Selected Federalist Papers

By Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay

To persuade undecided New York state voters to ratify the new Constitution of the United States, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay wrote 85 compelling essays, under the title The Federalist and signed "Publius," that appeared in New York City newspapers in 1787–1788. These far-reaching essays, which comprise a masterful exposition and defense of the proposed federal system of government and of the Constitution's carefully designed system of checks and balances, are today considered a keystone of American democracy. Their continuing relevance was demonstrated by the frequent references to Paper No. 65, "On Impeachments," during the impeachment proceedings against President Clinton.
This volume contains 35 of the most famous and important pieces, including ones that deal with "dangers from foreign arms and influence"; with the need for a federal government able to raise revenues through taxation; with the creation of an electoral college; with freedom of the press and the inadvisability of a bill of rights; with the three-fifths rule for counting slaves; with the objectives and powers of the judiciary; and much else. Of lasting value and interest to students of American history and government, this carefully chosen selection will also fascinate any general reader curious about the history of the Constitution and the beginnings of American federalism.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Dover Publications
• Release date: May 11, 2012
• ISBN: 9780486112374

Alexander Hamilton

Alexander Hamilton (1755-1804) was an American statesman, legal scholar, military leader, lawyer, and economist. After serving as a senior aide to General George Washington during the American Revolutionary War, Hamilton practiced law and founded the Bank of New York. As the need to replace the confederal government became apparent, Hamilton advocated for a Constitutional Convention to be held in Philadelphia. Following the convention, Hamilton wrote 51 of the 85 Federalist Papers, essays and articles intended to promote the ratification of the new Constitution. He then served as head of the Treasury Department under President Washington, later campaigning for Thomas Jefferson’s presidential nomination. In 1804, following a dispute, Hamilton was killed in a duel by politician and lawyer Aaron Burr.

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1788)

ALEXANDER HAMILTON: THE FEDERALIST, NO. 1

Introduction: The Union and Its New Constitution (October 27, 1787)

Happy Will It Be If Our Choice Should Be Directed by a Judicious Estimate of Our True Interests

To the People of the State of New York:

After an unequivocal experience of the inefficiency of the subsisting federal government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting in the world. It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety be regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind.

This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of patriotism, to heighten the solicitude which all considerate and good men must feel for the event. Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not connected with the public good. But this is a thing more ardently to be wished than seriously to be expected. The plan offered to our deliberations affects too many particular interests, innovate upon too many local institutions, not to involve in its discussion a variety of objects foreign to its merits, and of views, passions and prejudices little favourable to the discovery of truth.

Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution will have to encounter may readily be distinguished the obvious interest of a certain class of men in every State to resist all changes which may hazard a diminution of the power, emolument, and consequence of the offices they hold under the State establishments; and the perverted ambition of another class of men, who will either hope to aggrandise themselves by the confusions of their country, or will flatter themselves with fairer prospects of elevation from the subdivision of the empire into several partial confederacies than from its union under one government.

It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of this nature. I am well aware that it would be disingenuous to resolve indiscriminately the opposition of any set of men (merely because their situations might subject them to suspicion) into interested or ambitious views. Candour will oblige us to admit that even such men may be actuated by upright intentions; and it cannot be doubted that much of the opposition which has made its appearance, or may hereafter make its appearance, will spring from sources, blameless at least, if not respectable—the honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived jealousies and fears. So numerous indeed and so powerful are the causes which serve to give a false bias to the judgment, that we, upon many occasions, see wise and good men on the wrong as well as on the right side of questions of the first magnitude to society. This circumstance, if duly attended to, would furnish a lesson of moderation to those who are ever so much persuaded of their being in the right in any controversy. And a further reason for caution, in this respect, might be drawn from the reflection that we are not always sure that those who advocate the truth are influenced by purer principles than their antagonists. Ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party opposition, and many other motives not more laudable than these, are apt to operate as well upon those who support as those who oppose the right side of a question. Were there not even these inducements to moderation, nothing could be more ill-judged than that intolerant spirit which has, at all times, characterised political parties. For in politics, as in religion, it is equally absurd to aim at making proselytes by fire and sword. Heresies in either can rarely be cured by persecution.

And yet, however just these sentiments will be allowed to be we have already sufficient indications that it will happen in this as in all former cases of great national discussion. A torrent of angry and malignant passions will be let loose. To judge from the conduct of the opposite parties, we shall be led to conclude that they will mutually hope to evince the justness of their opinions, and to increase the number of their converts by the loudness of their declamations and the bitterness of their invectives. An enlightened zeal for the energy and efficiency of government will be stigmatised as the offspring of a temper fond of despotic power and hostile to the principles of liberty. An over-scrupulous jealousy of danger to the rights of the people, which is more commonly the fault of the head than of the heart, will be represented as mere pretence and artifice, the_stale bait for popularity at the expense of the public good. It will be forgotten, on the one hand, that jealousy is the usual concomitant of love, and that the noble enthusiasm of liberty is apt to be infected with a spirit of narrow and illiberal distrust. On the other hand, it will be equally forgotten that the vigour of government is essential to the security of liberty; that, in the contemplation of a sound and well-informed judgment, their interest can never be separated; and that a dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people than under the forbidding appearance of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government. History will teach us that the former has been found a much more certain road to the introduction of despotism than the latter, and that of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics, the greatest number have begun their career by paying an obsequious court to the people; commencing demagogues, and ending tyrants.

In the course of the preceding observations, I have had an eye, my fellow-citizens, to putting you upon your guard against all attempts, from whatever quarter, to influence your decision, in a matter of the utmost moment to your welfare, by any impressions other than those which may result from the evidence of truth. You will, no doubt, at the same time, have collected from the general scope of them, that they proceed from a source not unfriendly to the new Constitution. Yes, my countrymen, I own to you that, after having given it an attentive consideration, I am clearly of opinion it is your interest to adopt it. I am convinced that this is the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness. I affect not reserves which I do not feel. I will not amuse you with an appearance of deliberation when I have decided. I frankly acknowledge to you my convictions, and I will freely lay before you the reasons on which they are founded. The consciousness of good intentions disdains ambiguity. I shall not, however, multiply professions on this head. My motives must remain in the depository of my own breast. My arguments will be open to all, and may be judged of by all. They shall at least be offered in a spirit which will not disgrace the cause of truth.

I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the following interesting particulars:–The utility of the UNION to your political prosperity—The insufficiency of the present Confederation. to preserve that Union—The necessity of a government at least equally energetic with the one proposed, to the attainment of this object—The conformity of the proposed Constitution to the true principles of republican government—Its analogy to your own State constitution– and lastly, The additional security which its adoption will afford to the preservation of that species of government, to liberty, and to property.

In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavour to give a satisfactory answer to all the objections which shall have made their appearance, that may seem to have any claim to your attention.

It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer arguments to prove the utility of the UNION, a point, no doubt, deeply engraved on the hearts of the great body of the people in every State, and one which, it may be imagined, has no adversaries. But the fact is, that we already hear it whispered in the private circles of those who oppose the new Constitution, that the thirteen States are of too great extent for any general system, and that we must of necessity resort to separate confederacies of distinct portions of the whole.¹ This doctrine will, in all probability, be gradually propagated, till it has votaries enough to countenance an open avowal of it. For nothing can be more evident, to those who are able to take an enlarged view of the subject, than the alternative of an adoption of the new Constitution or a dismemberment of the Union. It will therefore be of use to begin by examining the advantages of that Union, the certain evils, and the probable dangers, to which every State will be exposed from its dissolution. This shall accordingly constitute the subject of my next address.

PUBLIUS.

JOHN JAY: THE FEDERALIST, NO. 3

Dangers from Foreign Arms and Influence (November 3, 1787)

The Union Tends Most to Preserve the People in a State of Peace with Other Nations

To the People of the State of New York:

It is not a new observation that the people of any country (if, like the Americans, intelligent and well-informed) seldom adopt and steadily persevere for many years in an erroneous opinion respecting their interests. That consideration naturally tends to create great respect for the high opinion which the people of America have so long and uniformly entertained of the importance of their continuing firmly united under one federal government, vested with sufficient powers for all general and national purposes.

The more attentively I consider and investigate the reasons which appear to have given birth to this opinion, the more I become convinced that they are cogent and conclusive.

Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their safety seems to be the first. The safety of the people doubtless has relation to a great variety of circumstances and considerations, and consequently affords great latitude to those who wish to define it precisely and comprehensively.

At present I mean only to consider it as it respects security for the preservation of peace and tranquillity, as well as against dangers from foreign arms and influence, as from dangers of the like kind arising from domestic causes. As the former of these comes first in order, it is proper it should be the first discussed. Let us therefore proceed to examine whether the people are not right in their opinion that a cordial Union, under an efficient national government, affords them the best security that can be devised against hostilities from abroad.

The number of wars which have happened or will happen in the world will always be found to be in proportion to the number and weight of the causes, whether real or pretended, which provoke or invite them. If this remark be just, it becomes useful to inquire whether so many just causes of war are likely to be given by United America as by disunited America; for if it should turn out that United America will probably give the fewest, then it will follow that in this respect the Union tends most to preserve the people in a state of peace with other nations.

The just causes of war, for the most part, arise either from violations of treaties or from direct violence. America has already formed treaties with no less than six foreign nations, and all of them, except Prussia, are maritime, and therefore able to annoy and injure us. She has also extensive commerce with Portugal, Spain, and Britain, and, with respect to the two latter, has, in addition, the circumstance of neighbourhood to attend to.

It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe the laws of nations towards all these powers, and to me it appears evident that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national government than it could be either by thirteen separate States or by three or four distinct confederacies.

Because when once an efficient national government is established, the best men in the country will not only consent to serve, but also will generally be appointed to manage it; for, although town or country, or other contracted influence, may place men in State assemblies, or senates, or courts of justice, or executive departments, yet more general and extensive reputation for talents and other qualifications will be necessary to recommend men to offices under the national government—especially as it will have the widest field for choice, and never experience that want of proper persons which is not uncommon in some of the States. Hence, it will result that the administration, the political counsels, and the judicial decisions of the national government will be more wise, systematical, and judicious than those of individual States, and consequently more satisfactory with respect to other nations, as well as more safe with respect to us.

Because, under the national government, treaties and articles of treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded in one sense and executed in the same manner—whereas adjudications on the same points and questions, in thirteen States, or in three or four confederacies, will not always accord or be consistent; and that, as well from the variety of independent courts and judges appointed by different and independent governments, as from the different local laws and interests which may affect and influence them. The wisdom of the convention, in committing such questions to the jurisdiction and judgment of courts appointed by and responsible only to one national government, cannot be too much commended.

Because the prospect of present loss or advantage may often tempt the governing party in one or two States to swerve from good faith and justice; but those temptations, not reaching the other States, and consequently having little or no influence on the national government, the temptation will be fruitless, and good faith and justice be preserved. The case of the treaty of peace with Britain adds great weight to this reasoning.

Because, even if the governing party in a State should be disposed to resist such temptations, yet, as such temptations may, and commonly do, result from circumstances peculiar to the State, and may affect a great number of the inhabitants, the governing party may not always be able, if willing, to prevent the injustice mediated, or to punish the aggressors. But the national government, not being affected by those local circumstances, will neither be induced to commit the wrong themselves, nor want power or inclination to prevent or punish its commission by others.

So far, therefore, as either designed or accidental violations of treaties and the laws of nations afford just causes of war, they are less to be apprehended under one general government than under several lesser ones, and in that respect the former most favours the safety of the people.

As to those just causes of war which proceed from direct and unlawful violence, it appears equally clear to me that one good national government affords vastly more security against dangers of that sort than can be derived from any other quarter.

Because such violences are more frequently caused by the passions and interests of a part than of the whole; of one or two States than of the Union. Not a single Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggressions of the present federal government, feeble as it is; but there are several instances of Indian hostilities having been provoked by the improper conduct of individual States, who, either unable or unwilling to restrain or punish offences, have given occasion to the slaughter of many innocent inhabitants.

The neighbourhood of Spanish and British territories, bordering on some States and not on others, naturally confines the causes of quarrel more immediately to the borderers. The bordering States, if any, will be those who, under the impulse of sudden irritation, and a quick sense of apparent interest or injury, will be most likely, by direct violence, to excite war with these nations; and nothing can so effectually, obviate that danger as a national government, whose wisdom and prudence will not be diminished by the passions which actuate the parties immediately interested.

But not only fewer just causes of war will be given by the national government, but it will also be more in their power to accommodate and settle them amicably. They will be more temperate and cool, and in that respect, as well as in others, will be more in capacity to act advisedly than the offending State. The pride of states, as well as of men, naturally disposes them to justify all their actions, and opposes their acknowledging, correcting, or repairing their errors and offences. The national government, in such cases, will not be affected by this pride, but will proceed with moderation and candour to consider and decide on the means most proper to extricate them from the difficulties which threaten them.

Besides, it is well known that acknowledgements, explanations, and compensations are often accepted as satisfactory from a strong united nation, which would be rejected as unsatisfactory if offered by a State or confederacy of little consideration or power.

In the year 1685, the state of Genoa having offended Louis XIV., endeavoured to appease him. He demanded that they should send their Doge, or chief magistrate, accompanied by four of their senators, to France, to ask his pardon and receive his terms. They were obliged to submit to it for the sake of peace. Would he on any occasion either have demanded or have received the like humiliation from Spain, or Britain, or any other powerful nation?

PUBLIUS.

JOHN JAY: THE FEDERALIST, NO. 5

Dangers from Foreign Arms and Influence, Continued (November 10, 1787)

Let Us Not Forget How Much More Easy It Is to Receive Foreign Fleets into Our Ports, and Foreign Armies into Our Country, Than It Is to Persuade or Compel Them to Depart

To the People of the State of New York:

Queen Anne, in her letter of the 1st July 1706, to the Scotch Parliament, makes some observations on the importance of the Union then forming between England and Scotland, which merit our attention. I shall present the public with one or two extracts from it: "An entire and perfect union will be the solid foundation of lasting peace: It will secure your religion, liberty, and property; remove the animosities amongst yourselves, and the jealousies and differences betwixt our two kingdoms. It must increase your strength, riches and trade; and by this union the whole island, being joined in affection and free from all apprehensions of different interest, will be enabled to resist all its enemies." "We most earnestly recommend to you calmness and unanimity in this great and weighty affair, that the union may be brought to a happy conclusion, being the only effectual way to secure our present and future happiness, and disappoint the designs of our and your enemies, who will doubtless, on this occasion, use their utmost endeavours to prevent or delay this union."

It was remarked in the preceding paper, that weakness and divisions at home would invite dangers from abroad; and that nothing would tend more to secure us from them than union, strength, and good government within ourselves. This subject is copious and cannot easily be exhausted.

The history of Great Britain is the one with which we are in general the best acquainted, and it gives us many useful lessons. We may profit by their experience without paying the price which it cost them. Although it seems obvious to common sense that the people of such an island should be but one nation, yet we find that they were for ages divided into three, and that those three were almost constantly embroiled in quarrels and wars with one another. Notwithstanding their true interest with respect to the continental nations was really the same, yet by the arts and policy and practices of those nations, their mutual jealousies were perpetually kept inflamed, and for a long series of years they were far more inconvenient and troublesome than they were useful and assisting to each other.

Should the people of America divide themselves into three or four nations, would not the same thing happen? Would not similar jealousies arise, and be in like manner cherished? Instead of their being joined in affection and free from all apprehension of different interests, envy and jealousy would soon extinguish confidence and affection, and the partial interests of each confederacy, instead of the general interests of all America, would be the only objects of their policy and pursuits. Hence, like most other bordering nations, they would always be either involved in disputes and war, or live in the constant apprehension of them.

The most sanguine advocates for three or four confederacies cannot reasonably suppose that they would long remain exactly on an equal footing in point of strength, even if it was possible to form them so at first; but, admitting that to be practicable, yet what human contrivance can secure the continuance of such equality? Independent of those local circumstances which tend to beget and increase power in one part and to impede its progress in another, we must advert to the effects of that superior policy and good management which would probably distinguish the government of one above the rest, and by which their relative equality in strength and consideration would be destroyed. For it cannot be presumed that the same degree of sound policy, prudence, and foresight, would uniformly be observed by each of these confederacies for a long succession of years.

Whenever, and from whatever causes, it might happen, and happen it would, that any one of these nations or confederacies should rise on the scale of political importance much above the degree of her neighbours, that moment would those neighbours behold her with envy and with fear. Both those passions would lead them to countenance, if not to promote, whatever might promise to diminish her importance; and would also restrain them from measures calculated to advance or even to secure her prosperity. Much time would not be necessary to enable her to discern these unfriendly dispositions. She would soon begin, not only to lose confidence in her neighbours, but also to feel a disposition equally unfavourable to them. Distrust naturally creates distrust, and by nothing is good-will and kind conduct more speedily changed than by invidious jealousies and uncandid imputations, whether expressed or implied.

The North is generally the region of strength, and many local circumstances render it probable that the most Northern of the proposed confederacies would, at a period not very distant, be unquestionably more formidable than any of the others. No sooner would this become evident than the Northern Hive would excite the same ideas and sensations in the more southern parts of America which it formerly did in the southern parts of Europe. Nor does it appear to be a rash conjecture that its young swarms might often be tempted to gather honey in the more blooming fields and milder air of their luxurious and more delicate neighbours.

They who well consider the history of similar divisions and confederacies will find abundant reason to apprehend that those in contemplation would in no other sense be neighbours than as they would be borderers; that they would neither love nor trust one another, but on the contrary would be a prey to discord, jealousy, and mutual injuries; in short, that they would place us exactly in the situations in which some nations doubtless wish to see us, viz., formidable only to each other.

From these considerations it appears that those gentlemen are greatly mistaken who suppose that alliances offensive and defensive might be formed between these confederacies, and would produce that combination and union of wills, of arms, and of resources, which would be necessary to put and keep them in a formidable state of defence against foreign enemies.

When did the independent states, into which Britain and Spain were formerly divided, combine in such alliance, or unite their forces against a foreign enemy? The proposed confederacies will be distinct nations. Each of them would have its commerce with foreigners to regulate by distinct treaties; and as their productions and commodities are different and proper for different markets, so would those treaties be essentially different. Different commercial concerns must create different interests, and of course different degrees of political attachment to and connection with different foreign nations. Hence it might and probably would happen that the foreign nation with whom the Southern confederacy might be at war would be the one with whom the Northern confederacy would be the most desirous of preserving peace and friendship. An alliance so contrary to their immediate interest would not therefore be easy to form, nor, if formed, would it be observed and fulfilled with perfect good faith.

Nay, it is far more probable that in America, as in Europe, neighbouring nations, acting under the impulse of opposite interests and unfriendly passions, would frequently be found taking different sides. Considering our distance from Europe, it would be more natural for these confederacies to apprehend danger from one another than from distant nations, and therefore that each of them should be more desirous to guard against the others by the aid of foreign alliances, than to guard against foreign dangers by alliances between themselves. And here let us not forget how much more easy it is to receive foreign fleets into our ports, and foreign armies into our country, than it is to persuade or compel them to depart. How many conquests did the Romans and others make in the characters of allies, and what innovations did they under the same character introduce into the governments of those whom they pretended to protect.

Let candid men judge, then, whether the division of America into any given number of independent sovereignties would tend to secure us against the hostilities and improper interference of foreign nations.

PUBLIUS,

ALEXANDER HAMILTON: THE FEDERALIST, NO. 7

Dangers from War between the States (November 17, 1787)

What Inducements Could the States Have, If Disunited, to Make War upon Each Other?

To the People of the State of New York:

It is sometimes asked, with an air of seeming triumph, what inducements could the States have, if disunited, to make war upon each other?

Reviews for Selected Federalist Papers

[msaucier818 · Rating: 3 out of 5 stars]

This was the most difficult book I have ever read. It got to the point where I loathed the idea of having to open it back up again and continue. In terms of my enjoyment, this was a 2 star read. I rated it 3 stars because as much as I disliked the hours I spent going through it, I understand the contribution these essays made toward the ratification of the Constitution and how they shaped the ideas of government for generations. With that said, they were incredibly hard to follow and unless you were directly mired in the debate at the time, most of these essays argued in favor of the more obscure issues in the Constitution. As a teacher of early American History, I am glad to have read through all of these.

[fredjryder1946 · Rating: 5 out of 5 stars]

Okay. Here's what it is! Step ONE: Read the book.Step TWO: Just for kicks, turn on the boob tube and watch Hannity & Colmes, or any live session of the Senate or the House. And maybe a presidential debate or two.Step THREE: Ask the Almighty: "What the hell happened to this country??????"

[devil_llama · Rating: 4 out of 5 stars]

One of the most classic documents of American history, this work is a series of essays by the writers of the Constitution, which were written to explain the new Constitution and to agitate on behalf of ratification. The prose soars in most places, and it reminds a person of what it would have been possible for America to become if we'd treated our new constitution as a living document, but recognized the importance of the clauses that safeguard us from imperial presidents and monarchs.

[bness2 · Rating: 4 out of 5 stars]

It was most enlightening to read some of the Right's favorite quotes in context.

[aleph123_1 · Rating: 4 out of 5 stars]

interesting introductory historical essay, while obviously the Federalist Papers are available on archive.orgstill worth reading (I read excerpts of the Federalist Papers first in the early 1980s, but in Italian)

[jvioland_1 · Rating: 5 out of 5 stars]

Every American citizen should read this seminal work. We have come so far from knowing why are government was created in the way it was. A brilliant justification by brilliant men.

[jimocracy · Rating: 4 out of 5 stars]

I thought this was an unabridged edition of the 85 articles known as the Federalist Papers. As it turns out, it was a very entertaining summary (with excerpts) of the articles; as well as responses from the anti-Federalists of the time.

[audacity88_1 · Rating: 4 out of 5 stars]

We Americans know how important our Founding Fathers were, but sometimes we forget how smart they were. The polemics in this book manifest authorship by towering intelligences, and provoke us to ask whether we have stayed true to their vision for this country.

[tjsjohanna_1 · Rating: 4 out of 5 stars]

As a thorough explanation of how these three men understood the US Constitution to work, this work is indispensable. The reader also gets a good understanding of the basic principles of republican government - its ideals, its limits, its checks and balances. Some of the issues raised seem particularly timely (which just goes to show that the more things change the more they stay the same).

[lisamaria_c · Rating: 5 out of 5 stars]

This subtitle to my edition is "The Famous Papers on the Principles of American Government." It's an apt description, but perhaps doesn't go far enough. Try foundational. They consist of 85 essays by Alexander Hamilton, who became our first Secretary of the Treasury, James Madison, who largely framed the United States Constitution, and John Jay, who became our first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The essays were written to urge people to ratify the constitution, and have been used every since to illuminate it by everyone from judges to--well, political science professors, and this was one of my texts in my college course introducing political science. It may be this edition regularized grammar and spelling, but one thing that hit me is how readable it all is. It was meant to explain the constitution to ordinary voters, so perhaps that shouldn't be so surprising. If I could get Americans to read one book, this would be my choice. Whether they agree with the principles of the Founders who created this country or not, at least by the end of it they'd understand what--and what they were not--about, and not just who the pundits and politicians claim for them. But if I couldn't get them to read the whole thing, I'd at least urge on them "Federalist No. 10" by James Madison. Our professor taught us that particular essay was at the heart of the philosophy of American Government and the design of the constitution:Liberty is to faction, what air is to fire, an aliment, without which it instantly expires. But it could not be a less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourish faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.It is to control faction (think political parties) and the strife that tore previous democracies to pieces, without sacrificing liberty that the separation of powers and system of checks and balances was written into the constitution. As that particular essay elegantly explains. If the Constitution is our text book, the Federalist Papers is the Constitution 101 for Dummies, the owners' manual.

[6boysandme · Rating: 3 out of 5 stars]

Summary: Hamilton, Madison and Jay write individual pieces on their views of government that were basically adopted in the making of America.

[hadriantheblind · Rating: 4 out of 5 stars]

Shameful that I hadn't marked this as read yet. Attached are some thoughts copied from my notes, some of which are not entirely relevant, but still.

Post-Revolution, the colonies experimented with Articles of Confederation. Flawed, replaced by modern Constitution.

History of Republics as derived from ancient Greece, then Rome -> England. Rome became Tyranny, although Republic was lauded as mixed government between Aristocracy, Monarchy, and Democracy. Same with England after the Glorious Revolution.

US was not only republic - Venice as a mercantile aristocratic Republic. Dutch as ad hoc mercantile republic w/ Stadholder. Switzerland as federal canton system. US as special because it was a mixed government, but w/o monarchy, was large, expanding and heterogeneous. All others were small and isolated, as Montesquieu had stated would be necessary for a republic's survival. US definitely became a republic, although not quite a total democracy in modern sense, as women did not become franchised until 1900s, POCs in 1960s. Capitalist social strata - nation ruled by lawyers.

Hamilton, Madison and Jay use some of the former as historical examples. Federal union as preventing interstate anarchy, as these states and colonies would have dubious chances of surviving on their won. Done so through mutual restraint, separation of powers, executive command of military, first seen through Strategos of ancient Athens. No state had hegemony over others, even the bigger ones such as New York or Virginia, hence federal union of states made more appealing.

Federal government superseding and managing states would also be most efficient at economic governance, and managing the military against outside factors - Spanish, British, etc. Powers of taxation. Fear of despotism, individualist tendencies, self-rule.

Idea of popular sovereignty, derived from people, versus Westphalian sovereignty of authority and power alone. Engaged democracy, derived from Rousseau.

Constitutional crises led to one of main factors leading to civil war - sectionalism - the rights of states to continue slavery, South feeling threatened due to sudden expansion to the west of free states. #10 as major paper against worries of 'factionalism and insurrection'. History between founding of Philadelphian system to Civil War marred by controversy and three Great Compromises over slavery. Hence one of the great flaws of the system between state and federal rule, and over the great crime of slavery. Calhoun, Disquisition, pro-slavery, nullification. Webster, majority rule. But little exposition seen of Hamilton's old position by the 1850s.

Civil War ending the constitutional crisis. Federal union finally dominant. Most productive Congress in years now that the South is gone.

And so forth. These papers are old, but far from irrelevant.

[jwhenderson_1 · Rating: 5 out of 5 stars]

The arguments of Hamilton, Madison and Jay are just as relevant today as they were more than two hundred years ago. The authors of The Federalist Papers wanted to influence the vote in favor of ratifying the Constitution. However, the authors of the Federalist papers also had a greater plan in mind. According to Federalist 1:"It has been frequently remarked, that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not, of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend, for their political constitutions, on accident and force."They present positive arguments for the ratification of the Constitution and, as Madison says in Paper No. 37, "They solicit the attention of those only who add to a sincere zeal for the happiness of their country,". What a thought and temperament, that zeal for happiness. One thing that impressed me on reading the papers was the classical education demonstrated by the authors with their articles filled with references to Cicero, Rome and Greece. Enlightenment thinkers were also evident with Montesquieu being a notable example. Certainly this is a book worth rereading with the current importance of the constitution in our political life.

[randystafford · Rating: 5 out of 5 stars]

My reactions to reading this in 1992.What can you say about a classic of political thought -- a dense work that took a long time to read? I?ll record a few surface impressions. Madison has a more reasonable tone than the sometimes sarcastic Hamilton. Though he never names names, you can see why his personal invectives led to his death in the duel with Aaron Burr. I found the methods of argument interesting. The authors, especially Hamilton, argue the initial assumptions of their opponents then go on to show how their arguments are without merit even if certain of their assumptions are accepted. Constantly, they emphasize that this is not a perfect government and that we should neither assume people are totally evil or totally trustworthy. Yet, in their proposal for a Republican government, they wisely choose to link a man?s ambition to his constituents? welfare (and carefully arrange each type of government official to have their own power base) and have the Supreme Court and Senate reign in the wilder passions of the people. I found it revealing that they expected the legislative branch to become dominant (and it has) and seemed, to my pretty ignorant eyes, to forsee the role the Supreme Court assumed after Maybury vs Madison (Justice Marshal was tutored in political philosophy by Madison). The new republic seemed to think excise taxes, duties, and property taxes would be the main supports. Hamilton comes off as a vigorous supporter of a strong central government -- vigorous enough to motivate some fortunately not heeded arguments against the proposed Bill of Rights. Hamilton seems particulary incensed that opponents of the Constitution would claim the right to trial by jury is eliminated. A great deal of space is taken by his rebuttal. Madison?s early papers shows his historical knowledge and the inspirations for different features of the Constitution. I found the argument that command of the armed forces should be vested nationally because people wouldn?t trust it interesting. One can see the whole matter of loyalty to state throughout the work, a loyalty the authors saw as a check on national despotism.

[quantum_flapdoodle · Rating: 4 out of 5 stars]

One of the most classic documents of American history, this work is a series of essays by the writers of the Constitution, which were written to explain the new Constitution and to agitate on behalf of ratification. The prose soars in most places, and it reminds a person of what it would have been possible for America to become if we'd treated our new constitution as a living document, but recognized the importance of the clauses that safeguard us from imperial presidents and monarchs.

[janeaustennut · Rating: 5 out of 5 stars]

Excellent; A must read and reference for any citizen of the United States! Should be required reading in all American High Schools! If one is a citizen and participates in the voting process, they must be familiar with The Federalist Papers and the Constitution.

[shawncorps · Rating: 5 out of 5 stars]

An essential classic of American constitutional scholarship.

[antiquary_1 · Rating: 5 out of 5 stars]

I rated it 5 not just because it is a classic, but because it really is that good-- and much less naive than some commentators make out. For example, it clearly does expect that the US will have fiercely partisan politics.

[jpsnow · Rating: 5 out of 5 stars]

All thoughtful citizens should read this classic. Does anything need to be said about its importance? A few new impressions of mine: difficult reading due to the elevated style of the authors of that time, bordering on embarrassing for our present day situation. About 1/3 through the 85 papers, I thought I could begin to determine which "Publius" was the writer, Hamilton being more foreceful in argument and direct in course. The authors predicted some of the problems we have today and the evolution of the Constitution, especially with regard to the variety and continual change of factions (and corresponding need for the country to be flexible. Our government was similar to many others being developed at that time (including the 13 state governments), all based on the recent writings of political philosophers such as Montesque. I think the 3 authors would be most surprised today at the gargantuan size of the federal government. While they admitted of the potential growth, they also believed it would be in relation to the growth of the population. A typical sentence "Our own experience has corroborated the lessons taught by the examples of other nations; that emergencies of this sort will sometimes exist in all societies, however, inseparable from the body politic as tumors and eruption from the natural body; that the idea of governing at all times by the simple force of law (which we have been told is the only admissible principle of republican government) has no place but in the reveries of those political doctors whose sagacity disdains the admonitions of experimental instruction." In #31, Hamilton illustrates his consistency by comparing axioms of good government to the axioms of geometry, the former being that: "there cannot be an effect without a cause, that the means ought to be proportioned to the end, that every power ought to be commensurate with its object, that there ought to be no limitation of a power destined to effect a purpose which is itself incapable of limitation." In reading the Constitution itself, I note that the more recent amendments are significantly longer than the original ten and even longer than most of the original articles.

[angelic55blonde · Rating: 5 out of 5 stars]

This is a great addition to any library, and a must read/own for anyone who calls themselves an American historian/buff.

[kade_11 · Rating: 4 out of 5 stars]

One thing about this version that is superior to others is the table of contents with summaries of the contents of each Federalist article. All the other Federalist Papers compilations I've read lacked an effective table of contents which told you which article covered which subject.

[cajun_huguenot · Rating: 5 out of 5 stars]

A MUST read for every American who wants to understand our Constitution.

[beau0p0laurence · Rating: 4 out of 5 stars]

this is the written dialogue between and among our Founding Fathers as they debated -- in public -- how the U.S. of A. would work, legally speaking. news flash -- most of the "constitutional issues" in 2006 were discussed in the late 1700s by Jefferson, Adams, et al. if you agree (or disagree) with today's pundits, read this book and be able to articulate why your opinion makes sense.

[ulfhjorr · Rating: 5 out of 5 stars]

The great letters of Publius are an essential collection for anyone wishing to understand the Constitutional views of elite federalists in the late eighteenth century. This edition adds an enlightening and interesting introductory essay by Benjamin Wright that only adds to the value of the text.