being, and in fact, our way of life.

Harold A. Skaarup

Major

G2

Land Forces Atlantic Area Headquarters

Halifax, Nova Scotia

01 May 2005

"The role of the G2 is to provide the commander with the intelligence he requires to plan and conduct operations. The G2’sprimary task is the timely determination of the enemy’s location, activities, capabilities and intentions.’¹⁵

Volume 1

Pre-Confederation to 1982

1

In Caesar’s time, each Roman Legion of3,000 to 6,000 men had ten speculators assigned to intelligence duties. Genghis Khan used spies under the guise of merchants and traders and long-range patrols of swift, lightly equipped horsemen ranged far ahead of his mounted columns to gather information and intelligence.¹

Canadian Military Intelligence—Early History

What enables an intelligent government and a wise military leadership to overcome others and achieve extraordinary accomplishments is foreknowledge²

1700 BC, Woden-Lithi’s Visit to Canada

The earliest record of a Nordic visit to Canada—a trading expedition—is at least some 3700 years old. A Nordic king named Woden-Lithi sailed across the Atlantic and entered the St. Lawrence River. He came to North America about 1700 BC to trade his cargo of woven material for copper ingots obtained from the local Algonquians. He left behind an inscription that recorded his visit, his religious beliefs, a standard of measures for cloth and cordage, and an astronomical observatory for determining the Nordic calendaryear. His inscription is carved in stone at Petroglyph Park near Peterborough, Ontario.³

There would have to have been a great deal of scouting and intelligence gathering conducted in making contact with the Algonquians to establish trade. There is clearly a great deal of Canada’s early history with other nations that has yet to be uncovered and recorded.

1398, Prince Henry Sinclair’s Expedition to Nova Scotia

The Norse came back many times over the next 30 centuries, as evidenced by their settlement at L’Anse aux Meadows in present day Newfoundland. They in turn passed on this lore to Prince Henry Sinclair of the Orkney Islands, who anchored his fleet in Trinity Bay near Guysborough, Nova Scotia, on 10 June 1398. Prince Henry and his men spent more than a year gathering Intelligence and exploring parts of the Maritimes and evidently, some of what is now New England in the United States.⁴ Jacques Cartier, John Sebastian Cabot, and Samuel Champlain followed Sinclair much later.⁵

1756-1763, Seven Years War in North America

The Canadian Military Intelligence Community traces its specific origins back to those British and French officers who were employed at various times in the early history of Canada as scouts, guides, agents, liaison officers, and on other duties.⁶ Early cooperation between Britain and the 13 Colonies occurred during the Seven Years War, 1756-1763, when a Unit named the ‘Yankee Rangers’ was employed in a reconnaissance role and conducted scouting duties. In the planning for the seizure of Quebec, General James Wolfe kept most of the available Intelligence in his own hands, personally interrogating deserters, questioning spies and Rangers. He read and intercepted letters, conducting his own reconnaissance and including a deception plan (the leading assault boats masqueraded as French provision vessels, for example, and a feint attack to distract the enemy was mounted). General Jef-fery Amherst, who took Montreal, also used Rangers and guides for Intelligence work with great skill and success.⁷

1796, Napoléon’s Corps des Guides-Interprètes

The British Army of the 19th Century, which included the Canadian colonial Militia, owed much of its organization and procedures to principles laid down by the Duke of Wellington. During his campaigns against Napoleon, Wellington had observed Napoleon’s reconnaissance forces known as the "Corps des Guides-Interprètes" in action.⁸

Napoleon’s Corps de Guides was formed in 1796, during the Italian Campaign. The C des G performed so well in Italy, it became a special favourite of Napoleon’s, and in Egypt (1798), was expanded from company to regimental size. Though originally established to conduct special reconnaissance tasks and to provide Intelligence directly to Napoleon or his cabinet, the corps, after 1798, became more and more an elite Unit which provided personal bodyguards for Napoleon and his principal commanders.⁹

1809, Wellington’s Corps of Guides

On 2 June 1809, Wellington formally established a similar Corps of Guides. Guide Units were composed of irregular light horsemen, normally recruited in the country of operation, (i.e. Spain, Portugal and France) and were employed in agent-handling, interpreting, tactical questioning, reconnaissance targeted upon French movements, force sizes and commanders some distance behind the front. A small group of specialist junior officers worked on local topography, reporting or making maps and sketches of terrain.¹⁰

The Guides were also tasked with the observation of enemy movements and collection of information, either by observing the lie of the land and the situations encountered or by conversation with the local inhabitants. The Guides were under the control of a ‘Capt of Guides,’ an officer on Wellington’s staff whose services…are most essential, there being no map of the country and no person capable of giving information of a topographical nature.¹¹

The British "Kent, and Sussex Corps of Guides, each consisting of three officers and sixty men, were modeled after the original (1796-97) C des G in both size and mission. These two British Units of Guides were disbanded in March 1802.¹²

The dearth of good maps, along with the scarcity of British officers and men fluent in Spanish and Portuguese led [to the raising] of the Peninsula Corps of Guides in April 1809 [during] the survey of Portugal. The Peninsula C of G was initially a small, irregular Unit consisting of a Sgt, a Cpl, and 16 men who were mainly Spanish guerrillas and French Army deserters. Wellington was sufficiently impressed by the performance of the C of G, and in late May he directed that it be expanded and officially established as part of the Army. By April 1812, the Unit had risen to 150 privates [under the command] of LCol George Scovell. Like Napoleon’s C des G, the Peninsula C of G gradually became more than mere guides in the traditional sense. They were used for special reconnaissance missions and as interrogators, and in such non-Intelligence roles as dispatch carriers and military police. The Peninsula C of G was the first officially established Unit of the British Army whose primary mission was the gathering of Intelligence.¹³

In the Duke of Wellington’s Army in the peninsula (1809-1814), both the adjutant general (AG) and the quartermaster general (QMG) continued to have Intelligence functions. The task of reconnaissance, particularly topographical reconnaissance, belonged to the QMG; the AG had control overprisoners of war, always a valuable source of Intelligence…Wellington favoured the QMG and as time went on he gave [them] most of the operations and Intelligence functions. When the Corps of Guides was formed in 1809 to provide Intelligence for British columns moving into strange territory, it was placed under the QMG’s Department. The QMG, Sir George Murray, was Wellington’s personal Intelligence staff officer.¹⁴

Wellington’s Guides disappeared at the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1814, but a similar organization was brought into effect by Sir Harry Lawrence on 14 December 1846 to keep the North West Frontier of India under surveillance. The Queen’s Own Corps of Guides (Lumsden’s), Indian Army consisted of a rough bunch of men, recruited from every warlike tribe on the Frontier and commanded by Lt H. Lumsden. The Guides were to be comprised of trustworthy men who could, at a moment’s notice, act as guides to Troops in the field; men capable, too, of collecting trustworthy Intelligence. This Corps developed rapidly into two fighting regiments, the Guides Cavalry and the Guides Infantry, and served with distinction in both World Wars.¹⁵

1862, The Royal Guides

A mounted Unit that was designed to gather information about the lay of the land, produce maps and study the indigenous population seemed to be highly desirable for the Canadian frontier. Thus, on 7 February 1862 during the reign of Queen Victoria, the first Guides Unit in Canada, the "4th Troop of Volunteer Cavalry of Montreal (or Guides) was formed. On 17 April 1863, the Unit’s name was changed to The Royal Guides or the Governor General’s Bodyguard.’" The title conflicted with that of’ another similar Unit in Toronto, and political pressure forced a third name change on 13 April 1866 to The Royal Guides or Governor General’s Body Guard for Lower Canada;" its short title was The Royal Guides. In 1866, the Guides were called out to help repel Fenian raiders attacking Canada from the United States. The Fenians took their names from a band of men that surrounded Irish rebel Finn MacCool, legendary hero of early Irish history. At that time Irish rebels were raising money in America to support Ireland’s fight for freedom. The American branch of the Fenians, founded by John O’Mahoney in 1858, was bent on using America as a base for a campaign against British rule of their homeland. The Guides took part in an action against the Fenians near St. Armand, Quebec on 09 June 1866 that saw the intruders withdraw across the border.¹⁶

700 Fenians under the command of BGen Samuel Spear, a graduate of the US Military Academy at West Point, NY, crossed the border on 7 June 1866, to conduct an assault on Canada. Spear led at least one mounted Unit, the 22nd Irish Cavalry, but his men were an undisciplined lot who proceeded to loot houses, seize livestock and terrorize the local population. Unfortunately for Spear, President Andrew Johnson declared on 5 June the US neutrality laws of 1818 would be upheld.

On 8 June, Spear learned US marshals had impounded his ammunition and supplies, forcing him to lead a disorganized retreat. The Royal Guides, a volunteer cavalry Unit composed primarily of Montreal Hunt Club members, encountered a party of about 200 Fenians near Pigeon Hill, Quebec. Under the Command of Capt D. Lorne MacDougall, the Guides charged with drawn sabres, hurtled the Fenians’ breastworks and hacked at the Irish Americans as they raced for the border. Not only did the Guides valiant charge result in the taking of 16 Fenian prisoners, but it also salvaged what was left of Canadian military honour, (after an earlier battle which had ended in the Fenians favour). A gala military review was staged on Montreal’s Champs de Mars to celebrate the successful defence of British North America, with the Royal Guides given the place of honour. With the crisis over, however, there was no further need for the services of the Guides, and (likely due to the ever-present necessity of government military budget cutbacks), the Unit was disbanded on 13 August 1869.

The Fenian raids demonstrated that Canada needed to strengthen her defences. The Canadian government purchased 3,000 Peabody rifles with bayonets from the Providence Tool Company of Providence, Rhode Island, along with a number of R.I. Starr carbines and Spencer repeating rifles, also acquired in the United States. In 1867, the British government shipped 30,000 breech-loading Snider-Enfield rifles, complete with all the necessary equipment, for immediate issue to the Canadian Militia.

Due in some part to the unifying effect the Fenian threat had on their Canadian subjects, the British passed the British North America Act in 1867, creating the Dominion of Canada. Shortly after the new nation was established, the British government began to withdraw the Regular Garrisons at Kingston and Quebec. Clearly, the Dominion of Canada was expected to provide for its own defence. Accordingly, Canada passed the first Militia Act in 1868, under which an administrative system was established to train and organize a 40,000-member Militia force.¹⁷

The Fenian raids sparked an increased interest in national security on the part of the newly formed government of Canada. Thus the earliest agreement between Canada and the United States concerning defence cooperation can found in the 1871 Treaty of Washington. The document was drafted as a Treaty between the United States of America and Her Britannic Majesty for an Amicable Settlement of all Causes of Difference between the Two Countries. Many more such agreements and treaties for military cooperation would be signed between the two nations, including the renewal of the present day NORAD treaty.¹⁸

1885, The Dominion Land Surveyor’s Intelligence Corps in the North West Campaign Article by Maj S. Robert Elliot

Louis Riel returned from exile in the United States in 1884. By mid-March 1885, the unrest in the Prairie was such that the Minister of Militia and Defence, the Honourable A.P. Caron, ordered his GOC Major-General Frederick Middleton, to go at once to Winnipeg and restore law and order. When the trouble broke, most of the Dominion Land Surveyors, who were engaged in surveying the western regions, were at a Conference in Ottawa, mapping out the program for the next summer. The then Dominion Land Surveyor was one Col J.S. Dennis, who had served in rather equivocal terms in the earlier Riel Rebellion of 1869 on the prairies and the Fenian raid of 1866. He volunteered his Surveyors en bloc, with his son J.S. Dennis as their commander. The strength of this Unit was three officers and 50 men, and it was variously known as the Intelligence Corps (Militia Orders), Dennis’s Scouts, Surveyors Scouts, and Dominion Land Surveyor’s Scouts. They were not the only Scout Unit.

Other scout Units were formed in Winnipeg, Qu’Appelle, Lethbridge, and Fort MacLeod. These Units included Boulton’s Scouts, Boulton’s Mounted Infantry, and The Mounted Corps; and French’s Scouts, White’s Scouts or the Moose Mountain Scouts; and Steele’s Scouts, the Alberta Mounted Rifles or Scout Cavalry; and the Rocky Mountain Rangers."¹⁹

During the North West campaign, The scout Units performed a light cavalry function as well as their more normal role of long-range patrol reconnaissance locating and reporting on parties of Indians. They may have been undisciplined, untrained, and unused to war, but they were tough, self-reliant outdoorsmen who were much less costly to raise and maintain than regular cavalry would have been.

It is not clear when they arrived in the theatre of operations. They were deployed as a line of piquet between Swift Current Creek and Long Lake during the Battle of Fish Creek (24 April 1885), and joined Middleton’s column on 10 May. They acted as skirmishers before the main enemy positions at Batoche. The attack went in on 12 May, with four casualties including Lt E.A.W. Kippen, killed; Pte Hay, Pte Allen, Pte Cook and Pte Wheeler wounded.

On 24 May, Middleton and Otter (who had been moving north from Swift Current) joined. The combined force then moved up the Saskatchewan River to a point about six miles down river from Port Pitt, where they met the Alberta Field Forces. 120 Scouts, including 40 Dennis’s, followed the balance of the Scouts, which had been with the Alberta force on the trail of Chief Big Bear. After a skirmish at Loon Lake, Big Bear’s party disintegrated and he surrendered on 2 July.²⁰

With the end of the fighting, the Scout units were all disbanded by 18 September 1885. With two exceptions, they vanish from the Canadian Militia scene. The Unit from Winnipeg has been perpetuated in the Fort Gary Horse, and the Qu’Appelle Unit in the North Saskatchewan Regiment.²¹

1899-1902, Canadian Scouts in South Africa

During the South African or Boer War (1899-1902), 7,300 Canadians served in the contingents sent overseas, in both official and irregular Forces which were raised for the war. Many of them served in British regular and irregular scout Units such as Howard’s Scouts, Ross’s Scouts, or the Canadian Scouts and others. The one wholly Canadian Unit, the Lord Strathcona’s Horse, was composed of 500 roughriders from the Canadian North West, under NWMP Inspector Samuel B. Steele. This Unit was raised by Lord Strathcona at no cost to the Canadian government and is perpetuated in the present day Canadian Forces as "Lord Strathcona’s Horse (Royal Canadians)."²²

1901Canada’s First Intelligence Officer, LCol Victor Brereton Rivers

The British Army in South Africa at the time fielded a large Intelligence organization. This organization included a Director of Military Intelligence and 63 officers engaged in Intelligence staff and field duties. There was a Director of Military Intelligence, graded as Assistant-Adjutant-General (AAG), an AAG (Topography), four Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-Generals (Intelligence), and two Press Censors, all at Force HQ; a Press Censor and a baggage and Intelligence Officer on the Railway Staff; and a Field Intelligence Staff of 15 DAQMGs (Intelligence), 13 staff Capts, a staff Lt, seven staff Intelligence officers, four officers employed on Provosts duties (possibly as early forerunners of the Field Security trade), 24 Intelligence officers, most of whom were or had been, members of irregular mounted Units, and the necessary clerical staff.²³

Several Canadians trained and served in this British Intelligence system during the war, and its successful operation brought it to the attention of the serving General Officer Commanding (GOC) Canadian Militia, MGen R.H. O’Grady-Haly, CB, DSO, attached to the British War office. He noted that Canada did not have a similar working organization and recommended that an Intelligence Staff Officer be added to the department of the

Quartermaster General. His recommendation was accepted, and on 06 February 1901, the Canadian Militia appointed its first Intelligence Staff Officer (ISO), Lieutenant-Colonel Victor Brereton Rivers, RCA, a career soldier and a veteran of the battles of Fish Creek and Batoche.²⁴

1903, Formation of the Canadian Corps of Guides

Lieutenant-Colonel Victor B. Rivers was one of the first of the small band of Canadian Military Intelligence officers serving in an organization that was in effect the forerunner of Canadian Forces Intelligence Branch as we know it today. This officer’s staff work led to the formation of the Canadian Corps of Guides as authorized by General Order 61 of 01 April 1903.²⁵ This Order directed that at each of the 12 Military Districts across Canada there would be a District Intelligence Officer (DIO) whose duties included command of the Corps of Guides in his District.²⁶

The Corps of Guides (C of G) was a mounted corps of non-permanent Militia with precedence immediately following the Canadian Engineers. The officers, NCOs, and men were appointed individually to the headquarters staffs of various commands and districts to carry out Intelligence duties. From the authorizing order, it is apparent that one of the functions of the C of G was to ensure that, in the event of war on Canadian soil, the defenders would possess detailed and accurate information of the area of operations. The ranks of the Corps of Guides were filled quickly, and by the end of 1903, the General Officer Commanding the Militia was able to report that, the formation of the Corps has been attended by the best possible results. Canada is now being covered by a network of Intelligence and capable men, who will be of great service to the country in collecting information of a military character and in fitting themselves to act as guides in their own districts to forces in the field. I have much satisfaction in stating that there is much competition among the best men in the country for admission into the Corps of Guides. Nobody is admitted into the Corps unless he is a man whose services are likely to be of real use to the country.²⁷

The training of the Corps began at once under the supervision of the Director of Intelligence. Special courses stressed the organization of foreign armies, military reconnaissance, and the staff duties of Intelligence officers. Instruction in drill and parade movements was kept to a minimum. Although primarily made up of individual officers and men, there was also an establishment for a mounted company of the Corps with one company allocated to each division. The strength of the company was 40 all ranks.

Each Military District was sub-divided into local Guide Areas.²⁸ The head of this organization was a Director General of Military Intelligence (DGMI), under the control of the General Officer Commanding (GOC). The DGMI was charged with the collection of information on the military resources of Canada, the British Empire, and foreign countries.²⁹

The first DGMI was Brevet-Major William A.C. Denny, Royal Army Service Corps, psc, a veteran of South Africa. His staff included LCol Victor B. Rivers as ISO and two AISOs, Capt A.C. Caldwell and Capt W.B. Anderson responsible respectively for the Information and Mapping Branches, three Lieutenants, a Sergeant and two NCOs. All officers and men in the Districts were Militia. (As late as 1913 there were less than 3,000 men serving in the Canadian Militia).³⁰ This was the basic organization for military Intelligence with which Canada entered the Great War. Capt R.M. Collins, the Secretary of the Australian Defence Department, who had recently visited Canada, reported that:

The Canadian Forces were run by a Militia Council, similarly constituted to the Australian Military Board with the Minister as President and the First Military Member. The Chief of the General Staff (CGS) had the responsibility to advise on questions of general military policy; Intelligence, and preparation for war; as well as the education of staff officers. Of particular interest was the fact that there were two Intelligence Officers on the Canadian Staff, assisted by a Corps of Guides (consisting of 185 Militia officers) which had been raised on 01 April 1903."

A report was prepared following his visit, recommending that provision be made for a Director of Education and a Director of Intelligence, as this was the only way that the many duties assigned to the Chief of Intelligence could be properly discharged. He pointed to the Canadian example as a sound arrangement to emulate.³¹

The Canadian Corps of Guides were responsible for the collection of military information, and their duties were described as follows: The Guides should be intelligent men and capable of active work with a knowledge of the topographical features of the country as well as the roads, the country between the roads, sidepaths, names of farmers, etc., in the area, and when possible, should be in possession of a horse.³²

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Mounted Corps of Guides Officer, artwork by Maj Gary W. Handson.

1913-1914, Corps of Guides Annual General Meetings

During the 1913 AGM of the Corps of Guides in Ottawa, they were visited by the Minister of Militia and Defence, who told them officers of the Corps should mingle with officers of other units more than they do and give the benefit of their special knowledge and training to others in their commands.³³

At the 1914 AGM, also held in Ottawa, Maj C.H. Mitchell gave an address on the Balkan War and illustrated his remarks with lantern slides.³⁴

1926, Corps of Guides Prize Article by Maj S. Robert Elliot

On 8 January 1926, the Commandant of the Royal Military College, Colonel Commandant G.F. Constantine, received a letter from Col A.C. Caldwell, then Director of Engineer Services, which advised him that the late Col E.J. Chambers (former Gentleman Usher of the Black Rod), had wished to donate the funds of the old Corps of Guides Association toward an annual prize to be awarded to cadets of RMC. The Association of Guides Officers of the Militia of Canada had been formed in 1906 or 1907, with the multiple aims of fostering esprit de corps, bringing officers of the Corps of Guides into closer relations with officers of other branches of the Active Militia, affording a channel for officers in a position to do Intelligence work in addition to their other duties, discussing Intelligence work and Guide’s duties in peace and war, discussing military matters from the Intelligence viewpoint, and reading and publishing Intelligence papers of benefit to the Militia. Membership was open to officers and civilians who would be of use to Intelligence. The annual meetings held in Ottawa in late February and early March were two-day affairs, of which the annual dinner was doubtless a highlight. Papers were read by officers of the Corps on such subjects as The Hudson Bay Route—From a Military Point of View (Lt J.W. Tyrell, 1909), and, The Relation of the Corps of Guides to the Cavalry (Lt W.B. Sifton, 1913). The deliberations were published.

The Corps of Guides Prize was given for the highest marks in topography, reconnaissance, or in subjects which the old Corps of Guides considered particularly their own, and was to be known as the Corps of Guides Prize. The letter advised that Mitchell, Parsons, Van Nostrand, Dubue, Brown, Hamilton and other officers of the Corps approved the presentation. Colonel Commandant Constantine accepted the offer with thanks on 12 January 1926, and on 9 March, Col Caldwell sent a formal letter of presentation with a cheque for $829.89. The Commandant wrote Army Headquarters on 3 December, stating that he had accepted the Prize, had purchased Dominion of Canada Bonds for the amount of $841.40, which was the sum plus accrued interest and that the conditions of the Prize had been included in the Calendar as:

Corps of Guides Prize—To be awarded to the gentleman cadet earning the greatest number of marks in map reading and field sketching throughout his whole course.

The first award was made in 1927 and the Prize was presented annually until 1941 except for 1940. It took the form of some article of personal equipment such as binoculars, a travel case, watch, etc. There were no awards made between 1941 and 1952. Reorganization of courses at RMC between 1948 and 1952 required a change in the terms of the Prize and it was decided that it should be awarded for Survey and Field Sketching, which were closest to the original specialties. A cash award is now made to enable the winner to select his own article of personal equipment. A certificate of award, signed by the Commandant is also presented.

1927-2004, Winners of the Corps of Guides Prize:

1927, R.M. Elliott; C. Gow; 1932, D.S. Blaine; 1933, C.L. Ingles; 1934, H.L. Meuser; 1935, F. le B.T. Clifford; 1936, K.H. McKibbin; 1937, J.F.H. Morazain; 1938, S.D. Clarke; 1939, J.M. Houghton; 1940, No Award; 1941, A.C. Whittier; 1942-1951, No Award; 1952, J.I.B. Williamson; 1953, J.M. Willsher; 1954, B.D. Blair; 1955, P.A. Thompson; 1957, D.H. Greenfield; 1958, R.J. Rennie; 1959, G.F. Williamson; 1960, M.J. Desrochers; 1961, D.H. Smith; 1962, J.G. Allen; 1963, G.J. Corbould; 1964, J.C. Schamuhn; 1965, R.P. Roelofsen; and, 1966, H.J. Hamilton.³⁵ 1967, J.F. Sawchuk; 1968, D.G. Mcintosh; 1969, R.W.J. James; 1970, A.R. Thickson; 1971, W.J. Holtz; 1972, W.H.R. Pachal; 1973, D.S. Heath; 1974, T.K. Molstad; 1975, M.J. More; 1976, R.E. Isabelle; 1977, J.A. Fedoruk; 1978, W.F. Wawrychuk; 1979, J.G. Ritter.³⁶ 1980, D.R.S. Benjamin; 1981-1982, No Award; 1983, S.A. Tracey; 1984, D.J. Allin; 1985, L. Hains; 1986, R.K. Gupta; 1987, M.P. Braid; 1988, No Award; 1989, N.A. Godau; 1990, M.J. Gilmore; 1991, C.P.L.P. Valotaire; 1992, P.M. Arsenault; 1993, D.J. Pretorius; 1994, K.A. Cameron; 1995, H.L. Budden; 1996, J.C.M. Bennett; 1997, J.D. Hawthorne; 1998, F. Sauvé; 1999, M.D. Carrière; 2000, S.E. Michaud; 2001, M.J. Sawchuk; 2002, A.J. Manthorne; 2003, M.J. Dawe; and 2004, R.F. Ulrich.³⁷

2

1914-1918, Canadian Military Intelligence in the Great War

Canada’s military intelligence came of age in the Great War. Because it was part of the British Empire, when Britain declared war on 4 August 1914, Canada also found itself at war. The machinery of strategic Intelligence was at that time located in, responsible to, and managed by Britain’s Whitehall. The Canadian Director General of Military Intelligence (DGMI) had been required since 1903 to gather information on foreign armies, Militia, military engineering and to prepare reports for any Army in the field. Militia Headquarters in Ottawa, however, had no direct access to official foreign sources and agencies and there were no Canadian offices abroad.¹

Before the war, Ottawa had periodically forwarded Intelligence gathered on Canada’s military resources to the Colonial Office for use by the Committee on Imperial Defence. The forwarding of Intelligence to Great Britain highlights the fact that it would have been very unlikely that Canada would have stood aside even if it had a choice, when the British Empire went to war. In fact, Canada specifically endeavoured to acquaint the Imperial authorities with the material [Canadian] resources upon which the Empire might reckon in the event of a Great War.²

When the Great War broke out, the Corps of Guides volunteered for service in a body and a concentration…moved to Valcartier as part of the general mobilization then in progress. It quickly became evident however, that the Corps could not be employed under the conditions of warfare for which it had been designed. General Sir Arthur Currie³ recorded:

The Corps of Guides was absorbed into existing Units and formations. Officers to the number of about thirty were absorbed into Staff posts and various regimental and special duties. Owing to their special training in reconnaissance and scout duties generally, the officers appointed to Staff duties were utilized essentially as Staff Capts for Intelligence and General Staff Officers. Non-Commissioned Officers and men were absorbed into cavalry, horse artillery and various other Staff duties and, subsequently, into the Cyclist Corps which later became the natural channel for the absorption of the Guide per-sonnel.⁴

Canadian Army personnel were also attached to the British Intelligence Corps for employment in Intelligence duties such as liaison and Counter Intelligence.⁵ In spite of their limited training, the Guides were still better prepared than their English counterparts were for the mud of Flanders. Their very existence kept the importance of battlefield Intelligence highly visible, which may explain why Canadian formations tended to employ more Staff Officers on Intelligence duties than their British equivalents did.⁶

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Officers of the 4th Division Cyclists Battalion, Toronto, March 1916

The Canadian Corps of Cyclists, 1914-1918

The Canadian Corps of Cyclists were employed in a wide range of duties other than cycling due to the nature of the fighting on the Western front, including spells as infantry in the front-line trenches.⁷ They came into their own in 1918 as liaison and reconnaissance Units, but suffered heavy casualties while keeping the Canadian Command in touch with the rapidly changing disposition of both sides.⁸

The Canadian Army did not have cyclists in 1914. Cyclists were a British development that dated from 1885. On 7 November 1914, some 51 Yeomanry and 23 Territorial Force Cyclist Battalions in the UK were formed into an Army Cyclist Corps, which, by late 1916, had grown to a strength of 14,624 men. The First Canadian Division (1 Cdn Div) conformed to the British organization, and although there was no provision for a Guides Unit, it formed a Cyclist Company in September 1914 as part of its divisional mounted Troops. As 1 Cdn Div was being assembled in Valcartier, some 350

Canadian Corps of Guides personnel had been assembled there minus their horses. The Guides were pressed into service to form the new Cyclist Company, which was commanded by Major C.C. Child, with Capt W.W. Everall as second in command, both of whom were Corps of Guides officers. The First Division Cyclist Company of 100 all ranks and a few bicycles was formed and sailed on 3 Oct 1914. The Company HQ had a Company Sgt Major, a Company Quartermaster Sgt, an artificer, three signallers, and a batman. There were 3 platoons, each with a subaltern, 1 Sgt, 2 Cpls, 2 lance Cpls, 24 privates, and a batman.

After spending some time in England, the company moved to France in February 1915. It was immediately moved to the front and engaged in a wide variety of tasks including traffic control, dispatch riding, mapping, and guarding prisoners of war. Special tasks were often assigned, including their use as a mobile infantry force. The Second Division Cyclist Company was formed from platoons drawn from across Canada and assembled in Toronto during the autumn of 1914. In May 1915, it embarked from Montreal for England in a ship previously used to transport horses. The company trained through to Sep 1915, when it embarked for France where it took up similar duties to those of the 1st Company.⁹

Several platoons of cyclists were formed in Niagara, Ontario, moved to Toronto and sailed for England in Nov-Dec 1915. In March 1916, they were formed into the Third Divisional Cyclist Company and deployed to France. In May 1916, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Divisional Cyclist Companies were amalgamated and formed into "The Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion.¹⁰

Like its predecessors, the Fourth Divisional Cyclist Company followed a recruiting, training and deployment pattern through Toronto to England. The Company was officially formed in May 1916 but disbanded shortly thereafter and its members dispersed to other Units. Almost simultaneously as the 4th Company was being formed and disbanded, recruiting in Canada for a fifth Unit was taking place. As they considered themselves mounted Troops, they adopted cavalry style dress, drill and attitude. After reaching England, the Unit was deployed piece-meal to other Army Units including some personnel being assigned to the other cyclist companies.¹¹

Cyclists were originally intended to protect the main force from surprise, much as the armoured car Units did during WWII, and present day reconnaissance patrols still do. They were mobile, and had a larger ratio of machine-guns to rifles than an infantry battalion. However, as a report on British manoeuvres of 1912 pointed out, numerous and good roads are a necessity for (their) effective employment. In France, the Cyclists dug trenches, carried material forward, and acted as stretcher-bearers, observers, runners, Lewis-gun crews on anti-aircraft defence, traffic-controllers, trench wardens, and prisoner-of-war escorts. During the period 1916-1918, the Canadian Cyclist Battalion was involved in most major battles including the Somme, Vimy Ridge, Hill 70, and Passchendaele.

The battalion was included in the establishment of the Canadian Independent Force when it was formed in 1918 as a heavily armed (machine-guns and mortars) mobile force. Later, General A.W. Currie strengthened his defences against the German offensive with extra machine-gunners from the Cyclists and the Canadian Light Horse. In August, at Amiens, the Cyclist Battalion covered the right flank of the cavalry. They formed part of BGen R. Brutinel’s Automobile Machine Gun Brigade’s thrust through the Hindenburg Line, and were active in the pursuit of the Germans around Mons. During the Battle of Amiens, 7 Aug 1918, Cavalry…was to pass through the Infantry…seize area Blue Line" supported on its right flank by the Canadian Independent Force, which consisted of two Motor Machine Gun Brigades, two sections of heavy trench mortars which could be fired from trucks and the Canadian Cyclists Corps, all under the direction of BGen Brutinel, CMG, DSO, commanding the Canadian Machine Gun Corps.¹²

Parenthetically, of the first eight officers appointed to that Brigade in 1914, four were from the Corps of Guides; Major J.E. Browne, Capt F.A. Wilkin, Lt G.A. Bradbrooke, and Lt J.W. Sifton, his principal administrative officer. Replacements for both of these Units came from the Guides in Canada.

The Independent Force was frequently used to clear areas in the pursuit ahead of the main force as the German Lines began to collapse in 1918. It crossed the Rhine into Germany in December 1918 and moved as far as

Cologne but then in January 1919, it began the move back to England through Belgium. In April 1919 it embarked for Canada.

After the war, the battalion and the Canadian Reserve Cyclist Company disbanded. Some members returned to Canadian Corps of Guides Units, which, at least on paper, still existed (until disbanded in 1929).

1914-1918, Canadian Cyclist Units, Wartime Order of Battle

The following is a brief chronological listing of the wartime Canadian Cyclists Units formed after 4 August 1914. In September 1914, a Cyclist Company was authorized for each Canadian Division, leading to the formation of five Cyclist Companies. 1st Division Cyclists became A Company of the Canadian Corps Cyclists Battalion in May 1916. 2nd Division Cyclists Company became B Company of the Canadian Corps Cyclists Battalion, also in May 1916. 3rd Division Cyclists Company became C Company of the Canadian Corps Cyclists Battalion, also in March 1916. 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Division Cyclists (A, B, and C