Scottish Philosophical Theology

By David Fergusson

This volume concentrates on the period from the beginning of the 18th century to the latter part of the 20th. It is impossible to depict a single school of philosophical theology in Scotland across three centuries, yet several strains have been identified that suggest some recurrent themes or intellectual habits. These include the following: the mutually beneficial cross-fertilisation of the disciplines of philosophy and theology; the tendency to eschew powerful philosophical systems that might threaten to imprison theological ideas; a stress on both the providential limitations and reliability of human reason; a suspicion of reductive theories of a materialist inclination; and a determination to inspect critically the proposals of theology and to place these in positive relation to other disciplines.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Imprint Academic
• Release date: Oct 5, 2012
• ISBN: 9781845404482

David Fergusson

David Fergusson is professor of divinity and principal of NewCollege at the University of Edinburgh. He is also the authorof Faith and Its Critics: A Conversation.

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Scottish Philosophical Theology 1700–2000

Edited and Introduced

by David Fergusson

Copyright © David Fergusson, 2007

The moral rights of the author have been asserted

No part of any contribution may be reproduced in any form without permission, except for the quotation of brief passages in criticism and discussion.

Originally published in the UK by Imprint Academic

PO Box 200, Exeter EX5 5YX, UK

Originally published in the USA by Imprint Academic

Philosophy Documentation Center

PO Box 7147, Charlottesville, VA 22906-7147, USA

2012 digital version by Andrews UK Limited

www.andrewsuk.com

Full series details:

www.imprint-academic.com/losp

Series Editor’s Note

The principal purpose of volumes in this series is not to provide scholars with accurate editions, but to make the writings of Scottish philosophers accessible to a new generation of modern readers in an attractively produced and competitively priced format. In accordance with this purpose, certain changes have been made to the original texts:

Spelling and punctuation have been modernized.

In some cases, the selected passages have been given new titles.

Some original footnotes and references have not been included.

Some extracts have been shortened from their original length.

Quotations from Greek have been transliterated, and passages in foreign languages translated, or omitted altogether.

Care has been taken to ensure that in no instance do these amendments truncate the argument or alter the meaning intended by the original author. For readers who want to consult the original texts, full bibliographical details are provided for each extract.

The Library of Scottish Philosophy was originally an initiative of the Centre for the Study of Scottish Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen. The first six volumes, published in 2004, were commissioned with financial support from the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland, and the texts prepared for publication by Mr Jon Cameron, administrative and editorial assistant to the Centre. In 2006 the CSSP moved to Princeton where it became one of three research centers within the Special Collections of Princeton Theological Seminary. The next four volumes were prepared for publication by the new administrative and editorial assistant, Ms Elaine James.

Acknowledgements

The CSSP gratefully acknowledges the support of the Carnegie Trust, the first class work of both Mr Cameron and Ms James, the enthusiasm and excellent service of the publisher Imprint Academic, and the permission of the University of Aberdeen Special Collections and Libraries to use the engraving of the Faculty of Advocates (1829) as the logo for the series.

Gordon Graham,

Princeton, May 2007

Introduction

The term ‘philosophical theology’ is itself a contested one. In the current collection, it designates the very fluid boundary between philosophy and theology that has characterised Scottish thought since the middle ages. The related notion of ‘philosophy of religion’ typically signifies the rather abstract and detached study of the arguments for God’s existence, the possibility of miracles and the problem of evil. These remain the staple diet of much teaching in foundational university courses and increasingly also certificate work in secondary schools. By contrast, ‘philosophical theology’ is a richer and more diffuse category. Within Scotland, it reflects the ways in which currents of philosophical thought were perceived to carry far-reaching religious significance that could not be reduced or confined to a narrow sub-division entitled ‘philosophy of religion’. This is apparent negatively in the case of David Hume’s scepticism, but it applies more positively to the appropriation of rationalist arguments for God’s existence, the study of ethics, discussions about the human person, and theories of knowledge that situate the self in relation to the world. In this respect, important theological issues have been tacitly present in much philosophical work.

The flourishing of philosophical theology in Scotland also has an institutional explanation. Until quite recently, the four ancient universities existed in close relationship to the church. Three medieval universities (St Andrews, Glasgow and Aberdeen) were all established by crown and church, followed shortly after the Reformation with the foundation of a university in Edinburgh by the town council in 1583.[1] From this period until around the mid-twentieth century Scotland was in important respects a Presbyterian society. Its identity as the national church guaranteed by the Act of Union and the Act of Security in 1707, the Church of Scotland (the Kirk) exercised a significant influence over much of society, including the life of the universities. Unlike other European contexts, 18th century Enlightenment thought in Scotland was largely facilitated by the Presbyterian church, even if the theology that typically accompanied its philosophy, history and social thought was often of a markedly different character to that of the preceding century. In this respect, the institutional position of the Kirk together with its doctrinal tenets, particularly as set out in the Westminster Confession[2], provided a point of reference against which much philosophical study took place. While the role of the Confession undoubtedly diminished from the 18th century onwards, the continuing influence of the Kirk inevitably ensured that many Scottish intellectuals, albeit often in a revisionist spirit, remained conscious of the theological context in which they laboured. This applied also to natural scientists as well as to professional philosophers.

The present volume concentrates on the period from around the beginning of the eighteenth century to the latter part of the twentieth. The start of this era coincides with the emergence of a philosophical professoriate—the first established chair of philosophy was held by Gershom Carmichael in Glasgow from 1727. It also initiates a movement of thought that emerges in the early modern period and leads to the Scottish enlightenment and its aftermath. A more comprehensive coverage, perhaps through a separate volume, would require attention to that distinguished group of medieval scholars who worked in the universities of Europe and, in many cases, played an important role in the early years of St Andrews, Glasgow and Aberdeen universities. This group includes Duns Scotus (c.1266–1308), John Ireland (c.1440–96) John Mair (c.1467–1550), George Lokert (c.1488–1547) and Hector Boece (c.1470–1536). As Alexander Broadie has shown, their philosophical work was often directed towards issues concerning the nature of faith, free will, political authority, and our knowledge of God.[3] Although the theologians of the Reformation were largely preoccupied with doctrinal controversies, they borrowed heavily from their medieval predecessors and shared some of their preoccupations, including for obvious reasons the nature of political authority in relation to divine sovereignty. Yet sustained work in philosophical theology becomes a more pressing priority with the incursion of new ideas from England and the European continent in the late 17th century. The emergence of rationalism, deism, empiricism and higher criticism of the Bible generated theological problems that required engagement with philosophical arguments and approaches. This is apparent in the first group of writers presented.

The Early Enlightenment

At the beginning of the 18th century, fresh currents of thoughts had entered the mainstream of Scottish theology. A striking indication of this is the case of John Simson (1667–1740), Professor of Divinity in Glasgow, who was tried for heresy twice. One of the charges levelled against Simson at his first trial was that he tended ‘to attribute too much to natural reason and the power of corrupt nature’.[4] Although Simson was prevented from teaching, he was never deposed from his office, a decision that provides evidence of a change in the intellectual climate. The Reformed orthodoxy of the seventeenth century was gradually being replaced, at least in some sections of the Kirk, by a milder, more latitudinarian theology that conceded a greater degree of autonomy to philosophical thought while simultaneously turning away from the internecine doctrinal controversies of the 17th century, particularly the struggle against Arminianism.[5]

The influence of these newer philosophical trends from England and the continent generated a set of theological issues, some of which are explored in the first part of this volume. The following four problems can be readily identified, each of which is treated in the respective selections from this period.

The role of reason in establishing the existence and nature of God. In the face of scepticism and to avoid appeals to sources of special revelation, a wide range of rationalist and empiricist scholars had rehabilitated older arguments for God’s existence in the early modern period. These tended to blend cosmological and design arguments, giving them a more central epistemological status than was the case in the theologies of the Reformation. In the deist thinkers of the late 16th and early 17 centuries, this reached its apogee with the claim that a rational religion stripped of revelation and its claims of special divine action was alone acceptable. At best, the claims of Scripture could provide only a ‘republication’ of truths generally accessible to reason. This presented a significant challenge to philosophical theologians. To what extent could there be a rational demonstration of the existence of God, and what sort of God was here at stake? As M.A. Stewart has pointed out, this discussion was not only about the existence of God but also concerned the divine attributes. In engaging with deist writers, the thinkers of the early Scottish Enlightenment employ a series of arguments intended not only to establish the divine existence but to ascribe to God attributes that are more consistent with the traditional theism of Christianity, particularly those that inform accounts of divine revelation, providence and eschatology. The modern ahistorical treatment of the proofs tends to obscure this important function.[6] In fusing cosmological and design arguments, what emerges is not only a first cause but also a providential ruler of the universe who can be relied upon to order nature and history. While by no means committed to the Reformed orthodoxy of their covenanting forebears, the Scottish philosophers of this period are inclined to defend a form of theism that looks more traditional than the radical claims of the English deists.[7]

The relationship of faith and reason. Even where the powers of reason were adjudged sufficient to demonstrate the existence and nature of God, a further issue arises over their status in relation to faith. Is faith in the particular deliverances of Scripture and the church to be established upon some prior claims adduced by reason? This possibility appeared to raise difficulties both for the sufficiency of revelation and also for the nature of that certainty that accompanies the act of faith, traditionally regarded as a gift of the Holy Spirit in Reformation theology. Is faith to be suspended until reason has first reached reliable judgements about the existence and nature of God? And, in any case, how much confidence can be placed in the powers of reason if the doctrine of total depravity, which attests the corruption of every component of human nature, is to be believed? One can see here compelling evidence of the extent to which quite abstract philosophical enquiry impinges upon some central claims of Reformed theology. Again, Scottish writers of the period tend to steer a middle course. Reason is assigned a role in confirming some of the fundamental claims of faith without usurping the office of divine revelation. Its function is important, furthermore, in the need to contest and rebut the arguments of sceptics and deists. In his popular treatise on Natural Religion Insufficient Thomas Halyburton argues that rational argument has a limited apologetic role in defending theological truth claims but that it is wholly inadequate to provide the basis for a lively faith.

The dependence of ethics on religion. A further issue of some ecclesiastical and social sensitivity at the time concerns the extent to which moral knowledge and virtuous conduct are attainable independent of a distinctive faith commitment. If, as according to several leading thinkers, human beings are by nature endowed with a moral sense that governs their actions in society, does religion have no role to play in moral knowledge or motivation? To put the point less abstractly, can one love one’s neighbour without loving God? Here again some fundamental Reformed theological assumptions are engaged. According to the Westminster Confession, good works issue only from regenerating grace. Yet, according to moral sense theorists such as Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, a healthy moral disposition is the natural endowment of all human beings. The tension created by these apparently contradictory positions is addressed, with various mediating proposals being presented. For Francis Hutcheson, the love of God is clearly useful and important in promoting the moral order of both the individual and the community, but it is not in itself a necessary or even sufficient condition for moral knowledge and right action.[8]

The rational status of Scriptural claims. The encounter with rationalism and deism inevitably raised problems about whether and in what terms the veracity of Scripture should be defended. Did it require to stand at the tribunal of reason before its claims could be accepted, as Locke appeared to suggest? And, if so, what sorts of arguments could be brought forward in its defence? Here again, some of the leading philosophical figures of the early Scottish Enlightenment advance claims appealing to the internal coherence of Scripture, the comparative excellence of its moral teaching, and the foundational miracles that attest its supernatural character.[9] Yet there is an important subtlety in George Turnbull’s appeal to miracles in relation to the teaching of Jesus. Noting that an extraordinary action is not in itself compelling evidence for the claims of the agent, Turnbull argues for the integral connection between Christ’s action and words. The testimony of the miraculous is only compelling when set within a wider context of claims that are cumulatively persuasive. The epistemological load placed upon miracles is hence proportionately reduced, though not abolished. As advanced by Turnbull, moreover, this approach can save us from a commitment to a narrow and problematic definition of the miraculous.

Moderate Pragmatism and the Challenge of Hume

The dominant theology of the moderate intellectuals in the era of the Scottish Enlightenment tends to follow lines already apparent in Hutcheson and Turnbull. The role of God as creator and sustainer of the world is emphasised. The signs of the divine presence are evident in the natural world; in this respect, the design argument is widely assumed to be valid. The beneficial role of religion in civil society is stressed. Religion contributes to social order and harmony. When purged of irrational fanaticism and intolerance, faith exercises a cohesive function through the moral direction and focus it offers human life. As benevolent and wise, God has ordered the world so that its moral and scientific laws contribute to human welfare. The prospect of an eschatological state in which virtue and felicity coincide, moreover, provides further moral motivation.

The moderates were much less interested in revisiting the doctrinal controversies of the previous century. The causes of this are multiple. Fear of ecclesiastical censure was undoubtedly a factor—Simson, Hutcheson and Leechman had all been investigated by the Presbytery of Glasgow. This public intrusion upon their work was hardly the reception desired by progressive scholars. A distaste for the heated and arcane disputes that had surrounded the Marrow controversy in the early 18th century is also apparent.[10] Arguments about the salvific scope of Christ’s atoning death, the relationship of faith and works, and the doctrine of double predestination were seldom if ever engaged by moderate thinkers. Doubtless this reflected a dominant providential theism. Concentrating on creation and providence, their theology was less specific on the tenets of revealed theology. Partly under Stoic influences, a pragmatic religion thus emerged that was preoccupied with the business of living well here and now. Indeed it may have been part of God’s providential purpose that, for the sake of the practical concerns of life, human beings are given only such knowledge as is sufficient to this end. This appears to have been the default position of thinkers such as Thomas Reid (1710–96) and Hugh Blair (1718–1800), both ministers of the Kirk. Reid’s philosophy is remarkable in that he says so little about theology, yet in his epistemology and moral theory the providential purposes of God are everywhere assumed. In his recent work on Reid, Nicholas Wolterstorff has pointed to the ways in which Reid stresses the epistemological restrictedness of our human condition.[11] This awareness of the limits of knowledge produces a distinctive form of piety. By attending to what we can know, we are able to live wisely in the darkness. For Reid, this is divinely ordered. We are enabled by the Creator to act in ways that lead to fulfilled and useful lives. Blair’s famous sermon on ‘seeing through a glass darkly’ makes a practical virtue out of an epistemological necessity. Although ‘we are strangers in the universe of God’, this is fitting. Had God equipped us with too keen a vision of transcendent realities, we would likely have been incapacitated for the tasks to which we are called here and now.[12] While a characteristic moderate theme, this also resonates with the Reformed theological stress on the limitations of human reason before the mystery of God.

Despite the alliance of Enlightenment thought with moderate theology, the most significant philosophical contribution to the study of religion in the 18th century emerged in the writings of David Hume (1711–76). Although other writers (e.g. Adam Smith and William Robertson) may have been suspected of leaning unduly toward Stoic and Deist positions, it was Hume who was the most egregious religious sceptic of the 18th century. The constant return to religion in his work reveals a lifelong preoccupation with its themes. In assessing miracles, the design argument and the natural history of religion, he offers what have since become standard philosophical criticisms of religious belief. His writings form something approaching a unity: the attack on miracles undermines claims to revelation; the design argument, so popular and dominant throughout the 18th century, is attacked ingeniously; his attention to the problem of evil places the theological apologist on the defensive; while his essay on the natural history of religion exposes many of its absurdities and harmful effects. Each of these requires further comment.

Miracles: Having removed his material on miracles from the Treatise on Human Nature (1739), Hume eventually published it as an essay in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748). It belongs to its 18th century context and develops many of the arguments of the deists against miracles. The significance of this dispute was not narrowly confined to one sub-section of revealed theology. Given the appeal to miracles in support of the truth claims of Scripture, the standard argument for the reasonableness of revelation was at stake. In the deist writers, one finds several sceptical charges: the intrinsic rarity of miracles requires persuasive testimony if these are to be believed; in practice, we are sceptical about most reports of miracles in popular religious traditions; accounts of the miraculous abound in different cultures with miracles appealed to in support of incompatible belief systems; and the Bible itself contains miraculous stories often as bizarre as those found in pagan cultures. Hume’s essay develops these arguments by focussing on the appeal to the resurrection of Jesus.[13]

Although this essay is not amongst his most lucid philosophical writings, it proved highly controversial, exciting a range of responses. His main contention appears to shift in the course of the discussion. There are three possible claims each of varying strength. 1. Miracles cannot occur. 2. As a matter of principle, we could never believe anyone’s testimony to a miracle. 3. As a matter of fact, there is no account of a miracle that is particularly well attested. The argument appears to equivocate much of the time between the second and third of these claims. Hume’s attack concentrates on the reliability of testimony, arguing that it is always more likely that the witnesses were mistaken or mendacious than that a miracle has ever occurred. The outcome is that there are never sufficient grounds for believing in miracles as violations of natural regularities by a supernatural agency.

The only response which provoked comment by Hume was the dissertation published in 1762 by George Campbell (1719–96), Professor of Divinity at Marischal College, Aberdeen. Campbell sought to argue that testimony was more deeply rooted in human affairs than Hume allowed, and that reports of the unique and unrepeatable were often a source of knowledge in fields other than religion. Moreover, he pointed out that there is no conceptual incoherence in presupposing both the occurrence of miracles and the regularity of nature. The miracles on which Christianity is based cannot be accounted for on the basis of pre-existing prejudice. Furthermore, these confirm the dignity of the doctrines that accompany them. While Campbell makes some progress in attacking Hume and defending the possibility of miracles, it is less clear that miracles can continue to function as warrants for the reasonableness of the Christian faith. The subsequent history of the debate seems to confirm this. To this extent, the type of sceptical arguments advanced by Hume, even if not admitted as wholly valid, lead to a subsequent weakening of the epistemological role of miracles in the writings of theologians.[14]

The Design Argument: Hume’s assault on the standard design argument for God’s existence is found in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Widely regarded as one of the finest texts in the philosophy of religion, the Dialogues were published posthumously in 1779. Although much of the material had been written by 1751, it seems that Hume was still revising the work on his deathbed. Set as a series of conversations between three interlocutors—Demea, Cleanthes and Philo—the Dialogues range over a series of topics. The bulk of the text is preoccupied by the design argument, much of the discussion featuring Philo’s sceptical comments on its validity. Most commentators assume that Philo is for the most part Hume’s mouthpiece.[15]

The criticisms levelled by Philo have since become standard. These focus on the perceived analogy between the universe and a human artefact. Given their analogous properties, can we assume that they have analogous causes? The uniqueness of the universe itself poses an initial difficulty. We do not have other universes with which to compare it and from which to analogise. It may equally well be compared in likeness to an animal or vegetable, rather than an artefact. Moreover, even if we can confidently ascribe an intelligent cause to the universe, this may be wholly unlike the God of Christian theism. A plurality of gods or a limited deity indifferent to human welfare may be conceptually consistent with the design hypothesis. Nor can we exclude the ancient Epicurean proposal that the universe in its current state is nothing more than the product of random forces. In this respect, the world may be a mere brute fact without further explanation or purpose. Together these criticisms weaken the force of the design argument that turns on the strength of the analogy with human effects. Amidst all this, it is worth recognising that Hume’s conclusions tend towards agnosticism rather than atheism.[16] The Dialogues appear to conclude with the thought that while there is a degree of analogy between the world and human artefacts, this is insufficient to support a lively belief in God. Even if we could believe that God existed, we could have little knowledge of God’s attributes or intentions. The conclusions to which Hume’s writings on religion tend are thus profoundly sceptical.

The Problem of Evil: In the writings of Henry Home, Lord Kames, a series of reflections on the problem of evil are offered. These typify many of the standard moves in Christian theodicy, and indicate the extent to which the problem was increasingly exercising philosophical thinkers. Whereas the Calvinist doctrine of total depravity perceives evil, both moral and natural, as the righteous effect of the fall of Adam, for the writers of the 18th century this has become a stumbling block to belief in divine benevolence. The response of Kames is roughly twofold. He argues that evils are the exception rather than the rule; the world is generally ordered to facilitate the welfare of all its creatures and this is a mark of God’s providential order. Second, the flaws and defects that do exist are a necessary part of an overall richness and harmony. We should not complain, therefore, about deficiencies in our natural and moral constitution since these belong to a world in which pain and struggle make a positive contribution to a divinely ordained order.

Hume’s account of the problem of evil in the Dialogues is much more sombre than that of his kinsman. It adumbrates modern scepticism surrounding theodicies. According to Philo, the defects of the natural and moral world are extensive and dire in their consequences. Moreover, it is not hard to imagine a world that is better ordered through the elimination of some of the obvious delinquencies of moral and physical disorder. The view that emerges is of an indifferent world. ‘Nature pours forth her maimed and abortive children without parental care or discernment.’ Here Hume’s agnosticism becomes less urbane and more strikingly passionate.

Naturalist Accounts of Religion: Hume’s essay on The Natural History of Religion (1757) is an important sequel to his philosophical writings on the subject. Having concluded that there is no rational explanation for religious belief, he sets about proposing an alternative account. As befits the rest of his philosophy, his account of religion is both sceptical and naturalist. Religion is presented as deeply embedded in human societies, although it is not regarded as arising from an innate impulse. This suggests the possibility that there might be societies past, present or future that can live without religion. Religious belief and practice are to be explained as arising from our relative ignorance of the causes of natural and historical events. At an earlier stage of history, this gives rise to polytheism as the explanation for manifold and conflicting forces. The invisible, intelligent powers attested by all religion are attempts to explain the hidden causes of happiness and misery. Monotheism gradually emerges from the desire to flatter and recommend a local deity as an object of worship.

Unlike many of his contemporaries, Hume does not attach a high estimate to the civilising force of the Christian religion. Instead, he suggests that it has been characterised by a high level of intolerance and a propensity to treat its opponents violently. By contrast, Greek polytheism is presented as a more accommodating religion that promotes many of the finest traits of the human spirit. In order to minimize its offensiveness to Hume’s contemporaries, the Natural History makes little comment on rational claims for religion. Yet the tendency of Hume’s argument is clear. It anticipates later reductive theories of religion whether of an anthropological, economic or psychological variety. Theism propagates some of the worst vices and most servile virtues. It displays a capacity to subsume and usurp reason in its defence of the most absurd doctrines.

This account of religion reveals the extent to which Hume is both the most egregious and most formidable thinker of the Scottish Enlightenment. The explanations of religion are neither necessary nor available for our understanding of nature, morals or art. Moreover, he claims that individuals and societies can live well without religious practice and belief. The challenges that he poses for religious belief remain amongst the most fundamental facing theologians today.

Nineteenth Century: Natural Theology, Apologetics and Idealism

The early period of the nineteenth century is usually perceived as a time of resurgent evangelicalism within the Scottish churches. The conservatism induced by the French revolution and the Napoleonic wars, together with a sense that something more vital and experiential than moderate theology was required, contributed to this change in the religious climate. By this time, a significant number of Scots were now worshipping outside the national church. A greater religious ferment, infused with democratic leanings, could be detected. A defining moment was the appointment of John Leslie to the Chair of Mathematics and Natural Philosophy in 1805. A layman, whose views were regarded as tending towards scepticism, Leslie was opposed by the moderate party within the Kirk who