Beyond Good and Evil

By Friedrich Nietzsche

German philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche was one the most controversial figures of the 19th century. His evocative writings on religion, morality, culture, philosophy, and science were often polemic attacks against the established views of his time. First published in 1886, “Beyond Good and Evil” is a work that draws upon and expands the ideas that Nietzsche first addressed in his previous work, “Thus Spoke Zarathustra.” Nietzsche contrasts the concepts of good and evil as they were viewed in ancient times with the modern interpretations of them. As he asserts, the initial form of morality arises from the warrior nature of the ruling castes of ancient civilizations, who viewed themselves as good because of their wealth and power in contrast to the weakness of those that they enslaved. He further describes how the recasting of these ancient values through religion has given rise to a new “slave” morality, which defines goodness by a set of virtues which are contradictory to those of the ruling classes. Ultimately “Beyond Good and Evil” is a harsh criticism of philosophical systems that described a good person as the opposite of an evil one rather than just a relative expression of the impulses inherent in all men. This edition is translated by Helen Zimmern, includes introductions by Willard Huntington Wright and Thomas Common, and a biographical afterword.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Digireads.com Publishing
• Release date: Nov 17, 2015
• ISBN: 9781420951950

Friedrich Nietzsche

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) on saksalainen filosofi, runoilija ja filologi.

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BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL

By FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE

Translated by HELEN ZIMMERN

Introductions by WILLARD HUNTINGTON WRIGHT and THOMAS COMMON

Beyond Good and Evil

By Friedrich Nietzsche

Translated by Helen Zimmern

Introductions by Willard Huntington Wright and Thomas Common

Print ISBN 13: 978-1-4209-6134-8

eBook ISBN 13: 978-1-4209-5195-0

This edition copyright © 2019. Digireads.com Publishing.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior written permission of the publisher, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical reviews and certain other noncommercial uses permitted by copyright law.

Cover Image: a detail of The Angel Binding Satan, c. 1797 (oil on canvas), by Philip James (Jacques) de Loutherbourg (1740-1812) / Yale Center for British Art, Paul Mellon Collection, USA / Bridgeman Images.

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CONTENTS

First Introduction

Second Introduction

Preface

Chapter I. Prejudices of Philosophers

Chapter II. The Free Spirit

Chapter III. The Religious Mood

Chapter IV. Apophthegms and Interludes

Chapter V. The Natural History of Morals

Chapter VI. We Scholars

Chapter VII. Our Virtues

Chapter VIII. Peoples and Countries

Chapter IX. What is Noble?

BIOGRAPHICAL AFTERWORD

First Introduction

A double purpose animated Nietzsche in his writing of Beyond Good and Evil ("Jenseits von Gute und Böse). It is at once an explanation and an elucidation of Thus Spake Zarathustra, and a preparatory book for his greatest and most important work, The Will to Power. In it Nietzsche attempts to define the relative terms of good and evil, and to draw a line of distinction between immorality and unmorality. He saw the inconsistencies evolved in the attempt to harmonise an ancient moral code with the needs of modern life, and recognised the compromises which were constantly being made between moral theory and social practice. His object was to establish a relationship between morality and necessity, and to formulate a workable basis for human conduct. Consequently Beyond Good and Evil" is one of his most important contributions to a new system of ethics, and touches on many of the deepest principles of his philosophy. As it stands, it is by no means a complete expression of Nietzsche’s doctrines, but it is sufficiently profound and suggestive to be of valuable service in an understanding of his later works. The book was begun in the summer of 1885 and finished the following winter. Again there was difficulty with publishers, and finally the book was issued at the author’s own expense in the autumn of 1886.

Nietzsche opens Beyond Good and Evil with a long chapter headed Prejudices of Philosophers, in which he outlines the course to be taken by his dialectic. The exposition is accomplished by two methods: first, by an analysis and a refutation of the systems of thinking made use of by antecedent doctrinaires, and secondly, by defining the hypotheses on which his own philosophy is built. This chapter is a most important one, setting forth, as it does, the rationale of his doctrine of the will to power. It has been impossible to make extracts of any unified sequence from this chapter because of its intricate and compact reasoning, and the student would do well to read it in its entirety. It establishes Nietzsche’s philosophic position and presents a closely knit explanation of the course pursued in the following chapters. The relativity of all truth—the hypothesis so often assumed in his previous work—Nietzsche here defends by analogy and argument. Using other leading forms of philosophy as a ground for exploration, he questions the absolutism of truth and shows wherein lies the difficulty of a final definition. Here we become conscious of that plasticity of mind which was the dominating quality of his thinking. It is not, however, that form of plasticity which on inspection resolves itself into amorphic and unstable reasoning, but a logical, almost scientific, method of valuing. The mercurial habits of the metaphysicians who deny absolutism are nowhere discernible in Nietzsche’s thought. His mind is definite without being static. The basis of his argumentation is what one might call floating. It rises and falls with the human tide of causation; yet the structure built upon it remains at all times upright and unchanged.

Nietzsche points out that the numerous logical conclusions of philosophers have been for the most part a priori propositions, the results of prejudices or desires, and that the syllogistic structures reared to them came as explanations and defences, rather than as dialectic preambles. In their adopting a hypothetical truth as a premise, he sees only the advocacy for a point of view, arguing that in order to erect a system of logic the initial thesis must be proved. Therefore he questions the fundamental worth of certainty as opposed to uncertainty, and of truth as opposed to falsity, thus striking at the very foundations reared by those philosophers who have assumed, without substantiation, that only certainty and truth are valuable. Nietzsche calls these absolutists astute defenders of prejudices, and characterises the verbalistic prestidigitation of Kant as a highly developed form of prejudice-defending. Spinoza, with his mathematical system of reasoning, likewise falls in the category of those thinkers who first assume conclusions and then prepare explanations for them by a process of inverted reasoning. Nietzsche proceeds to pose the instinctive functions against conscious thinking. He asserts that the channels taken by thought are defined by the thinker’s nature, and that even logic is influenced by physiological considerations. The whole fabric of philosophic thought is held up to the light of immediate necessity.

Going further, he inquires into the impulse to knowledge. He finds that a specific purpose has always been the actuating force of any philosophy, and that consequently philosophy, even in its most abstract form, has had a residuum of autobiography in it. In fine, that philosophy, far from being a search, has been an aim toward a definite preconceived result. The moral or ethical impulse, being always imperious, has not infrequently resulted in philosophising, and in all such cases knowledge has been used as an instrument. Thus knowledge which led to a philosophical conclusion has been the outgrowth of a personal instinct. In those cases where an impersonal impulse to knowledge may have existed, it has led, not into philosophical channels, but into practical and often commercial activities. The scholar has ever remained personal in his quest for philosophical formulas. In Kant’s Table of Categories, wherein that philosopher claimed to have found the faculty of synthetic judgment a priori, Nietzsche finds only a circle of reasoning which begins and ends in personal instinct. And in Kant’s discovery of a new moral faculty, Nietzsche sees only sophistical invention, and accounts for its widespread acceptance by the moral state of the Germans at that period. Ignoring the possibility of synthetic judgments a priori, Nietzsche advances the query as to their necessity, and lays stress on the impracticability of truth without belief. The inherent falsity or truth of a proposition has no bearing on philosophical doctrines so long as a contrary belief is present, a belief such as we exert toward the illusions of the world of reality when we make practical use of that world’s perspective.

The schemes of personal philosophy, such, for instance, as we find in Schopenhauer, are dealt with by Nietzsche in a single paragraph: "When I analyse the process that is expressed in the sentence, ‘I think,’ I find a whole series of daring assertions, the argumentative proof of which would be difficult, perhaps impossible: for instance, that it is I who think, that there must necessarily be something that thinks, that thinking is an activity and operation on the part of a being who is thought of as a cause, that there is an ‘ego,’ and finally, that it is already determined what is to be designated by thinking—that I know what thinking is. For if I had not already decided within myself what it is, by what standard could I determine whether that which is just happening is not perhaps ‘willing’ or ‘feeling’? In short, the assertion ‘I think,’ assumes that I compare my state at the present moment with other states of myself which I know, in order to determine what it is: on account of this retrospective connection with further ‘knowledge,’ it has at any rate no immediate certainty for me." Thus the smug materialistic philosopher finds himself necessitated; to fall back on purely metaphysical explanations for answers to the questions arising out of his definition of truth.

Locke falls under a critical survey in this chapter. In answer to this thinker’s theory regarding the origin of ideas, Nietzsche names the great cycles of philosophical systems and calls attention to the similarity of processes in such cycles. Furthermore, he shows that the foundations of all previous philosophies are discoverable in the new styles of contemporaneous thought. And in those national schools of philosophy conceived in languages which stem from the same origin, he finds an undeniable resemblance. All of which leads to a conclusion incompatible with Locke’s theory. Nietzsche attacks the conclusions of the physicists, denying them any place in philosophy because their research consists solely in interpretations of natural laws in accordance with their own prejudices and beliefs. The theories which might be deduced from natural phenomena are not discoverable in their doctrines; their activities have consisted in twisting natural events to suit preconceived valuations.

Finally Nietzsche inquires into the habits and practices of psychologists. Not even among these workers does he find a basis for philosophy. Psychology, he argues, has been guided, not by a detached and lofty desire to ascertain truth in its relation to the human mind, but by prejudices and fears grounded in moral considerations. He finds a constant desire on the part of experimenters to account for good impulses as distinguished from bad ones. And in this desire lies the superimposing of moral prejudices on a science which, more than all others, deals with problems farthest removed from moral influences. These prejudices in psychology, as well as in all branches of philosophy, are the obstacles which stand in the way of any deep penetration into the motives beneath human conduct. Nietzsche, in his analyses and criticisms, is not solely destructive: he is subterraneously constructing his own philosophical system founded on the will to power. The phrase is used many times in the careful research of the first chapter. As the book proceeds, this doctrine develops.

Nietzsche’s best definition of what he calls the free spirit, namely: the thinking man, the intellectual aristocrat, the philosopher and ruler, is contained in the twenty-six pages of the second chapter of Beyond Good and Evil. In a series of paragraphs—longer than is Nietzsche’s wont—the leading characteristics of this superior man are described. The free spirit, however, must not be confused with the superman. The former is the bridge which the present day man must cross in the process of surpassing himself. In the delineation and analysis of him, as presented to us here, we can glimpse his most salient mental features. Heretofore, as in Thus Spake Zarathustra, he has been but partially and provisionally defined. Now his instincts and desires, his habits and activities are outlined. Furthermore, we are given an explanation of his relation to the inferior man and to the organisms of his environment. The chapter is an important one, for at many points it is a subtle elucidation of many of Nietzsche’s dominant philosophic principles. By inference, the differences of class distinction are strictly drawn. The slave-morality (sklavmoral) and the master-morality (herrenmoral), though as yet undefined, are balanced against each other; and the deportmental standards of the masters and slaves are defined by way of differentiating between these two opposing human factions. While the serving class is constantly manifesting its need of a guiding dogma, the ruling class is constantly approaching the state wherein the arbitrary moral mandates are denied. Nietzsche sees a new order of philosophers appearing—men who will stand beyond good and evil, who will be not only free spirits, but something more, higher, greater, and fundamentally different. In describing these men of the future, of which the present free men are the heralds and forerunners, Nietzsche establishes an individualistic ideal which he develops fully in later chapters.

A keen and far-reaching analysis of the various aspects assumed by religious faith constitutes a third section of Beyond Good and Evil. Though touching upon various influences of Christianity, this section is more general in its religious scope than even The Antichrist, many indications of which are to be found here. This chapter has to do with the numerous inner experiences of man, which are directly or indirectly attributable to religious doctrines. The origin of the instinct for faith itself is sought, and the results of this faith are balanced against the needs of the individuals and of the race. The relation between religious ecstasy and sensuality; the attempt on the part of religious practitioners to arrive at a negation of the will; the transition from religious gratitude to fear; the psychology at the bottom of saint-worship;—to problems such as these Nietzsche devotes his energies in his inquiry of the religious mood. The geographical considerations which enter into the character and intensity of religious faith form an important basis for study; and the differences between Comte’s sociology and Sainte-Beuve’s anti-Jesuit utterances are explained from a standpoint of national influences. Nietzsche examines the many phases of atheism and the principal anti-Christian tendencies of all philosophy since Descartes. There is an illuminating exposition of the important stages in religious cruelty and of the motives underlying the various forms of religious sacrifices. Again we run upon the doctrine of eternal recurrence, but here, as elsewhere, it may be regarded, not as a basic element in Nietzsche’s philosophical scheme, but as a by-product of his thought. Nietzsche emphasises the necessity of idleness in all religious lives, and shows how the adherence to the religious mood works against the activities, both of mind and of body, which make for the highest efficiency.

A very important phase of Nietzsche’s teaching is contained in this criticism of the religious life. The detractors of the Nietzschean doctrine, almost without exception, base their judgments on the assumption that the universal acceptation of his theories would result in social chaos. As I have pointed out before, Nietzsche desired no such general adoption of his beliefs. In his bitterest diatribes against Christianity, his object was not to shake the faith of the great majority of mankind in their idols. He sought merely to free the strong men from the restrictions of a religion which fitted the needs of only the weaker members of society. He neither hoped nor desired to wean the mass of humanity from Christianity or any similar dogmatic comfort. On the contrary, he denounced those superficial atheists who endeavoured to weaken the foundations of religion. He saw the positive necessity of such religions as a basis for his slave morality, and in the present chapter he exhorts the rulers to preserve the religious faith of the serving classes, and to use it as a means of government—as an instrument in the work of disciplining and educating. In paragraph 61 he says: The selecting and disciplining influence—destructive as well as creative and fashioning—which can be exercised by means of religion is manifold and varied, according to the sort of people placed under its spell and protection. Not only is this an expression of the utilitarian value of religious formulas, but a definite voicing of one of the main factors in his philosophy. His entire system of ethics is built on the complete disseverance of the dominating class and the serving class; and his doctrine of beyond good and evil should be considered only as it pertains to the superior man. To apply it to all classes would be to reduce Nietzsche’s whole system of ethics to impracticability, and therefore to an absurdity.

Passing from a consideration of the religious mood, Nietzsche enters a broader sphere of ethical research, and endeavours to trace the history and development of morals. He accuses the philosophers of having avoided the real problem of morality, namely: the testing of the faith and motives which lie beneath moral beliefs. This is the task he sets for himself, and in his chapter, The Natural History of Morals, he makes an examination of moral origins—an examination which is extended into an exhaustive treatise in The Genealogy of Morals. However, his dissection here is carried out on a broader and far more general scale than in his previous books, such as Human, All-Too-Human and The Dawn of Day. Heretofore he had confined himself to codes and systems, to acts of morality and immorality, to judgments of conducts. In Beyond Good and Evil he treats of moral prejudices as forces working hand in hand with human progress. In addition, there is a definite attitude of constructive thinking here which is absent from his earlier work. He outlines the course to be taken by the men of the future, and points to the results which have accrued from the moralities of modern nations. He offers the will to power in place of the older will to belief, and characterises the foundations of acceptance for all moral codes as fictions and premature hypotheses. He defines the racial ideals which have grown up out of moral influences, and, applying them to the needs of the present day, finds them inadequate and dangerous. The conclusion to which his observations and analyses point is that, unless the rulers of the race take a stand beyond the outposts of good and evil and govern on a basis of expediency divorced from all moral influences, the individual is in constant danger of being lowered to the level of the gregarious conscience.

In the chapter, We Scholars, Nietzsche continues his definition of the philosopher, whom he holds to be the highest type of man. Besides being a mere description of the intellectual traits of this free spirit, the chapter is also an exposition of the shortcomings of those modern men who pose as philosophers. In the path of these new thinkers Nietzsche sees many difficulties both from within and from without, and points out methods whereby these obstacles may be overcome. Also the man of science and the man of genius are analysed and weighed as to their relative importance in the community. In fact, we have here Nietzsche’s most concise and complete definition of the individuals upon whom rests the burden of progress. These valuations of the intellectual leaders are important to the student, for by one’s understanding them, along with the reasons for such valuations, a comprehension of the ensuing volumes is facilitated. Nietzsche hereby establishes the qualities of those entitled to the master-morality code; and, by thus drawing the line of demarcation in humanity, he defines at the same time that class whose constitutions and predispositions demand the slave-morality. In addition, he affixes, according to his philosophical formula, a scale of values to such mental attributes as objectivity, power to will, scepticism, positivity and constraint.

Important material touching on many of the fundamental points of Nietzsche’s philosophy is embodied in the chapter entitled Our Virtues. The more general inquiries into conduct and the research along the broader lines of ethics are supplanted by inquiries into specific moral attributes. The current virtues are questioned, and their historical significance is determined. The value of such virtues is tested in their relation to different types of men. Sacrifice, sympathy, brotherly love, service, loyalty, altruism and similar ideals of conduct are examined, and the results of such virtues are shown to be incompatible with the demands of modern social intercourse. Nietzsche poses against these virtues the sterner and more rigid forms of conduct, pointing out wherein they meet with the present requirements of human progress. The chapter is a preparation for his establishment of a new morality and also an explanation of the dual ethical code which is one of the main pillars in his philosophical structure. Before presenting his precept of a dual morality, Nietzsche endeavours to determine woman’s place in the political and social scheme, and points out the necessity, not only of individual feminine functioning, but of the preservation of a distinct polarity in sexual relationship.

In the final chapter many of Nietzsche’s philosophical ideas take definite shape. The doctrine of slave-morality and master-morality, prepared for and partially defined in preceding chapters, is here directly set forth, and those virtues and attitudes which constitute the nobility of the master class are specifically defined. Nietzsche designates the duty of his aristocracy, and segregates the human attributes according to the rank of individuals. The Dionysian ideal, which underlies all the books that follow Beyond Good and Evil, receives its first direct exposition and application. The

Reviews for Beyond Good and Evil

[jane.elinor · Rating: 4 out of 5 stars]

(Disclaimer: I'm definitely not qualified to write this review.)When I started secondary school, in our first history classes, every so often it would be mentioned that such and such a historical figure was racist, or sexist, or what have you. For a bunch of 12 year old girls, this was pretty shocking, and I remember my teacher having to silence us and remind us: "it's not fair to judge someone by the standards of our time".I think there's a lot of sense in that idea, and this is what I tried to do with 'Beyond Good and Evil', but unfortunately, I found it impossible simply because Nietzsche's philosophy is deeply entrenched in 19th century European society -- remove that context and what he's saying won't make sense. And so, because a lot of his philosophy is deeply rooted in social hierarchy, misogyny and nationalism (even though I wouldn't say Nietzsche is hugely nationalistic himself by 19th century standards), 'Beyond Good and Evil' can be tasteless to someone with more contemporary values.I don't doubt that Nietzsche was a genius, however. His deconstruction of Western philosophy is very impressive and he makes many valid criticisms of the likes of Descartes and Kant. I also can see that his work is incredibly influential, and (though I'm not well versed in philosophy) I gather that it's Nietzsche's influence that led to the more post-moral slant of modern philosophy.Nietzsche brings forward a lot of excellent ideas, and is admirable in not shying away from controversy. He takes a more cynical view of human nature than (probably) was typical until that point, and this is seen in ideas such as the will to power and the notions of master and slave morality. However much or little we agree with these notions, they're daringly subversive, and I think that they've made their mark on contemporary thinking, on an everyday level as much as on a philosophical one.Master and slave morality is itself one of the ideas that seems particularly tasteless to us, in spite of it having penetrated people's thinking -- we (hopefully!) don't see the world in terms of masters and slaves, or leaders and followers, or higher and lower anymore, at least not in the same way that Europe did in the 19th century. It's very unappealing to us to see the world in terms of noble versus downtrodden and victimised. At the same time, though, some of the ideas of master morality -- self-respect, self-righteousness, etc -- are widely accepted these days as positive ways of living.I don't want to go on for too much longer, but I'll finish by saying that Nietzsche was a highly intelligent philosopher, and an astute observer of the world around him. I may be slightly unfair in criticising the tastelessness of his views, but I do think that his philosophy is inextricably linked with the attitudes of 19th century Europe. I did enjoy it on the whole, though, and in spite of the three-and-a-half stars, I think 'Beyond Good and Evil' is definitely a book worth reading and forming an opinion on!And I'm sorry for this mess of a review.

[richestgirls-3 · Rating: 5 out of 5 stars]

I think that the entire book is fascinating, but the one part that I read over and over is the aphorisms section.

[deusvitae · Rating: 2 out of 5 stars]

Not exactly the best introduction to the work of Nietzsche.This text is a set of nine chapters subdivided into 290 sections with various pontifications by the noted German philosopher. I did not detect a lot of coherence throughout. I get that Nietzsche has strong opinions. I get that he is not a fan of the British. I get he would not be a fan of all that feminism has wrought.Apparently, in the midst of all of these declarations and many more, Nietzsche is critiquing the basis of all modern morality and exposing it all as the Will to Power; he takes down the philosophers; he overthrows religion, condemning its love of suffering, considering the OT of greater value than the NT; having little love for the ethos of Jesus. At the very end he confesses his great love for Dionysus and all he represents.He found value in the Jews and condemned antisemitism...all the more ironic since the Nazis found plenty to love in Nietzsche's philosophy in general.If this is representative of Nietzschean thought...man, the guy needed an editor. Unless, of course, clearly set forth and coherently argued premises is also something he's against. Wouldn't surprise me.

[darwin.8u · Rating: 5 out of 5 stars]

The blockbuster, followup hit (I think it originally sold 300 copies) to Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Same general theme, different method. One macro, one micro; one infinite, one finite; one timeless, one current -- I suppose (those are all methaphorical stretches to awe a Swami for sure, but hell, who reads these reviews anyway).

[gyanadass · Rating: 3 out of 5 stars]

So I think this books is pretty okay. I first thought it was pretty lousy, but then when he mentioned the part about the funky chicken dance - it all turned around and I began to really love it. He kind of messed up towards the end when he said that all the chicken really does is flap its wings around. Doesn't exactly spell excellence to me. - Santosha

[jpsnow · Rating: 4 out of 5 stars]

In this book we have the "non-fiction" counterpart to Zarathustra, in which Nietzsche explains not so much a single, integrated philosophy as his philosophical outlook on almost every aspect of life. It is a profound book and, as is often the case, I can at most note here snippets and anecdotes that especially caught my attention. Nietzsche provides an ongoing "survey of the literature," discussing the development of epistemology and criticizing Kant in particular ("By virtue of a faculty... But such replies belong in a comedy.") Nietzsche bemoaned the reduction to philosophy as being the theory of knowledge - the branch which dominate so much of the field before and during his time. He also saw the rapid expansion of science outpacing the development of philosophy, as philosophers worked too much in specializations and failed to rise high enough to look "down" (a very important metaphor for perspective in much of his writing.)

[clancy.coonradt · Rating: 5 out of 5 stars]

Such a wonderful book. Truly one that I find hard to put down. This is my night reader during a History MA, and it certainly keeps my mind busy and not worrying on about the day and its endless problems. The way Penguin have re-published the book is beautiful, and it really adds to the impact of the brain warming words within. A must read for anyone that enjoys philosophy, or just for something to put you to sleep at night.

[joeydag · Rating: 4 out of 5 stars]

required reading in college. I got ignored by the professor as I ignored N as a blathering anti-semite. Little did I know how to read anti-jewishness as an intellectual category and a tool for analysis of a cultural trend.

[sfisk_8 · Rating: 4 out of 5 stars]

Classic- Must read

[pickwick817 · Rating: 3 out of 5 stars]

I began this book with the hope that Nietsche would better explain some of my own theories on morality and its function in society. I did not quite find what I was looking for. I now realize that my hope was terribly naive.In addition to my dissapointment on that front, I found a few others. Nietsche seems to have used this book to attack some of his rivals with viewpoints opposed to his own. While this is not alway a bad thing, Nietsche does this in what appears to be more of a personal attack than a refutation of a theory.While some of his ideas seem very distant from what we accept today (some of his points about women) I did glean a few things that have helped me to understand my own perspective. I think a class or study group where I could discuss my views and hear those of others would go a long way to helping me to really understand the book.

[michael.bradham · Rating: 1 out of 5 stars]

When writing about relation between neurosis and practices of solitude, fasting, sexual abstinence, Nietzsche writes: "This latter doubt is justified by the fact that one of the most regular symptoms among savage as well as among civilized peoples is the most sudden and excessive sensuality, which then with equal suddenness transforms into penitential paroxysms, world-renunciation, and will-renunciation, both symptoms perhaps explainable as disguised epilepsy? But nowhere is it MORE obligatory to put aside explanations around no other type has there grown such a mass of absurdity and superstition, no other type seems to have been more interesting to men and even to philosophers - perhaps it is time to become just a little indifferent here, to learn caution, or, better still, to look AWAY, TO GO AWAY -" (pages 33-34)After reading above words, decided to go away from this book.

[garypatella · Rating: 3 out of 5 stars]

Interesting thoughts. I agree with some and disagree with others. The biggest problem I have is that the writing style is VERY choppy. Since I read the English translation, I can't say for certain whether it is Nietzsche who wrote this way, or the way in which it was translated. In either case, the choppy writing is not conducive to absorption. A handful of sentences on one topic, followed by three sentences on another topic, followed by another few sentences on a third topic, etc. Such writing results in lack of retention. There is no central theme to any of the chapters or sections. For this reason, I was even considering going as low as two and a half stars.

[byebyelibrary · Rating: 5 out of 5 stars]

One of the best audiobooks on Nietzsche I have ever come across. The author captures perfectly the wit, sarcasm and musicality of the writing.

[librarianbryan · Rating: 5 out of 5 stars]

Good to know the N-meister is still invigorating after all these years. You will be offended and you will think. What more could one ask for in a philosopher. It should be said too that enjoying Neitzsche is not to be ignorant of his flaws. Remember the myth of Icarus, but be prepared to be accused of possessing a slave morality.

[jorgecarvajal-1 · Rating: 4 out of 5 stars]

The book pretty much does what the title says, it does take you beyond good and evil, it does wash those dirty ideas ingrained in the mind since childhood. I can summarize the core of this work as "there is no good nor evil, only rules".

[ashryan_1 · Rating: 3 out of 5 stars]

Though it contains some thought-provoking aphorisms, when it comes to its longer, more substantive passages, Beyond Good and Evil is not what its title proclaims. Nietzsche certainly does not move beyond the realm of value judgments altogether (which is about the best thing I can say for him in this regard). Nor does he even offer a genuine alternative to conventional conceptions of good and evil. Rather, he simply takes the flip-side of that coin and reverses the labels, ascribing (at least by strong implication) moral superiority to what would conventionally be called the "evil" and moral inferiority to what society had generally come to accept as the "good". On this last, much of his criticism of Christianity, which he aptly described as "slave-morality", is quite accurate; but in his own positive views, he unfortunately failed to move beyond the Christian moral framework and offer a genuine alternative. For example, instead of saying that the strong should sacrifice themselves to the weak, he held that the strong should sacrifice the weak to themselves. He completely accepted the view that morality was about masters and slaves, and only argued as to who should be sacrificed to whom.He writes, for instance: "The essential thing, however, in a good and healthy aristocracy is that it should...accept with a good conscience the sacrifice of a legion of individuals, who, FOR ITS SAKE, must be suppressed and reduced to imperfect men, to slaves and instruments. Its fundamental belief must be precisely that society is NOT allowed to exist for its own sake, but only as a foundation and scaffolding, by means of which a select class of beings may be able to elevate themselves to their higher duties, and in general to a higher EXISTENCE..."This illustrates the problem with this sort of Nietzschean pseudo-egoism very well: one cannot accept egoism except on the basis of individualism---the "ego" is, after all, the "I", the individual self as distinct from other selves. Nietzsche senses this and tries to uphold the individual (e.g., "the individual dares to be individual and detach himself")---but one cannot uphold the individual while at the same time speaking of sacrificing legions of individuals. It's simply not consistent...if it is right for some people to exist for their own sake as individuals, then by the same token every other individual has that same right (Nietzsche's separation of them into "noble" and "despicable" classes notwithstanding).The alternative to populism is not elitism, but individualism...and elitism is by definition not individualism. As one dictionary aptly puts it, elitism is "consciousness of or pride in belonging to a select or favored group"...it may be a smaller group, but it is still defining oneself primarily in terms of and in relation to the group. Indeed, Nietzche writes: "...egoism belongs to the essence of a noble soul, I mean the unalterable belief that to a being such as 'we,' other beings must naturally be in subjection, and have to sacrifice themselves..." Note the "we" where one would expect an "I", followed by the calls for sacrifice of one group to another...clearly, Nietzsche is not a genuine individualist, but a common elitist merely posing as one.All of this follows from what might be called his metaethical principles, for example that "...life itself is ESSENTIALLY appropriation, injury, conquest of the strange and weak, suppression, severity, obtrusion of peculiar forms, incorporation, and at the least, putting it mildest, exploitation..." This is of course true of animals, but not of human beings in the moral sense. You might think that Nietzsche recognizes this as he describes the egoist as a "CREATOR OF VALUES", but he means that only in the sense that he subjectively defines values for himself, not that he actually creates the values his life requires rather than appropriating them from those who do create them. So for Nietzsche, the "egoist" is existentially a parasite on those who are actually creative and productive.Nietzsche does insist that the highest men are not simply those who are physically superior, but spiritually (for lack of a better word---Nietzsche uses the term "psychically" in the translation I'm using) as well---the great individuals who shape a culture rather than merely being shaped by it, the Wagners, the, well...the Nietzsches! But given that these men are simply those who have the greatest concentration of the Will to Power, and not through any morally praiseworthy choices of their own, as Nietzsche denies freedom of the will, it's not clear that their superior status is in any sense "deserved". And whether their domination over others is through sheer force of will, or by actual physical domination, it still basically comes down to "might makes right".The "Will to Power" is itself a sort of half-baked idea. Robert C. Solomon makes a lot out of Nietzsche's rejection of Plato and Schopenhauer, and of metaphysics in general, but interpreting his "Will to Power" as a merely psychological phenomenon (even a universal one) is a bit of a stretch, when he largely took the idea from Schopenhauer's "Will" or "Will to Live" and when its place in Nietzsche's philosophy is similar in form and function (if not in content) to Plato's Form of the Good. But to be fair, interpreting Nietzsche is not exactly a clear-cut undertaking, considering the unsystematic nature of his writings.Even Nietzsche's comments on peripheral subjects don't stand up very well in retrospect. Many of his remarks about women are extremely unfortunate, and his attempt at music criticism is almost laughable as he dismisses Mendelssohn, Schumann, and the Romantics (and even Beethoven as the transition between Mozart and them) as unsubstantial and therefore short-lived and already forgotten---when his own musical compositions (yes, Nietzsche was himself something of an amateur composer!) have actually been forgotten (though they're not too bad) much more so than those.So is there any value in reading Nietzsche today? Certainly, for those interested in the history of philosophy...it is interesting, for example, how Nietzsche's emphasis on feeling or "the passions" over rational thought bridged the gap between Hegel as well as the German Romantic philosophers such as Schelling, and the existentialists, on the one hand; and on the other how his proto-phenomenology bridged the gap between Kant and not only the existentialists but also the pragmatists.And Beyond Good and Evil does contain some beautifully expressed thoughts, including one of my all-time favorite passages: "...it is some fundamental certainty which a noble soul has about itself, something which is not to be sought, is not to be found, and perhaps, also, is not to be lost.--THE NOBLE SOUL HAS REVERENCE FOR ITSELF." That is a beautiful, and (properly understood) profoundly true, idea. If only Nietzsche could have lived up to it in the rest of the work.

[madepercy-1 · Rating: 4 out of 5 stars]

The other evening, a few pages from the end of this work, I fell asleep listening to Alan Watts lecturing on virtues. I find it difficult to articulate the connection to Nietzsche, but what I comprehended as I awoke, while being in a state not dissimilar to that of Debussy's faun, was this rough recollection: You cannot be virtuous. If you become virtuous and you are aware of being virtuous, then you are prideful and thus no longer virtuous. Virtues are not self-conscious, and you cannot consciously be virtuous. Breathing is a virtue. You don't think about it, you are not responsible for it, it happens 'un-self-consciously'. That is virtue. I understand that Alan Watts was discussing elements of Eastern philosophy, but Nietzsche mentions Eastern philosophy numerous times. Following Mortimer Adler's guidance in How to Read a Book, I now take notes in pencil in the margins of my books. This rather short book is full of notations; Latin, French, Greek, German, and Italian words and phrases; class consciousness, waiting too long to display one's genius, "the herd"; the Will to Power; morality; and so on. Too much to summarise here appropriately. But I read in Nietzsche a critique of mediocrity, and it provides me with an awakening to the class-based cringe that has been highlighted by my reading and study over the years. Alan Watts said something like being self-conscious won't help one to be virtuous. Benjamin Franklin wrote that although he worked to consciously improve himself, using his 13-week virtues checklist, he was aware that he could never be perfect. If I take into account Nietzsche's critique of the herd morality and religion, and the privilege of rank and the position adopted by others in relation to my lowly class-based existence (which doesn't manifest itself in any meaningful way outside my own head), then the idea of "beyond good and evil" makes some intuitive sense. Nonetheless, I am far from articulating Nietzsche's ideas beyond what I can grasp from a handful of his work. I may take some solace in that Franklin couldn't be virtuous, that Adler tells me there is nothing wrong with interpreting my reading without the aid of others, that Nietzsche writes much like La Rochefoucauld, and that he thought the Stoics were wrong. This is interesting because the Stoics advocated "living according to one's nature". As it is so natural, then how can one "will" oneself to live in a way that is predestined? This is one of the most helpful explanations of the deductive method! On flicking back through my notes, two things are noticeable. First, the race elements the Nazis picked up on (thanks to Nietzsche's sister, I believe). This is no worse than Jack London, writing not that long after Nietzsche and I encountered parts that wouldn't fit with Nazism. Second, the attitude towards women. This was written before universal suffrage, but clearly, Nietzsche was no John Stuart Mill. Indeed, Nietzsche was a critic of utilitarianism. I will finish with this quote on scholars and artists (I had heavily underlined it while reading - there is always a pencil on hand these days), one that brings together in Nietzsche's words what I felt in my "faunish" moment while listening to Alan Watts (pp. 142-3):One finds nowadays among artists and scholars plenty of those who betray by their works that a profound longing for nobleness impels them; but this very need of nobleness is radically different from the needs of the noble soul itself, and is in fact the eloquent and dangerous sign of the lack thereof. It is not the works, but the belief which is here decisive and determines the order of rank - to employ once more an old religious formula with a new and deeper meaning - it is some fundamental certainty which a noble soul has about itself, something which is not to be sought, is not to be found, and perhaps, also, is not to be lost. -The noble soul has reverence for itself. It would seem that it is "beyond good and evil".

[ajbraithwaite_1 · Rating: 1 out of 5 stars]

The passage which really summed up this book for me was "Every deep thinker is more afraid of being understood than of being misunderstood." Yep, right there. It's what annoys me about a lot of philosophy - I just want people to be able to write clearly and honestly about what they actually mean. Nietzsche's language is so dense and impenetrable (and clearly deliberately so) that it is frustrating to read. There's definitely a whiff of the emperor's new clothes about this book.And don't get me started on his views about women: "nothing is more foreign, more repugnant, or more hostile to woman than truth - her great art is falsehood, her chief concern is appearance and beauty." Oh dear, too late, I can't stop now: "When a woman has scholarly inclinations there is generally something wrong with her sexual nature. Barrenness itself conduces to a certain virility of taste..."."Comparing man and woman generally, one may say that woman would not have the genius for adornment, if she had not the instinct for the secondary role."I thought Erasmus's views were bad, but he lived four hundred years before Nietzsche. I had hoped that by the late nineteenth century 'deep thinkers' might have become more enlightened. Apparently not.

[booksontrial · Rating: 3 out of 5 stars]

With a philosopher nothing at all is impersonal.
As an armchair Platonist, I had a personal aversion to Nietzsche, whose whole purpose in life seemed to be to overthrow Platonism. After reading "Beyond Good and Evil", however, my attitude changed from aversion to pity, that is, pity in the Nietzschean sense.

To illustrate what I think of Nietzsche and his relation to Plato, let me introduce a Chinese fictional/mythical character, Sun Wukong (孙悟空), also known as the Monkey King. The Monkey King challenged the authority of the gods, stormed their dwelling, The Heavenly Palace, and proclaimed himself an equal of the gods. They appealed to the Buddha for help, after repeatedly failing to subdue the Monkey King. The Buddha made a wager with the Monkey King, who could travel 108,000 miles with one somersault, that the latter could not jump out of the former's palm. In order to prove his power, the Monkey King traveled as far as he could, and reached what he thought were the Five Pillars of Heaven. When he returned to confront the Buddha, he learned, to his chagrin, that those pillars were actually the Buddha's fingers. He lost and was imprisoned by the Buddha under a mountain for 500 years.

An attentive reader would have no difficulty guessing at my meaning: Nietzsche was the Monkey King, Plato the Buddha.

Firstly, Plato derived the notion of an eternal cyclic nature of the universe long before Nietzsche stumbled upon it and gave it a different name, "eternal recurrence". Apparently, like the Monkey King, Nietzsche was not immune to self-deception and illusions of grandeur, when he claimed that his philosophy was new and free of metaphysical presumptions.

Secondly, there is nothing new to the idea of "order of rank" either. Plato made a division of classes in his Republic. Nietzsche seems to share Plato's contempt for democracy, which is based on the assumption of equality among man. Both would assert that some men are fit to rule and others to be ruled.

Thirdly, Christianity has long inculcated the notion that suffering is necessary for the character development of human beings. Nietzsche borrowed the idea again, without acknowledging the source.

Fourthly, Nietzsche's philosophy is not grounded in biological facts, but rather, it is another subjective interpretation with assumptions and leaps. To use his own simile, the text may have disappeared under the interpretation, but it is still there, and each interpretation shall be evaluated according to its relation to the original. The philosopher can no more place himself above the standard of good and evil, than a translator can place himself above the original.

Fifthly, the ancient Greek philosophers believed that the ultimate purpose of philosophy is the attainment of the Good and the True. Nietzsche rejected the notion as utilitarian and ignoble. What noble value did he create by will to power that would set him above those philosophers he satirized? None.

[poetontheone · Rating: 4 out of 5 stars]

I think one of the key barriers to understanding Nietzsche, particularly this book and its immediate predecessor which both deal with the Ubermensch and master morality versus slave morality, is that the uninformed may go into such a book looking for some sort of dogma (as the Nazis did). Though if Nietzsche were to work in such a mode, his form would contradict his content. The most digestible aspect (though not for some, surely) of this writing are its moments of passion and poetic brilliance, alongside characteristic biting wit. Such wit abounds in the early parts of the book, where he deals mostly in polemics against prevalent views, against schools of thought and their propagators. Such style eventually drags, and then starves to death when Nietzsche begins to mock women in a rather juvenile way. It is in the end section entitled "What is Noble?" that Nietzsche's poetics flare up and the text becomes introspective, in the sense that Nietzsche begins to discuss and refer to himself, but also in the sense that in doing he may reveal certain keys to understanding the book itself. Especially, "my written and painted thoughts [...] You have already taken off your novelty, and some of you are ready, I fear, to become truths: they already look so immortal, so pathetically decent, so dull! [...] We immortalize what cannot live and fly much longer — only weary and mellow things!"In reading Nietzsche it might serve us to rely on context both historical and biographical, but even this method of interpretation, narrow as it is, may do us more harm than good. We may perhaps do best to acknowledge Nietzsche as Zarathustra made flesh in his own time and place, as an observer of the condition of man. He sees this with a terrified eye, but allows his throat to well up in Dionysian laughter at the possibilities of what the future might hold. As it stands, the outlook is dim. Such a time as now could not foster another Nietzsche, nor a complete realization of his ideal man. We remain in the muck, though some of us stand on the bridge between man and superman, with so many below us, fallen into the black pit of modernity where it is doubtful that no Goethe could stand upright.

[pingdjip · Rating: 4 out of 5 stars]

Some of my colleagues are infatuated with Nietzsche, and judging by this book it’s easy to understand why. In places it sounds considerably poststructural (I work in a literature department). It’s about complexity (“our body is, after all, only a society constructed out of many souls”, section 19), determinism and power-relations. Nietzsche considers language a constituating force (20), tightly linked to experience (268). He undertakes a typology of value systems (186), meaning to expose and to undermine them. He subordinates truth to interest and he questions the reality of oppositions: “we can doubt whether opposites even exist” (2). This was funny and familiar. But gradually I grew irritated, because of what seemed a continuous promotion of arrogance and rudenes. Please stop bullying supposedly “ill” and “degenerated” people, i thought. To make matters worse, he debunked Madame de Stael (233). I’m a fan of hers. But then my opinion swung again. He deals with the downsides of intellectual distance (chapter 6) in an intriguing way. In chapter 8 he makes broad sweeping statements about european culture, that are, if not really convincing, still interesting. Then, in the concluding chapter, he zooms in on his favorite subject, the “noble” person. Surprisingly this figure now loses its arrogant looks and adopts an almost tragic countenance, prone to self-destruction and loneliness (269-284). The writing here is very serious and passionate, and results in an embrace of Dionysos, “that great ambiguity and tempter god” (295).

[chellinsky · Rating: 5 out of 5 stars]

Over the past two days, I read Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future. I didn't know what to expect and online reviews of the book were mixed and often lacking content. Hopefully, my amateur reading of this book and accompanying review will do it service.First, I found Nietzsche very appealing–even if his ideas didn't always mesh well with mine. His directly anti-exceptionalist approach agreed with what I believe to be wrong with much of our discourse (in politics, philosophy, etc.). Additionally, his sarcastic, blunt, and provocative style is useful and aids his attempt to discredit existing trends of thought. However, using this tactic also limits his eventual ability to create the "new generation's" philosophy that he describes. When does the sarcasm end and non-cynical pontificating begin?Nonetheless, the book is worthwhile in the same sense that Dylan's music and Kerouac's writing are. Reading Nietzsche for the first time was like reading Kerouac or listening to Dylan for the first time. It added to my understanding about human thought and revealed some of the underlying assumptions that permeate Western existence. Doors have been opened for me by Nietzsche.