Collateral Damage And The United States Air Force

By Major Patrick M. Shaw

Minimization of collateral damage is an objective of the United States Air Force (USAF) whenever it conducts hostile operations. While the USAF has often expressed concern about causing collateral damage, its actions have not always reflected a consistent level of commitment. This essay explores the evolution of USAF concerns about collateral damage and examines the causes and effects of this unfortunate by-product of airpower. It concludes that the concerns harbored about causing collateral damage reduce the military effectiveness of airpower. This loss of effectiveness is not always important. For example, when a resource rich coalition conducts an air campaign against an inferior adversary, that coalition can discriminate in its application of airpower by allocating great effort to the avoidance of collateral damage. In a different context, such asymmetry may not exist. Commanders then might have to focus on achieving objectives while paying little attention to the possibility of collateral damage. In either case, collateral damage will likely occur, varying only in degree. The USAF can take actions which will help alleviate some of the causes of collateral damage. Improvements in the areas of planning and technology provide certain relief, but ultimately, political and military leaders must accept that collateral damage is an inevitable part of airpower.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Tannenberg Publishing
• Release date: Aug 15, 2014
• ISBN: 9781782896791

Major Patrick M. Shaw

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Text originally published in 1997 under the same title.

© Pickle Partners Publishing 2014, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

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Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

COLLATERAL DAMAGE AND THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

BY

PATRICK M. SHAW

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

ABOUT THE AUTHOR 5

Acknowledgment 6

Abstract 7

Chapter 1 — Introduction 8

Chapter 2 — Collateral Damage and The Law of War 11

The Need for a Law of War 11

Beginnings of the Law of War 13

A Law of War for Bombing 14

The Law of War Today 16

Summary 18

Chapter 3 — Causes of Collateral Damage from Aerial Attack 20

Problems in Determining Causes 20

Influencing Factors 21

Causes of Collateral Damage 22

Attacks pursued using the principle of proportionality 22

System inadequacies 24

Human error 25

Incomplete intelligence 25

Enemy defenses 26

Environmental conditions 27

Inadequate comprehension 28

Brute force 28

Conclusion 29

Chapter 4 — The Effect of Collateral Damage on USAF Operations 31

Reduced Military Efficiency 31

Limited Options 32

Challenges to Support 33

Restrictive Rules of Engagement 34

Increased Restrictions 37

Enemy Exploitation 38

Chapter 5 — USAF Efforts to Minimize Collateral Damage in Desert Storm 41

Planning 41

Instances of Collateral Damage 44

Enemy Exploitation 47

Assessment 49

Conclusion 53

Chapter 6 — Controlling Collateral Damage 56

Dealing with Context 56

Importance of Consequences 58

Controlling Collateral Damage 60

Planning 60

Technology 62

Acceptance 63

Dealing with Enemy Exploitation 64

Conclusion 65

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 67

BIBLIOGRAPHY 68

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major (Lt. Col. select) Patrick M. Shaw was commissioned through Officer Training School in 1982. He graduated from Undergraduate Navigator Training that same year and went on to fly the F-111 for 13 consecutive years. His first operational tours were at Royal Air Force Lakenheath. Subsequently, he was selected for an operational test and evaluation assignment at McClellan AFB followed by a tour in developmental testing at that same base. Major Shaw is a senior navigator with over 2400 flying hours. He has a bachelor’s degree in Business from the University of Washington and a master’s degree in Aeronautical Technology from Embry Riddle University. In July 1997, Major Shaw was assigned to Headquarters, United States Air Forces in Europe as a strategist.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Here’s to Major Mark Conversino who, although he did not read this essay quite as many times as I did, had the innate ability to inform me as to what it was I was trying to say. Here’s also to my wonderful wife, Nicole V. Brown, who took up all the slack I left lying about while trying to bring this project through to completion. Apologies to my daughters Callahan and Reilly for being gone so often. Tomorrow belongs to you.

ABSTRACT

Minimization of collateral damage is an objective of the United States Air Force (USAF) whenever it conducts hostile operations. While the USAF has often expressed concern about causing collateral damage, its actions have not always reflected a consistent level of commitment. This essay explores the evolution of USAF concerns about collateral damage and examines the causes and effects of this unfortunate by-product of airpower. It concludes that the concerns harbored about causing collateral damage reduce the military effectiveness of airpower. This loss of effectiveness is not always important. For example, when a resource rich coalition conducts an air campaign against an inferior adversary, that coalition can discriminate in its application of airpower by allocating great effort to the avoidance of collateral damage. In a different context, such asymmetry may not exist. Commanders then might have to focus on achieving objectives while paying little attention to the possibility of collateral damage. In either case, collateral damage will likely occur, varying only in degree. The USAF can take actions which will help alleviate some of the causes of collateral damage. Improvements in the areas of planning and technology provide certain relief, but ultimately, political and military leaders must accept that collateral damage is an inevitable part of airpower.

CHAPTER 1 — INTRODUCTION

This is war and some civilians are bound to get killed.—Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp

The United States Air Force (USAF) often proclaims its desire to minimize collateral damage when conducting hostile operations.{1} Doctrine and training manuals contain statements indicative of this aspiration.{2} Senior leaders are apt to reiterate it any time the USAF executes an attack. This apparent commitment to keep collateral damage low raises several fundamental questions. Specifically, why does the USAF seek minimal collateral damage during operations? What are the causes of collateral damage? How does the potential for collateral damage affect USAF operations? What can the USAF do to ensure its ability to minimize collateral damage? If we are successful at minimization, does that set a standard which the USAF must meet in all future operations? A determination of the answers to these questions requires an investigation into the many factors, which influence the occurrence of collateral damage.

The purpose of this paper is to examine these factors and determine the answers to the above questions. The methodology of this thesis includes: a study of how the Law of Armed Conflict influences USAF combat actions, an examination of past instances of airpower-inflicted collateral damage, and an investigation into the effects potential collateral damage can have on USAF operations. While I cannot chronicle every instance of collateral damage, I will present representative samples, which illustrate its basic causes. Examination of these examples will shed light on how potential and actual collateral damage can affect USAF operations. Analysis of how the USAF approached this minimization problem in Desert Storm can provide an indication of how well airpower can minimize collateral damage while still successfully achieving military objectives. The investigation begins by considering the definition of collateral damage.

Most of the references that exist in Air Force manuals merely state that commanders and planners consider the potential for collateral damage when taking military action and minimize such damage if possible. Few of the citations give more than cursory attention as to what constitutes collateral damage. The Air Force provides only a simple definition: the damage to surrounding resources, either military or non-military, as a result of actions or strikes directed specifically against enemy forces or military facilities.{3} This is quite narrow and does not deal with casualties to non-combatants, which are probably our major concern. Certainly, the Air Force regrets harm it causes to innocent civilians and implies this in any definition meant to elucidate the inadvertent outcomes of military actions. Air Force Pamphlet 110-34, Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Armed Conflict, states that it is not unlawful to cause incidental injury or death to civilians or damage to civilian property during an attack on a legitimate military objective.{4} The pamphlet gives the name collateral damage to the incidental results of such attacks.

The definition of collateral damage is also of concern to non-military groups. Influential organizations like Greenpeace and the International Committee of the Red Cross have their own concepts of collateral damage which are more far-ranging than that of the USAF.{5} The viewpoints of non-governmental organizations like these may occasionally be important to the USAF because of the political influence they may wield. This influence can restrict the employment of airpower through changes in international law or political pressure on domestic US leaders.{6} It behooves the airpower strategist to be aware that more than one concept of collateral damage exists.

Actual collateral damage can produce various responses, which affect USAF operations. For example, excessive destruction of an adversary’s infrastructure may cause that nation’s government to be less cooperative in achieving post-war stability; perhaps a coalition member who believes greater than necessary damage is being inflicted will withdraw basing rights for the other members; or it is possible that domestic support for a war might wane if collateral damage exceeds certain levels.{7} These types of responses can undermine the USAF’s ability to effectively conduct operations. To deal with the possibility of such responses, the USAF often places restrictions on operational attack methods. This can reduce the chance of collateral damage occurring, but it can also reduce airpower’s effectiveness and efficiency.

The airpower strategist seeks to mitigate such reductions. One of his