The Free Market Existentialist: Capitalism without Consumerism

By William Irwin

Incisive and engaging, The Free Market Existentialist proposes a new philosophy that is a synthesis of existentialism, amoralism, and libertarianism.

• Argues that Sartre’s existentialism fits better with capitalism than with Marxism
• Serves as a rallying cry for a new alternative, a minimal state funded by an equal tax
• Confronts the “final delusion” of metaphysical morality, and proposes that we have nothing to fear from an amoral world
• Begins an essential conversation for the 21st century for students, scholars, and armchair philosophers alike with clear, accessible discussions of a range of topics across philosophy including atheism, evolutionary theory, and ethics

• Language: English
• Publisher: Wiley
• Release date: Aug 17, 2015
• ISBN: 9781119121305

Book preview

Introduction

Philosophies of Individualism

I am all alone, not in a despairing existentialist place, though sometimes I go there. No, I am all alone in the intersection of circles in a Venn diagram. The first circle represents the set of free market philosophers and the second circle represents the set of existentialist philosophers. Free market existentialism? The very idea makes some people cringe. Academic philosophy in the English-speaking world is dominated by the analytic school, which is often openly hostile to continental philosophy in general and existentialism in particular. There is, though, at least one thing that the vast majority of academic philosophers of both the analytic and continental schools agree on: the free market is bad. The few defenders of the free market in academic philosophy are all analytic. Indeed, to my knowledge, I am the only existentialist defender of the free market. So this book is an attempt to synthesize views that don't often relate. It aims to show that existentialism and free market thinking can not only associate but can do so very well.

By the free market I do not mean the crony capitalism or crapitalism one finds in the United States, but rather an economic system in which the government plays no role aside from providing rule of law and protecting property rights. I also use the term free market more broadly as shorthand for libertarian political philosophy: briefly, the view that the proper role of government is limited to the prevention of force, fraud, and theft. Though I think the free market has many advantages, it is not the purpose of this book to argue for the superiority of the free market. Rather, the purpose of the book is to show that capitalism and existentialism are compatible and to argue modestly that a minimal state with a truly free market would be a worthwhile option among liberal states.

The main link between existentialism and libertarianism is individualism. The individual is primary and the individual is responsible. Granted, the sense of individualism characteristic of existentialism is not exactly the same as the sense of individualism characteristic of libertarianism, but they are not foreign to each other, inasmuch as both strive for genuine autonomy. Libertarians have long recognized the importance of strong property rights in securing autonomy, and existentialists have long recognized the importance of choosing meaning and subjective values for oneself in developing authenticity. One sense does not necessarily imply the other, but they do fit together well. Existentialists emphasize the importance of subjectively choosing one's values and making one's meaning, and libertarians champion the individual's prerogative to live in any way that does not cause harm to others.

Existentialism and libertarianism both value freedom and responsibility. As with individualism, the sense of freedom characteristic of existentialism is not exactly the same as the sense of freedom characteristic of libertarianism, but they are not foreign to each other. The entrepreneurs whom libertarians celebrate are risk takers and often rebels who feel a sense of exhilaration in taking chances. Existentialists, though, because of their largely negative view of capitalism, have typically ignored or dismissed such entrepreneurs as not genuine examples of individuals exercising their freedom. Sartre and the French existentialists were tenderhearted, with great care and concern for oppressed groups, and thus did not extend their concern for freedom into the economic realm as a concern for freedom from government interference. Instead, they championed freedom in the economic realm in terms of improving equality of opportunity.

One of the great fears of the political left is that capitalism deprives us of freedom, that, among other things, it makes us into mindless drones who simply buy and consume. Of course capitalism provides circumstances that make it easier for a person to live that way, but capitalism can't make you do anything. It is possible to have capitalism without consumerism. Existentialism is actually the ideal balancing agent, the perfect accompaniment to capitalism, allowing us to reap the benefits of a free market while encouraging us to resist crass consumerism.

Existentialism highlights the individual's ontological freedom. The individual is never compelled to do anything she does not want to do; and she is urged to make and create herself. Just as the individual is ill-advised to let family, church, or government dictate who she is, so too she is ill-advised to let the economic system dictate who she is. Family, church, and government may provide good resources and worthwhile pieces of identity as long as they are reflectively chosen. Likewise, the capitalist system not only brings benefits in terms of wealth but in terms of opportunities for free expression. This is all desirable, and with the existentialist imperative to define oneself, the negative of crass consumerism can be avoided. As I say, this is desirable, but it is not strictly necessary. The argument of this book is not that all libertarians should become existentialists or that all existentialists should become libertarians. The argument is simply that the two fit together well, better than either libertarians or existentialists might have realized. Indeed, free market existentialism is a view worthy of consideration in the marketplace of ideas.

The Free Market Existentialist is divided into seven chapters and addresses three main issues. Chapters 1–3 address the nature of existentialism, its relationship to Marxism, and the way existentialism can be reconciled with capitalism. Chapters 4 and 5 make a case for an existentialist moral anti-realism. And chapters 6 and 7 argue, on the basis of existentialist moral anti-realism, for strong property rights and a minimal state.

Chapter 1 Out, out, Brief Candle!: What Do You Mean by Existentialism? addresses its subtitle's question. Because existentialism has regularly been associated with Marxism, the reaction to combining existentialism and free market thinking may be one of disbelief. Once the disbelief fades, though, the admission follows that it depends on what you mean by existentialism." I agree. In this chapter, I argue that existentialism is best understood as a family resemblance concept with no necessary and sufficient conditions, just an overlapping set of characteristics among its instances. Without attempting to defend my account against all comers or establish necessary and sufficient conditions, I define existentialism as a philosophy that reacts to an apparently absurd or meaningless world by urging the individual to overcome alienation, oppression, and despair through freedom and self-creation in order to become a genuine person. I then elaborate on the elements of the definition with reference to the canonical existentialist philosophers.

Chapter 2, Like Cigarettes and Existentialism: Why There Is no Necessary Connection between Marxism and Sartre, considers the question: Why was Jean-Paul Sartre a Marxist? Sartre's great emphasis on individual freedom and responsibility in Being and Nothingness seems an unlikely match for Marxism. A look at the historical record reveals that Sartre's existentialism was, in fact, rejected as bourgeois by the leading French Marxists of the day. Sartre was never an orthodox Marxist, but he was an unorthodox Marxist in his later work, most notably the Critique of Dialectical Reason. The reason for Sartre's move to Marxism, it is averred, lies in the cultural milieu of post-war France.

Chapter 3, To Consume or not to Consume?: How Existentialism Helps Capitalism, makes the positive case for a link between existentialism and the free market. Both, of course, stress the importance of the individual and freedom. Beyond that, however, existentialism actually helps the individual to deal with capitalism's potential pitfalls. For the free market existentialist, alienation is not something that just happens to a person but rather is something the person must avoid. The free market existentialist must take responsibility to choose work that she finds meaningful rather than aimlessly drifting into work that is alienating. And even when she is compelled to do work that is dull, repetitive, and potentially alienating, the existentialist, like Camus' Sisyphus, can make meaning and soar above her fate.

As with alienation, so with consumerism, the free market existentialist does not see herself as a victim. By consumerism I mean the addictive drive and desire for the newest and latest goods and services for the sake of deriving self-worth and for signaling one's worth to others. Existentialism calls for us to define ourselves as individuals and to resist being defined by external forces. The self-defining existentialist will find consumer culture crass without necessarily rejecting the free market that makes it possible. Indeed, the existentialist may choose to practice voluntary simplicity so as not to contract affluenza, a painful, contagious, socially transmitted condition of overload, debt, anxiety, and waste resulting from the dogged pursuit of more.1 One size does not fit all, though. Ultimately, guided by prudence, the free market existentialist will pursue whatever she deems to be desirable and in her enlightened self-interest.

Chapter 4, Why Nothing Is Wrong: Moral Anti-realism, takes up the existentialist denial of objective moral values. Here I make another unexpected connection, that between existentialism and evolutionary theory. At first glance, the two are incompatible because existentialism holds that there is no human essence or nature, whereas evolutionary theory holds that human nature is in our genes. Upon closer inspection, though, it becomes clear that the human nature dictated by our genes is loose and fluid. It is not constraining in a way that would eliminate freedom. To the contrary, our genetic inclinations and limitations simply provide the context that we can interpret to make free choices. Having reconciled existentialism and evolutionary theory, the chapter considers the evolutionary evidence against moral realism and in favor of moral anti-realism. Drawing on work by Richard Joyce, Sharon Street, Alex Rosenberg, and others, the chapter argues that the best atheistic explanation for our moral feelings is evolutionary adaptation.2 The development of moral feelings, a kind of core morality rooted in reciprocity, was adaptive for humans living in groups. Moral realist theories, which argue that our moral feelings track a metaphysical moral reality, are not parsimonious and are to be rejected.

Chapter 5, Not Going to Hell in a Handbasket: Existentialism and a World without Morality, considers the options and implications for accepting moral anti-realism. Richard Joyce, a moral anti-realist, has argued in favor of moral fictionalism in which a person accepts morality without believing in its metaphysical reality.3 Thus, much as we accept the action on the screen while watching a movie without believing that it is actually occurring in the real world, so too the moral fictionalist acts as if it is true that, for example, gratuitously kicking a dog is morally wrong while not really believing it. Joyce argues that such moral fictionalism can be helpful to us in taking the actions we most want to take; the relevant fictional moral propositions act as bulwarks, providing reinforcement when habits and non-moral prudence fail.

Against Joyce, chapter 5 argues that moral fictionalism is disingenuous, and, beyond that, moral fictionalism is unlikely to be effective for highly reflective people. When push comes to shove in the fray of decision making, such people will realize that they regard moral propositions as literally false, and so the propositions will not be effective as bulwarks.

Some may be concerned that a moral anti-realist unaided by moral fictionalism is apt to do the kind of harmful things that morality calls wrong. Chapter 5 argues that this concern is largely unwarranted. Yes, in getting accustomed to moral anti-realism, some people may abuse their existential freedom like the student away at college for the first time who abuses her freedom by overindulging in pleasures and underperforming in the classroom due to lack of preparation. But much as the student is likely to settle down into more responsible behavior, so too is the moral anti-realist likely to settle down into responsible behavior as dictated by non-moral prudence. Endorsing the views of Hans-Georg Moeller, the chapter argues that love and the law can largely replace the motivating role of morality.4 It remains an open empirical question what an amoral world would look like. Opponents fear the worst, whereas some advocates, such as Ian Hinckfuss, predict that the world would likely be more peaceful and less conflict-ridden.5 Splitting the difference, I argue that an agnostic position is warranted.

Chapter 5 concludes by endorsing a version of Joel Marks's amoralist philosophy of desirism, which counsels individuals to reflect rationally on what they, all things considered, desire, and then act to satisfy their desires.6 The free market existentialist will rely on non-moral prudence to make decisions and take actions in accord with desirism. This prudence is itself relative to the individual and her circumstances; it fits the existentialist paradigm by working within the confines of the individual's situation and allowing for free choice, ultimately posing the question: Can you live with it? The moral anti-realist is likely to be left with vestiges of her previous morality in the form of guilt, and so part of the prudential decision making will involve considering whether she can live with the guilt that follows from an action.

Chapter 6, What's Mine Is Mine: Moral Anti-realism and Property Rights, argues that, from a moral anti-realist perspective, there are no natural rights. All rights, including property rights, are contractual, which is not to say that they are granted by the state or necessarily require the state for their protection. The chapter considers the way that property rights could develop in the state of nature, beginning with property claims that are contested, negotiated, and eventually agreed to contractually. Spontaneous development is likely to produce appropriate laws, and it will likely become attractive to leave the state of nature to obtain the stability provided by rule of law provided by government. Among other topics, the chapter considers first appropriation, the Lockean proviso, and intellectual property. While a moral anti-realist will reject any realist conception of justice, Nozick's conceptions of justice in acquisition, justice in transfer, and justice in rectification can be pragmatically agreed to, shorn of any moral realism.

She who has decided she can live without God and morality must next decide if she can live without the nanny state. The free market existentialist calls for internalizing responsibility as much as possible. Chapter 7, Who's Afraid of the Free Market?: Moral Anti-realism and the Minimal State, thus considers the possibility of a minimal state that is restricted to protecting citizens against force, fraud, and theft. Exposing the fallacies of the scarcity mentality that characterizes the proponents of redistribution, the chapter argues for the spillover benefits of economic growth.

For the free market existentialist, capitalism provides a large array of choices and opportunities conducive to self-definition. Dealing with consumer culture may be difficult, but it is just the kind of challenge the existentialist should relish for its opportunity to exercise responsibility and to grow through challenge. Fear of the free market is just fear that people can't be trusted to think and act for themselves, a proposition that the existentialist roundly rejects along with the proposition that freedom must sometimes be restricted in the name of freedom. Because of our radical individuality, no person or persons could ever know enough about individuals and the societies they form to make good top-down decisions for all. Knowledge, as F.A. Hayek argues in The Uses of Knowledge in Society, is widely dispersed and localized.7

To fund the minimal services of the minimal state, the free market existentialist rejects the income tax, arguing that it is tantamount to theft. The equal tax is presented as an attractive alternative. The state is conceived as a club in which members pay equal dues for equal benefits, from each the same, to each the same. No one would be compelled to join the club, but there would potentially be adverse effects for those who were not club members. For example, others might be less likely to hire them or patronize their businesses. The minimal state is not an historical inevitability, but it is a viable option—one that ideally would be offered as a choice among liberal states that share in common the right to exit.

To begin this introduction I stood alone in the intersection of a Venn diagram, its circles representing the set of free market philosophers and the set of existentialist philosophers. In fact, the space is even lonelier than that, for I am a moral anti-realist in addition to being a libertarian and an existentialist. So there are actually three circles. While historically there have been some existentialists who arguably were moral anti-realists, I know of none but myself living today. And I know of no other libertarians who are moral anti-realists. So I find myself alone where the three circles overlap, and I worry that it is not a Venn diagram that I have drawn in my mind, but instead a target on my back. I realize that I do not have a popular view, but I do not think that I am terminally unique. My conjunction of commitments is logically possible and, I hope, philosophically attractive.

In closing this introduction I should say something about my writing style. This book is intended to be of interest to both a scholarly audience and a general audience. For that reason, some parts are more formal and others are more informal. Not all parts will necessarily be of interest to all readers, and so you should feel free to skip parts that do not suit your interest. I hope that by the end of the book you will join me in the intersection of the Venn diagram, or, if not, that at least you won't think that I deserve to be alone. I hope to start a conversation, not to conclude an argument.

Notes

1. John de Graaf, David Waan, and Thomas H. Naylor, Affluenza: The All-Consuming Epidemic (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2001), p. 2.

2. Richard Joyce, The Evolution of Morality (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007); Sharon Street, A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value, Philosophical Studies 127 (2006): 109–66; Alex Rosenberg, The Atheist's Guide to Reality: Enjoying Life without Illusions (New York: Norton, 2011).

3. Richard Joyce, The Myth of Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 206–31.

4. Hans-Georg Moeller, The Moral Fool: A Case for Amorality (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).

5. Ian Hinckfuss, The Moral Society—Its Structure and Effects (1987). http://philosophy.ru/lib/fortext/fortext_2075.html.

6. Joel Marks, Ethics without Morals: A Defense of Amorality (New York: Routledge, 2013).

7. F.A. Hayek, The Uses of Knowledge in Society, American Economic Review 35 (1945): 519–30.

1

Out, out, Brief Candle!

What Do You Mean by Existentialism?

Let us imagine a number of men in chains, and all condemned to death, where some are killed each day in the sight of the others, and those who remain see their own fate in that of their fellows and wait their turn, looking at each other sorrowfully and without hope. It is an image of the condition of men.1

Blaise Pascal, Pensées

Existentialism and free market thinking are not often found together, and so I have met with some disbelief when I have proposed combining them.2 The strength of the connection between the two depends on the conception of existentialism. The aim of this chapter is thus to articulate my account of existentialism, which is an atheistic and highly individualistic, rather than social, philosophy. I do not seek to defend my account of existentialism or my interpretation of particular existentialists against competing accounts, nor do I attempt to establish the truth of my account. The aim of this chapter is predominantly explanatory, not argumentative. The relevant arguments come in chapters 2 and 3. The existentialist I describe may be a figure in whom you recognize yourself or others, but even if you do not, the description will serve as the foundation for the larger project of this book, namely articulating and defending free market existentialism.

Defining Existentialism

Those who do not appreciate existentialism often seek to dismiss it as a passing fad or a moment in time characteristic of post-war France. This is misguided. Existentialism crystallizes an insight or impulse that has always been with us to recognize the importance of individual, lived, concrete experience. We see this tendency in many places, from the Old Testament books of Job and Ecclesiastes to elements of Buddhism and stoicism, to Pascal, to Shakespeare, and beyond. In my view, existentialism is expressed hauntingly in Macbeth's musing:

Out, out, brief candle!

Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player

That struts and frets his hour upon the stage

And then is heard no more. It is a tale

Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury

Signifying nothing.3

Not all existentialists have been as gloomy and pessimistic as Macbeth at that moment, but human beings from any time or place could comprehend the significance of this image: the absurdity, the meaninglessness, the deception, the pointless striving, the anxiety, the despair, the urgency, and the sense of ever-impending death.4

Existentialism resists definition because there is nothing essential that the philosophers and artists grouped together as existentialists share in common. Indeed, existentialism is best thought of as a family resemblance concept with an overlapping set of characteristics but no necessary or sufficient conditions.

If there were an existentialist's club, no one would join.5 Existentialists aren't joiners; they're individualists. And they certainly don't like labels, including existentialist. Nearly all the philosophers who are usually considered existentialists did not accept the label at one point. Two of the major figures we will consider, Søren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche, pre-date the term and are often referred to as forerunners or fathers or grandfathers of existentialism rather than as existentialists themselves. Martin Heidegger purposely disavowed the existentialist label, and Albert Camus saw himself as being in opposition to existentialism. Jean-Paul Sartre rejected the label at first before later accepting it. Among the big four of existentialism—Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Sartre—only Sartre can unquestionably be called an existentialist. Labeling any of the other three as an existentialist will result in a scholarly fight, and even Sartre's relationship to existentialism is ambiguous. As I will argue in chapter 2, Sartre's adoption of Marxism after the publication of Being and Nothingness sits in uncomfortable tension with the existentialism articulated in his magnum opus.

Clearly, whatever I claim existentialism is will meet with disagreement. Because my aim is not primarily historical, nor to articulate what is common to the canonical existentialists, but rather to present a view that I want