Rollback: The Red Army's Winter Offensive along the Southwestern Strategic Direction, 1942-43

By Richard Harrison

Rollback: The Red Army’s Winter Offensive along the Southwestern Strategic Direction, 1942–43 covers the period from mid-December 1942 to mid-February 1943, one of the most critical periods of the war on the Eastern Front. It was here that following the encirclement of an entire German army at Stalingrad, the Soviets sought to take advantage of the ruptured Axis front in southern Russia to finish off the Germans’ Italian and Hungarian allies and liberate the economically vital areas of eastern Ukraine.

This study is drawn from a number of wartime and postwar articles, published by the General Staff’s directorate for the study of wartime experience. Also featured are documents relating to the operational-strategic conduct of the various operations, which were compiled and published after the fall of the Soviet Union.

Several articles deal with the preparation for and conduct of the Southwestern Front’s Middle Don operation of December 1942. Originally intended as an ambitious offensive to cut off the German forces in the North Caucasus by driving on to Rostov, the operation was later reoriented to meet the threat of the German effort to relieve Stalingrad. The offensive not only accomplished its objective of turning back the German attack, thus dooming the Stalingrad garrison, but also destroyed the Italian army in the East as well.

The Soviet Voronezh Front then struck further up the Don River, and in the Ostrogozhsk–Rossosh’ operation destroyed what remained of the Italian forces in the area, as well as the Hungarian army. This enabled the Red Army to capture Khar’kov and push nearly to the Dnepr River by mid-February, before being thrown back by a skillful German counteroffensive.

The territorial results of this operation set the stage for the front’s subsequent Voronezh–Kastornoe operation, which enabled the Soviets to push as far west as Kursk before exhaustion and growing German resistance brought the offensive to a halt. Further to the south, the Soviets were able to capture Voroshilovgrad and penetrate into the industrial Donets Basin.

The book also contains a detailed Soviet examination of the employment of tank and mechanized corps during the campaign. The conclusions reached here had a direct bearing on the restructuring of the Red Army’s tank armies in time for the summer campaign of 1943.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Helion and Company
• Release date: Jan 19, 2016
• ISBN: 9781912174591

Richard Harrison

Richard Harrison is an Australian author and speaker. He resides on Victoria's Mornington Peninsula, having lived (for ten years) in England, where he launched and established the iconic Australian garden maintenance franchise - Jim's Mowing throughout the UK. His hilarious gardening misadventures became the subject of his first book -The Export Gardener, before he wrote the novel - First Tuesday, a murder mystery set against the backdrop of the Melbourne Cup. Richard’s latest book - Stumped: One Cricket Umpire, Two Countries, is a very funny and truly unique memoir of his fifteen year umpiring career, in both England and Australia. He is currently writing a book entitled Quando, Quondo, Quando: Learning Italian late in life. An entertaining speaker, Richard is available to attend corporate, social and fundraising events throughout Australia.

Book preview

Part I

The Soviet Counteroffensive along the Middle Don: Preparation

The following took part in drawing up the materials for Sbornik no. 8: lieutenant generals Ye.A. Shilovskii and N.G. Korsun; Lieutenant General of Tank Troops M.L. Chernyavskii; major generals K.F. Vasil’chenko, Ya.A Kutsev, Z.Ya. Rudinov, S.G. Timokhin, L.V. Oianov, N.A. Talenskii, B.I. Kuznetsov; major generals of artillery V.G. Guleiko and N.T. Selyakh; Lieutenant General of Engineering Troops A.I. Proshlyakov, major generals of technical services A.S. Kubasov and F.Ya. Gerasimov; Lieutenant General of Communications Troops P.D. Miroshnikov; colonels A.P. Alekseev, A.N. Red’kin, I.A. Cherkezov, V.D. Utkin, I.N. Kharuk, V.N. Zhelannov, M.R. Mazalov, M.N. Kochergin, A.S. Rogov, G.V. Litvinov, and A.N. Trofimov; Captain First Class V. I. Sumin; lieutenant colonels I.V. Parot’kin, D. A Borshchev, V.I. Sidorov, V.G. Romanov, A.N. Sandal’tsev, V.M. Tret’yakov, and N.G. Pavlenko; majors N.A. Fokin, S.I. Patrikeev, A.M. Tselebritskii, and A.M. Rapoport.

Editor: Major General P.P. Vechnyi.

1

The Planning and Preparation of the Southwestern Front’s Offensive Operation in December 1942

The offensive operation by the Southwestern Front’s forces, which unfolded in the second half of December 1942 along the broad steppe expanses of the Don’s middle course, was accomplished by the Southwestern Front command in accordance with the overall plan by the Stavka¹ of the Supreme High Command for the defeat of the German-Fascist forces in the south of Russia.

The events of this period were partially examined in Sbornik no. 6, which was dedicated to a description of the Stalingrad operation. However, a separate study of the experience of the Southwestern Front’s December operation is of undoubted interest and has great practical value in the operational training of the Red Army’s officer cadres.

The December offensive by the Southwestern Front’s forces was carried out for the purpose of operationally supporting the activities of the Don and Stalingrad fronts in eliminating the Germans’ Sixth and Fourth Panzer armies around Stalingrad.

A characteristic feature of this operation is the massed employment of tank and mechanized formations, which performed a leading role during all stages of the operation.

A second feature of the operation is that it was conducted in difficult winter conditions, over broken terrain, under conditions of the extensive lengthening of communications and the great remove of the supply bases from the attacking troops, as well as the absence of railroads in the area of operations and extremely limited automobile transport.

All the consecutive stages of the operation’s development are fully expressed here: the breakthrough, the development of the success, pursuit, encirclement, the defeat of the encircled enemy forces, and the consolidation of the success.

Finally, it should also be noted that an instructive feature of the operation is its bold and flexible planning.

The above-enumerated problems are briefly laid out in two articles: The Planning and Preparation of the Southwestern Front’s Offensive Operation in December 1942, and The Breakthrough and the Southwestern Front’s Forces’ Activities in the Operational Depth of the Enemy’s Defense.²

Only the most important and instructive aspects of the operation are illuminated in these articles, chiefly the planning for the front operation, its preparation and the organization of the breakthrough. The entire remaining material is laid out only in passing, in order to preserve an integral impression of the content and character of the Southwestern Front’s December offensive.

The Overall Situation

As a result of the November offensive,³ the forces of the Southwestern Front broke through the enemy’s heavily fortified defensive zone along a front from Rubezhinskoe (15 kilometers east of Veshchenskaya) as far as Melokletskaya (five kilometers east of Kletskaya) and, while pursuing and destroying in detail the formations of the Romanian Third Army, which was covering this sector, by 25 November their left flank had reached the Chir River and the center the Krivaya River. The Southwestern Front’s right flank remained as before along the Don River.

As a result of this offensive, the Romanian Third Army was routed and only the remnants of its defeated divisions managed to fall back behind the Chir River and consolidate along its right bank, with the support of German units that had arrived during the fighting.

Following the Romanian army’s abandonment of the line of the Don, the Germans were forced to hurriedly begin fortifying new positions along the Chir River and to strengthen the defeated Romanian forces by means of their extremely limited reserves, which were absolutely vital in the developing situation.

Besides this, the extremely difficult situation, in which the encircled German forces in Stalingrad found themselves, forced the fascist command to adopt emergency measures for relieving this group of forces.

At the end of November and the beginning of December, the Germans made repeated attempts to launch an attack with limited forces against the Southwestern Front’s center. However, the Germans’ fierce attacks along the Bokovskaya—Kletskaya axis did not yield the expected results—the fighting resulted in only insignificant tactical successes. The attacking German-Romanian units, upon encountering our forces’ stubborn resistance, wore themselves out and, without achieving their goal, were forced at the end of November to go over to the defensive along this sector of the front.

At the same time, the enemy began to hurriedly transfer troops to the Southwestern Front’s left flank. Thus the following forces were transferred to the Tormosin area: the 11th Panzer Division from the Central Front,⁴ the 336th Infantry Division from the Voronezh Front’s front, the 45th Infantry Division from the Bryansk Front’s front, and the 7th and 8th Luftwaffe field divisions from France. The enemy was simultaneously trying to create a major group of forces in the Kotel’nikovo area; the following units were arriving here: the 17th Panzer Division from the Bryansk area, the 23rd Panzer Division from the Northern Caucasus, and the 6th Panzer Division from France. Other small units were arriving along these axes from neighboring fronts and from the deep rear. Divisions from France, Belgium and other occupied European countries were also moving there.

The somewhat extended operation by the Don and Stalingrad fronts for eliminating the enemy’s encircled armies and the increased activities of his Tormosin and Kotel’nikovo groups of forces demanded that we speed up the Southwestern Front’s offensive activities.

A description of the area of combat operations

Combat operations by the Southwestern Front’s forces in December 1942 unfolded in the area between the Don and Severskii Donets rivers. The terrain in this area is an open, hilly plateau, very short on vegetation, cut by a large number of rivers and deep ravines, with steep and precipitous banks, which form natural anti-tank defensive lines and make even entire areas difficult for an attacker to reach.

The majority of rivers are shallow. By the start of the operation they had iced over heavily (with the exception of the Bogucharka River, through which crossings had to be erected during the offensive) and did not present formidable obstacles for forcing them with tracked or wheeled vehicles, not to mention the infantry.

The deep and abundant Don River occupied a special place in the area’s river system; its width along the sector from Novaya Kalitva to Veshchenskaya varies from 200-350 meters. Due to the late freezing, the thickness of the river’s ice cover in December 1942 did not allow for crossings without special work to strengthen the ice or laying down bridges, all the more so as the enemy along the 1st Guards Army’s main axis of attack was systematically blowing up the ice. This required additional engineering work for supporting the crossings while forcing the river.

The absence of rail lines in the area of combat operations was deeply felt during the operation’s preparation and conduct. The front was based on the Povorino—Liski and Povorino—Stalingrad rail sectors, which ran 150-200 kilometers from the front line and which created serious difficulties for the materiel supply of the troops and the arrival of reserves. The troops’ communications could only be over the dirt roads, a network of which covered the area of combat operations comparatively thickly.

A feature of the area in which the Southwestern Front’s December fighting took place was that a majority of the area’s inhabited locales were located in the ravines and river valleys and sometimes stretched for tens of kilometers in an uninterrupted chain; the main roads ran, as a rule, along the rivers and the ravines. Thus it was planned to launch the main attacks chiefly around the heights, while the most stubborn fighting usually unfolded along the approaches to the inhabited locales and immediately in them.

The meteorological conditions in December 1942 were quite favorable for combat operations. The air temperature in the middle of December varied from zero to minus ten degrees Celsius and did not fall below -20 throughout the entire month.

The insignificant snow cover, which did not exceed 14-15 centimeters in December, and the absence of snowstorms and heavy drifts, created favorable conditions for the movement of all combat arms along the roads, and partially off the roads.

The disposition of the enemy’s forces

The German command sought through the stubborn defense of its allies—the Italians and Romanians—along the line of the Don and Chir rivers to tie down the Southwestern Front’s forces and to hold these positions at all costs. By thus covering their left flank and the rear of their southern armies, the German command planned to create powerful groups of forces in the Tormosin and Kotel’nikovo areas, and through concentric attacks in the general direction of the northeast, to break through our positions along the boundary between the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts. In the event of success, this offensive operation was to be combined with a meeting offensive by part of the German Sixth Army’s forces from the east and result in, in the opinion of the German command, the elimination of the encirclement and the restoration of the communications of the forces in the Stalingrad area.

The enemy’s group of forces was to be created in accordance with the plan laid out above.

Opposing the Southwestern Front’s right wing and center; that is, opposite the 6th and 1st Guards armies,⁵ the forces of the Italian Eighth Expeditionary Army were defending, which also included only a small number of German units.⁶

Opposite the 3rd Guards and 5th Tank armies were the remnants of the Romanian Third Army, and German forces.

By the start of the operation the 7th and 8th Luftwaffe field divisions, the 336th Infantry Division, 11th Panzer Division, the rear of the 14th and 16th panzer divisions, the headquarters of the XLVIII Panzer Corps, the 63rd Independent Motorized Battalion, up to 15 battalions of special troops, and the scattered elements of Romanian units, which had been thrown beyond the Don as a result of the November offensive, were opposite the front’s left wing. Besides this, German units were located in the areas of Tatsinskaya and Morozovskii.

A shortage of forces forced the German command to commit almost all of its operational reserves into the fighting as early as the Red Army’s November offensive. Thus by the middle of December the enemy’s operational reserves opposite the Southwestern Front were extremely insignificant and consisted chiefly of small garrisons located in the area’s major inhabited areas.

The overall number of enemy forces along the front from Novaya Kalitva to Rychkovskii, taking into account the units located in the second line, comprised up to 16 infantry and three panzer divisions, and two of the latter (1st and 22nd) had suffered losses up to 70 percent. Besides this, up to 25 composite battalions of special troops and up to six artillery regiments as reinforcements were operating along various sectors of the front.

The strength and operational density of the enemy’s group of forces is shown in Table I/1.1.

Table I/1.1 Strength and Operational Density of the Enemy Group of Forces, December 1942

Due to the front’s significant length and the enemy’s limited forces along this sector, his defense was built along a broad front. The features of the enemy’s defense on the Don are detailed in the article The Disposition and Composition of the Romanian Third and Italian Eighth Armies on the Don.

The densest enemy group of forces was being created opposite the Southwestern Front’s left wing, where the overwhelming number of formations defending the Chir River belonged to the Germans, while at the same time the Italians and the remnants of the Romanians were located opposite the 6th and 1st Guards armies on the Don.

Such a distribution of forces may be explained by the following considerations. First of all, the front along the Chir River had only just stabilized and had not yet been much fortified in the engineering sense, as was the case opposite the Southwestern Front’s right wing and center; secondly, the Germans expected that the Red Army’s new attacks, should they follow, would be launched predominantly from the line of the Chir River against the immediate rear of the Nizhne-Chirskaya and Tormosin groups of forces; finally, such a group of forces could be created for the purpose of restoring the situation and linking up with the group of forces encircled around Stalingrad. Aside from this, the Germans themselves planned to go over to the offensive along this sector of the front; thus it is perfectly natural that the German command would primarily concentrate German units here, as they were the most combat-worthy.

Planning the December Operation

The Southwestern Front’s tasks

In December 1942 the Red Army was faced with an extremely important task: to prevent the linkup of the enemy’s main forces with the encircled Stalingrad group of forces and to destroy the latter. The Southwestern Front was to resolve this task by defeating the main Italian-Romanian and German group of forces on the Don and the Chir River, followed by its arrival at the line Derkul River—Kalitva River—Severskii Donets River.

According to the plan by the Stavka of the Supreme High Command, the offensive by the Southwestern Front’s forces was to unfold in general connection with the operations of the Don and Stalingrad fronts and in close cooperation with the Voronezh Front, which was simultaneously preparing an offensive along its left wing with the task of operationally supporting the offensive activities of the Southwestern Front’s forces.

The decision by the Southwestern Front command

At the moment the plan for the new operation was drawn up at the end of November, the Southwestern Front included General Lelyushenko’s⁷ 1st Guards Army, which occupied a front from the Osetrovka bridgehead as far as Chernyshevskaya, about 240 kilometers in length, and General Romanenko’s⁸ 5th Tank Army, which was operating along a front from Chernyshevskaya to the mouth of the Chir River, 140-150 kilometers in length.

Due to the difficulties of command and control, the 1st Guards Army’s right wing was detached as an independent operational group, under the command of General Kuznetsov,⁹ on 27 November.

The main idea contained in the plan for the Southwestern Front’s new operation came down to the following.

Having concentrated powerful shock groups in the area of the Osetrovka bridgehead and in the area east of Bokovskaya, to break through the enemy’s defensive front along the sectors Krasno-Orekhovoe—Solontsy and Astakhov—Krasnokutskaya. Following the breakthrough, by developing the success along converging axes by the right shock group in the direction of Man’kovo-Kalitvenskaya and Degtevo, and by the left shock group in the direction of Bokovskaya and Kashary, to surround and destroy the Italian Eighth Army, the remnants of the Romanian Third Army, and the German formations operating along the front from Krasno-Orekhovoe to Bokovskaya.

Without waiting for the start of the offensive along the 1st Guards Army’s front, the 5th Tank Army was to develop the offensive along its left flank and by 12 December reach the line of the Kalitva and Severskii Donets rivers.

The Voronezh Front’s 6th Army was to attack along its left wing simultaneously with the Southwestern Front’s 1st Guards Army, launching an attack from the line Novaya Kalitva—Derezovka in the general direction of Kantemirovka, with its main task being the creation of a serious screen against possible enemy attacks from the west.

By the end of the operation the 6th and 1st Guards armies’ front was to run along the line Novaya Kalitva—Markovka—Voloshino—Millerovo.

Changes in the initial operational plan

By 10 December 1942 the situation at the front had changed drastically. The elimination of the encircled German group of forces at Stalingrad had become protracted. The enemy continued to concentrate in the Tormosin, Nizhne-Chirskaya and Kotel’nikovo areas major forces for an attack to link up with the encircled forces. On 10 December the Germans’ Tormosin group of forces made an attempt to attack the 5th Tank Army’s left flank. The German offensive was beaten back.

On 11 December the front commander assigned the 5th Tank Army the task, in conjunction with the Stalingrad Front’s newly-formed 5th Shock Army, of destroying the enemy’s Nizhne-Chirskaya and Tormosin groups of forces and at all costs to prevent his breaking through to link up with the encircled Stalingrad group of forces. Following the defeat of the Nizhne-Chirskaya and Tormosin groups of forces, our forces would then attack toward Morozovskii and Il’inka, as well as in the direction of Tormosin, Tatsinskaya and Likhaya.

However, our offensive attempts did not yield tangible results and the 5th Tank Army’s formations continued to fight along the previous line. On 12 December the enemy’s Kotel’nikovo group of forces, the so-called Manstein group,¹⁰ attacked. The enemy, thanks to the superiority in forces he had created along this sector, began to successfully advance to the northeast, pushing back our forces. The real threat arose that this group of forces might link up with the encircled troops.

Taking into account the developing situation, the Stavka ordered the front commander to direct all his efforts toward supporting the operations of the Don and Stalingrad fronts to foil the German command’s plans to link up with its encircled group of forces. In order to resolve this task, it was proposed that the Southwestern Front launch its attack not to the southwest, but in the general direction of the southeast, through Nizhnii Astakhov toward Morozovskii with the forces of the 1st and 3rd guards armies,¹¹ with the immediate task, in conjunction with the Voronezh Front, of encircling and destroying the Italian Eighth Army and to then attack toward Morozovskii.¹²

The attack was set for 16 December. The changes in the direction of the attack and the operation’s depth required that the front command redirect the armies toward their new missions.

Based on the Stavka’s instructions, the front’s military council, in directives nos. 0055/op and 0056/op, of 14 December, made changes to the earlier plan. These changes came down to the following.

The front would launch its main attack with the forces of the 1st and 3rd guards armies, not to the southwest, but to the south and southeast, in the general direction of Morozovskii. The immediate task was the defeat of the Italian Eighth Army and our arrival on the communications of the enemy’s Tormosin group of forces.

For this purpose, the 1st Guards Army’s tank corps, following the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense, were to develop a vigorous offensive to the southeast and by the close of the operation’s fourth day seize the Tatsinskaya and Morozovskii areas, cutting the communications of the enemy’s Tormosin group of forces. The army’s rifle formations, taking advantage of the tank corps’ success, were to encircle the Italian Eighth Army’s Boguchar—Mogulinskaya group of forces by the close of the operation’s third day and on the operation’s sixth day reach the security line Voloshino—Galitsin.

The 3rd Guards Army, following the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense, was to eliminate the Kruzhilin group of enemy forces in the course of three days and then launch an attack in the general direction of Nizhnii Astakhov and Morozovskii, and by the close of the operation’s third day its mechanized corps was to occupy Morozovskii and part of its forces occupy Chernyshkovskii. On the operation’s sixth day the rifle formations were to occupy the security line Pokrovskaya (20 kilometers east of Millerovo)—Il’inka—Pulichev—Morozovskii—Chernyshkovskii.

The 1st and 3rd guards armies’ refined tasks came down to the following.

The 4th Guards Rifle Corps was to set up a security front along the line excluding Kononovka—excluding Voloshino on the operation’s fourth day, with its forward elements to reach the line by the close of the operation’s third day. The 35th Rifle Division was to be directed through Tverdokhlebova, Sloboda Sokhrannaya and Degtevo toward Millerovo, which it was to reach on the operation’s fifth day. The division was to dispatch detachments from the Alekseevo-Lozovskaya area to clear the enemy out of Setrakovskii, Pavlovka and Degtevo.

The 6th Guards Rifle Corps’ immediate task was to encircle and destroy the enemy in the Boguchar—Meshkov—Migulinskaya area. The corps was to carry out this mission over three days, in conjunction with units of the 153rd Rifle Division, which was to attack in the direction of Meshkov. Upon completing the immediate task, it was planned to concentrate the corps in the Mal’chevskaya—Degtevo—Mikhailovo-Aleksandrovskii area.

On the operation’s sixth day the 6th Guards Rifle Corps was to occupy the security line Voloshino—Krasnovka—Ivanovka—Galitsin. In the event of a failure along the 3rd Guards Army’s front, it was planned to dispatch the 6th Guards Rifle Corps to Nizhnii Astakhov.

Following its commitment into the breach, the 18th Tank Corps was to develop the offensive in the direction of Lofitskoe, Malaya Lozovka, Setrakovskii, and Verkhnyaya Makeevka, while part of its forces would attack through Kashary toward Pervomaiskoe, the Gusarovskii State Farm and Morozovskii. It was planned to reach the Morozovskii area on the operation’s fourth day.

It was planned to commit the 25th Tank Corps into the breach simultaneously with the 18th Tank Corps, with the mission of attacking in the direction of Millerovo, and to aid in the retention of this area until the arrival of the rifle formations. The corps’ subsequent task would be determined by the situation as it developed.

It was planned to commit the 24th Tank Corps into the breach behind the 18th and 25th tank corps, with the mission of reaching the Tatsinskaya area on the operation’s fourth day. The axis of the corps’ movement was Tverdokhlebova—Man’kovo-Kalitvenskaya—Degtevo—Skasyrskaya—Tatsinskaya.

The following changes were made in the 3rd Guards Army’s plan. Following the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense, it was planned to turn to the north not two, but three rifle divisions. It was planned to eliminate the enemy’s Kruzhilin group of forces in three days. Following the completion of this task, it was planned to reach with the forces of five rifle divisions and two rifle brigades the following line on the operation’s sixth day: Pokrovskaya—Yefremovo-Stepanovka—Il’inka—Gusynka—Zakharovo-Oblivskii—Pulichev. Following the breakthrough, it was planned to try to immediately begin to roll up the enemy’s front to the south, for which purpose the forces of the 203rd and 50th Guards rifle divisions, joined subsequently by the 346th Rifle Division, were to reach the front Morozovskii—Chernyshkovskii on the operation’s fifth day.

By the close of the first day the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps was to reach the area Kamenskii—Popovka—Nizhnii Astakhov, and on the third day capture Morozovskii and, with part of its forces, Chernyshkovskii.

This was the plan of the Southwestern Front command, transmitted to the troops on 14 December for execution.

It was suggested by the Stavka that the Voronezh Front’s 6th Army reach the line indicated in the front plan not on the fifth, but on the operation’s fourth day. The 17th Tank Corps was to be committed into the breach simultaneously with the 18th and 25th tank corps and, while developing the success in the direction of Kantemirovka and Voloshino, by the close of the operation’s second day reach the area Voloshino—Krasnovka—Sulin and secure it until the arrival of the rifle divisions. However, this plan still had to undergo one more change.

The situation along the Kotel’nikovo axis was growing more complex with each day. The enemy, having committed significant forces into the fighting, was rapidly advancing to the line of the Myshkova River. In order to get into the rear of the enemy’s Tormosin—Kotel’nikovo group of forces as quickly as possible, the Stavka demanded that the Southwestern Front increase the planned rates of advance to the southeast and reinforce this axis with mobile forces by reducing the scope of the front’s tasks along the southern and southwestern axes.

Based upon the Stavka’s instructions, the front commander on 15 December, the eve of the offensive, ordered the commander of the 1st Guards Army to arrange his security front along the line excluding Markovka—Zorinovka—Chertkovo and then along the Kalitva River, without advancing it to the line of the Derkul River—Millerovo. The new security front was to be occupied by units of the 4th Guards Rifle Corps by the close of the operation’s third day, while forward detachments, mounted on auto transport, were to reach the indicated line by the close of the operation’s second day.

The 6th Guards Rifle Corps, following the accomplishment of its immediate objective, was to concentrate in the area Vyazhinskii—Alekseevskii—Meshkovo—Setrakovskii by the close of the fourth day of the operation for subsequent operations toward Nizhnii Astakhov or Millerovo.

The 18th Tank Corps’ mission was recast. Following the commitment into the breach in the direction of Lofitskoe and Krinitsa, it was to occupy the area Mikhailovskii—Verkhnii Chirskii—Alekseevskii as early as the close of the second day. The corps’ mission was to, in conjunction with the 6th Guards Rifle Corps and the 153rd Rifle Division, encircle and destroy the Italian units on the south bank of the Don. The corps’ subsequent mission would be determined by the situation—either to launch an attack on Chernyshkovskii, or on Kruzhilin to support the 3rd Guards Army.

The 25th Tank Corps received an entirely new mission. Following the corps’ commitment into the breach it was to reach the area Shirokii—Neledovo—Lebedinka by the close of the operation’s first day, and subsequently, while developing a vigorous offensive along the route indicated earlier for the 18th Tank Corps, reach the area Kostino-Bystryanskii—Bol’shoi Khlopovskii—Morozovskii on the operation’s fourth day. The tasks of the front’s remaining units and formations remained unchanged.

This was the operation’s final plan, according to which the offensive by the Southwestern Front’s forces would unfold in December 1942.

Comparing the initial operational plan with the final version, it is necessary to note first of all the change in the direction of the main attack from the southwest to the southeast. At the bottom of this change lay a principally new mission, laid down for the Southwestern Front in the middle of December, due to the changed situation along the Stalingrad axis.

If in the initial plan the task of operationally securing the Don and Stalingrad fronts was to be carried out as a spin-off task, to be resolved during the course of the operation itself and aimed, for the most part, at striking a deep blow in the rear of the southern group of German forces, then in the final plan that was drawn up in light of the changed situation, the task of operationally securing the defeat of the German troops around Stalingrad was the main one.

In accordance with the changed mission and direction of the main attack, the depth of the operation changed, while the rapidity of the development of events demanded that the operation’s pace be speeded up.

However, the path toward achieving both the first and second tasks lay through the defeat of the Italian Eighth Army and the remnants of the Romanian Third Army. Thus the front’s immediate task remained unchanged. The methods of resolving this task remained almost without change. This circumstance enabled the front command to rapidly redirect its forces toward carrying out a new task.

Planning the breakthrough

It was planned to move the artillery to its firing positions in the course of three nights, so that on the day before the start of the offensive all of the artillery would be in place. So as not to reveal the artillery’s dispositions, it was planned to register targets and benchmarks with a limited number of guns.

The rifle divisions received orders to occupy their jumping-off positions with their main forces on the night before the offensive, observing all measures for maintaining the secrecy of their concentration. Analogous instructions were issued to the tank formations.

An hour and a half before the beginning of the infantry attack, all available guns were to fire on the enemy’s positions and for five minutes carry out fire with maximum intensity. It was then planned to use the artillery’s aimed fire for 75 minutes to destroy and suppress the enemy’s fire system. And, finally, in the final ten minutes all the guns were to take part in suppressing the enemy’s fire system along the forward edge of the defense. The infantry was assigned a minimal amount of ammunition expenditure for this period: 20 rounds per rifle and two disks (belts) per machine gun.

Worthy of attention are the Stavka’s instructions on employing M-30¹³ guards mortar units, the enormous destructive power of which was to be used to a maximum degree. It was ordered to particularly carefully define the forward edge of the enemy’s defense and the location of his forces, because the Germans (knowing the destructive capabilities of our M-30s) would set up the main forward edge of their defense 4-5 kilometers from the false forward edge, along which they would leave only a security force. In accordance with these instructions, the front’s forces carried out a vigorous reconnaissance in force for several days, which enabled us to determine the forward edge of the enemy’s defense and to assign specific tasks to the guards mortar units.

Our aviation had the task of suppressing from medium and low altitudes the enemy’s positions and his immediate reserves and to simultaneously cover the shock groups’ jumping-off areas, especially of the tank and mechanized formations. It was planned to massively employ all antiaircraft weapons in these areas.

In accordance with the front command’s instructions, planning tables were drawn up in the armies, in which all questions of organizing cooperation and the combat support of the activities of the various combat arms during the breakthrough were reflected.

The front command planned to commit the success development echelon as soon as the first-echelon units successfully attacked the enemy’s defensive zone. As soon as the infantry made a breach into the enemy defense to a depth of 2-3 kilometers, the mobile formations were to overtake it and, developing the success, follow along the paths laid out by the plan.

Engineering units were attached to the tank and mechanized formations in order to lay down routes and bridges and clear mined areas. For this purpose, part of the sappers were to be placed with the tank landing forces on combat vehicles, in order to quickly assist the tanks at the necessary time.

It was planned to carry out the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense on the operation’s first day. By the close of the first day the tank corps were already supposed to reach the edges of the tactical zone and be operating against the rear and communications of the first-line troops.

From the above, it is clear that the Southwestern Front’s operational plan was a bold one and had a number of characteristic features.

1. The task of operationally supporting the forces of the Don and Stalingrad fronts was to be resolved by means of conducting a major, independent front operation for the defeat of an entire enemy army; furthermore, this task was to be resolved as the immediate one during the course of carrying out the main task—reaching the rear and communications of the German group of forces striving to link up with the forces encircled around Stalingrad.

2. At the basis of the operation lay the idea of a deep concentric envelopment of the enemy’s main forces located along the Don. The realization of this idea was to be entrusted to powerful groups of forces from rifle, tank and mechanized formations, created along the flanks of the 1st and 3rd guards armies. The favorable shape of the front line facilitated the launching of a concentric attack against the enemy’s forces along converging axes, which had been fully taken into account by the Southwestern Front command in planning the operation.

The leading role in resolving this was to be given over to the tank and mechanized formations, which were to develop the success of the first-echelon rifle divisions, and through bold and vigorous actions attack the enemy’s deep rear, demoralize his forces and disrupt control and communications between them, cut off the enemy’s routes of retreat and tie down his arriving reserves until the completion of the defeat of the enemy’s first-line forces.

3. Simultaneously, the 1st and 3rd guards armies’ plans also called for a concentric envelopment of the enemy forces located immediately opposite these armies, which would create conditions for breaking up the enemy’s position into separate isolated groups, which would enable us to eliminate them in detail.

The fulfillment of these tasks was to be supported by the creation along the armies’ secondary axes of such groups of forces that would, in conjunction with the shock groups along the main axes, encircle and destroy the enemy forces located in the tactical zone of his defense.

4. The task of creating the conditions for the commitment of the mobile formations into the fighting was entrusted to the rifle formations, along with the artillery and aviation, during the first stage of the operation. They were to resolve this task by breaking through the first line of the enemy’s fortifications and suppressing his fire system along the sectors designated for committing the mobile formations into the breach.

Subsequently, the rifle formations, while following behind the mobile formations, were to complete the encirclement and destruction of the enemy forces and consolidate the success achieved by creating security lines outlined by the plan.

5. The movement of the tank corps in the enemy’s operational rear was planned parallel to the front of the Italian, Romanian and German troops, which would create particularly favorable conditions for disrupting, as early as the operation’s first days, the entire system of control, communications and materiel supply of the enemy forces.

6. The depth of the planned operation, taking as the axis of the main attack as the point of departure, was 220 kilometers. The operation was to last 5-6 days. Thus the average rate of advance for the mobile formations was planned at 50 kilometers (70 kilometers for the 17th Tank Corps). The average daily rate of attack for the rifle formations was determined at 20-30 kilometers.

The planning of a winter offensive operation of such a scale and vigor was based on the assurance that by creating an overwhelming superiority in force along the axes of the main attacks, the ability to break through the enemy’s heavily fortified defensive zone on the operation’s first day would be guaranteed, and that the vigorous advance by the mobile formations, given the absence of the enemy’s operational reserves immediately adjacent to the front line, would disorganize the control of his forces, create a panic within his ranks and enable our forces to rapidly reach the lines indicated by the plan.

7. Worthy of particular attention is the organization of operational security against possible attacks from the west into the rear of the Southwestern Front’s attacking forces.

The necessity of creating a powerful flank screen while conducting a deep operation has been confirmed by the entire course of the Great Patriotic War. This experience was fully taken into account in planning the present operation. The role of such a screen was entrusted by the Stavka to the Voronezh Front’s 6th Army.

Such were the main characteristic features of the Southwestern Front’s plan for the December offensive operation.

The disposition of forces

In accordance with the operational plan, the necessary disposition of forces was to be created for carrying it out. Because the plan for breaking through did not undergo any significant changes during the preparation period for the operation, the disposition of forces went on basically in accordance with the initial concentration plan.

Changes in the armies’ composition were carried out by the following means: the transfer of the 25th Tank Corps from the 6th Army to the 1st Guards Army and the latter’s reinforcement with the new 24th Tank Corps; the transfer of the 22nd Mechanized Brigade from the 1st Guards Army to the 3rd Guards Army; the transfer of the 5th Mechanized Corps from the 3rd Guards Army to the 5th Tank Army and the transfer from the 5th Tank Army of part of its forces for the newly-formed 5th Shock Army.

The composition of the armies by the start of the operation is shown in Table I/1.2.

Very powerful groups of forces were created along the axes of the 1st and 3rd guards armies’ main attacks, which fully corresponded to the overall operational plan. The operational formation of the front’s main forces is shown in Table I/1.2.

Table I/1.2 Composition of Soviet Forces at the Start of the December 1942 Offensive Operation

Notes

1. The artillery data is taken from materials contained in the Red Army artillery headquarters.

2. The 9th Artillery Division, consisting of the 47th and 127th artillery regiments, the 212th, 221st and 230th howitzer regiments, and the 407th, 442nd and 456th anti-tank artillery regiments, except for the 407th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment, had not arrived by the start of the operation.

The disposition of forces along the axes of the main attacks was expressed sufficiently clearly. Thus, along the 6th Army’s front of five rifle divisions, four divisions, along with reinforcements, were concentrated along a 9-kilometer sector where it was planned to carry out the breakthrough. One division occupied the remainder of the army’s 18-kilometer front.

Along the 1st Guards Army’s front, of seven rifle divisions, five divisions (minus one regiment) were concentrated along an 18-kilometer sector. Four tank corps were to be committed along the center of this sector, along a 5-kilometer front. The army’s remaining forces (two rifle divisions and a rifle regiment) occupied a front 127 kilometers in length.

Thus along the 6th and 1st Guards armies’ two neighboring breakthrough sectors, which covered an overall front of 27 kilometers, there were concentrated nine rifle divisions and four tank corps, with reinforcements.

Along the 3rd Guards Army’s front, of seven rifle divisions, four rifle divisions were concentrated along a 14-kilometer breakthrough sector, of which three divisions were along a 9-kilometer front. A mechanized corps, a motorized rifle brigade and a rifle brigade were to be committed here. The remaining three divisions occupied a front 75 kilometers in length.

The organizational-numerical composition of the Southwestern Front’s groups of forces along the axes of the main attacks and the correlation of forces along these axes are shown in Table I/1.3. Only the composition and weapons of the first-echelon forces are given.

In order to get a more exact idea of the correlation of force along the axes of the main attacks, it is necessary to take into account the following:

•the presence of guards mortar units in the amount listed in Table I/1.2 ;

•the presence of tanks in the breakthrough development echelon, accounting for the following correlation of forces by army: 1st Guards Army, 8:1; 3rd Guards Army, 3.3:1; moreover, along the 6th and 1st Guards armies’ breakthrough sectors (5-6 kilometers) up to 100 tanks per kilometer of front were to operate;

•the employment of the second echelons’ artillery, which enabled us to create an artillery density along the breakthrough sectors of 45-69 guns and mortars per kilometer of front in the 1st and 3rd guards armies and up to 100 guns and mortars in the 6th Army.

Table I/1.3 Correlation of Soviet and Enemy Forces at the Start of the December 1942 Offensive Operation

In analyzing the operational formation of the Southwestern Front’s forces along the axes of the main attacks, it is worth noting that the commanders of the 6th and 1st Guards armies each had in reserve a single rifle division, while the 3rd Guards Army had only a single rifle brigade. The front commander had no reserves at all.

Such an echeloning of forces diverges from the accepted view of organizing the combat formation of forces in breaking through a heavily fortified defensive zone. However, taking into account the existing conditions, the given decision by the command is justified by the situation and the course of combat activities.

The enemy had a powerful, well-outfitted tactical defensive line, 5-10 kilometers in depth. In places the defensive depth reached up to 20 kilometers, although beyond this defensive zone the enemy lacked a prepared rear defensive line and there were no operational reserves.

In order to break through such a defense, it was necessary to quickly concentrate the maximum efforts in order to smash through the first defensive zone like a powerful ram, to rapidly achieve operational freedom and thus exclude the possibility of the enemy using his deep reserves. The echeloning of the front’s main forces was done in such a way so that the maximum number of forces could be committed into the fighting from the very beginning, to create an absolute superiority over the enemy and thus, as early as the beginning of the battle, determine its outcome. It is necessary; however, to keep in mind that in such operational planning the restoration of second echelons and reserves (when their arrival is not expected from the depth) must be carried out by removing part of the first-echelon’s forces from the fighting immediately following the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense.

The creation of a dense concentration of forces along the axis of the main attacks by maximally weakening the auxiliary axes was boldly and decisively realized by the front command, because a serious offensive by the enemy was excluded, while the presence of a powerful water line like the Don would fully secure the retention by our forces of the positions occupied along these axes.

Such were the basic characteristics of the distribution and echeloning of the Southwestern Front’s forces along the sectors of the planned breakthrough.

Preparing the Operation

Troop training

The operation’s preparatory period embraces the end of November and the first half of December. The overall length of this stage was about 20 days.

During the first days of December the front had already received two new rifle corps (six divisions), three tank corps and a large number of reinforcement units. This circumstance demanded that the front command, alongside the drawing up of plans for conducting the operation and its materiel support, carry out a great deal of work to throw together units and prepare them for the forthcoming combat operations.

By 5 December, when the operational plans and other documents had basically been drawn up in the front and army headquarters, the troops had the opportunity to begin purposeful combat training in accordance with their forthcoming missions.

The front commander’s instructions in regard to the troops’ combat training came down to the following:

•to devise the organization of the troops’ combat formation for the breakthrough, to organize cooperation between the infantry, tanks, artillery and aviation during the attack and development of the battle in depth, to organize and secure the commitment of the mobile formations into the breach, as well as their activities in the depth of the enemy’s operational defense;

•to teach the troops to consolidate their captured lines, to repel tank attacks and to combat the enemy’s aviation with their own weapons;

•to train the command element and staffs to broadly employ radio communications equipment in the battle;

•to plan for and teach the troops to maneuver on the battlefield for the purpose of attacking the enemy in the flank and rear and encircling him.

In accordance with these instructions, combat training commenced in all units and formations upon their concentration. The troops prepared theoretically and practically on site for the forthcoming battles.

In order to disorganize the enemy’s command and control system, to seize his command posts and headquarters and to destroy his lines of communications, special select groups of bold soldiers and commanders were prepared, which were to get into the rear of the enemy’s position during the battle. Special navigators—commanders with the task of leading their unit (or elements) to its designated area at any time—were chosen and trained in all units.

Corps commanders carried out reconnaissance with the commanders of their divisions, attached units and artillery commanders before issuing orders to the divisions. The same sort of work was carried out by the division commanders with their regimental commanders, and the regimental commanders with their battalion commanders.

The commander of the 1st Guards Army personally carried out exercises with unit commanders down to the regimental commanders, inclusively, while such exercises were conducted with corps and division commanders twice.

A number of exercises on the forthcoming fighting were also conducted in the tank corps with the command element of the brigades and headquarters. For example, eight field rides to the combat area were conducted with the 25th Tank Corps’ command element, five tactical exercises on the theme of The Commitment of Tank Corps into the Breach, of which two were conducted on maps showing the dynamic nature of the battle in the enemy’s tactical and operational depth. Analogous work was carried out in the front’s other units and formations.

The Organization of Troop Control

The overall control over the operation’s preparation was exercised by the Stavka of the Supreme High Command through its representatives—Marshal of the Soviet Union comrade A.M. Vasilevskii,¹⁴ and Marshal of Artillery N.N. Voronov,¹⁵ as well as by means of the Stavka’s conversations with the front command through direct wire communications and personal interaction with the front leadership, when they were summoned to the Stavka.

The control of the armies by the front command and staff during the preparatory period for the operation was exercised chiefly through personal interaction by the front commander and his staff officers with the army commanders, and also through written directives, which were transmitted either personally, or through the command’s communications officers. The use of wire and radio communications during this period for problems of operational preparation was forbidden.

Army plans were reviewed and amended by the front commander. During the preparatory period the front’s military council conducted several conferences with the army command, during which the details of the forthcoming combat operations were examined and refined.

On 3 December an inter-front conference was held with the commander of the Voronezh Front on questions of coordinating the activities of the Voronezh and Southwestern fronts in the forthcoming operation.

The main communications and control equipment during the operation following the breakthrough were to be radio, mobile equipment and aircraft, as well as cable communications with the rifle formations and the armies.

An important role during the preparatory period and the conduct of the operation was entrusted to communications officers.

All the mobile formations were supplied with radio sets, through which they were to maintain contact with the headquarters of the front and armies and cooperating units. However, the power of the corps’ radio sets was not great, which is why communications could only be maintained through intermediate sets when the corps were far removed from the front and army headquarters.

The front commander retained general control over the tank corps, without relieving the army commanders of responsibility for the direct control of these formations during the operation. This duality of control can be explained, on the one hand, by the presence of powerful radio sets at front headquarters, which enabled the commander to control the corps if they were at a great distance from the army headquarters and, on the other hand, by the necessity of rapidly coordinating the activities of all the corps in case the situation at the front changed drastically.

It was planned to decentralize the artillery following the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense. Air corps were attached to the armies, which were to employ them in a centralized fashion to the end of the operation.

Thus rigid centralization of control was called for during the operation’s first stage. Foreseeing the difficulty of controlling the troops during a vigorous development of events, the front commander allowed the formation commanders the opportunity to manifest the broadest initiative directed at realizing the command’s overall plan.

In order to assure command secrecy, a system of radio signals was drawn up; map coding for the front and armies, as well as coding the positions and names of the leading officers and generals. During the operation’s preparatory period, a number of training exercises were conducted on questions of general and secret control, particularly involving radio equipment.

Preliminary work on questions of organizing cooperation between the armies, formations and combat arms, as well as on questions of troop control during the operation, to a significant degree, facilitated the operation’s success. However, the insufficient supply of communications equipment (particularly radios) and the officer element’s insufficient skill in correctly and professionally employing this equipment created certain difficulties during the operation that negatively affected troop control.

Measures for Ensuring Operational Secrecy

All the measures for concentrating and regrouping the troops were carried out while observing the strictest secrecy. An extremely limited number of individuals were privy to the command’s plan, even within the front staff. The front commander’s orders to the army commanders were transmitted only orally, in person, or sent through communications officers. Documents were drawn up by hand in a single copy by either the commander or the chief of staff. All conversations over the wire and correspondence on questions of the operation with the troops or among them were categorically forbidden. Radio sets were authorized only to receive.

Troop movements to the concentration areas were conducted only at night. The elements and units occupied their jumping-off positions in secrecy. Oral commands, smoking, conversations and any kind of light signals were forbidden. Commanders responsible for concealment were appointed in the units. False regroupings and movements and reinforced reconnaissance along secondary axes were carried out to disorient the enemy on a large scale.

The concentration, regroupings and the disposition of troops were also ensured by the activities of anti-aircraft defense, including fighter aviation. Moreover, particular attention was paid to covering the crossing areas over the Don and Chir rivers. The main mass of anti-aircraft weapons was concentrated here along the designated breakthrough sectors.

As a result of the measures adopted, the enemy was not able to uncover in any reliable way the disposition of our forces and to determine the direction of the main attack. Although the enemy had information as to the attack being prepared and undertook measures to repel it, the measures listed above ensured surprise, in the sense of time, axis and the force of the Red Army’s attacks.

Engineer support

During the operation’s preparatory period the engineering troops built six wooden bridges over the Don River, with a capacity of six, 16, 40 and 60 tons, for the timely concentration of men and materiel in the area of the Osetrovka bridgehead. Aside from these, 12 special ice crossings were built by strengthening the ice. Boats, sledges and travois for crossing the artillery and supply trains were built by hand from local materials. Besides this, bridges 8-10 meters long were built to cross tanks over small water obstacles. The 1st Guards Army’s engineering elements, on special vehicles with treadway bridges, were detached to the 18th and 25th tank corps as mobile groups to support and accompany the tanks.

Storm groups and obstacle detachments were created and trained for making passages in the minefields and wire obstacles, as well as for sealing off and clearing mines from the enemy’s minefields left in our troops’ rear.

At the same time, blocking groups were trained for destroying the enemy’s firing points and earth and timber pillboxes that survived the artillery preparation.

The engineering troops built command and observation posts for the commanders of the armies, corps and divisions.

Materiel support

During the preparatory period and the operation itself the Southwestern Front was based on the Povorino—Liski and Povorino—Stalingrad railroads, which were 150-200 kilometers from the front line. Only the Talovaya—Kalach (Voronezh) rail spur approached the front’s right flank, some 70 kilometers from the 1st Guards Army’s area.

The difficulty of materiel supply for the operation was exacerbated by the fact that the Voronezh and Don fronts were also based on these main lines.

The underdeveloped and overloaded rail net presented the front and army commands with the problem of fully employing the dirt roads. The number and condition of the latter could fully make up for the shortage of railroad communications, although the shortage of auto transport told negatively on the timely supply of all kinds of ammunition, food and forage for the troops.

The front’s main rail communication were divided among the armies in the following manner: the 1st Guards Army had the Aleksikovo—Uryupinsk sector; the 3rd Guards Army was based on the Kumylga station—excluding Filonovo sector, and; the 5th Tank Army on the Rakovka—excluding Kumylga station.

The front regulating station was located in Balashov and the forward depots were distributed along the railroad in the Budarino and Filonovo areas.

The army bases were distributed in Uryupinsk for the 1st Guards Army, in Panfilov and Kumylga for the 3rd Guards Army, and in Rakovka for the 5th Tank Army. Besides this, the armies deployed forward sections of their depots in the open for the main types of supplies.

The following were unloading stations for the armies: Kalach (Voronezh) for the 1st Guards Army, Kumylga for the 3rd Guards Army, and Log and Kachalino for the 5th Tank Army.

Until the end of the December operation the basing of the front and armies was carried out with small changes on the same main railroad. The 6th Army, which was subordinated to the Southwestern Front on 19 December, had the railroad sector excluding Talovaya—Shirinkin.

By the start of the operation the front’s provisioning was as follows, taking into account all supplies: 2.5 combat loads of rifle rounds, 1.5 combat loads of mortar rounds, up to 2.5 combat loads of artillery shells, up to four refills of fuel and lubricants, and 10-12 days of food and forage.

Despite the presence at the bases of a sufficient amount of ammunition, fuel and food, the factual provision of the troops, as a result of the extended communications and auto transport, was significantly lower than planned. For example, despite a number of measures adopted to increase deliveries in the 1st Guards Army, the availability of ammunition by 16 December varied from 0.8 to 1.5 combat loads in the rifle divisions and 2-2.5 combat loads in the tank corps. In the 3rd Guards Army the overall amount of ammunition by 16 December varied from 1-1.5 combat loads.

Thus the offensive by the Southwestern Front’s forces began in conditions of incomplete materiel supply, which told on the success of the artillery offensive and the pace of the operation.

The above-listed measures during the preparatory period are only a part of the colossal work carried out by the front command and staff and troops. Nonetheless, the operation began with an incomplete concentration of forces (the 9th Artillery Division, a number of tank regiments, as well as the rear organs of a number of formations newly-arrived with the 1st Guards Army, failed to arrive) and with a significant under fulfillment of the plan for materiel supply. Such circumstances created great additional difficulties in realizing the plan and influenced the pace of the operation.

General Conclusions

An examination of the preparation and planning for the Southwestern Front’s December offensive operation enables us to draw certain conclusions relating to the preparation of modern operations.

1. The enormous experience accumulated by the Red Army and its generals and officers during the Great Patriotic War, plus the great saturation of the armies with modern equipment, created conditions for planning and conducting large-scale deep operations, which usually go beyond the scope of individual fronts and have grown into operations of a strategic character, according to their goals and scale. The experience of the preceding November operation involving three fronts speaks eloquently of this, as does the plan for the Southwestern Front’s December operation.

The plan for the December offensive operation called for the operational interaction of the Voronezh, Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts. Moreover, the task of defeating the enemy’s main group of forces along the middle Don was entrusted to the Southwestern Front’s 1st and 3rd guards armies, with the Voronezh Front’s 6th Army operationally securing their activities. The elimination of the enemy’s lower Chir and Tormosin groups of forces was to be carried out by the forces of the Southwestern Front’s 5th Tank Army, in close coordination with the Stalingrad Front’s 5th Shock Army.

The basis of the enumerated fronts’ plans was the single idea of the Stavka of the Supreme High Comamnd—supporting the Don Front’s activities for completing the elimination of the Germans’ Sixth and Fourth Panzer armies encircled around Stalingrad.

2. The character of the majority of major modern operations demands the coordination of the activities of several fronts, in order that the planned operations issue not only from the tasks assigned directly to the fronts, but that they should support, in the final analysis, the achievement of an overall strategic goal in the overall plan of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command. The plan for the Southwestern Front’s December operation was drawn up under the direct control of the Stavka and according to its directives underwent changes in connection with the rapidly developing situation in the area to the southwest of Stalingrad.

3. A particular method of controlling fronts and armies developed during the Great Patriotic War, which flows from the overall character of the ongoing war, the difficulty of modern operations, the degree of the Red Army’s technical supply, the level of the troops’ training, and the generals’ and officers’ level of skill. This method is expressed in the fact that the Stavka and front are not limited to assigning overall tasks to subordinate formations, but rather actively participate in the drawing up of operational plans, determining the content and method of their conduct.

4. The plan for the Southwestern Front’s December operation, despite the specificity of conditions in which it was to be conducted (a shallow defense, an absence of the enemy’s powerful reserves, the insufficiently stable enemy along the front’s right flank—the Italians and Romanians), deserves special attention in studying the modern front