Illustrated History of the Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202

By Norbert Számvéber

The Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202 was one of the most successful German assault gun units in the Second World War. It had been deployed exclusively on the Eastern Front against the Red Army between 1941 and 1945. The StuGs of this unit were very effective AFVs on the battlefield in the role of heavy weapons for infantry fire support and also as mobile antitank firepower. Dr. Norbert Számvéber, author of Waffen-SS Armour in Normandy and Days of Battle, presents a detailed combat history of this unit, primarily based on archival sources. The book includes a significant number of rare photographs and several maps.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Peko Publishing
• Release date: May 24, 2016
• ISBN: 9786155583056

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© PeKo Publishing Kft.

PUBLISHED BY

PeKo Publishing Kft.

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AUTHOR

Norbert Számvéber

Edited by Derik Hammond

Translated by Tímea Tóthné Vágó

Color plates designed by Felipe Rodna

Cover designed by Ádám Nagy (www.nadam.hu)

Photos: Péter Kocsis, Thomas Anderson, Archive of Modern Conflict

FIRST PUBLISHED

2016

ISBN: 978-615-80072-6-9

PDF ISBN: 978-615-55830-3-2

EPUB ISBN: 978-615-55830-5-6

PRC ISBN: 978-615-55830-4-9

All rights reserved.

No parts of this publication may be reproduced, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the Publisher in writing.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Armoured Support for the German Infantry

PART I

IN HEERESGRUPPE MITTE

CHAPTER 1

In the sector of the German 4. Armee near Moscow

CHAPTER 2

In the Sector of the German 2. Panzerarmee, in the area of Orel, Tula and Bolchow 1941

In the sector of the German 3. Panzerarmee near Wjasma.

CHAPTER 3

In the sector of the German 9. Armee in the area of Rschew

CHAPTER 4

Divided

The 2. and 3. Batterie/Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202 were in the sector of the 2. Armee, in the area of Kursk and Ssumy

PART II

IN HEERESGRUPPE SÜD

CHAPTER 5

In the sector of the German 4. Panzerarmee from Ssumy to the Dnieper river

CHAPTER 6

In the sector of the German 1. Panzerarmee in the area of Korsun-Shevchenkovsky

CHAPTER 7

In the sector of the 8. Armee from Uman to the withdrawal

PART III

IN HEERESGRUPPE NORD

CHAPTER 8

In the sector of the German 16. Armee in the Baltic area

SUMMARY

APPENDIX 1

APPENDIX 2

APPENDIX 3

APPENDIX 4

APPENDIX 5

APPENDIX 6

APPENDIX 7

MAPS AND DOCUMENTS

PHOTOS

COLOR PLATES

Seventy years after the end of World War Two there are still many issues of historical interest that have not been researched and described in sufficient detail.

When the managing director of Peko Publishing House called upon me to write the detailed combat history of one of the most successful German assault gun units in World War II, Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202, I suddenly found myself in a difficult situation. To the best of my knowledge, no detailed history has ever been penned about this outstanding unit which destroyed more than 1,000 confirmed Soviet AFVs (armoured fighting vehicles) during the savage war fought in the eastern theatre. Only a generalized overview of its outstanding achievements is available in excerpts of war diaries (long out-of-print) written by veterans who served in the unit and in some excellent general works on the German assault artillery.

Moreover, I unfortunately had to face the fact that some of the German divisions that, according to evidence in archival documents, owed much to this assault gun-unit often forgot to mention its name and accomplishments in their own formal histories. The lack of contemporary sources must have played a great part in this.

To my best knowledge, Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202’s own records have not survived the hell of war. So, without any guide, my work was exactly like a criminal investigation: each and every ‘suspicious’ archival and bibliographical source had to be collected and examined minutely for details concerning this unit. I wouldn’t say that I found all traceable sources, nor that my work is a perfect unit history of Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202. However, I did my best to write the combat history of the third most decorated assault gun unit in the German land forces in the most detailed way. So if you, dear reader, have any archival record, document or photo relating to this unit or can correct any shortcoming in the content of this work, I would be interested to hear from you through the publisher’s e-mail-address so that any new information might be included in a new, extended edition of the history of this outstanding formation.

In the course of my work I received invaluable help from my friends Péter Barnaky, Péter Kocsis and Mátyás Pánczél. Mr Thomas Anderson helped me in a way he may not know about. Thank you all! But as always my greatest gratitude goes to my wife and my two sons, who endured, smiling, all that went with this work.

Budapest, in May, 2015

The author

INTRODUCTION

ARMOURED SUPPORT FOR THE GERMAN INFANTRY

During World War I, the attacking infantry – within the last one-or-two hundred metres from the enemy trenches – always found themselves facing the fire of machine guns and other firearms that survived friendly preparatory fire, as well as the resistance of the remaining elements of fortification. For this reason the Germans developed a light 3.7 cm gun that, moving forward in the infantry’s order of battle, could knock out remaining defensive elements by direct fire, clearing the way towards the enemy’s positions. A new infantry arm of service was formed around this weapon: assault troops heavily equipped with hand grenades. The combination worked perfectly well.

However, the manually portable gun proved too clumsy in the field and its crew was exposed to the defensive fire. Because of this emerged the idea of the mechanically propelled (self-propelled) gun carriage which, with the realization of the necessity for anti-tank defence, soon appeared on the battlefield.

Refreshing the concept of the accompanying artillery piece, the Germans mounted a 7.7 cm field gun on a tracked towing vehicle and put it to service with the Reichswehr. However, its 50 hp engine was not powerful enough to propel the 6.8-ton vehicle. Later they tried to ‘crossbreed’ a 7.5 cm field gun with a 100 hp chassis, but it wasn’t accepted for use either. Finally, in 1932 Germans ceased experimenting with self-propelled accompanying guns.

In 1935, Erich von Manstein – who was a colonel at that point in time – raised the issue of the need for mechanized accompanying guns. The well-known term of the ‘assault artillery’ (Sturmartillerie) originated with him, though the word itself is not a German ‘invention’. In World War I, the French referred to heavy tanks employed to support their infantry as l’artillerie d’assaut. A year later Manstein worked out the principles of its employment. German ground forces backed the idea and, on 15 June 1936, they commissioned the development of a prototype assault gun.

Developed as a self-propelled ‘accompanying gun’ for the infantry, and manufactured with a short barrelled (L/24) 7.5 cm main armament that was very effective against personnel and field fortifications, the StuG. III assault gun was first employed in May 1940, during the western campaign. At that time the six-gun battery was the largest formation of these weapons. Eighteen combat vehicles were deployed in three batteries then, in mid-June, a fourth battery joined them with an additional six assault guns. In 1941, three assault gun battalions (each with three batteries of six guns) participated in the Balkans Campaign. Until 1943, German assault artillerymen were trained at Jüterbog near Berlin with Artillerie-Lehr-Regiment 2 (mot.). After that, work continued at Burg, near Magdeburg, at the so called assault-gun school.

Between 1940 and 1942, 826 StuG. IIIs were produced. These were equipped with the short-barrelled, 7.5 cm main gun (Kampfwagenkanone 37 L/24). However, to achieve a more effective anti-tank defence – due to the mass appearance of modern Soviet tanks – these assault vehicles were subsequently equipped with longer barrelled 7.5 cm guns (L/43s then L/48s) with higher armour penetration capabilities that enabled them to operate as self-propelled anti-tank reserves in combat focal points.

When Germany attacked the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, its Heer (army) had 11 assault gun battalions and seven independent assault gun batteries. The assault gun units (each subordinated to a corps) effectively supported the German infantry during attacks, counterattacks and in defence but mostly provided ‘back up’ against the Soviet AFVs that usually appeared in superior numbers. Orders were issued to set up the staff of Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202 on 29 August 1941. On 10 September 1941, the staff of Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202 was formed at Jüterbog (Wehrkreis III) with three assault-gun batteries under its command.¹ The replacement unit became Sturmgeschütz-Ersatz-Abteilung 200² when it was relocated to Schweinfurt (Wehrkreis VIII).

Seven StuG. III assault guns made up a battery each of which consisted of the assault gun of the battery commander and six other guns divided equally into three platoons. Battalions were equipped with three batteries giving them a total complement of 21 assault guns. The battalion commanders led their assault guns from half-track armoured vehicles.

The period of time between raising the unit and its arrival in the theatre was unusually short (just three weeks) and it is therefore it is highly probable that the personnel of these units were assembled from officers, NCOs and enlisted men who had already undergone training as assault artillery troops. Consequently, after their transfer to Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202, there wasn’t a lot more to be done in terms of training until their departure for the front line apart from developing team spirit and familiarising themselves with their vehicles by conducting exercises in different formations and practising live-fire manoeuvres.

In September 1941, units of the German Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Centre) fighting in the area of Smolensk were significantly reinforced before the launch of Operation ‘Typhoon’ against Moscow in early October 1941. The assigned forces were rested and losses in equipment partly replaced. Infantry divisions with reduced strength were reinforced with heavy artillery and assault artillery guns. One of Wehrmacht’s youngest assault artillery units, Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202, was ordered to join the attack without delay.

1 The staff battery of Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202 was set up on 20 September 1941.

2 It was changed on 1 May 1942. From then on, Sturmgeschütz-Ersatz-Abteilung 300, located in Neisse, was tasked with the replacement of personnel.

PART I

IN HEERESGRUPPE MITTE

CHAPTER 1

IN THE SECTOR OF THE GERMAN 4. ARMEE NEAR MOSCOW

1941

Operational Background

Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202 was introduced under the command of the 4. Armee into the sector of Heeresgruppe Mitte. It fought in the area south-west of Wjasma in October 1941 for the first time during Operation ‘Typhoon’.

16 SEPTEMBER 1941

The German Armeeoberkommando 4 informed the staff of IX. Armeekorps that transportation of Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202 was to begin on 20 September 1941 and ordered it move from Jüterbog to Smolensk where it would be temporarily subordinated to the IX. Armeekorps.³

19 SEPTEMBER 1941

The headquarters of the IX. Armeekorps issued orders according to which the infantry divisions would receive support from the arriving assault gun battalion. Two-thirds of the unit were assigned to 183. Infanterie-Division, but one battery was put under the corps’ direct command.⁴

20 SEPTEMBER 1941

Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202 came under the command of IX. Armeekorps.⁵

22 SEPTEMBER 1941

The staff of the IX. Armeekorps planned to subordinate the whole of Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202, which presumably began arriving from 25 September, to the 183. Infanterie-Division.⁶

26 SEPTEMBER 1941

The IX. Armeekorps drew up plans for the deployment of the assault artillery battalion. According to the order of battle, which came into effect on 28 September, one assault gun battery would be attached to each of the 263. and 292. Infanterie Divisionen with the battalion staff and the remaining battery remaining subordinated to 183. Infanterie-Division.⁷

27 SEPTEMBER 1941

At 1120 hours⁸ the staff of IX. Armeekorps informed the 4. Armee by telegram that the promised Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202 (along with other army units) still hadn’t arrived. However, the battalion commander reported to the corps that the transport of his unit was in progress.⁹

29 SEPTEMBER 1941

At 2202 hours, the IX. Armeekorps reported to the staff of the 4. Armee that Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202 had arrived in the sector of the corps.¹⁰

30 SEPTEMBER 1941

The batteries of the assault gun battalion finally arrived at the infantry divisions of IX. Armeekorps.¹¹ On the same day the 263. Infanterie-Division issued orders for its own attack across the Ustrom River at 0630 hours on 3 October as part of Operation ‘Typhoon’. According to this plan, its most important task was to contain the Soviet troops in positions facing them.

During the attack, the division’s reinforced Infanterie-Regiment 483 would advance to Hill 247.6 and Hill 260.7 north-west of Sadki, jumping off from the area of Mal. Tischowo North–Bossjawo public bridge in an easterly direction then turning northwards, together with the 2. Batterie/Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202, III. Bataillon and the regimental pioneer platoon of Infanterie-Regiment 463, 1. Kompanie/Pionier-Bataillon 263, and the 1. Kompanie/Panzerjäger-Abteilung 263. The hill was to be reached by the group in one phase by taking advantage of terrain thickly overgrown with mountain pines.¹²

The staff and 1. Batterie of the assault gun battalion waited for the order to launch the offensive operation under the command of Infanterie-division 183 while 3. Batterie was subordinated to Infanterie-Division 292.¹³

Infanterie Division 292 had already been advised of the detailed plan of the imminent offensive in a divisional order the day before, on 29 September. According to this, most of the 3. Batterie/Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202 was subordinated to Infanterie-Regiment 508 and one section of the battery was put under the command of Infanterie-Regiment 507. The plan was for the assault gun battery to be brought forward across a bridge that would be built at Oserensk.¹⁴

1 OCTOBER 1941

According to an oral report submitted at 0650 hours by the adjutant of the assault gun Abteilung, the staff battery and the maintenance squad were stationed in the area of Metwedewa from 1300 hours. The advance message centre (Meldekopf) was set up at Rukino, in the corps’ ammunition dump. In the evening the command post of Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202 was located near the command post of Infanterie-Division 183 in the western part of Berniki.¹⁵

3 OCTOBER 1941

At 0500 hours, the four divisions of IX. Armeekorps¹⁶ launched their attack. The three infantry divisions (a total of nine battalions in the first echelon) attacking in the main direction along the 10 km frontline were supported by 50 artillery batteries and Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202.¹⁷

At night the assault guns were drawn forward to their jump-off positions so that they could participate in the attack in the area of Wjasma. The batteries of Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202 assigned to the infantry divisions received orders to attack at daybreak. The AFVs rolled forward to open the way for the German infantry through the Soviet defence. However, in the sector of the 1. Batterie, which was subordinated to 183. Infanterie-Division, the German attack collapsed in an hour. By that time six out of the seven assault guns had struck mines and been had been disabled. None of the AFVs were destroyed, but their tracks and suspensions were damaged. Oberleutnant Hans-Gerhard Maurischat, platoon leader of 1. Batterie, left to bring forward towing vehicles to rescue the immobilized assault guns, but disappeared in the area of Nowo Tischowo without a trace. Despite a thorough search, he was never found.¹⁸

By around noon, only one assault gun remained operational. Its commander was Leutnant Heise. However, by then the AFV had almost used up its ammunition. When the assault gun turned to collect more ammunition, a Soviet anti-tank gun fired on it from the edge of a nearby forest. The German assault gun then fired on the supposed Russian firing position with its last three shells which had been reserved to meet any unforeseen contingency. However the attempt failed: neither Heise (the commander of the assault gun) nor Unteroffizier Barth (the gunner), was able to spot the Soviet anti-tank gun. After a half-turn, the German assault gun started back on its quest to rearm but at that moment it was hit by a Russian shell that struck its armour with a deafening crash. The StuG was able to make it to a depression where nonetheless it became disabled. The Soviet anti-tank shell had damaged one of its road wheels and its track, which luckily for the crew only became detached after they had reached cover.

The first action of the other two batteries was equally unsuccessful. For example, the 2. Batterie lost its commander and his entire crew, all of whom were killed by a direct hit.¹⁹

The assault guns of Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202 had failed to provide the required support for the infantry. The attack was described in the war diary of the 292. Infanterie-Division:

The attack is launched at 0530 hours. The infantry attacks with a great dash – the artillery fire is accurate. The attack is making progress despite the very stubborn resistance and the well-directed, violent Russian artillery fire, even though most of the assault guns strike mines or get stuck.²⁰

4 OCTOBER 1941

Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202 had only four combat-ready assault guns left. These came under the command of Leutnant Heise, who was given the task of conducting reconnaissance with Radfahr-Schwadron 219 (219 Bicycle Squadron) of the 183. Infanterie-Division towards the division fighting on their left flank because a gap had opened up between them. The leader of the bicycle-squadron was Rittmeister Hans-Hermann Sachenbacher. Leutnant Heise recalled the action:

We fought our way forward a couple of hundred metres to high ground from where a wide view opened up. We recognised at once that this wasn’t a ‘no man’s land’ anymore. Russians were lying everywhere in the surrounding cornfields, masterfully camouflaged. It was extremely difficult to identify their machine-gun nests, not to mention their nasty mortars, which were impossible to hit most of the time. While we were busy cleaning up our immediate surroundings with fire, I received a radio message from Leutnant Sch., leader of the Second Platoon. He reported that the other assault gun had slipped into a Soviet trench along the total length of one of its tracks. The hull was trapped on the edge of the trench. Since I was fully aware of the difficulties of the required towing operation, I radioed him to wait till I could come to his aid. Because Rittmeister Sachenbacher had just informed me that he considered the mission accomplished and was pulling back his men, I asked him to stay and provide fire support for us while we recovered the stuck assault gun. Obviously he was not able to inform his men about this, because when I looked back shortly afterwards, I only saw the last helmets of his infantry disappearing far in the rear behind us.

Meanwhile Leutnant Sch. tried to tow out the assault gun with his own vehicle, but it too was trapped – just like the other one – two metres behind it. Neglecting our own defence I then had to pull out Leutnant Sch.’s gun with my second gun. The enemy fired at us with infantry weapons. We suffered casualties. When at last Leutnant Sch. broke free, he provided fire support for us with his gun. The group returned with the sad balance of several dead from this mission, at the end of which my own gun struck a mine, too!²¹

5 OCTOBER 1941

At 0700 hours two infantry regiments (Infanterie-Regimente 507 and 508) of the 292. Infanterie-Division received two assault guns each (supposedly repaired during the night) from 3. Batterie/Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202 for the attack planned to be launched in the morning across the area of Jelnja in a northeasterly direction.²²

Infanterie-Regiment 508 advanced with two StuG. III assault guns. The regiment encountered minimal resistance and were soon fighting 1.5 km north-east of Leonidow. At the same time Infanterie-Regiment 507 and two of its assault guns met considerable Soviet resistance in the area of Leonowo on Hill 236.1. The Hill was eventually taken at around 1400 hours because the ‘Russians had to be smitten one by one in their foxholes’.²³

German pioneers cleared passages through a minefield allowing the assault guns from the 1. Batterie/Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202, together with elements of 183. Infanterie-Division to reach the railway north Jelnja. During this action, the German AFVs participated mainly in fighting down Soviet artillery batteries that had presented difficulties not only for the infantry but for the assault guns as well.

6 OCTOBER 1941

The 1. Batterie of the assault gun battalion could deploy only two of its StuG. IIIs. Under the command of Leutnant Heise and Leutnant Pickert, they set off to seize Dorogobusch 30 km east of their position together with an advance detachment of the 183. Infanterie-Division.

Following preparation by the 21 cm mortars of Schwere Artillerie Bataillon 833 (833 Heavy Artillery Battalion), elements of 292. Infanterie-Division took Jelnja at 0845 hours. If the 3. Batterie/Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202 still had combat-ready assault guns they too might have participated in capturing the town.²⁴

7 OCTOBER 1941

Following the two assault guns of Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202, an advance detachment of 183. Infanterie-Division (Rittmeister Sachenbacher’s bicycle squadron), pressed forward, passing through a number of Soviet settlements without significant contact with the enemy. During their advance they encountered Soviet supply columns which they fired on and destroyed.

As the Germans pushed forward, 20 aircraft appeared in the sky above a settlement. Luckily for the German ground troops these were Ju 87 ‘Stuka’ dive bombers. Having evidently seen the unfolded marking panels on the German assault vehicles they swung around in a wide circle before flying further to the east.

The two StuG. III assault guns were only 800 m from Dorogobusch when Leutnant Heise looked through his periscope binoculars and saw vehicles and throngs of enemy soldiers milling around in front of the settlement and a significant Soviet force retreating towards the town. However, the bicycle riflemen of the German advance infantry detachment had dropped behind leaving the assault guns without infantry support.

At around 1400 hours, the advance detachment of 183. Infanterie-Division with the two assault guns of the 1. Batterie at their head, broke into Dorogobusch before the main forces of IX. Armeekorps and, during continuous action, established a bridgehead on the north bank of the Dnieper. This bridgehead was successfully defended together with two bridges that had been captured intact despite the fact that Soviet troops were still fighting in the settlement (until the next morning).²⁵ Leutnant Heise wrote the following about the fighting:

My first thought was that I start at full throttle and take the entrance to the settlement by surprise. At that moment my loader reported: ‘Herr Leutnant! We have almost no ammunition left!’ I stopped to discuss the situation with my friend, Pickert, who stayed right behind me. The ammunition situation was no better with him. We had 20 shells altogether so a private action would have been too risky.

Meanwhile the Soviets had noticed us. The enemy set up an anti-aircraft battery at the entrance of the place in a hurry, and its guns were aimed at us. Using up some of our valuable shells we destroyed the battery while it was still unlimbering.

It soon it became clear to me that we had to exploit the confusion among the Russians. We had to dash forward or else the enemy would complete the establishment of its defensive position and our advance detachment would be too weak to breach that.

Following a brief check with my driver, Wachtmeister Frenzel, we headed for the settlement at full throttle behind an enemy column that turned away to the right, inside the locality. All at once indescribable confusion broke out. Russians were swarming around us, lurking behind house walls and hedges. I saw frightened faces but also fists grasping Molotov cocktails. It was clear to me that we mustn’t stop for a moment. If the Russians found out that we were all by ourselves, we would be dead meat.

We fired our few remaining shells into the column ahead of us at point-blank range. That must have been a terrible shock to the enemy because they didn’t even attempt to knock out Pickert’s vehicle or my own, or shoot at us, as we stood in our the open entrance hatches.

Clanking and crashing, literally shooting our way clear, our two assault guns drove through the rubble. The street was more or less clear. It was then that I noticed a side road turning at right angles towards a valley and directly towards a long timber bridge. It had to be the bridge over the Dnieper, the upper reaches of which flowed through Dorogobusch. I abruptly turned in that direction because we needed to take that bridge while it was still undamaged!

A guard stood in the middle of the 100 m long bridge. Our shell – the last one, according to the report of the loader – swept him away. With butterflies in our stomachs we dashed across the bridge. Then we found ourselves alone, on the opposite bank of the Dnieper, discussing what to do. Meanwhile Leutnant Pickert had driven straight on. Obviously he hadn’t noticed when we had turned.

Now we were attracting the fire of the Soviet infantry. Then we saw the enemy closing on us from the opposite bank of the river. ‘Get the submachine guns out – one for the loader and the other for me!’ I yelled.

We opened fire but both guns failed to feed after the first shots. They were covered with sand and had jammed. The same thing happened to my P08 pistol. Then a dozen egg-grenades came to our rescue. This is how we used them: we stuck our head out of the entrance hatch for a moment, then pulled it back; the enemy shot at us revealing his position. We threw the grenades in their direction, and gained a moment’s peace.

The whole thing lasted for about 10 minutes, but for us it seemed an eternity. We could hardly wait for the bicycle riflemen to arrive. Before they showed up, a low-silhouetted vehicle appeared on the opposite bank of the Dnieper and raced across the bridge towards us at breakneck speed. We didn’t believe our eyes – it was our ammunition vehicle. The driver had calculated that we must have run out of ammunition. Luckily enough they had been able to push their way through the Russian units despite their absurdly soft-shelled vehicle.

As we stacked our ammunition, we could hear the din of bicycle riflemen arriving at the entrance to the settlement, and see Pickert’s gun. He had found us at last. He drove across the bridge and picked up his ammunition. After this we established radio-contact with Rittmeister Sachenbacher. The cyclists reached us and with this, Dorogobusch was ours.

Towards evening, the Russians tried once again to recapture Dorogobusch with artillery support. By the light of the burning houses the struggle for the town continued. By dawn, 7 October [correctly: 8 October (Author)], the settlement was securely in our hands. For capturing Dorogobusch Rittmeister Sachenbacher was awarded the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross. The crews of the assault guns were decorated with Iron Cross 1 Class.²⁶

8/9 OCTOBER 1941

Elements of Infanterie-Regiment 509 were drawn into a savage woodland battle by the Soviet troops south of Potschinok in the sector of Infanterie-Division 292. The hard-pressed infantry were pulled out of the hole by the assault guns of the 3. Batterie/Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202. Nevertheless, Soviet soldiers put up strenuous opposition, and fought skilfully.²⁷

On 9 October, the staff of the IX. Armeekorps decided – based on the battle order that was about to come into force the following day – that the whole of Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202 would operate under the command of 137. Infanterie-Division.²⁸ The reason for this was that as from 10 October the 183. Infanterie-Division would be detached from the corps and although the assault gun battalion had been supplied through the latter division till 11 October, from 12 October it was assigned to 137. Infanterie-Division.²⁹

During its attack covering the period 3 to 9 October 1941, the IX. Armeekorps clashed with elements of a total of 13 Soviet divisions. In the course of the fighting the forces of the German corps – besides others – took 20,908 prisoners and destroyed or captured 108 various guns and five AFVs. The Soviet AFVs fought exclusively in the sector of the 183. Infanterie-Division.³⁰

12 OCTOBER 1941

The Quartermaster General of the German Land Forces (Heer) issued a general order that applied to every assault gun unit in relation to requests for additional assault guns. According to this order, the growing need for assault guns could only be partially covered by AFVs from the production lines and from repair. In such circumstances, the Quartermaster General emphasized again the importance of the recovery of assault guns knocked out or broken down, as well as their transport to the army tank equipment depot at Magdeburg–Königsborn, because the ability to provide additional vehicles decisively depended on this. Requests for the supply of assault guns had to be submitted to the Quartermaster General of the Heer in two copies that included the following content:

The chassis number of the assault gun damaged or knocked out.

The location of the assault gun damaged or knocked out (a sketch-map was requested in the case of unrecovered AFVs and in the case of recovered vehicles the location of the unit accommodating them).

For assault guns already transported to the rear area, the place and time of their dispatch and the number transported.³¹

15 OCTOBER 1941

From noon, the assault gun battalion should have been allocated to the 268. Infanterie-Division, subordinated to IX. Armeekorps, but it didn’t come to that.³² Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202 was relieved from its assignment with IX. Armeekorps that morning and dispatched to the sector of the German Panzerarmeekommando 2 together with other independent artillery units. The forces were to reach the area of Karatschew (40 km south-east of Brjansk) as soon as possible, following the Spass-Djemenskoje–Kirow–Brjansk route prescribed for them.³³

3 National Archives and Records Administration (Washington). Henceforward: NARA. T314, R406 (IX. Armeekorps), F000346.

4 NARA T315, R1416 (137. Infanterie-Division), F000264.

5 NARA T314, R409 (IX. Armeekorps), F000022.

6 NARA T315, R1416 (137. Infanterie-Division), F000329.

7 NARA T315, R1416 (137. Infanterie-Division), F000386.

8 Unless otherwise indicated, times and dates quoted according to the German documents are given in Berlin time and not in local time.

9 NARA T314, R406 (IX. Armeekorps), F000792.

10 NARA T312, R147 (Armeeoberkommando 4), 7686891.

11 NARA T314 R407 (IX. Armeekorps), F000482.

12 NARA T315, R1416 (137. Infanterie-Division), F000449.

13 NARA T315, R1416 (137. Infanterie-Division), F000458.

14 NARA T315, R1919 (292. Infanterie-Division), F000156.

15 NARA T314, R407 (IX. Armeekorps), F000482.

16 The forth division of IX. Armeekorps, 137. Infanterie-Division didn’t receive any assault guns.

17 NARA T315, R1923 (292. Infanterie-Division), F000592.

18 Kurowski, Franz – Tornau, Gottfried: Sturmgeschütze – Die Panzer der Infanterie. Würzburg, 2008. p. 76. The authors of the book cover the battles of Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202 fought in October 1941 with a day’s delay, compared to the data of contemporary operational documents. It has been corrected in the present text.

19 Kurowski, Franz – Tornau, Gottfried: Sturmgeschütze – Die Panzer der Infanterie. Würzburg, 2008. p. 76.

20 NARA T315, R1918 (292. Infanterie-Division), Kriegstagebuch Ia vom 3. Okt. 1941.

21 Kurowski, Franz – Tornau, Gottfried: Sturmgeschütze – Die Panzer der Infanterie. Würzburg, 2008. p. 77.

22 NARA T315, R1919 (292. Infanterie-Division), F000163-164.

23 NARA T315, R1918 (292. Infanterie-Division), Kriegstagebuch Ia vom 5. Okt. 1941.

24 NARA T315, R1923 (292. Infanterie-Division), F000592.

25 NARA T315, R1923 (292. Infanterie-Division), F000593.

26 Kurowski, Franz – Tornau, Gottfried: Sturmgeschütze – Die Panzer der Infanterie. Würzburg, 2008. pp. 77-78.

27 NARA T315, R1918 (292. Infanterie-Division), Kriegstagebuch Ia vom 8. Okt. 1941.

28 NARA T315, R1416 (137. Infanterie-Division), F000642.

29 NARA T314, R409 (IX. Armeekorps), F000423.

30 NARA T315, R1923 (292. Infanterie-Division), F000593.

31 NARA T314, R409 (IX. Armeekorps), F000443.

32 NARA T314, R409 (IX. Armeekorps), F000602-604.

33 NARA T314, R406 (IX. Armeekorps),