Comments on Jacques Maritain's Book (1935) Philosophy of Nature

By Razie Mah

Philosopher Jacques Maritain serves as a keystone in the recovery from the excesses of the Age of Ideas (as defined by John Deely, in his masterwork, Four Ages of Understanding). Maritain strives to recover Thomism during the 20th century. But, there are difficulties. The mechanical philosophers of the 17th century jettisoned scholasticism. The scam worked for over three hundred years.
The lockout of Aristotle coincided with a change of terminology. Today, scholastic words stand as vessels. But, we have difficulty re-conceiving the contents. The change of terminology comes on the heels of another change, well underway in the 13th century, from Plato to Aristotle as a paradigm of inquiry.
Now comes another shift.
In the late 19th century, Charles S. Peirce discovered that the sign is a triadic relation. Ironically, the Baroque scholastic, John Poinsot, formulated the sign as a triadic relation in the 17th century. No one knew. In fact, no one would know today if Maritain had not suggested that Deely look into the matter. Deely found John Poinsot's definition of sign.
Today, Daniel Novotny carries on the study of the Baroque scholastics.
Aristotle's causalities participate in triadic relations.
When the early modernists exiled Aristotle, they also blocked the way to understanding triadic relations.
Maritain's book opens the door to a recovery.
In these comments, the shifting balance among the empirical sciences, religion and natural philosophy are rendered as judgments. There are two types of judgments. Reflective judgments do not unfold into category-based nested forms. Actionable judgments do.
Here is a scholarly portal into the fourth age of understanding.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Razie Mah
• Release date: Jul 1, 2018
• ISBN: 9781942824497

Razie Mah

See website for bio.

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Comments on Jacques Maritain's Book (1935) Philosophy of Nature

By Razie Mah

Published for Smashwords.com

2018

Notes on Text

This work comments on a book by Jacques Maritain, a Catholic philosopher of the 20th century, who strove to recover Thomistic (or generally, scholastic) thought. The title is Philosophy of Nature. It was first published in French in 1935. I follow the translation by Imelda Byrne, published in 1951, by Philosophical Library (NY, NY). My comments rely on two models of triadic relations, judgment and the category-based nested form.

Single quotes and italics are used to group words together.

Prerequisites include A Primer on the Category-Based Nested Form, A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction, plus A Primer on the Individual in Community.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1 Point 0001

Chapter 2 Point 0132

Chapter 3 Point 0189

Conclusion Point 0414

Text, Chapter 1, Section 0, Points 1-3

0001 What happened to the philosophy of nature?

0002 Prior to the birth of experimental science in the 1600s in Western civilization, physics is the subject matter for the philosophy of nature. Observation is followed by a rational (or proportional) discussion about the nature of what is observed.

Today, a familiar phrase sums the approach, saying, Observe a phenomena. Then, explain it. If the explanation is true, then what does that imply?

0003 This philosophic practice takes for granted that the real (mind-independent being) influences our minds (the generators of mind-dependent beings) through sensory impressions. Aristotle says as much. Natural philosophy tries to make sense of what we sense.

0004 After the birth of experimental science, natural philosophy is torn into two camps.

One camp absorbs natural philosophy into experimental science, claiming that physics investigates what is (mind-independent beings), even though scientific facts are mind-dependent beings. Science becomes more real than natural philosophy.

The other ignores natural philosophy in favor of totalizing systems of thought, claiming that only philosophy can figure out what ought to be (the proper constitution of mind-dependent beings). These totalizing systems are not metaphysical, even though they seem to be. They are independent of natural philosophy. They provide superior and regulative knowledge through critiques.

Comments and Method

0005 One attitude stands before the birth of the empirical sciences.

Two attitudes stand after the birth.

These attitudes are judgmental.

0006 What is a judgment?

A judgment is a triadic relation that brings what is into relation with what ought to be.

0007 The first attitude goes with Aristotle. Here is the judgment:

Natural philosophy (relation) brings mind-independent being (what is) into relation with mind-dependent being (what ought to be).

Natural philosophy (relation) brings the Real (what is) into relation with reality - or - real knowledge (what ought to be).

0008 These are reflective judgments. Here is a diagram.

0009 Why do I call this judgment reflective?

The categorical nature of each element is not yet determined. Eventually, each element is assigned a unique category. When this is done, the judgment becomes actionable. It can unfold into a category-based nested form. The nested form is a condition for action.

0010 How do I assign categories to each element in a judgment?

Typically, the relation belongs to the category of thirdness, the realm of normal contexts. What is matches secondness, the realm of actuality. What ought to be goes with firstness, the realm of possibility.

When I assign a category to each element, I prepare the judgment for organized action.

How so?

The elements of judgment unfold into the normal context, the actual, and the potential, according to their assigned categories.

0011 Aristotle's reflective judgment is prepared for action by assigning categories. If the categories are assigned in typical fashion, the result is the following category-based nested form.

Philosophy of nature3 (the observed thing or event2 (the potential of knowledge1))

0012 This nomenclature is developed in A Primer on the Category-Based Nested Form.

The category-based nested form is rendered as:

normal context3 (actuality2 (possibility of 'something'1))

It is spoken in four statements. The last statment is paradigmatiic.

A normal context3 brings an actuality2 into relation with the possibility of 'something'1.

0013 So let me apply the four statements to the nested form of natural philosophy.

The observed thing2 emerges from the potential of knowledge1.

The observed event2 situates the possibilities inherent in knowledge1.

Natural philosophy3 contextualizes the observed thing2(potential of knowledge1).

Natural philosophy3 brings the observed event2 into relation with the potential of knowledge1.

0014 So, back to Aristotle's judgment.

What does Maritain claim?

The birth of the empirical sciences forces philosophers to assign different categories to each element in Aristotle's reflective judgment, resulting in two camps or actionable judgments.

0015 Instead of exploring this claim, I return to Maritain's script.

Text, Chapter 1, Section 1, Points 3-4

0016 Maritain asks (more or less), What gives birth to the experimental sciences?

The intellect seeks to understand the nature of things.

0017 How long has this been going on?

0018 The first singularity begins around 5800 BC or 0 Ubaid Zero Prime. This is a crucial point. It marks the start of our current Lebenswelt.

The Sumerian Dynastic civilization consolidates around 2800 U0'. Civilization spontaneously arises as speech-alone talk spreads from Mesopotamia.

The Indus River-valley Harappan civiliation precociously rises then collapses in the face of unrelenting Indo-European migrations. By 4800 U0', Hindus ponder what the intellect seeks.

The intellect represents something particular to humans. Being includes both humans and the world. It seems as though the intellect is designed to seek a stable object, which it calls being. However, the intellect only grasps flux or maya (illusion).

How frustrating is that?

0019 In Greece, around 5100 U0', Heraclitus draws a similar conclusion. We can observe only flux. There is no constant or eternal being. Is becoming is a better term? Heraclitus turns observations into contradictions.

Around 5400 U0', Plato sharpens the distinction between the observed (contradiction-filled) flux and the intellect's quest. Humans are full of opinions, rather than (scientific) knowledge.