Why Gallipoli Matters: Interpreting Different Lessons From History
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History can often provide contradictory lessons to those who wish to use it to practically apply operational art. Using analogies correctly is important. For the operational commander, drawing the correct lessons learned is made even more difficult by the very nature of inter-service rivalry. Derived from an analysis of the operational art and at operational level of war, the lessons learned from this campaign led directly to the development of sound doctrine, which developed in peacetime was absolutely essential in wartime. Finally, we continue to learn from failure more often than through success, but we must not allow ourselves to be intimidated by failure either.
Lieutenant Colonel John M. Sullivan Jr USMC
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Why Gallipoli Matters - Lieutenant Colonel John M. Sullivan Jr USMC
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Text originally published in 2003 under the same title.
© Pickle Partners Publishing 2014, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.
Publisher’s Note
Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.
We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.
WHY GALLIPOLI MATTERS: INTERPRETING DIFFERENT LESSONS FROM HISTORY
by
Lieutenant Colonel John M. Sullivan Jr USMC
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS 4
Abstract 5
Introduction 6
Background 6
The British Approach 9
The Influence of the Strategic End State 9
Operational Experiences 10
Means Available to the Operational Commander 12
The American Approach 14
The Influence of the Strategic End State 14
Operational Experiences 15
The Means Available to the Operational Commander 17
Conclusions 19
REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 21
BIBLIOGRAPHY 22
Abstract
After careful study of the Gallipoli Campaign of 1915, why did the British and the Americans come up to contradictory operational conclusions regarding the future applicability of amphibious operations? Divergent views from the lessons of Gallipoli campaign are the result of three differing operational approaches to strategic considerations that Britain and the Unites States faced in the 1920s and 1930s. The first were different theater strategic objectives that required different operational campaigns necessary to achieve each. The second was different operational experiences,