Mutiny on the Somme : 1st Battalion Scapegoats 1918

By Des Lambley

This book is about the fog of war when 127 men in the 1st Battalion AIF walked out of the line in September 1918. It was called a mutiny and they were all court martialled. Most were found guilty and were sentenced to years in prison. They became scapegoats for command incompetence.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Des Lambley
• Release date: Jul 15, 2018
• ISBN: 9780994405418

Book preview

ISBN: 978-0-9944054-1-8  e-Pub 

ISBN: 9780994405401 : Paperback (Deposit libraries only)

Edition: 1st edition.

Non-Fiction

Copyright © 2018 by Des Lambley

e-MAIL: [e-mail]

K:\MUTINY ON THE SOMME\1ST BN PATCH - Copy - Copy - Copy.png Cover image:  Colour Patch of the 1st Battalion AIF

The AIF was a spearhead for the British Expeditionary Force towards the end of the war on the Western Front. It was recognised that the exhaustion of body and mind, and the soldiers' good will was bordering on local mutiny. The men of the 1st Battalion were always part of that environment. One hundred and twenty-seven of them were sent to the Compound on 23 September 1918 after walking out of the line overnight on 21 September 1918 at Hargicourt,  seven weeks before the end of the war. It has been called a mutiny. It has been called desertion, and it has been called an industrial dispute that is somehow intended to justify or sanitise the event and it also obfuscates the circumstances surrounding the causes. There is no doubt consternation and confusion was more a feature, and these men became scapegoats because communication, command and control had evaporated at a critical time during the temporary fog of war.

The Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Stacy sent a report about the event to Brigade HQ and dated it the 20th. People at Brigade initialled dated its receipt the 20th but the event had occurred at 0300 on 21 September 1918. The commanders and their Staff didn't even know what day it was!

Stacy blamed his NCOs and said that men with bad records had induced some to leave and others were too weak not to follow. This insinuated the character of them all. A quarter of their number were sergeants and corporals.

Command and control of the unit was impacted by the reversal of orders communicated poorly at a late hour to the men and not at all to some of them. Instead of the planned withdrawal for a long rest the generals had thought up another operation they wanted to commence in a few hours time.

Good communication had been broken down by the hard fighting over the last few days, and confusion, and misunderstanding reigned. The soldiers used their initiative and marched away to the earlier planned rendezvous miles to the rear. Command called this a mutiny and imprisoned the soldiers two days later.

Biographies for each of the so called mutineers are included to show that the character of each of these men before, during and after the war was not necessarily as portrayed by their commanding officer. These biographies along with the assembled in-depth evidence surrounding the event also help to correct some of the historical misinterpretations.

It was argued at the subsequent courts martial that they went out under the bona fide belief they were being relieved and had received an order to go out.

127 were sent to the Corps Safe Custody Compound on 23 September 1918. 

2 were charged with inciting a mutiny, joining a mutiny and with desertion.

124 of them were charged with joining a mutiny and with desertion.

1 escaped from custody and for administrative convenience after his apprehension was charged with being AWL.

11 were found not guilty and released.

1 charge was downgraded to AWL to satisfy 'face' and convenience.

114 were found guilty of desertion (for six hours from 3am-9am on 21 September 1918) & sentenced for up to 10 years gaol. Fortunately Monash, Hobbs and Senator Pearce convinced General Sir William Birdwood that in honour of Anzac Day 1919 over 200 Australian prisoners could be released. These so-called mutineers were included in this amnesty.

A question remains as to whether these soldiers were made the scapegoats for command errors brought about by the fog of war. Evidence suggests leadership had evaporated at a critical time over the twelve hour period on 20/21 September 1918. An injustice may therefore have been done to these AIF volunteers. - Author

This book is an intricate and well overdue account of the antecedents to the events on the Somme on 20th and 21st September 1918 into which these 127 ordinary volunteer Australian soldiers were catapulted where, 'communication, command and control' had broken down. These ordinary men serving as soldiers on the front line in brutal and inhuman conditions, fighting for their country, were cast as mutineers perhaps to shift responsibility from the Officers who ought bear responsibility for maintaining 'communication, command and control'. The author has lifted the veil on the lives of these enlisted volunteers and writes elegant psychological portraits in which he measures and weighs the course of these men’s lives before enlisting through the circumstances of their service in various theatres of the war from Gallipoli to the Somme and their lives, their contributions and commitment to their families and communities upon their return to Australia in 1919 including the many instances of their re-enlistment in the Australian armed forces during WW2.

- David Sullivan, Forensic Psychologist

This book is about the fog of war at two levels on the Western Front in WW1 at a time when confusion, uncertainty and indecision were at a premium. And it is about how under such circumstances the egos and the reputation of those at command level will tend to work against fairness in relation to those at the subordinate level.

-  Bob Slater A.M., Brigadier (Retd.)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A NUMBER OF FRIENDS graciously agreed to critique various aspects of this book from their own specialist and professional perspectives. Others agreed to proof read the manuscript for me. A special thanks to the descendant relations of the men in this sad yet noble story. Many willingly provided wonderful fragments of oral family history about these soldiers and photographs of them. Their contribution has assisted in progressing the human focus of this work. Other families were willing to assist but the intergenerational time-lapse had distanced their knowledge about their ancestor soldier. So thanks too to all of you who graciously responded to my request but could not provide any information.

Acknowledgement is due to the various archives for the digitised records made freely available on-line. These sites are invaluable to historians.

A special thanks to Bob Slater and David Sullivan who agreed to write forewords for me. Your erudite, insightful and kind words from your different professional perspectives has convinced me that my research was not wasted.

PREFACE

AT 4.30AM ON 25 APRIL 2017 in Griffith, NSW the kookaburras started to laugh in the gum trees nearby and umbrellas went up as the rain came down. So Australian. By comparison we were safe from the weather at this Anzac Dawn Service, and from bullets and tyranny thanks to the men and women we were remembering. I reflected upon those that had been mown down one hundred years ago and since then on battlefields far away, in the air, and on the sea and on the land. And upon those who returned with physical and psychological baggage from active service.

In WW1 others were maimed by gas, and accidents and sicknesses added to the wastage as the generals like to call it. In WW1 some Battalions had a manpower turnover sixfold in number. This Anzac morning we were comparatively comfortable in the wet. At this time of the day one hundred years ago the soldiers were typically forming up on start lines for another 'stunt' (a commonly used term to mean a battle operation). They were trying to stay alive and fight in an extreme environment, sometimes cold and wet through or up to their knees in mud for days at a time. There was always a fear of death or maiming. They were desperately tired.

The soldiers in those days were regarded merely as numbers fatally marching into a war of attrition that the politicians had initiated and the geriatric generals had poorly planned. In this way the soldiers were anonymous automatons without flesh or blood or thought. Historians have by and large written about the feats of those soldiers in much the same way. This book treats these men as individuals, as human beings, with flesh on their bones and with blood in their veins. They were able to think, to reason, to make decisions and to love and be loved. But more importantly they were not only some mothers' sons they were someone's subordinates.

These 'mutineers' each and every one of them should not be forgotten, but remembered, warts and all. They represented the society from which they came as volunteers. They reflected the existing cultural values of the day in their homeland. These biographies about them provide a powerful perspective of a small event in Australian military history.

Although the details about these men (and other WW1 soldiers) are now freely available and in the public domain, there is no intention to present this event in a salacious way or to hurt the sensibilities of their descendant families. Instead, this perspective may assist us all to better understand why these men acted as they did. We can let bygones-be-bygones, but cover-ups to protect commanders at the expense of the soldier is not to be condoned. All of the men saw action in what has been said was the most ghastly war of all time. Sadly, what they had been trained to do then still remains central to every Australian soldier's raison d'être today, and that too must be remembered.

Some of the surviving soldiers told of their participation in this event while others covered up their involvement and their gaoling out of shame or guilt. Some families maintained this cover-up to protect the family's reputation. Society has contributed to this silence too, perhaps on the basis of respect for the men while they were alive. But the words used by the historian Babette Smith about the convict stain also applies to these 'mutineers' for they too were indeed real-life characters, whose true stories abounded with success, failure, optimism and in tragedy, triumph and pathos.

This book attempts to restore dignity to them and to refresh our memory about this event in history. In studying these soldiers I have come to know them, to respect them and to understand them as brother soldiers who wore the uniform. When placed in the unenviable position of military leadership in dangerous situations, the welfare, interest and safety of your subordinate soldier is paramount, but perversely it is always secondary to 'getting the job done'. A civilian would find this paradox difficult to comprehend.

As is an historian's prerogative particularly as an independent author, this narrative is my perspective. In reviewing the work I am struck by the fact that an interdisciplinary approach is necessary to properly understand this sad event. It is a reference text that answers some of the questions historians have been asking for a long time, and it corrects a number of errors and misconstructions by others. I simply hope it is accepted by intelligent people as a cogent, fair, in-depth review of the events surrounding those charged with mutiny in the 1st Battalion AIF for the events of 21 September 1918, and that it fairly humanises these men. - DBL

AIF Mutinies

DEAR NON-COM - FURTHER to Donnachaid's item about the mutiny, here is one that occurred in the 112th Battery when camped near Hazebrouck. A Sergeant Major called one of our drivers, Digger Armstrong, over to him, Digger was told to stand to attention, and, when he did so, the SM aimed a punch at him. This happened two or three times, and Digger had to be like Griffo - just dodge them. Johnny Prendergast was the first to notice them, and he called out to Digger to stow the boots in, and Digger would have been justified, as he was barely ten stone and the SM about seventeen. The next minute somebody yelled, Run, Digger! and, as he did a shower of stones was pelted at the SM. He was chased into the officers' billet, and wasn't game to come out.

The Major in charge of the Battery at the time shoved his head through a window to speak to the mob, but another bombardment of rocks began. The battery refused to do anything except water and feed horses until the SM was transferred somewhere else. He was going to be transferred to the BAC but they threatened to go on strike if he was sent there, so headquarters had to have him. I remember he was on the carpet and got 21 days CB.

- ARTILLERIE, Paynesville

Western Mail, Perth, Thursday 23 December 1937.

FOREWORD

TODAY PSYCHOLOGICAL appraisal of high profile figures in government, commerce or sport during their careers is commonplace although frowned upon by professional psychologists when that appraisal is undertaken without any direct face to face interaction with the person whose character, conduct or behaviour is being assessed.

Many biographies of historical figures such as Sir John Monash or contemporary figures such as Governor General Cosgrove or Mark Donaldson VC reflect upon psychological attributes which have contributed to their achievements.

Even for an experienced psychologist it can be daunting to write a detailed psychological assessment giving due considerations to personal history, context, character, personality, behaviour and conduct in often novel and ambiguous life events.

To do so contemporaneously is challenging. All the more so courageous is the task of preparing a report of psychological assessment of the person living in extraordinary and unusual circumstances and to contemplate upon those effects of those circumstances upon the perceptions, emotions and decision making capabilities.

That Des Lambley embarks on this major expedition into the psychological dimensions of each of the lives of these one hundred and twenty seven men of the AIF 1st Battalion in World War 1 fighting on the Somme after four gruelling years of war is inspiring.

This book is an intricate and well overdue account of the antecedents to the events on the Somme on 20th and 21st September 1918 into which these 127 ordinary volunteer Australian soldiers were catapulted where, 'communication, command and control' had broken down. These ordinary men serving as soldiers on the front line in brutal and inhuman conditions, fighting for their country, were cast as mutineers perhaps to shift responsibility from the Officers who ought bear responsibility for maintaining 'communication, command and control'.

The author has lifted the veil on the lives of these enlisted volunteers and writes elegant psychological portraits in which he measures and weighs the course of these men’s lives before enlisting through the circumstances of their service in various theatres of the war from Gallipoli to the Somme and their lives, their contributions and commitment to their families and communities upon their return to Australia in 1919 including the many instances of their re-enlistment in the Australian armed forces during WW2.

These 127 AIF volunteers serving in appalling conditions and doing all that was demanded of them including, just three days earlier having dug the graves for their comrades and enemy soldiers, on 21 September 1919 were doing something for their country and suddenly they came to realize that their leaders were not doing something for them.

The author provides an account of his experimental psychological study and its failure and the statistics relating to these 127 men. However I consider it is Des Lambley’s erudite and insightful psychological studies of these men who served in undeniably inhumane conditions and by sheer mischance became scapegoats for the failures of their Officers to maintain or to take responsibility for maintaining 'communication, command and control' which might in no small measure serve to right the wrong done to them nearly one hundred years ago in the fog of war. - David Sullivan, Forensic Psychologist, Fellow, College of Forensic Psychologists, Australian Psychological Society

FOREWORD

WAR IS THE REALM OF uncertainty: three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. A sensitive and discriminating judgement is called for, a skilled intelligence to scent out the truth. - Carl von Clausewitz

'Fog of War' is a term frequently used to explain why outcomes on the battlefield are quite different from those intended or expected. Battles are fluid. The unforseen, the element of surprise, the uncontrollables (eg., weather), all contribute. Also contributing is the noise, heat, smoke, human responses that all lead to confusion, a sense of forced urgency, and anxiety. Fog of War is a convenient and effective term to cover an exhaustive range of intangibles.

But Fog of War is not limited to command levels. It can occur legitimately at all levels.

This book is about the Fog of War at two levels on the Western Front in World War 1 at a time when confusion, uncertainty and indecision were at a premium. And it is about how under such circumstances the egos and reputations of those at the command level will tend to work against fairness in relation to those at the subordinate level.

In this book Des Lambley, through his exhaustive research of battlefield studies and the facts surrounding a 'mutiny' involving 1st Battalion AIF in September 1918, has sought to penetrate the Fog of War in order to 'scent out the truth'. - Brigadier Bob Slater AM, RFD (Retd.)

CHAPTER ONE

They did not know what day it was

THIS BOOK IS STRUCTURED to describe the military order, discipline, punishment and leadership issues underpinning the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) involvement on the Western Front in WW1. The context for the so called mutiny of 20/21 September 1918 in the 1st Battalion is detailed to show the complexity of communication, command and control that sometimes leads to a fog of war and unwanted outcomes. Military discipline is the backbone of every successful army but the fog of war is the bane of all military commanders. Courts martial processes and testimonies tell of a peremptory handling of military justice. Biographies for each of the so called mutineers are included to show that the character of each of these men before, during and after the war was not necessarily as portrayed by their commanding officer. These biographies and the statistics correct some of the historical misinterpretations of the past.

The AIF was a spearhead for the British Expeditionary Force towards the end of the war on the Western Front. But it was being recognised that the exhaustion of body and mind, and the soldiers' good will was bordering on local mutiny. The men of the 1st Battalion were always part of that environment and it resulted in 127 of them being sent to the Corps Safe Custody Compound on 23 September 1918 after walking out of the line overnight on 21 September 1918 at Hargicourt on the Somme, seven weeks before the end of World War 1. It has been called a mutiny. It has been called desertion, and it has been called an industrial dispute that somehow is intended to justify or sanitise the event. Alternatively, there is no doubt consternation and confusion was more a feature, and these men became scapegoats because communication, command and control had evaporated at a critical time during the temporary fog of war. The Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Stacy sent a report about the so called mutiny to Brigade and dated it the 20th. The Brigade people dated and initialled its receipt the 20th. The event occurred at 0300 on the 21st September 1918. The commanders and their Staff didn't even know what day it was! They too were suffering from fatigue.

Lieutenant Colonel Stacy blamed his NCOs for this so called mutiny and said that men with bad records had induced some to leave and others were too weak not to follow. This insinuates the character of them all. They were made the scapegoats for command shortcomings at a critical time. The lives and character of these soldiers are examined closely.

One hundred and twenty-six of them were charged with mutiny and with desertion. Two days earlier command and control of the unit was impacted by the reversal of orders that were communicated poorly to the men and not at all to some of them, and at a late hour. Instead of the planned withdrawal for a long rest the generals had quickly thought up another operation they wanted to commence in a few hours time. Good communication had been broken down by the hard fighting over the last few days, and confusion, and misunderstanding reigned. This was the trigger for the march out. The soldiers had used their initiative and marched away to the earlier planned rendezvous miles to the rear. Command perceived this as a mutiny and imprisoned the soldiers.

The soldiers wrongly thought someone was in charge

2 were charged with inciting a mutiny, joining a mutiny and with desertion.

124 of them were charged with joining a mutiny and with desertion.

1 escaped from custody and for administrative convenience after his apprehension was charged with being AWL.

11 were found not guilty and released.

1 charge was downgraded to AWL to satisfy 'face' and convenience.

114 were found guilty of desertion (for six hours from 3am-9am on 21 September 1918) & sentenced for up to 10 years gaol. Fortunately Monash, Hobbs and Senator Pearce convinced General Sir William Birdwood that in honour of Anzac Day 1919 over 200 Australian prisoners could be released. These so-called mutineers were included in this amnesty.

IT WAS ARGUED AT THE subsequent courts martial that they went out under the bona fide belief they were being relieved and had received an order to go out. All were found not guilty of mutiny but most were found guilty of desertion and were sentenced to years of imprisonment. Fortunately common sense subsequently prevailed and they served months instead, in brutal British military prisons.

A question remains as to whether these soldiers were made the scapegoats for command errors brought about by the fog of war, or whether all of the depleted forces were suffering from battle fatigue to the extent that all were guilty of making poor decisions. It is believed that leadership had evaporated at a critical time over the twelve hour period on 20/21 September 1918. An injustice may therefore have been done to these soldiers.

Of the overworked AIF Monash wrote, 'It was essential that they should be called upon to yield up the last particle of effort of which they are capable. I was compelled to disregard the evident signs of overstrain which were brought to my notice by the divisional generals and their brigadiers'.[1] This is the story of but one mutiny that occurred in the AIF in WW1.

This work takes some comfort from the philosopher John Locke's words that truth 'must come from proofs and arguments'.[2] Thus it follows that from the additional evidence searched for, found, collated and presented here, it seems to this author that the benefit of the doubt for the cause of this event ought to have rested with the so called mutineers. However, the answer to the question, 'The Somme, a place of glory or a place of shame', shall remain with the reader.

Origin of this work

THIS WORK TOOK ITS lead from an earlier history paper developed at the University of New England. Many errant AIF soldiers were identified in that study. There were about 17,000 AIF soldiers court martialled in WW1 and some of them were court martialled for mutiny and desertion. Attention was drawn to a group of soldiers court martialled for an alleged mutiny at Hargicourt on the Somme on 21 September 1918. This event does not register in today's collective consciousness. What had been written about this event? Who were these soldiers, could the circumstances and the environment surrounding the event be more fully described and how might their experience have affected them particularly after they returned to Australia. Author Peter Cochrane made an important observation when he said, 'The collective empathy (surrounding Anzac Day) was not from the big picture but from the way the personal and historical have merged in the form of intimate tales of trauma and suffering'.[3]

In-depth statistical detail about them and about the event has long been called for by military historians. This book should also put to rest a number of misconceptions and provide new perspectives. Fundamental to this work was the advent of the personal computer, the data-basing of so much material in digital form, and the making of it available on-line to researchers.

It is hoped that this exposure of these court martialled soldiers is not regarded as insensitive. Resurrecting their stories may seem disrespectful to their memory but telling it from a human perspective may help us to better understand their motivation against the context of the battlefront and generate compassion for them. In this way it may bring honour to their memories. Descendant families should not in any way be ashamed about their behaviour, but rather have a pride in their strong example of mateship. Today many descendants are unaware of this military stuff up, such was the secrecy about it. Some would still prefer to ignore the facts. Although one cannot literally be there to hear first-hand the circumstances surrounding the event, certain assumptions can be made about their actions and leadership issues.

In order to tell this story it was firstly necessary to carefully (and tediously) search for and identify all of the 1st Battalion men involved. Historians have not concurred with the exact number of men who were rounded up and sent to the Corps Safe Custody Compound on 23 September 1918 suspected of participating in a mutiny. Secondly, some historians have stated that the soldiers were charged with desertion. A distinction must be made to correct this misunderstanding, misinterpretation or misconstruction. Two of them were charged with the offence of (a) 'inciting a mutiny', and (b) 'when on active service joining in a mutiny', and (c) 'when on active service, desertion on or about'. (Private Case & Private Earle). Three charges were laid against them. Neither of these men were the soldiers with the worst indiscipline amongst those placed in the Corps Safe Custody Compound on 23 September 1918. It is suspected that these were the first attempts at drafting the Charge Sheets, or perhaps before higher authority prevailed to have the charge of inciting a mutiny not included on the remainder of the charge schedules. This view is given some validity because Private Case was an original Anzac and although his charge sheet reflects some minor indiscipline during his four years of war he had a clean conduct record in the twelve months prior to the alleged mutiny. Private Earl's conduct record was exemplary. One hundred and twenty-four soldiers were charged with (a) 'joining a mutiny' and with the alternative charge of, (b)'when on active service, desertion on or about.' Two charges were laid against them. The subsequent courts martial found all of them 'not guilty of joining a mutiny', but most were found 'guilty of desertion'.

Of the one hundred and twenty-seven soldiers sent to the Safe Custody Compound on 23 September 1918, eleven were found not guilty of all charges. Another, an ex-Quarter Master Sergeant, (Joseph Brissett), had his charge arbitrarily downgraded to that of being absent without leave. For this he was found guilty and fined. This downgrading was an arrangement so that he could return to Australia as one of those who had already been nominated on a list of the 6,000 1914/15 men the Prime Minister had directed should be returned forthwith for extended furlough. Three soldiers escaped from the Safe Custody Compound after their arrest. One of these absconders (Bowman) was not charged with mutiny or desertion but subsequently with the lesser charge of being absent without leave because he was not re-arrested until 28 November, after the Armistice, and after the courts martial board and witnesses had dispersed, with some of them already on their way to Australia. Sergeant Wilesmith's testimony at one of the courts martial confirms this observation, 'In addition to the accused and men being tried today and the ones with me, there are 3 men of 'D' Company who were in the sunken road at the time and who are at present away'. It is presumed they were the three soldiers who escaped from the Compound, one of them being Bowman. The result was for one hundred and fourteen (114) 1st Battalion soldiers being found guilty and imprisoned for desertion.

While personal service and courts martial records are sometimes only a few pages long they do provide an abstract that tells of up to four years of a soldier's life under the most awful circumstances. The civilian lives of these men also had to be systematically identified if that was at all possible, and also described. Fragmentary detail for some of them was resurrected from the limited public sources available and from contact with their descendant relations. This gradually allowed for a biography and a character study to be assembled for each of the men. These biographies also enabled the assembly of cumulative descriptive statistics for many different aspects of these soldiers' lives. The stigma of the crime, the court martial and the harsh punishment would have remained with these soldiers for life. It might be expected that a bitterness toward war, towards government, and the feeling of injustice about their treatment would be a permanent burden that was likely to affect their physical and mental health. This research shows that some were able to put the experience behind them while others never recovered. Some lives were colourful, and some seem to speak to us candidly about the good and the bad.

The Commanding Officer asserted that the Companies were warned during the afternoon and evening of the 20th that another operation would take place in a few hours time, 'but they did not receive definite orders until later' (author's emphasis). This statement is one of self-protection by Stacy but dishonest by being ambiguous as to exactly when definite orders were given to the Companies, if at all, and it conflicts with testimony given by many of the men and some of the Officers at the courts martial. Stacy also acknowledged that the men of 'D' Company were not made aware of the passive support role intended for them before they marched out. He admitted that 'the men were probably ignorant of the actual nature of the operation' (author's emphasis). In doing this he is seen to be agreeing with the view that the proper communication of orders had broken down. It seems he had lost command and control of his Battalion. Lieutenant Colonel Stacy had proceeded to Grantham in Lincolnshire for a two week Machine Gun Course on 7 August 1918. The August offensive by the Allies began next day. He rejoined on 18 August. Command and control may not have been helped by the operational turmoil involved in the tactical advances made since the August offensive began in his absence.

Historiography

HISTORIOGRAPHERS TEND to pigeonhole the philosophical bases upon which historians research and present their perspective of an event. The school of Marxist historiography regards 'biography, intellectual history, history from below and studies of the common people' as a most important model for studying history.[4] Without inviting the opprobrium of being called a 'Marxist', the academic acceptance of history about ordinary people, in this case a group of soldiers, and being from below, appeals. It personalises much more the impact of events upon smaller groups within the larger population that was the AIF. To borrow a criticism from the historian Babette Smith, 'academics who focused on convicts dealt in statistics and quantification rather than character and narrative'.[5] Military history interests have also typically focused on the generals, battles, military units, the belligerent countries and their governments rather than on the life and character of the soldier. Post-truth revisionists may deride this work as a neo-form of jingoism - but they would be wrong again to use such a partisan form of ideology.

Previous historians have tended to group these soldiers charged with mutiny into generic, anonymous, inaccurate numbers without addressing their individual character. The Official Historian CEW Bean said that the nature of these mutineers was such that they were easily led by a few bad ones. Their biographies show that this simplistic reason is not true and does not do justice to Bean. This work gives the men their names. They were ordinary people being asked to do an extraordinary job. Apart from leadership issues the context in which the misbehaviour, the indiscipline, the illnesses and their workload must also be considered. There are serious questions about command and about the ownership of blame. More importantly, we need to reflect upon the tyrants, aggressors, and the governments who precipitated the need to protect free people of the world in the first place. The soldiers did the protecting, and then they too became victims of war.

Morant et al

ODDLY, WE NOW LIVE in an era where it is fashionable to apologise for history. Sorry! The British Government recently forgave the 347 deserters they executed in WW1. This was a magnanimous act of contrition. The military death penalty was struck down in 1930 in the British military. Some Australians have pursued a redress for Lieutenants Morant and Handcock after their execution during the Boer War but all attempts for that have failed. It is fashionable to elevate the Eureka Stockade uprising as politically righteous instead of being regarded as a rebellion by malcontents against the existing laws of the land. Many of those miners had previous involvement with social turmoil in England, Ireland and Europe in the 1840s. An ex-Premier of the State of Victoria, Steve Bracks even wants December 3, the date of the Gold Diggers' rebellion, made a national day of celebration 'it was the beginning of Australian democracy', he said.[6] Some even elevate the deeds of the bushranger and murderer Ned Kelly to hero status. A hero is regarded as a person noted for courageous acts or nobility of virtue and character. Therefore, maybe it is time to reflect upon the treatment of a gallant group of AIF men who nobly volunteered to help defend a free world from tyranny during WW1 and their overriding courage and strength of character. One hundred and twenty-seven men were sent to the Corps Safe Custody Compound in the belief they had incited or had joined a mutiny, and had deserted on 21 September 1918. The courts martial found them not guilty of mutiny but most of them were found guilty of the alternative charge of desertion. They were harshly punished in spite of what many authors have stated, but unlike Morant and Handcock they were not executed.

The morality of war & fairness

THE QUEENSLAND SHEARERS’ Union and the Queensland Labourers’ Union resolution on 1 February 1891 in part said,' disenfranchised though we are, we are the men whose labour mainly upholds Queensland (equates to democracy and freedom). It is our toil that brings rich dividends to banks and fat incomes to squatters (equates to people) and profitable trade to great cities (equates to the free commercial world).   no votes by which we can secure laws to protect us'. These words might have resonated with the feelings of over-worked soldiers twenty-seven years later, during another war.

Norman F Dixon, an emeritus professor of psychology at University College London elaborated a theory about military incompetence that also has relevance to the events on 21 September 1918. He said personality and its derivation is an intrinsic psychological feature of the militarist mind. While accepting that the environment of war possesses many variables, battle failures and leadership incompetence have common features within such an authoritarian structure. 'Military leaders possess constitutional power of a magnitude which surpasses that of leaders in most other human groups. If he cannot pull his followers by force of character, he can at least push them by force of law'. Many such character traits can be observed in the leadership of 1st Brigade AIF. For example, the attempted evasion of responsibility, egotism, wastage of human resources, traditionalism, ignoring advice and common sense, a readiness to find scapegoats and distorting facts.[7] Dixon argues that incompetence in military officers typically involves denial, rationalization, and by making scapegoats or by any combination of them. Metaphorical 'little' officers are conditioned to please rather than to challenge their superiors. In reading the following narrative about the events on 21 September 1918 and the 1st Battalion 'mutineers', the impression might be gained that incompetence at the Officer level occurred, and it resulted in the attribution of blame being delegated down to those least able to defend themselves.

Three hundred years after Cromwell's model army based promotion on merit, the British Expeditionary Forces in WW1 promoted Officers on entitlement and class. The historian William Westerman carries this tradition forward with the title of his 2017 book about the Australian Battalion Commanders in the Great War. There can be two interpretations of his main title. With 'Soldiers and Gentlemen' an Officer is seen as both a soldier and a gentleman. Or alternatively, it can be read as a marked class division into two groups: soldiers (Other Ranks) and gentlemen (Officers).[8]

Mutiny in the military in WW1 was not unknown in other forces. For example, in April 1918, 117 members of the 16th Irish Rifles were charged with mutiny and awarded five years penal servitude which was later suspended. Their unit's War Diary made no mention of this event but historian Charles Messenger said they had suffered heavily during operations in March and the Brigade had to be made into a composite force, and he suggested that as a result battle exhaustion may have been a reason for their indiscipline.[9]

It was a turgid time that required the war to be prosecuted with the knowledge that it would cause not only deaths to soldiers but collateral damage to civilians abroad and at home, and to the soldiers who survived. It was called the war to end all wars, where there were horrendous sights, scenes, smells and actions. It was comprised of good and not so good characters, good and not so good leaders, and good and bad governments in all countries. Presenting these men as individuals may also help to break down preconceptions about military stereotypes. Historians have suggested that the personal records for these men should be fully researched for indicators like breaches of discipline, commendations, hospitalisations and the length of time with the 1st Battalion. This might then tell more accurately, and from a different perspective, the character of these soldiers and bring us greater truth about the event. This work takes a lead from these suggestions. None of these soldiers had less than nine months service in the AIF and yet some historians question how long one has to be under shot and shell to become an effective, experienced soldier. Tours of duty should be considered. Another element that tends to be overlooked is the uniqueness of humankind. Soldiers may be selected because of their similar physical attributes, and training automates them to carry out actions instinctively. Notwithstanding this, a human being will compute the environment and the risk to life and limb, and may react in slightly different ways even when confronted by similar situations at different times. Such variability is regarded by biologists to be essential to the progress of humankind and the evolution of the species.

In spite of the indignation about the so-called bungling of the war by the British, about the wasted months, and the wasted men, Gallipoli was turned into a ‘glorious legend’ from the battle failure it was. Marketing that campaign that way also had the effect and added benefit of motivating the volunteer soldier. Although there was an inherent pride and a patriotic keenness in what they were asked to do, Gallipoli caused a national hurt and there was a strong desire for retribution. All future military efforts and standards were therefore judged against the futility that was Gallipoli. Nonetheless, there was, as the historian Stuart Macintyre said a lesson learned, for it had ‘revealed errors of command and execution’.[10] Regrettably, many of those lessons were ignored.

Mutiny & desertion

IN DECEMBER 1915 NEW orders regarding a bounty on deserters in Australia was published, 'a member of the civil police will receive one pound per head for any deserter he returns to military custody'. There were many newspaper articles about the level of desertion in the AIF during WW1. As early as July 1915 there were questions in Parliament about the severity of punishment for deserters. For example, Senator Pearce (the then Minister for Defence) replied to a question as to 'whether the department intended inflicting more severe punishment upon members of the Expeditionary Force who were guilty of desertion, as according to war rules, men could be sentenced to death for such an offence. Senator Pearce expressed the opinion that those who already had been arrested as deserters had received quite sufficient punishment'.

In Australia in 1916 the military was aware that mutinies did occur. So concerned were they that a warning was published in the newspapers about the punishment that mutinous soldiers might expect. Attention was drawn to paragraph 461 of the King's Regulations'. Under the existing law, any person who shall maliciously and advisedly endeavour to seduce any person or persons serving in his Majesty's forces by sea or land from his or their duty and allegiance to his Majesty, or to incite or stir up any such person or persons to commit any act of mutiny, or to make or endeavour to make any mutinous assembly, or to commit any traitorous or mutinous practices whatsoever, may on being legally convicted of such offence, be sentenced to penal servitude for the term of the natural life of such person'.[11]

A similar problem existed in 1918 and a similar but firmer position was taken in definite terms, viz., 'For the grave offence of desertion from units in the firing line, or those going there at an early date, Australian soldiers alone are not subject to the death penalty. This exemption is owing to the fact that the Army Act does not apply to the AIF but the defence authorities have decided that the names of deserters shall be published throughout Australia as a deterrent to others, and so that the opprobrium shall rest on the individual, and not on the AIF as a whole'.[12] Military crimes in Australia during the period of WW1 were generally for disobedience, false declarations, absences without leave and desertion. In the staging areas the courts martial mostly related to illegal absences, desertion and disobedience. Crime at the Front included self-inflicted wounding, absences without leave, desertion, and the charge of mutiny. However, it was always much more difficult for a soldier serving in the line to breach discipline because it was a constrained environment where there was always the group pressure of mutual safety and comradeship.

During WW1 the media across Australia continued to present a patriotic line about the punishments meted out to undisciplined soldiers, mutiny, those giving false attestations, those found guilty of self-inflicted wounding and to deserters. Another media report advised a change to the policy on pay for any deserting soldier. 'all pay due to a soldier, including allotment and separation allowance (if any), is to be forfeited for every day of absence without leave. After the soldier's arrest however, and during period awaiting trial, as well as during any period of punishment awarded, payment of allotment and separation allowance, if to a bona-fide dependent, may continue to be paid, but the allotment must not exceed the amount provided for in AIF orders, viz., - Three-fifths if there are children, and two-fifths if there are no children, any amount so paid to be deducted from sums due or becoming due to the soldier'.