Florida and the Mariel Boatlift of 1980: The First Twenty Days

By Kathleen Dupes Hawk, Ron Villella, Adolfo Leyva de Varona and Bob Graham

Winner of the Florida Historical Society's 2015 Stetson Kennedy Award

The 1980 Mariel Boatlift was a profound episode in twentieth-century American history, impacting not just Florida, but the entire country. During the first twenty days of the boatlift, with little support from the federal government, the state of Florida coordinated and responded to the sudden arrival in Key West of more than thirty thousand Cuban refugees, the first wave of immigrants who became known as “Marielitos.”
 
Kathleen Dupes Hawk, Ron Villella, Adolfo Leyva de Varona, and Kristen Cifers combine the insights of expert observers with the experiences of actual participants. The authors organize and present a wealth of primary sources, first-hand accounts, archival research, government records, and interviews with policy-makers, volunteers, and refugees that bring into focus the many far-reaching human, political, and cultural outcomes of the Mariel Boatlift that continue to influence Florida, the United States, and Cuba today.
 
Emerging from these key records and accounts is a grand narrative of high human drama. Castro’s haphazard and temporary opening of Cuba spurred many thousands of Cubans to depart in calamitously rushed, unprepared, and dangerous conditions. The book tells the stories of these Cuban citizens, most legitimately seeking political asylum but also including subversive agents, convicted criminals, and the mentally ill, who began arriving in the US beginning in April 1980. It also recounts how local and state agencies and private volunteers with few directives or resources were left to improvise ways to provide the Marielitos food, shelter, and security as well as transportation away from Key West.
 
The book provides a definitive account of the political, legal, and administrative twists on the local, state, and federal levels in response to the crisis as well as of the often-dysfunctional attempts at collaboration between governmental and private institutions. Vivid and readable, Florida and the Mariel Boatlift of 1980 presents the significant details that illuminate and humanize this complex humanitarian, political, and logistical crisis. 

• Language: English
• Publisher: University Alabama Press
• Release date: Jul 30, 2014
• ISBN: 9780817387686

Book preview

FLORIDA AND THE MARIEL BOATLIFT OF 1980

FLORIDA AND THE MARIEL BOATLIFT OF 1980

The First Twenty Days

By Kate Dupes Hawk, Ron Villella, and Adolfo Leyva de Varona, with Kristen Cifers

The University of Alabama Press

Tuscaloosa

Copyright © 2014

The University of Alabama Press

Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35487–0380

All rights reserved

Manufactured in the United States of America

Typeface: Minion and Futura

Cover photograph: Boat from Philadelphia arriving at dock with refugees; courtesy of Arturo Cobo

Cover design: Mary Elizabeth Watson

∞

The paper on which this book is printed meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48–1984.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Hawk, Kate Dupes, 1941–

Florida and the Mariel Boatlift of 1980 : the first twenty days / by Kate Dupes Hawk, Ron Villella, and Adolfo Leyva de Varona, with Kristen Cifers.

    pages cm

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-8173-1837-6 (cloth : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-8173-8768-6 (e book)

1. Mariel Boatlift, 1980. 2. Cubans—Florida—History—20th century. 3. Refugees—Florida—History—20th century. 4. Emergency management—Florida. 5. Disaster relief—Florida. 6. Interagency coordination—United States. 7. United States—Foreign relations—Cuba. 8. Cuba—Foreign relations—United States. I. Villella, Ron, 1943– II. Leyva de Varona, Adolfo. III. Cifers, Kristen. IV. Title.

E184.C97H385 2014

327.7307291ʹ09048—dc23

2014000504

This book is dedicated to all those who left Mariel Harbor, Cuba, in the Spring of 1980 and risked transit on crowded boats in unpredictable weather. They left behind all they knew in the pursuit of freedom and the opportunity to pursue their dreams. It is also dedicated to the American spirit of the first-responders who received them and cared for them because it was the right thing to do.

Contents

Foreword by Senator Bob Graham

Preface

Acknowledgments

Part I

Castro's Anti-American Obsession

1 - The Origins of Castro and the Cuban Revolution

2 - Cuba's International Conflicts and Communist Regime

3 - A Shift in Revolutionary Target and Rapprochement

4 - The Events That Led to the Mariel Boatlift

Part II

The First Days

5 - Monday, April 21, 1980—The Beginning of the End

6 - Tuesday, April 22—Decision Making Adrift

7 - Wednesday, April 23—Systems a Go

8 - Thursday, April 24—White House Complexity and Confusion

9 - Friday, April 25—Miami to Mariel

10 - Saturday, April 26—And the Boatlift Is On

11 - Sunday, April 27—The Hand of God

12 - Monday, April 28—The Feds Are Coming, the Feds Are Coming

13 - Tuesday, April 29—A Momentary Honeymoon

14 - Wednesday, April 30—Agency Games Begin

15 - Thursday, May 1—The Sublime and the Ridiculous

16 - Friday, May 2—Assessment, Assessment

17 - Saturday, May 3—Chaos to Confusion

18 - Sunday, May 4—One Potato, Two Potato

19 - Monday, May 5—All the Ships at Sea

20 - Tuesday, May 6—The Mixed Blessing

21 - Wednesday, May 7—Marines, Winn-Dixie, and Bologna

22 - Thursday, May 8—The Witching Hour

23 - Friday, May 9—Checkmate

24 - Saturday, May 10—Yet Another Try

25 - May 1980 and Beyond—The End of the First Wave

Part III

Mariel—The Legacy

26 - The Mariel Boatlift's Impacts

27 - Indictments, Threats, and Retrospections

Epilogue

Postscript

Appendix A. List of People Involved

Appendix B. Organizational Abbreviations

Appendix C. Minutes of Meetings of ICAP with Wayne Smith and the Committee of 75

Notes

References

Index

Illustrations

Foreword

As I reflect on my 41 years of public service, some of the most poignant memories involve the Mariel Boatlift of 1980. I was pleased and flattered when Ron and Kate asked me to contribute some of my memories to this volume.

At the start of the twentieth century, Florida was a lightly populated state with a primarily agricultural economy. When I am asked to identify the factors that transformed Florida into one of the most populated and economically diverse states by the end of the century, I typically cite five factors: air conditioning, mosquito control, the jet airplane, Social Security, and Fidel Castro. The final factor, Castro's rise to power in Cuba, was a tragic development for the Cuban people and the cause of democracy but a major influence on the growth of Florida's Hispanic community. The Mariel Boatlift is perhaps the most dramatic example of that phenomenon.

For the eighteen months prior to the Mariel Boatlift, the state of Florida, particularly Monroe, [Miami-] Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties, had experienced a number of disasters and emergencies. At the time of the boatlift, these counties were still reeling from floods, fuel and water shortages, and the aftermath of Hurricane David—problems that placed a serious strain on local government resources. These counties could ill afford another set of challenges, but as we now know, they were the hardest hit in the boatlift, with the burden of housing, feeding, processing, and relocating the first wave of refugees.

While the public was incensed that the White House did not act quickly to stem the flow of refugees, President Jimmy Carter was faced with competing national priorities—primarily, the 53 Americans held hostage in Iran. Two weeks before the start of the boatlift, on April 7, the United States broke diplomatic relations with Iran. By April 11, a decision was made to proceed with a hostage rescue mission. In late April, that mission, code named Operation Eagle Claw, failed tragically in the Iranian desert at a cost of eight American servicemen. Cyrus Vance resigned as secretary of state in protest of the decision to take military action. For the Carter administration, the Mariel Boatlift could not have come at a worse time. As a result, state and local governments played a uniquely prominent role in a major U.S. foreign policy crisis.

On April 21, the first two boats arrived in Key West from Mariel Harbor, and it was determined that there were at least 1,000 boats on their way to Mariel to pick up relatives. Within 20 days, approximately 30,000 refugees had arrived. By the end of August, the influx had reached 121,522, almost 1.3 percent of Cuba's population.

The Mariel Boatlift, as reported by Ron and Kate, is a compelling story that had to be told. It was history in the making and these two individuals lived it from the first moment. The story of the boatlift is complex. It is a tale of local, state, and federal officials struggling to respond to the unexpected. It has political intrigue, both in the covert activities taking place with the boatlift and in the chaos that followed. Ultimately, the boatlift is a tale of compassion—Floridians helping Cubans escape Fidel Castro's oppressive regime.

I strongly believe that our democracy works only when Americans understand and act upon their responsibilities as citizens. Many of the refugees have embraced that spirit. In the early years following the boatlift, many in South Florida feared that the Marielitos would have a negative impact on jobs, housing, and the educational system. They feared the refugees would create an unheralded crime wave and destroy the infrastructure of the community.

Reflecting on the Mariel Boatlift, we know that these fears were largely unfounded. Most of the refugees, who left everything behind to find freedom, took active roles in their new communities and helped strengthen the social and economic base, as well as enhance Florida's status as the capital of the Americas.

The people who spent those first 20 days on the front lines of history represented public service at its best. For me, it was an honor to have worked with them and to have been part of the contribution they made to our state and country. This volume is the latest extension of their contribution and helps chronicle a vital moment in Florida history.

FLORIDA GOVERNOR AND UNITED STATES SENATOR BOB GRAHAM

Preface

The 1980 Mariel Boatlift in Florida was one of the most profound events in twentieth-century United States history. It impacted not just Florida, but the entire country. During the first 20 days, with little support from the federal government, the state of Florida coordinated the arrival of approximately 30,000 Cuban refugees to the tiny town of Key West.

This book is a permanent record of the events of those 20 days. It is the story of the high human drama involving the refugees, and the actions of thousands of Americans, who, with few directives or resources, solved problems and brought comfort and security to the badly scared and frequently ill Cuban refugees. It is the story of the real refugees, spies, agents, and criminals; a story of those who went to Mariel and returned, while coping with a lack of food and medicine, little shelter, less money, and frequently uncooperative private and governmental agencies and institutions.

Many individuals involved at that period wanted this story told. They represented local, state, and federal governmental authority, as well as many private groups and organizations. They volunteered their time, money, and resources to help in the emergency. They believe the days of Mariel, and their part in them, to have been among the most important of their lives.

Ron Villella and I realized in 1990 that many of us had kept records and diaries of the unforgettable memories of what was to be the most profound time in our lives (including Senator Bob Graham, whose notable diaries were relied on for credibility during the 2009 CIA waterboarding fiasco). During an interview in 1991, in preparation for this book, Genaro Pérez, who was a double agent at the time of the Mariel Boatlift, referred to Castro as not unlike Attila the Hun. Pérez reflected, Castro is like Attila. He is a ‘mongrel.’ Wherever he goes, he destroys. He then proceeded to disclose what he classified as Plan Alpha and Plan Bravo, which constituted Castro's long-term plan for the U.S., and the role of the Mariel Boatlift in this effort.

Florida and the Mariel Boatlift of 1980: The First Twenty Days is our gift to all of those who will never forget—and to all of you so that you, too, can see behind the scenes of an event that can be described only by those who were there.

KATE DUPES HAWK AND RON VILLELLA

Acknowledgments

We, the authors, would like to acknowledge so many people who believed that the first twenty days of the Mariel Boatlift were Florida history that had never really been disclosed and that it needed to be recognized. John Burke, who with Ron Villella, was sent by then-Gov. Bob Graham to coordinate services not sanctioned by the federal government but enormously impacting the state of Florida. Then-Col. Bob Ensslin, sent by then-Maj. General Kennedy C. Bullard, Adjutant of the Florida National Guard, coordinated National Guard efforts. Arturo and Aleida Cobo volunteered their time and dedication; without them the situation would have been a disaster. Leah Rodríguez, business partner and friend of Kate Dupes Hawk, volunteered one weekend and spent the next twenty days at the request of Dr. Jim Howell, director of the Florida Department of Health, assisting with the coordination of medical services first at the old USO Building and subsequently at Truman Annex. Jack Carmody, chief of the Florida Highway Patrol, backed up the Florida National Guard. Reggie Parro and Graham Hicks provided invaluable emergency disaster preparedness at the city and county levels.

While several diaries were the basis for the book, those of Gov. Bob Graham, Maj. General Robert F. Ensslin Jr. FLANG Ret., Ron Villella, Kate Dupes Hawk, and Truman McCasland plus subsequent interviews expanded on the enormity of the event. Insight into complexity, intrigue, and espionage that was an integral dimension of the Mariel Boatlift came from interviews with Arturo Cobo, Sergio Piñón, Genaro Pérez, and José Espinola. Additional details of the event on the ground were expanded through interviews with senator Bob Graham, Bob Wilkerson, Jack Carmody, and John Burke, as well as Eugene Eidenberg, Tom Casey, and a group of national guardsmen who shared their experiences during a meeting with Maj. General Ensslin. Dr. Eugene Lyon, professor emeritus at the University of Florida, provided support during some of Kate's most difficult times, as well as translating some heretofore never published minutes of meetings between Fidel Castro, the Committee of 75, and Wayne Smith.

Doug and Kristen Cifers believed in the necessity of publishing this book. They are true heroes. This book never would have happened without them. In 1996, Doug published three articles on the Mariel Boatlift as a series in Florida Living Magazine. He always believed the story should be a book and movie. His wife, Kristen, has done all the preliminary editing and helped us rewrite what seems like a thousand times. Both of them made contact with the University of Alabama Press and coordinated prepublication activities. Mary Lou Crane worked alongside Kristen, assisting with preliminary edits/rewrites and validating references.

Perhaps the most unsung heroes are the husbands and wives of the three of us. Ron's wife, Lynne Villella, lived through the event. Instead of taking the children to Disney World, a long-planned trip, Ron went to Key West. Their daughter, Courtney Valdes, edited the first drafts of Ron's contribution. Marcela Noriega, Adolfo's wife, did all of the editing for his contribution, carefully ascertaining accuracy of information and coordinating with Kristen. Kate's husband, Tom, spent a year surrounded by mountains of paper and listening to interviews. His love, encouragement, and sense of humor afforded Kate the time to actually consolidate all the information into what was subsequently submitted to the University of Alabama Press. Kate would be remiss if she did not recognize her late husband and Florida Historian, Robert Hawk. He shared her dream, was a nightmare of a critic, and kept her focused and historically accurate.

PART I

Castro's Anti-American Obsession

1

The Origins of Castro and the Cuban Revolution

The Cuban revolutionary process that began with Fulgencio Batista's coup d’état against Cuba's constitutional president in 1952 was, at least until 1959, a popular uprising against the prototypical patriarchal Latin American dictator. Political, rather than economic and structural, factors were behind the emergence of revolutionary politics (del Águila 1984, 39).

According to a 1956 government analysis (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1956, 4), Cuba was the most heavily capitalized country in Latin America, and its networks of railways and highways blanket[ed] the country. Cuba's rates of investment and capital formation (15 to 18 percent) were often higher than those of many industrially developed countries. The rapidly expanding middle class included an impressive class of entrepreneurs, while 23 percent of the working class was classified as skilled (23). Salaried workers received 66 percent of the national income (second highest in Latin America). This was reflected in the acquisition of consumer goods, in which Cuba was virtually unmatched in Latin America. It ranked first in ownership of televisions and second in cars, telephones, and radios (Marrero 1987, 19–20). Cuba also had one of the highest nutritional standards in Latin America and comparatively high rankings in terms of social delivery, which made possible the lowest infant mortality rate (32/1,000) in the region. The island ranked third in the number of physicians, had a life expectancy of close to 60 years, and enjoyed a literacy rate of nearly 80 percent, considerably above the Latin American rate of around 50 percent (del Águila, 1984, 40). By the late 1950s, less than 40 percent of Cubans lived in the countryside or were engaged in rural activities—among the lowest averages in Latin America (Illán 1964, 33). Despite significant differences between urban and rural areas (due partly to large seasonal unemployment among sugar workers), only a very small minority of rural workers was engaged in subsistence agriculture. Moreover, Cuba did not suffer from the feudal peonage problem that was present in much of Latin America. While sugar was still pivotal in terms of exports, its participation in the overall economy had been reduced by the growth of manufacturing (25 percent of the national income in 1954) and achievements in agricultural diversification (in 1957, Cuba produced 75 percent of the food it consumed). Thus, while Cuba was still mostly a one-crop exporter (though increasingly less so), it was not a one-crop economy. All of these statistics indicate that although inequalities in the social structure and distortions affected the pattern of economic development, neither the dual society nor the classic underdevelopment models applied to Cuban society (Marrero 1987, 28).

In 1952, months before presidential elections, Batista, a candidate well behind in the polls, led a successful coup, promising to end the corruption and gang-related violence that permeated the Auténtico administrations and to hold future elections. Batista was not a newcomer to Cuban politics. He had been a major player since the days of the frustrated 1933 revolution.¹ As head of the military, Batista ruled Cuba behind weak presidents from the end of the 1933 revolution to 1940, when he allowed a constitutional convention of all Cuban political groups (including communists) to produce a surprisingly progressive constitution.² Afterward, Cuba experienced a period of constitutional rule that lasted until 1952 and included three administrations: that of Batista (1940–1944), whose coalition benefited from the broad front collaboration of the communists during World War II, and the presidential terms of President Ramón Grau (1944–1948) and Carlos Prío (1948–1952), both representing the Auténtico Party, a social democratic party representing the nationalist social democratic ideals of the 1933 revolution.

While most civil society groups and the two main parties, the Auténtico and the Ortodoxo (recently created by disillusioned Auténticos who promised to clean up Cuban politics), sought a negotiated way out for Batista after the 1952 coup, others plotted insurrection. On July 26, 1953, Fidel Castro, a relatively unknown Ortodoxo, led an unsuccessful 150-man attack on the Moncada army barracks without his party's authorization. Dozens died and Castro, although captured and sentenced to 15 years in prison, managed to obtain some national attention. The following year Batista held elections, but his control of the electoral board led his main opponent, Dr. Grau San Martín, to withdraw, and Batista became president with 50 percent voter abstention. In 1955, a committee of civic leaders sought new elections through a civic dialogue, but Batista refused to participate. Later that year, university students created the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (Student Revolutionary Directorate), which became the leading urban organization fighting the regime. Meanwhile, Castro, favored by a general amnesty in 1955, left for Mexico to organize the 26th of July Movement organization (M-26-7) and a guerrilla campaign.

Only 12 out of 81 men survived Castro's landing in Cuba in late 1956, but government reports of his death backfired when New York Times reporter Herbert Matthews interviewed Castro in 1957, portraying him as a Cuban Robin Hood and exaggerating the strength of his forces. Meanwhile, a loosely related urban resistance movement with cells from the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil, the Ortodoxos, the Auténticos, and the urban wing of the M-26-7 became the backbone of the anti-Batista struggle, giving Castro time to strengthen his position in the mountains while sporadically attacking the army with hit-and-run tactics. Other plots now multiplied: in April 1956, the Montecristi conspiracy of army officers was uncovered; an attack on the Goicuría army barracks by the Auténticos failed, and on March 12, 1957, the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil attacked the presidential palace and nearly killed Batista. Instead, the head of the Revolutionary Directorate, José Antonio Echeverría, was killed.

In March 1958, reacting to the growing bloodshed, the United States imposed an arms embargo to pressure Batista to end repression and hold elections. Many businessmen and wealthy families, such as the Bacardis, were now bankrolling the opposition. A military offensive by Batista in mid-1958 fell dramatically, and a final mediation by the church to convince the opposition to participate in the 1958 elections went unheeded by most groups, giving Batista's handpicked candidate an easy victory. Yet military conspiracies and the growing success of military operations by the urban and rural guerrillas, as well as increasing U.S. pressures and the army's virtual refusal to fight, forced Cuban leader Fulgencio Batista to flee Cuba at dawn on January 1, 1959.

THE EARLY, POPULIST STAGE OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPACT IN THE AMERICAS

Batista's sudden departure caught most political parties divided and in disarray. Those who had participated in the November 3, 1958, elections were discredited. The Auténticos were still demoralized from their failures while in power. The Ortodoxos, as well as the students’ Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil members, were splintered, and many of them had joined the 26th of July Movement. Other insurrectionary organizations lacked the mystique and the organized cadres of Fidel Castro's movement (Suchlicki 1986, 155–56).

Staying out of power for the first few weeks, Castro handpicked the first provisional president, former judge Manuel Urrutia, who appointed a civilian cabinet composed mainly of prominent and moderate anti-Batista political figures (H. Thomas 1971, 1065–67). Urrutia tore down Batista's governmental structure, dissolving Congress and removing from office all governors, mayors, and municipal councilmen. Yet Castro complained of the reforms’ slowness and announced new public policies without consulting the cabinet, making it obvious that power rested with him. This led Urrutia's prime minister, Miró Cardona, to resign in favor of Castro, who accelerated reforms and prosecution of Batista collaborators in public revolutionary tribunals. Hundreds were executed summarily. Faced with mounting national and international criticism, the regime ended these public trials but continued them privately (Suchlicki 1986, 156–57).

During its first months in power, the revolutionary government redistributed wealth in favor of the urban popular sectors through populist measures such as reductions in utility rates, freezing of urban rents, and changes in the tax structure. Some rural sectors benefited from the agrarian reform laws of May 1959, which established a maximum ownership of 988 acres. The confiscated property, to be compensated through 20-year bonds, was intended to favor squatters, sharecroppers, and renters, who were to be provided with credits and technical assistance (del Águila 1984, 46). However, most of the land was not distributed as promised but rather organized into farming and sugar cooperatives under the National Institute for Agrarian Reform.³

Some of the early government decrees affected sizable U.S. interests in Cuba: the takeover of the Cuban Telegraph and Telephone Company, the government-ordered rate reductions for the U.S.-owned Cuban Electric Company, and the large tracts of land confiscated from American companies. While the United States insisted on adequate and prompt compensation, it did not dispute Cuba's right to the expropriations (Domínguez 1989, 19). The United States had recognized the Cuban government on January 7, 1959, and signaled its desire for good relations by replacing Ambassador Earl Smith with an experienced career diplomat fluent in Spanish, Philip Bonsal. Although Castro had already harped on anti-Cuban American interests and past U.S. imperialist actions, Bonsal recommended patience and forbearance with Castro's anti-American posturing (H. Thomas 1971, 1207). Castro publicly sustained the image that Cuba was carrying out a humanist, liberal revolution: It is not red but olive green (Revolución, May 22, 1959).

In March 1959, Castro accepted an invitation to address the American Society of News Editors (ASNE) in Washington, D.C. Even though it was an informal visit, the State Department and Secretary of State Christian Herter honored Castro with a lunch, and Vice President Richard Nixon met with him for three hours.⁴ The State Department prepared to negotiate with Castro regarding an anticipated request for economic aid. Yet when Castro arrived, he instructed his startled economic team not to ask for aid. In his first press conference, Castro said, We are proud to be independent and we have no intention of asking anyone for anything (Revolución, April 17, 1959). According to Central Bank president Felipe Pazos, State Department and International Monetary Fund (IMF) officials were more than willing, anxious, avid, desperate to discuss aid. The Cuban officials’ courteous evasions perplexed U.S. representatives (Domínguez 1989, 18).

From Washington, Castro toured Latin America and attended the economic council meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS) in Punta del Este, Uruguay. Attempting to speak for Latin America, he called on the United States to provide a $30 billion loan over 10 years for economic development in Latin America (H. Thomas 1971, 1213). This astronomical figure, Castro's combative us versus them approach, and his refusal to discuss U.S. aid while in Washington raised many eyebrows within the Eisenhower administration.

In its initial populist, reformist stage, the Cuban revolution spread its influence throughout the Americas. Batista symbolized everything hated in the region: dictatorship, corruption, military involvement in politics, and repression of the opposition. For true democrats, the Cuban revolution represented a dramatic statement of popular will in a region struggling to create more open and just democratic societies. Thus, democratic leaders such as Venezuela's Rómulo Betancourt, Colombia's Alberto Lleras Camargo, and Costa Rica's José Figueres became enthusiastic supporters of the Cuban revolution. In turn, leftists in the region were impressed by the rapid succession of socioeconomic decrees, such as the agrarian and housing reforms, and other measures to improve income distribution. Also, the anti-U.S. attitude that Castro began to exploit, if slowly at first, would find great echo among many in Latin America's intellectual elite, even within the small ultranationalist segments of the right,⁵ who were historically anti-Yankee and culturally anti-Anglo. They echoed Castro's growing criticism of U.S. imperialism and supported his decision to confiscate U.S. firms operating in critical Cuban economy sectors.

Clearly, the remaining dictatorships in the region felt threatened by the Cuban revolution. Within months of Castro's victory, Havana was full of exiles from these dictatorships, seeking support from the government to confront their dictators. On the other hand, communist parties throughout the region, unaware of Castro's real intentions or ideology, had reason to worry about what appeared to be a non-Marxist social democratic revolutionary movement that would spark the masses’ imagination and weaken their claim to revolutionary leadership.

2

Cuba's International Conflicts and Communist Regime

By mid-1959, the Cuban regime found itself in a widening clash with conservative Latin American governments, which were targeted by Cuban-trained and -financed Latin American exile groups. The first Cuban-supported military actions were against the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Panama, Guatemala, and Haiti. In the Dominican Republic, a rapidly defeated invading force contained numerous Cubans, including a Cuban army commandant. Liberal regimes like Venezuela's and Costa Rica's did not react to Cuba's activities until these were also perpetrated on moderate regimes in the area. Perception sharply changed when 84 guerrillas landed in Panama to fight against Ernesto de la Guardia's elected government. The group included only one Panamanian and one U.S. citizen; the rest were Cubans. Venezuelan president Rómulo Betancourt, a Cuban revolution supporter, confided to his friends that Castro was becoming an evil influence in Latin America (H. Thomas 1971, 1239). Convinced the Castro regime would eventually become a threat to his power, Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo helped finance a plot by Cuban cattle ranchers to topple Castro, but it failed, and Trujillo's participation was loudly publicized (1238).

Responding to the situation of international tension in the Caribbean, the foreign ministries of the OAS-Río Treaty member nations called a meeting. After many charges and countercharges, the concluding resolution called for the strict observation of the OAS's nonintervention principle. It instructed the council to prepare a list of possible cases that constituted a violation of the principle of nonintervention, as well as to study the relationship among existing regional tensions, human rights violations, and the lack of a true representative democracy (García Amador 1987, 18–19).

These resolutions were obviously directed at the Dominican Republic and even more so at Cuba, but Castro was not overconcerned with OAS resolutions. Since early 1959, Castro had criticized, often brutally, the OAS, its purposes, and its activities. In March 1960, Cuba announced it would no longer accept actions taken under the Río Treaty (Domínguez 1989).

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TOTALITARIAN CONTROLS: THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET CONNECTION

By June 1959, the political situation in Cuba began to change radically. Castro dismissed most of his cabinet's moderate members. When President Urrutia expressed concern about the increasing number of communists named to government positions, Castro publicly accused Urrutia of inefficiency and of blackmailing the revolution by fabricating the story of communism to provoke U.S. aggression. Aghast at Castro's televised coup, Urrutia ignored his aides’ pleas to resist and resigned (H. Thomas 1971, 1224–30).

On October 15, 1959, Raúl Castro, who had joined the Communist Youth League in 1951 and was perceived by many as greatly responsible for the growing communist influence, was appointed armed forces minister. Five days later, military governor of Camagüey, Commandant Húber Matos, resigned in a letter to Castro, adducing Castro's failure to heed warnings of the communist threat. Castro publicly denounced Matos and ordered his arrest as a traitor and for having obstructed the agrarian reform (dozens of Matos's military officers also were arrested). The next day, the whole 26th of July Movement's high command in Camagüey resigned in protest (H. Thomas 1971, 1244–47). The last surviving liberal in Castro's cabinet, National Bank president Felipe Pazos, who offered to resign in support of Matos, was accused of insubordination and sent abroad, marking the beginning of the end of the liberal wing of the revolution, the genuine reformers who were also respected in Washington. Pazos was replaced by Ernesto Ché Guevara, causing a financial panic and a run in the banks (1252).¹

Meanwhile, the G-2—the political police—was created and placed under the direction of hard-liner Ramiro Valdés, Guevara's intimate friend. The Washington intelligence establishment, always suspicious of social movements in Latin America, could not agree on what was happening in Cuba.² But in the weeks ahead there was a noticeable increase in radical reforms, especially in agrarian reforms. Even medium-sized Cuban farms and their cattle, machinery, and even personal objects were seized without compensation. Large and medium-sized enterprises in other economic sectors were confiscated. It was becoming evident that a radical social revolution committed to the destruction of the capitalist order and bourgeois society, in general, was in the making, led by individuals seeking total power (del Águila 1984, 49).

By late 1959, all opponents of the accelerating turn toward Marxism were portrayed as enemies of the people. All independent groups were targeted: the church, labor, the university, professional associations, and the independent media. Criticism by the press was answered with orchestrated acts of public outrage, and fabricated labor conflicts were an excuse for government intervention and newspaper and radio station shutdowns. By the end of 1960, there were no independent media in Cuba (Clark 1992, 77–82). In September 1959, Castro, fearing the victory of independent-minded Luis Boitel in the upcoming elections, took control of the powerful University of Havana student government. (Boitel, a member of the 26th of July Movement, would die in a Cuban jail in 1970 [Clark 1992, 73–74 and 201]).

The government also moved to establish control of workers’ organizations. Of the existing 33 unions (representing 1.2 million workers), the communists controlled only 3. In fact, most of the new leaders were noncommunist members of the 26th of July Movement, who had cleaned the union of all corrupt or pro-Batista elements (Clark 1992, 75).³ However, by mid-1960, Castro had craftily and methodically cleaned the unions of anticommunist leaders and imposed an old communist leader, Lázaro Peña, as the new secretary general of the Workers Congress. Disillusioned 26th of July union leaders began to join clandestine opposition to Castro.

Despite the Catholic Church's initially supportive attitude, by early 1960, relations between the state and church began to deteriorate. Catholic social work was restricted to rural areas, and Castro attempted (unsuccessfully) to divide the increasing Catholic opposition by talking about foreign influence on the high clergy. After a very critical pastoral letter from the church on August 7, 1960, Castro closed the