The Mystery of Mind: A Systematic Account of the Human Mind Toward Understanding Its Own Realization

By Peter M.K. Chan

The Mystery of Mind is a systematic and critical introduction to the philosophy of mind. At issue is what is known as the mind-body problem. How does a body support a mind with its brain?

Pivotal to the book is the author's working out of an adverbial concept of mind that is user-friendly to the materialist cause. It is upon the strength of this adverbial concept that the author has come to hold that the conceptual gap between the neurobiological and the psych-cognitive could in fact be bridged. It is also the author's contention that despite shortcomings of other materialist approaches that have been taken in our time, an intelligible case for the truth of materialism could still be made in the form of a biological emergent two-aspect scenario, i.e., when the adverbial concept of mind he advocates is also brought to bear.

All in all, what The Mystery of Mind offers is a systematic introduction to one of the living philosophical issues that have engaged the human intellects for more than two thousand years. This is also the central issue that has motivated research in artificial intelligence, cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and the philosophy of mind in our time.

• Language: English
• Publisher: iUniverse
• Release date: Jun 10, 2003
• ISBN: 9780595805846

Peter M.K. Chan

The author is schooled in philosophy and religion. But he is not an academic philosopher. This book is the fruit of his labor subsequent to retirement. It is his way of squaring himself with what has been left dangling in his mind for the last thirty years.

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Copyright © 2003 by Peter M.K. Chan

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Contents

Dedicated

Introduction

Synopsis to Part I Mind and Matter

Chapter One

Chapter Three

Chapter Four

Chapter Five

Chapter Six

Synopsis to Part III Toward a Materialist Theory of Mind

Chapter Seven

Chapter Eight

Chapter Nine

Chapter Ten

Epilogue

Bibliographical Reference

Dedicated

To the living and the dead from whom I have drunk; As well as to those Who may find drink in me.

Introduction

This book is about the trials and tribulations of the human mind toward understanding the wherewithal of its own realization. At issue is the mystery: how is it possible for a material thing such as a body-brain to become conscious, remember, and think? Nowadays, most of us would take for granted that one’s cognitive capacities are indeed dependent on the operations of one’s body-brain. Yet, it is not easy to understand how the cognitive nature of mind could possibly have arisen solely from the interaction of mere material constituents and their processes. Thus enters the question: what reasons do we have to believe that body-brains alone are really sufficient to generate the phenomena of consciousness and mind? The purpose of this book is to show why an intelligible answer to the question is much more difficult than ordinarily assumed, and to see whether or not and to what extent this explanatory difficulty could in fact be overcome.

Needless to say, whether or not this difficulty is surmountable must depend on two considerations: how the cognitive nature of mind is to be assayed, and what insight, if any, could we draw from the findings of material science. It cannot be dealt with adequately on the basis of either material science or psychology alone. For material science is solely concerned with the nature of things (body-brains included), and psychology is basically about the phenomena of mind. This is why explaining how humans are able to remember and think has, traditionally speaking, always been seen as the business of philosophy. But it is no longer considered to be so. Recent advances made in the area of artificial intelligence and neuroscience has begun to render the question scientifically and technologically relevant. In the opinion of some, to unravel the material source of consciousness, memory, and thought should now be considered as one of the ultimate frontiers of scientific discovery.

In this light and for purpose of providing a systematic perspective to this very difficult and old problem, I have chosen three related topics to scaffold the structure of this book. They will be labelled respectively as Mind and Matter, The Nature of Mind, and Toward a Materialist Theory of Mind. These will also serve as divisions marking the book into three Parts.

In Part I, by drumming up the old dualism-materialism issue, I shall familiarize the reader with the history and dialectic of this very old controversy; and hope thereby to wet their appetite for the rest of this book. In the course of weighing arguments raised in support of these two opposing positions, it will be seen that even though classical dualism is not adequate for what it is about, the lures and arguments that could be amassed in its favour are not something that materialism will find easy to dispel and counter. The mind-body problem in particular stands in the way. Besides, as far as philosophy is concerned, what also stands in the way is the challenge of mentalism, and a phenomenalistic theory called neutral monism. Mentalism contends that the nature of reality is mental. Neutral monism contends that human reality could be understood as constituted of nothing other than sensory data. For materialism to hold its ground therefore, the basis of mentalism and neutral monism will also have to be examined and disposed.

Another big obstacle to a materialist theory of mind has been the traditional concept of mind to which many still implicitly subscribe. According to this concept, mind is constituted of mental acts and mental representations. As such, it is extremely user unfriendly to the materialist cause. For this reason, a critical examination of this concept must be included as an essential part of our overall dialectic. This will be the role of Part II. Its purpose is two fold. To critique this traditional model, and to show that upon another model of mind, there are actually no mental acts and representational entities in the mind. Among other things, it will be seen that what is customarily referred to as sensory percepts, mental images, concepts, ideas, propositions, and so on, are not really entities of any kind. It will also be seen that certain puzzles about self-awareness and the seemingly self-transcendence of the conscious subject or ‘mind’s I’ in particular, are not really as mysterious as they seem. In other words, much of the mental load as imposed by the traditional concept of mind will be shown to be bogus. As I shall explain, mind is constituted of cognitive states with cognitive contents, not mental acts on the one hand, and mental entities of a representational kind on the other. And the contents of cognitive states are nothing but our manners and ways of discriminating the world and expressing facts and possibilities about things and mind. But this is not to say that materialism is thus home dry. We have only cleared the way toward addressing the question of how the mind-body problem is to be overcome.

In Part III, the main explanatory strategies taken by materialism in our time toward tackling this central question will be scrutinized. It will be seen that even though the various approaches taken are either counterproductive or misses the mark, some of their insights are yet not to be ignored. It will also be seen that the findings of neuroscience in particular are pregnant with clues as to how Nature might have allowed a material thing such as a body-brain to become conscious, remember, and think. The trouble is that there is no straight conceptual bridge between the neurological and the psychological. To try and build a fundamental kind of property dualism out of this fact is also unjustified. A better alternative is perhaps to go for a biological emergent two-aspect scenario, and to call into service an adverbial concept of mind, which I shall outline in Part II. At the end of it all, readers will see that even though the nature of matter is still not completely within our grasp, the wherewithal of mind is for all we know, and to all probability, material. Anyone who is awed by the wondrous and mysterious workings of material nature as already revealed by the findings of science must also find dualism in all its forms to be redundant.

That, in one rough nutshell, is the tale of this book. For purpose of helping the reader to keep track of its overall dialectic, I shall begin each of the Parts with a synopsis concerning the objective of arguments to be pursued. In this way, it is hoped that no one will loose the forest for some of its trees. It will also allow the reader, if he or she wishes, to tackle each of the Parts as a separate topic pertaining respectively to metaphysical controversies about human reality, philosophical psychology, and contemporary materialism. But it is my hope that each of these Parts will be read as an integral part of a larger whole—an essay on the trials and tribulations of the human mind toward understanding the wherewithal of its own realization. Finally, a short Epilogue will come at the end to sooth the nerve of those who are religiously dualistic, and say something about the function of philosophy to which this book belongs. But before we begin, I must put my hand down on one basic philosophical issue that may from time to time interfere in the way. It consists of one principle and two clarifications.

I shall take for granted one primitive epistemological truth. It is that to be conscious of something is also to be conscious of its existence. Call this the existential principle. It should be observed that on the basis of this principle, it would be silly to say that one is conscious of some phenomenon (facts and events) that does not exist. Those who say so, as far as I am concerned, do not really understand the meaning of existence. For what does not exist for us in fact cannot even be mentioned. However, it is not to say that existence as such is itself some phenomenon we can refer to or describe. It is neither the property of things or a relation that stands between them. It is simply our apprehension of a state of being as against that which is nothing. Thus, to say that a phenomenon exists is not to say what it is, but simply that it is—or if you like, that it is ‘something’ rather than nothing.

In this connection, two further clarifications will be in order. One, in affirming that to be conscious of a phenomenon is also to be conscious that it exits, our existential principle does not legislate that what is not apprehended does not exist, much less that what exist must be perceived. In short, unlike Berkeley’s esse est percipi principle (which will be encountered in Chapter Three), our existential principle is silent with respect to anything of which one is not conscious. It takes full cognisance of the fact that our sensory apparatus is both finite and peculiar (a theme to be picked up in Chapter Five). We simply do not know what may or may not lie beyond our ken.

Two, what is mentionable include at least the real and the possible. The real is apprehended by way of the senses. The possible is conceived in thought. The possibility of one’s own death is as much a part of human existence as the reality of one’s life. Thus, with respect to any phenomenon, the more crucial of questions is how its nature is to be assayed. And of more philosophical interest, how it is going to be intelligibly accommodated into the kind of human reality that we have come to experience and know. This is what metaphysics, the ancient ‘queen of the sciences’, was primarily about. While your ontology tells what you deem exist, your metaphysics tells how you incorporate the nature of what exist in a coherent and systematic way. In other words, unlike science and psychology, metaphysics is not exclusively concerned with either things or mind. It is more concerned with how these drastically different natures could have existed as part and parcel of human reality. This is also what this book is about.

Synopsis to Part I Mind and Matter

Ancient science is known for its doctrine of four elements. According to this doctrine, everything is constituted, in one way or other, by the coming together of earth, fire, air and water. The formulation was primitive, but the underlying idea was not. It was meant to account for the formation and the transformation of things. As it turned out, it was also to become the great grand father of material science as it has come to be known. But the doctrine was not able to explain everything. While the element of earth could perhaps account for the corporeality of things, fire for the source of heat and light, air and water for the wherewithal of motion and life; it is by no means clear as to how the coming together of these four elements could also bring about the cognitive nature of mind. For this reason, many thought that some other elusive factors must have been left out. One of the most influential of proposals was that the cognitive nature of mind should be accounted for by the presence of some spiritual entity instead. And this spiritual entity is called a soul.

That was the root of the old dualism-materialism controversy. It is basically about the source of consciousness and mind. In the simplest of terms, dualism is the belief that the cognitive nature of mind could not possibly be accounted for in terms of body-brains or any of their material constituents. It contends that what carries consciousness and mind are actually spiritual entities called souls. Materialism, on the other hand, holds that even though the basic material elements of which body-brains are constituted may be cognitively inert, their coming together is yet able to bring about novel capacities such as life and mind. The bone of contention could thus be boiled down to this: is having a body-brain already sufficient for one to perceive, remember, and think; or should we say that the wherewithal of consciousness and mind must pertain to something spiritual? This is what the dualism-materialism issue is all about.

As we shall see in Chapter One, the case for dualism was traditionally buttressed on at least four main grounds. One is the mystery of memory. Another is our innate capacity for conceptual meaning. The third is the indubitable reality of the ‘mind’s I’ as distinct from the reality of one’s body. Last but not least, the apparent causal efficacy of mind on bodily behaviour. In the course of this Chapter, it will be seen that despite the ingenuity of arguments raised upon these bulwarks, the case for dualism is yet vulnerable on three counts. The first is that the purported existence of disembodied souls has never really been ascertained—popular appeal to the paranormal notwithstanding. The second is the difficulty of explaining how soul and body are supposed to interact. This is what is known as the problem of mind-body interaction. But the most detrimental of all is that for its claim that consciousness and memory are really the feats of souls, dualism is not able to explain why temporary loss of consciousness and permanent loss of memory should ever have occur to anyone. This is what I shall refer to as the problem of unconsciousness. And it is upon the weight of this second problem that I shall argue that classical dualism is not really intelligible for what it is about. On the other hand, to buy into Aristotle’s modified version, or what I shall refer to as minimal dualism, could only get dualism from the frying pan into the fire. But as I shall also point out, for as long as materialism is not able to show that consciousness and mind are really the feats of bodies and their brains, it is also to be expected that dualism of one kind or other is going to attract the allegiance of many—perhaps until kingdom come.

Temporary unconsciousness and loss of memory are of course of no threat to materialism. If consciousness and mind are generated by body-brains, it is only to be expected that damage to the body-brain should also have some effect on the performance of mind. As a matter of fact, some modern materialists were of the view that the truth of materialism is already demonstrated upon this fact alone. However, for reasons I shall explain in Chapter Two, this standard kind of argument is in fact inconclusive. Correlation between what happen to brain on the one hand and mind on the other does not necessarily guarantee causal connection, if any. On the basis of correlation alone, the most that could be made to follow is that having a normal functioning brain is a necessary condition (one of the contributing factors) for the occurrence of consciousness and mind. But a necessary condition is not a sufficient condition. Besides, the causal efficacy of mind on behaviour is also evident for all to see. For what one is aware therefore, to say that the relation between body and mind is interactive would be more in line with the facts. It should thus be seen that the case for materialism is far from being clinched. However, this is not to say that compared to classical dualism or the theory of souls, materialism has not already stamped its mark as a less problematic and more plausible hypothesis. Only that what is less problematic and more plausible need not necessarily be true.

As I shall further explained, the intelligibility of materialism is indeed hampered by a few explanatory difficulties. Firstly, it is not easy to explain how it is possible for body-brains to become conscious, remember and think. Secondly, it is difficult to explain how concepts, ideas, mental images, propositions, and the like are to be figured in the brain. Third, the apparent causal efficacy of mind on behaviour would also have to be accounted for. The difficulty of having to come to terms with issues such as these is what is known as the mind-body problem. As we shall see, while ancient materialism had to fall back on what was once known as the mind-dust theory,modern materialists were divided as to how the problem should really be tackled in the light of modern science. Of the two pairs of modern materialist theories that have come to the fore, I shall refer to them respectively as the two-aspects theory with panpsychism and emergentism with epiphenomenalism. It will be seen that while neither of these pairs are explanatorily satisfactory, they have yet laid down a couple of very useful conceptual handles for the materialist’s cause.

I shall further note that even though dualism and materialism are opposing theories, it must not be assumed that if one of them is blatantly inadequate, the other must therefore be endorsed. It will be observed that these two positions have not exhausted the universe of possibilities. For if material phenomena were in fact mental phenomena, as some (such as philosophical Buddhism) have long contended, it would mean that materialism too is mistaken. For this reason, the dialectics of this mentalist viewpoint must also be taken into consideration. In the history of Western philosophy, this third party incursion was first to appear in the philosophy of Berkeley. It’s declared intention was to show that the nature of all reality is mental, and that material substance as such does not really exist. As it turned out, however, the philosophical confusion it created was to lead to the phenomenalist abandonment of both material and mental substances. While mentalism holds that the nature of all reality is mental, phenomenalism has settled into the contention that in the ultimate analysis, reality as known is to be understood solely in terms of entities called sense data. As an ontological doctrine, this sense data theory of body and mind has also come to be known as neutral monism.

Yet, as we shall see in Chapter Three, the case for mentalism was actually built on conceptual rape. What it offered was a schema of perception that is in fact without any object. As such, it is blatantly inadequate for what it is about. Besides, it is also guilty of the problem of unconsciousness for which classical dualism is already hung. On the other hand, the phenomenalist’s hope of reconstituting reality out of sense data has actually created more puzzles than the ones it is trying to overcome. It should thus be seen that of all the philosophical positions considered, materialism is still the only plausible alternative worthy of further investigation.

Chapter One

The Lure of Dualism

(Are there Disembodied Souls?)

Classical dualism is the belief that a human person is composed of a body and a soul. The soul is further believed to be a spiritual entity capable of existing apart from the body. This belief is motivated by the assumption that the human body is in and of itself cognitively inert. As such, the wherewithal of consciousness, memory, and thought would have to be accounted for by the presence of a soul. In the history of Western philosophy, Plato (427-347 B.C.) endorsed the theory. But for reason to be explained, Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) and his followers sought to modify it. I shall refer to this modified version as minimal dualism. However, what eventually emerged for modern consumption was the two-substance philosophy of Descartes (1596-1650). But as we shall see, the contribution of Descartes was really less original than history had given him credit for. It was basically a product of Scholastic thought—Aristotelian in concept, but Platonic in spirit. In this Chapter, I shall show that for reason of what will be referred to as the problem of unconsciousness, classical dualism is actually unintelligible for what it is about. On the other hand, I shall also point out that in the absence of some intelligible answer as to how body-brains are able become conscious, remember and think, much of what surrounds the mind-body problem could still be marshalled in dualism’s favour. This is the source of its lure.

To give credit where credit is due, I shall begin our story with a few remarks concerning the pre-Socratic origin of ancient dualism and the dialectical strategy of Plato’s two major arguments. It will be seen that even though these arguments did pinpoint a couple of major mysteries that have since become the bulwark of dualism, the existence of disembodied souls is something that is difficult to ascertain—despite popular claims to the contrary. What this means is that the credibility of classical dualism is actually only as good as the absence of a more adequate theory. The second thing I should like to do is to say something about certain controversies as arising from within dualism itself. It has everything to do with the question of whether a person’s memory is really immortal. The original culprit of the piece, as we shall see, was Aristotle. The third business of this Chapter is to examine Descartes’ two major arguments for the existence of thinking substances as distinct from the likes of body-brains. As we shall see, not only had Descartes failed to put dualism really on a firm footing, his two-substance philosophy had instead ushered the problem of mind-body interaction right into the limelight. Last but not least, I shall blow the whistle on dualism by exposing its Achilles’ heel so far hidden, and to offer a plausible explanation as to why Aristotle had to re-structure dualism in the way he did.

1.1 Ancient Dualism—Platonism

Not knowing how a material thing such as a human body could possibly become conscious, remember, and think is sufficient to show that the cognitive subject therein must be a spiritual soul. That sums up the underlying rationale of ancient dualism. Why it is so believed has to do with its religious affiliation. According to Plato (Phaedrus), it was the belief of Pythagoreans (an Orphic religious sect to which Socrates probably belonged), that the soul is by nature immortal and that the purpose of its earthly sojourn is to try and secure an early return to its heavenly home. This is to be accomplished, or so it was said, by means of continued intellectual effort for as many as thirty or more incarnated existences, involving as many as ten thousand years (long transit time included obviously). Upon the death of the body, or so it was also said, the souls of those who have failed to make the grade will continue to transmigrate through different kinds of bodies. Only those that have attained will be released from the cycle of reincarnation—to return presumably to their divine source. Souls, in other words, are not only capable of existing apart from their bodies, but immortal as well. (See footnote 1.1 on the idea of personal immortality)

With the religious aspect of Platonism we shall not be concerned. I am more interested in the claim that consciousness and mind are actually carried by the soul capable of existing apart from the body. Yet, before we venture into Plato’s two major arguments in support of this view, it is important to come to grips with the objective and strategy of his dialectic. His objective is to show that we all have at our disposal certain know-how’s and know-what’s that are neither derivable from sensory experience nor capable of being taught. You may wonder why the having of such knowledge should have anything to do with the detachability of the human soul as carrier of consciousness and mind. Well, they are related. If it could be shown that there are indeed such innate know-how’s and know-what’s for which one is not taught or could not possibly have been acquired by way of this bodily existence, it would be equivalent to showing that such knowledge must have been acquired and retained from some previous existence. And to have shown that is to have shown that the soul, as carrier of consciousness and mind, did in fact exist apart from its current body. Plato’s strategy, as you can see, was as subtle as it was indirect.

Historically, Plato’s two arguments were couched in the form of two major doctrines for which Platonism is generally known: the doctrine of reminiscence, and the doctrine of Forms (or abstract and general concepts). In view of the key role played by these two doctrines, I should like to present them in the form of two arguments. These will be referred to respectively as the argument from memory and the argument from conceptual understanding. Before we get into these arguments, it would serve to highlight the overall structure of Plato’s dialectic. It could be laid out as follows. (1) It is possible to do mathematics of which one has not learned in this life. (2) Abstract and general concepts are not derivable from sensory experience. It was Plato’s contention that on the strength of either one of these premises, it should follow that (3) some of what one knows must have been acquired and retained from some previous disembodied existence. From this, it must further follow that (4) human souls must have existed apart from their current bodies. Notice that this final conclusion is designed to stand on either one of two legs or premises. In the event that only one of them is accepted as true, his kind of dualism would still have to be seen as having to follow.

Argument from Memory

According to Plato (as recorded in one of his dialogues, Meno), how some untutored person was able to know the answer to some very difficult geometrical problem is something that needs to be explained. He recounted an actual case in which an untutored slave boy was able to discover the Pythagorean theorem simply on the basis of nothing more than some cues from Socrates, and the drawing of a square (for our purpose, just say with each of its sides measures two units). The question was: what is the length of the side of a square that is twice the area of the one drawn? At first, the slave boy was not able to answer. But lo and behold, upon some sideline comments (not answers) from Socrates, the boy was eventually able to come up with the correct answer that it is the diagonal of the drawn square. In Plato’s opinion, if this untutored slave boy was able to come up with the correct answer when cued, it should be plain to all that such knowledge must be something that is already innate to his mind, or ‘saved’ in his memory, as we would nowadays say. His point was that for what one does not already know, it is not possible to get at it even when cued. Only what one already knows, but temporarily forgets, could be cued for recall.

What Plato was leading up to is this question. From whence have such innate knowledge been acquired? Surely, it could not have been derived from sensory experience. Granted that the slave boy might have come across many right-angled triangles before. But how is he to know without being taught that the square of a triangle’s hypotenuse is equal to sum of the squares of its other two sides—or the Pythagorean theorem that geometry students have come to know? According to Plato, the only way to come to terms with this ingenuity of the slave boy is to hold that this bit of mathematical knowledge must have been acquired and retained by him prior to this incarnated life. Further, since sensory experience (either of this or another life) is silent about the theorem, it goes to show that the slave boy must have acquired this mathematical truth in some disembodied existence. For there is no way of coming to know, just by looking at a square in this or another incarnated existence, that making a square out the diagonal of any square will produce a square the area of which is equal to that of two squares made out of its other two sides. What this means, according to Plato, is that such mathematical knowledge could only have been acquired in some disembodied state of existence independent of sensory organs and brains. Now, if you think that Plato is really out of his depth, imagine the following quarrel of sorts between the soul of Plato and his critics.

Modern Critic: Are you saying that the slave body is born with mathematical formulas in his head? Or are you saying that he was born with some mathematical know-how?

Soul of Plato: I know that many in our long intellectual history have understood me as asserting the former. Those who want to modernize me may want to say that what I really meant to assert is about mathematical know-how. For what I am about, the difference really makes no difference. As far as I am concerned, mathematical knowledge and know-how are actually one and the same. You see, it is not possible to grasp any mathematical truths if one does not already have mathematical know-how and vice versa. As we all know, it is sometimes very difficult if not impossible to teach someone to solve a mathematical problem. One may even at times become so frustrated that one has to secretly conclude that some people just doesn’t have what it takes to learn mathematics. It all goes to show that if it is innate to you, you are teachable; but if it is not innate to you, there is nothing anybody can do to make you understand. This is why I have insisted that mathematical knowledge in particular could not be taught.

Modern Critic: Most of us moderns would contend that innate talent for the mathematical, as with other natural endowments, has really nothing to do with what has been retained in one’s previous disembodied existence. It has rather to do with one’s make-up in this one and only bodily existence.

Plato: What make-up? If you are referring to what you moderns call genetic and neural make-ups, you must enlighten me as to how brain cells, or genes for that matter, have managed to come up with mathematical theorems or remember how they are actually proved. If you cannot, then you and I are actually in the same boat. It is impossible to imagine that body-brains could in and of themselves become mathematically disposed. This is why I have argued that given the fact that this is inconceivable, something else other than body-brains must be responsible for such mathematical competence. What I have inferred is that this something else must be a rational soul—for reason that no amount of sensory experience is capable of putting this kind of knowledge into anybody’s head.

Modern Critic: But we all know that the functions of memory are closely related to what is going on in certain parts of the brain—the hippocampus for instance as far as longer-term memory is concerned. And damage to some of its associated areas will result in the loss of some other memory functions. We also know the effect of certain chemicals on the performance of our memory: such as memory loss due to a deficiency in thiamine, or alternatively due to too much alcohol or marijuana. Further, we also know that a person’s memory will also decline inevitably with age, resulting for some in what is known as senile dementia leading eventually to a total loss of long-term memory.

Soul of Plato: You don’t have to go into so much detail. It is known a long time ago that too much alcohol or a hard knock on the head can have an effect on one’s memory. People are always tempted to attribute that to damages suffered by some vital organs, such as the heart or the brain. But as far as I am concerned, the problem is that despite all your neural physiological opinion, you moderns are still unable to explain to your own satisfaction as to how it is possible for brains to retain and remember any cognitive content. Despite your modern psychological theories about the so-called short-term and long-term memories, or the encoding and retrieval of memories as if brains were computers, I do not believe that any of your cognitive psychologists or neuroscientists really knows how any of our cognitive memories is exactly retained in and recalled from the brain, even though they often talk as if they do.

Modern Critic: If memory, as you contend, has everything to do with what you refer to as rational souls and nothing whatsoever to do with one’s body-brain, how do rational souls remember, and how do you account for the fact that the ability to remember can be destroyed by inflicting damage to some parts of the brain? How can a soul’s memory be crippled for damages suffered by the brain?

Soul of Plato: Like you, I only know that I can remember. I do not claim to know the mystery of memory. Nor do I know everything about the workings of rational souls. All I know is that as the performance of the charioteer can be affected by the physical condition of his horse, the performance of the soul is likewise affected by the conditions of its body-brain. As far as I am concerned, your modern observations regarding correlations between brain and mind are only indicative of the fact that the brain is the mediating organ between soul and body. My reason is simple. For what I know of dead brains, it is simply impossible to imagine that our mathematical know-how and memories about things and mind could have been retained in this greyish white stuff. That is also why I find the soul postulate to be more intelligible. Despite all the talk about neural transmitters and firing of neurons, you moderns are still unable to say how something as simple as the idea of 2+2=4 is actually registered in the brain, and how the brain in and of itself is able to retrieve this information for its own perusal. In this light, you must also admit that my dualistic position is far more reasonable. Let me also say that unless materialism is able to show intelligibly how brains are capable of such feats, this stalemate of ignorance should be sufficient to sustain the credibility of my theory until kingdom come. I have not done too badly, have I? Just look at the immortality crowd. It is simply more probable to the human mind that if the function of memory is to be account for, something else other than brains has to be taken into account.

Regardless of whether or not we agree with Plato, it must be said that he had certainly pick one of his horses right. How it is possible for brains to remember anything cognitive is still as puzzling to us (though not to the same extent) as it was with Plato. All we know is that we do remember, but we do not know how we actually retained what we remember. Nor is it easy to understand how, and in what neurological manner or form, memories of the cognitive kind are actually retained in the brain and with what they are actually recalled.

Argument from Conceptual Understanding

As already alerted, it was the contention of Plato that in addition to mathematical knowledge or know-how, some other kind of innate knowledge that humans possess could also be recruited to strengthen his position. This effort of his is known as the theory of Forms, which he expounded once and again mythically as a realm of heavenly exemplars throughout his Dialogues. His primary argument was that there is no reason to believe that the meanings of abstract concepts such as goodness, justice, beauty and so on are notions that sensory perception alone is able to provide. What that means is that some of our very basic conceptual understanding, as that of the mathematical, must also have been acquired in some disembodied state of existence. This is why Plato’s doctrine of reminiscence (argument from memory) and his theory of Forms (argument from conceptual understanding) have got to be seen as dialectically related. To hit home the gist of this second argument, let me present it in the form of another imaginary exchange over three of his favourite concepts: justice, goodness, and beauty.

Plato: It is a fact that we understand abstract concepts such as justice, goodness, and beauty. It is for reason of such understanding that value judgments are made. Now, the question I would like to ask is this. When we say that someone is just, good, or beautiful, in virtue of what are such judgments made? Obviously, these concepts are not about anything or feature in particular that one is able to point at and identify. That leads to another question: By