Logic and Metaphysics

By J.L. Shaw

This volume of the collected works of J.L. Shaw contains twelve papers that fall in the intersection of logic, metaphysics, and the philosophy of language. Professor Shaw's methodology in these papers is that of comparative philosophy. With an emphasis on classical Indian analytical philosophy and late 19th and 20th century Western analytical philosophy, Professor Shaw compares such traditions as the Nyaya, Navya Nyaya, Mimamsa, Vedanta, and Buddhism with each other and with Western thinkers like Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Strawson, Austin, Quine, Kripke, Searle, and Chomsky.

The first paper of the volume, “The Relevance of Indian Philosophy of Language to Contemporary Western Philosophy”, serves two main purposes. While the primary purpose of this paper is made obvious by its title, the paper also serves to introduce many of the topics that will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent papers, such as meaning, proper names, demonstratives, descriptions, and sentence transformation. Other papers in the volume deal with topics in logic, such as existentially and universally quantified sentences, negation, inference, fallacies, and the related notion of relevance. In addition, two important topics in metaphysics are also examined in detail, namely the nature of properties and the nature of existence. While the former is discussed throughout the volume, existence receives its own chapter in the form of “‘Exists’ and ‘Predicate’”.

The great value of the papers in this volume lies in their ability to connect the traditions and thinkers which Professor Shaw focuses on in a way that is clear and accessible to those with some background in analytical philosophy. Without investing some time in the study of comparative philosophy, one runs the risk of being stuck with the problems of one's own tradition while answers which may shed some light on these problems have already been developed within another tradition. This volume will therefore be of special value to professors and graduate students who wish to expand their perspective to include the ideas of the above mentioned traditions and thinkers, and to become familiar with philosophical thought outside of one's own tradition.

Jaysankar Lal Shaw is an Associate Professor in the School of History, Philosophy, Political Science & International Relations at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. Professor Shaw holds an MA from Calcutta University and PhD from Rice University, and has taught at Victoria University of Wellington, Calcutta University, Jadavpur University, the University of Alabama, and the University of Hawaii. He is the author of Knowledge, Belief and Doubt: Some Contemporary Problems and their Solutions from the Nyaya Perspective, Causality and Its Application: Samkhya, Bauddha, and Nyaya, and Some Logical Problems Concerning Existence, in addition to a number of other books and academic papers.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Society for Philosophy & Culture
• Release date: Sep 14, 2014
• ISBN: 9781310779701

J.L. Shaw

Jaysankar Lal Shaw, senior lecturer, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, had his education at Calcutta University and received his Ph.D. at Rice University, Houston, Texas. He taught at Jadavpur University, Calcutta, at the University of Alabama, USA, and was an Associate Professor at the University of Hawaii.

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Contents

Acknowledgements

The Relevance of Indian Philosophy of Language to Contemporary Western Philosophy

Descriptions: Some Contemporary Problems and their Solutions from the Nyaya Perspective

Subject and Predicate

‘Exists’ and ‘Predicate’

Singular Existential Sentences: Contemporary Philosophy and the Nyaya

Meaning: a Comparative Study

The Nyaya on Cognition and Negation

Empty Terms: The Nyaya and the Buddhists

Number: From the Nyaya to Frege-Russell

The Nyaya on Inference and Fallacies

The Concept of Relevance (Sangati) in Gangesa

Acknowledgements

The papers in this volume originally appeared in the following publications:

The Relevance of Indian Philosophy of Language to Contemporary Western Philosophy in Purushottama Bilimoria, ed., Contemporary Philosophy and J.L. Shaw (Pustak Mahal, 2006)

Descriptions: Some Contemporary Problems and their Solutions from the Nyaya Perspective in Journal of Indian Academy of Philosophy, Volume 36, 1997 (Part 1) & Volume 37, 1998 (Part 2).

Subject and Predicate in Journal of Indian Philosophy, Volume 4, Number 1-2, 1976.

‘Exists’ and ‘Predicate’ in Sambodhi, Volume 8, Number 4, 1980.

Singular Existential Sentences: Contemporary Philosophy and the Nyaya in Peter Fenner & Purusottama Bilimoria, eds., Religions and Comparative Thought: Essays in Honour of the Late Dr. Ian Kesarcodi-Watson (Sri Satguru Publications, 1988).

Meaning: A Comparative Study in Journal of Netaji Subhas Open University, Volume 1, Number 1, 2003.

The Nyaya on Cognition and Negation in Journal of Indian Philosophy, Volume 8, Number 3, 1980.

Empty Terms: The Nyaya and the Buddhists in Journal of Indian Philosophy, Volume 2, Number 3-4, 1977.

Number: From the Nyaya to Frege-Russell in Studia Logica Volume 41, Number 2-3, 1982.

The Nyaya on Inference and Fallacies in Madhabendra Nath Mitra, Mihir Kumar Chakraborty & Sundar Sarukkai, eds., Studies in Logic: a Dialogue between the East and the West : Homage to Bimal Krishna Matilal (Sanctum Books, 2012).

"The Concept of Relevance (Sangati) in Gangesa" in Sambhasa, Volume 16, 1995.

We thank the publishers of the above for their kind permission to use these papers in this book.

The Relevance of Indian Philosophy of Language to Contemporary Western Philosophy

Introduction

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the relevance of Indian philosophy of language to contemporary Western philosophy so that it can be integrated with the mainstream of Western philosophy. Hence I shall discuss 1) how to reconcile some of the conflicting views in contemporary Western philosophy by using the techniques of the classical Indian philosophy, 2) how to suggest new or better solutions to some of the problems of contemporary philosophy, 3) how to suggest solutions to some age-old or unsolved problems of Western philosophy, and 4) how to add new dimensions to Western philosophy.

In this paper I shall discuss some of the problems related to meaning and transformation in Western philosophy. The first section will deal with proper names. In this context I shall show how to reconcile the conflict between the description theory of proper names and the causal/historical explanation theory of proper names in Western philosophy.

The second section will deal with the nature of demonstrative pronouns or indexicals. In this context I shall demonstrate how the Nyaya philosophers have retained the distinction between the meaning of a demonstrative pronoun and the rule for its use.

In the third section I shall discuss Russell’s theory of definite descriptions. In this context I have reconstructed the Nyaya theory of definite descriptions from Gadadhara’s remarks on the use of the word ‘one’ in the sense of ‘only one’. Russell’s theory will be evaluated in the light of Gadadhara’s theory of definite descriptions.

The fourth section deals with the meaning of a sentence and the question of whether transformation preserves the meaning. The views of the Nyaya, the Mimamsa and the Vedanta philosophers will be discussed in this context. Our discussion of the meaning of a sentence and transformation will suggest solutions to some of the problems of transformation mentioned by contemporary philosophers, such as Chomsky, Katz, Fodor, Jackendoff, and Fillmore.

The fifth section deals with the nature of understanding the meaning of a sentence, especially the molecular sentences. The Nyaya philosophers have explained the atomistic as well as the holistic nature of it. The sixth section deals with the division of a sentence into subject and predicate. It deals with the question whether the predicate is to be considered as unsaturated. Since the Nyaya philosophers have given an argument for considering the predicate alone as unsaturated, our discussion will suggest solutions to some of the contemporary problems related to the subject-predicate discussion.

As I shall be discussing the relevance of Indian philosophy of language, let me mention the Nyaya concept of relevance in this context. According to Gangesa, the founder of Navya-Nyaya, relevance is a relation between the contents of expressions, or sentences, or sets of sentences. According to Gangesa if P is relevant to Q, then Q is an answer to a question, say S, and S is due to a cognition, say T; and the content of this cognition, say R, is the relation of relevance. It. is to be noted that the cognition T is causally related to S, and S is causally related to Q. In this context Indian philosophy of language would be our P and the questions, such as whether it can solve some problems of Western philosophy, whether it can add new dimensions to Western philosophy, and whether it can resolve some of the conflicts in Western philosophy, would be our S. The cognitions which are causally related to these questions would be our T, and the content of T, i.e. R, would be the relation of relevance. Our answers to these questions would be Q. The R would relate P to Q by the relation of relevance. Hence our demonstration of relevance would correspond to Q.[1]

I: Proper Names

In this section I shall discuss some of the theories of proper names, and how to resolve some of the conflicts by using the techniques of the Nyaya philosophers. In Western philosophy we come across two types of views about proper names. One type is known as ‘the description theory’ and the other type as ‘the causal or the historical explanation theory’. The former has been attributed to Frege, Russell, Strawson, and Searle, among many others. The latter has been propounded by Kripke, and defended by philosophers like Donnellan.

Now let us state the description theory of proper names with reference to the views of Frege and Russell. Frege has postulated both sense and reference for proper names. It has been claimed that according to Frege, the sense of a proper name is to be expressed by the sense of a set of definite descriptions. He has put forward the following arguments for his sense theory of proper names:

i) It is said that we cannot explain the difference between the statements ‘a=a’ and ‘a=b’ if’a=b’ is true, unless ‘a’ and ‘b’ have different senses. According to Frege, the statement’a=a’ is analytic and a priori, whereas the statement ‘a=b’ is both synthetic and aposteriori.

ii) Secondly, it is claimed that we cannot identify the referent of a proper name unless weadmit its sense. As regards the name ‘Aristotle’, Frege claimed that we can refer to himin terms of definite descriptions, such as ‘the teacher of Alexander the Great’.Moreover, Frege has admitted fluctuations in sense. Hence different persons might identify Aristotle in terms of different identifying descriptions.

iii) Thirdly, Frege has admitted meaningfulness of empty terms like ‘the series with the least convergence’. Since Frege has treated them as proper names, we have to admit senses for these expressions. Hence proper names like ‘Pegasus’ are meaningful terms.

iv) Fourthly, in order to explain indirect discourse and propositional attitudes, such as belief, Frege has postulated sense. Hence in the sentence ‘John believes that Shakespeare is the author of Waverley’ the subordinate clause ‘Shakespeare is the author of Waverley’ refers to its sense which is called ‘proposition’ in the terminology of Frege.[2]

As regards the nature of sense, Frege has made the following remarks:

i) It is a mode of presentation of the object.

ii) The sense of a proper name contains the manner and context of presentation.

iii) The sense of a proper name ‘Is grasped by everyone who knows the language.’[3]

iv) It illuminates the nominatum or referent if there is any.

v) The sense of a proper name belongs to the nominatum if there is one.

vi) The step from the sense of a proper name to its nominatum is determinate.[4]

As regards the ontological status of sense, he has claimed that it is neither subjective like ideas or images, nor is it objective like physical objects. It cannot be located in space and time. Hence his concept of sense leads to Platonism. Even if we reject Platonism what follows from his view is that the sense of a proper name is to be explained in terms of the sense of a set of descriptions, definite or indefinite. According to most of the interpreters or critics of Frege, the sense of a proper name is to be identified with the sense of a cluster of definite descriptions.

Now let us introduce Russell’s conception of proper names. According to Russell, unlike Frege, there is a sharp distinction between a logically proper name and an ordinary proper name or a definite description. An ordinary proper name such as ‘Socrates’ is a set of definite descriptions in disguise. It is reducible to a set of definite descriptions. Hence the meaning of ‘Socrates’ is to be identified with that of a definite description such as ‘the teacher of Plato’. It is also claimed that according to Searle, Strawson and later Wittgenstein, the meaning of a proper name is identified with that of a set of definite descriptions. Hence proper names are sets of conjunctions or disjunctions of definite descriptions. This theory is known as the description theory of proper names.

With respect to this theory of proper names, Kripke said, I think it is pretty certain that the view of Frege and Russell is false.[5] According to Kripke a proper name is a rigid designator. A term is a rigid designator if it designates the same object in any possible world in which it exists. The name ‘Aristotle’ cannot be equated with a set of definite descriptions. Definite descriptions are used to fix the referent of a name. Hence the sentence ‘Aristotle might not have been the teacher of Alexander the Great’ is true. This is due to the fact that in another possible world the person Aristotle is not the teacher of Alexander the Great. Hence in this possible world the description ‘the teacher of Alexander the Great’ cannot pick out the referent of ‘Aristotle’. Moreover, according to Kripke, a proper name has no sense or connotation. It has only reference. As regards the nature of the referent of a proper name, he claimed that it is a particular which is referred to by a proper name, but it cannot be equated with ‘a bundle of qualities’. Now the question is: How do we fix the referent of a proper name? He answered this question in terms of initial baptism. He said: Someone, let us say, a baby, is born; his parents call him by a certain name. They talk about him to their friends. Other people meet him. Through various sorts of talk the name is spread from link to link as if by a chain.[6]

This theory of Kripke is known as the causal or the historical explanation theory of names. It is to be noted that he has emphasised the initial baptism which fixes the reference either by ostension or by a description. Moreover, this causal theory is considered as a substitute for the description theory of names. He has also claimed that the description theory is false. Hence we face a conflict between these two theories. I would like to claim that the Nyaya theory of proper names can reconcile the conflict between these two opposing views in contemporary philosophy.

Now I shall introduce the Nyaya theories of proper names in the light of the Nyaya concept of the meaning of a general term such as ‘cow’ or ‘pot’. The Nyaya has admitted a conventional relation between an expression and what is referred to by that expression. The relation is called ‘vrtti’. There are two types of this relation depending on whether an expression refers to the primary referent or the secondary referent of it. The usual or the conventional referents of an expression are the primary referents. Hence the individual cows are the primary referents of the word ‘cow’. Similarly, the river Ganges is the primary referent of the word ‘Ganges’. But in the case of a metaphor, a word, according to the Nyaya, refers to something which is related to its primary referent and it is the intended object of the speaker or the writer. Hence it may be called ‘the secondary referent’. For example, in the sentence ‘The village is on the Ganges’, the secondary referent is the bank of the river Ganges. There would be inconsistency if we take primary referent of the word ‘Ganges’ in such contexts. Hence we should take the secondary referent of the word ‘Ganges’.

The relation between a word and its primary referent is called ‘samketa’ (‘primary relation’), but the relation between a word and its secondary referent is called ‘laksana’ (‘secondary relation’). Again samketa or the primary relation is of two types depending on whether the convention is ancient or modern. Regarding the nature of the conventional relation, the Nyaya claims that it is due to the intention of the name-giver. Hence it takes the form ‘Let such and such object(s) be cognised by such and such expression’ or ‘Let such and such expression generate the cognition of such and such object(s)’. If the relation between a word and its referent is due to an ancient convention, then it is called ‘sakti’ (‘ancient, conventional relation’), but if it depends on a modern convention, then it is called ‘paribhasa’ (‘modern conventional relation’).

Regarding the nature of the relation between a word and its referent, other schools of Indian philosophy differ from the view of the Nyaya. According to Grammarians such as Bhartrhari and literary critics the relation between them is identity-in-difference (bhedabheda or tadatmya). Since a word and its referent are cognised as non-different, the relation between them is identity-in-difference. But the Nyaya philosophers assert the difference between them even if they appear together at cognitive level. Hence the followers of the Nyaya claim this relation to be conventional.

According to the followers of t he Mimamsa and the Vedanta, the relation called ‘sakti’ is a type of power and it is an entity. It has been explained in the way we explain the capacity of fire to burn something. As fire has the capacity to burn something so a word (pada) has the capacity (or power) which is conducive to the generation of understanding the meaning of a sentence. The Nyaya philosophers also claim that a word generates the memory-cognition of its referent which is a causal condition for understanding the meaning of a sentence, but they do not consider this power as an entity. It is to be considered as a relation which is due to the intention of the name-giver (asmat padat ayam arthah boddhauyah).

As regards the meaning of a general term, the old Nyaya claims that the meaning complex includes three types of entities. The meaning of the word ‘cow’ includes particular cows, the configuration (akrti) of particular cows, and the class-character cowness. Hence the word ‘cow’ means ‘particular cows qualified by cowness and the configuration (akrti). But the Navya-Nyaya philosophers such as Jagadisa have interpreted the word akrti as ‘that which determines the form of an object.’ Hence it is taken as the relation of a class-character to the individuals which are instances of it. Since this relation is inherence in the Nyaya system, the word ‘akrti’ would refer to this relation. Hence the meaning of the word ‘cow’ may be stated in the following way:

The first member of this ordered triple is the referents (sakya) of the word ‘cow’, the third member is the limitor of the property of being the referent or referents (sakyatauacchedaka) of the word ‘cow’, and the second member relates the third member to the first member. In this context it is to be noted that the Nyaya philosophers have used the terms ‘sakyatavacchedaka’ and ‘pravrtti-nimitta’ to refer to the third member of the meaning-complex. The former refers to a property or a set of properties which will determine the referent or the referents of a term, but the latter is used in a wider sense. It may be translated as ‘the reason for applying the term to the object or objects to which it applies’. Since this concept will be used to reconcile the conflict between the description and the causal theory of proper names, let us explain it. We come across as many as three distinct views in the Nyaya literature. Vardhamana Upadhyaya has defined it in the following way:

x is the pravrtti-nimitta of the expression ‘y’ iff:

i) x is a part of the meaning-complex of ‘y’

ii) x qualifies the referent or the referents of ‘y’, and

iii) x appears as the qualifier when we remember the referent or referents of ‘y’.

But Gadadhara, a Navya-Nyaya philosopher, has not included the third condit ion of Vardhamana in his definition of ‘pravrtti-nimitta’. According to him, the pravrtti-nimitta of a term is a part of the meaning-complex, and it belongs to the referent or the referents of a term. According to Raghunatha Siromani the pravrtti-nimitta of a term need not be part of the meaning-complex of the term. He claims that, it is an indicator (upalaksana) of the referent or the referents of a term. It is something which fixes the referent or the referents of a term. Hence an indicator helps in cognising the referent(s) of a term. The sentence ‘The house of Devadatta is crow-possessor’ has been used to illustrate an indicator. It is something which helps in picking out the object even if it is not a necessary property of it, or not a real property of it. But the term ‘sakyatavacchedaka’ is not an indicator (upalaksaria). It refers to a unique property of the referent or the referents of a term. Hence it may be expressed by a universal in the case of the meaning of a general term or by an attributive definite description in the case of the meaning of a proper name. But the pravrtti-nimitta of a term may be expressed by any definite description, referential or attributive. Hence it gives us the reason for applying the term to the object or objects to which it applies.

Now let us introduce the Nyaya theories of proper names.

1) According to some early Nyaya philosophers such as Jayanta Bhatta the meaning of a proper name is the object itself. Since a proper name is applicable to one object only, the meaning-complex cannot include a universal as it does in the case of a general term such as ‘cow’. Hence the meaning of the word ‘John’ is the person John who is devoid of any universal (samanya) or class-character (jati). Several objections have been raised against this view by the followers of the Navya-Nyaya.

i) If the meaning of ‘John’ is the referent itself, then sentences such as ‘John is tall’ or descriptions such as ‘a brother of John’ would not generate any cognition in a hearer or a speaker if he/she is not acquainted with the referent of ‘John’.

ii) Moreover, the Navya-Nyaya philosophers claim that if we accept this view, then we multiply the number of entities which are cognised without any mode of presentation. According to the Nyaya thesis a class-character (jati) and an unanalysable imposed property (akhancia-upadhi) are cognised without any mode of presentation if they are not mentioned by expressions. But from the view of Jayanta it follows that the referents of proper names can also be cognised without any mode of presentation. Moreover, we have to admit this type of cognition of the referent even if the name is mentioned.

2) By using the Nyaya conception of akrti (configuration) the meaning of a proper name such as ‘John’ may be stated thus: The word ‘John’ means akrti) of John>, where R relates the third member to the first member. Hence ‘R’ stands for the relation of svasrayasamavetatva (the property of being the locus of akrti and the converse of inherence).

3) According to Jagadisa there is no fundamental difference between a general term and a proper name. As the term ‘man’ refers to human beings qualified by humanity, so the name ‘John’ refers to John-individuals qualified by the property of being John. Hence ‘John’ means

It is to be noted that the referents of ‘John’ are different John-individuals such as the John of boyhood, the John of adulthood, and the John of old age. If we accept this view, then we have to admit class-characters (jatis) corresponding to proper names. Since this view multiples the number of class-characters and goes against the ordinary usage, it is not acceptable to most of the followers of the Navya-Nyaya.

4) According to another view of the Navya-Nyaya, the meaning-complex of a proper name, say ‘John’, includes the individual John, the property of being John (tadvyaktilua), and the relation of the latter to the former. Hence the meaning of ‘John’ may be represented in the following way:

‘John’ means

As regards the nature of the property of being John, we come across several views in the Nyaya literature.

i) According to some Navya-Nyaya philosophers, such as Jagadisa, the property of being John is the individual John as the second term of the relation of identity, the first term of which is also John. Hence it is John presented under the mode of the relation of identity.

ii) According to some other Navya-Nyaya philosophers, such as Raghunatha, the propertyof being John is a separate irreducible category. Hence it cannot be identified eitherwith John or with any other category of the Nyaya system.

iii) According to another interpretation the property of being John is a function of the uniquenesses of the parts of John. Since the ultimate parts of any created object have their own uniquenesses, the uniqueness of any created object can be explained as a function of the uniquenesses of its parts and ultimately in terms of the uniquenesses of its irreducible parts.

iv) Following Raghunatha, the role of an indicator (upalaksana) may be assigned to the property of being John. As an indicator fixes or indicates the referent of a term, so the property of being John fixes the referent of John. In this sense any referential definite description of Kripke or Donnellan would serve as the property of being John. Moreover, the Nyaya philosophers have mentioned the name-giving or baptism ceremony. Hence it may be equated with the causal chain of Kripke, which is related to the initial baptism. Hence ‘John’ means .

From the above discussion of the Nyaya concept of pravrtti-nimitta it follows that it is something which would fix the referent of a term. It may be a necessary or a contingent property, or an indicator. Hence the conflict between the description theory and the causal theory of Kripke may be reconciled by using the Nyaya concept of pravrtti-nimitta. It is to be noted that the concept of pravrtti-nimitta is much more comprehensive than that of sakyatavacchedaka. Therefore, the Nyaya techniques maybe used to reconcile some of the conflicts in contemporary Western philosophy.

II: Demonstrative Pronouns

In this section I shall discuss the nature of demonstrative pronouns with reference to the views of the Nyaya philosophers as well as with reference to the views of some contemporary Western philosophers. I shall also address the question whether they are homonymous expressions.

The words like ‘this’, ‘that’, ‘he’, ‘she’, etc. are considered as demonstrative pronouns in the Nyaya system of Indian Philosophy. The Nyaya philosophers have drawn the distinction between the referent of a demonstrative pronoun, the property of being the referent, the mode of presentation of the referent, the rule for its use, the method of learning the rule, and the application of the rule. Moreover, the Nyaya philosophers have also discussed whether a demonstrative pronoun is a homonymous expression. Before introducing the Nyaya view, let us mention the views of some contemporary Western philosophers.

C.S.Peirce uses the term ‘indexical signs’ for ‘demonstrative expressions’. According to him the referent of an indexical sign is determined by its existential relation to the sign. Hence an act of pointing is an indexical sign, and the word ‘this’ is a surrogate for an index finger in an act of pointing. He thinks that an indexical sign indicates its object in the most direct way possible, and does not rely on any descriptive element. It is claimed that this view may give an account of some of the uses of indexicals such as ‘this’ when the object is present and the speaker is acquainted with it.[7] But the shortcoming of this view is that it cannot explain other uses of demonstrative pronouns such as ‘he’ in a sentence like ‘John went back home, and he is asleep’.

According to Russell demonstratives, including pronouns, are egocentric particulars. This is due to the fact that the referent of a demonstrative is relative to its utterer. According to him the word ‘this’ is a paradigm example of a demonstrative to which others are reducible. Hence the word T means ‘the biography to which this belongs.’ Similarly, the word, ‘now’ means ‘what is compresent with this’.[8] In his system the word ‘this’ is a logically proper name, and it refers to a sense-datum which the speaker experiences at the time of its utterance. One of the important objections to Russell’s analysis is that it makes communication between different persons almost impossible. This is due to the fact that the word ‘this’ refers to a private sense datum. Hence the objections against logically proper names and private language are also applicable to his explanation of the demonstratives. It is doubtful whether the same person would understand what is referred to by the word ‘this’ at different moments in his/ her history.

According to Hans Reichenbach demonstratives are token-reflexives. A token-reflexive is an expression which refers to itself. Hence the word T refers to the person who utters this token. Similarly, the word ‘now’ refers to ‘the time at which this token is uttered.’ But this analysis of Reichenbach cannot give an account of the uses of expressions such as ‘this room’, where ‘this’ refers to a room, not to itself. Hence the view that all demonstratives are self-referring is not a plausible thesis.

David Kaplan introduces a new term called ‘character’ to emphasise the linguistic meaning of a demonstrative. According to Kaplan the referent of a demonstrative depends upon the context of its use, and the meaning of a demonstrative is a rule which determines the referent in terms of certain aspects of the context. Kaplan draws the distinction between the character, content, and referent of a demonstrative. The proposition contains the referent of the demonstrative as its constituent, not its sense. Hence the referent of ‘this’ occurs as the constituent in the proposition expressed by the sentence ‘This is red’. Kaplan takes the character of a demonstrative to be a function that takes context into content.[9]

According to Kaplan, the referent of a demonstrative is determined by the meaning of it as well as by certain aspects of the context. Moreover, according to Kaplan, demonstratives are directly referential. In other words, they refer without the aid of Fregean sense. Hence the claim is that the indexicals are context-dependent, referential and univocal. In the context of our discussion of the Nyaya we shall see whether the referent of a demonstrative along with its sense occurs as a constituent.

According to the Nyaya philosophers also the expressions such as ‘this’, ‘that’, ‘it’, ‘he’, ‘she’, etc. are demonstrative pronouns. They have drawn the distinction between the referent (sakya) of a demonstrative, the property of being the referent (sakyata), and the limitor of the property of being the referent (sakyatavacchedaka). If something is a referent then it has the property of being the referent. It is a relational property of the referent. Let us consider the term ‘John’. The referent is the person John. The property of being the referent of ‘John’ is the property of being the qualificand residing in the qualificand of the intention of the speaker or name-giver, which takes the form ‘Let John be the object of cognition generated by the word John‘. In this intention John is the qualificand and the property of being the object of cognition generated by the word ‘John’ is the qualifier. Hence the property of being the referent of ‘John’ is the property of being the qualificand of the intention of the speaker. The limitor of the property of being the referent is a mode of presentation of the referent or it determines the referent. The limitor of the Nyaya cannot be identified with the sense of Frege, although both of them determine the referent of a term. Since the limitor determines the referent of a term, it may be identified with its meaning.

According to the Nyaya the referent of a demonstrative expression depends upon