Alpha

By Max Morgan

Alpha began as an intellectual diary and gradually evolved over the years into an exploration of scientific and mathematical foundations. Essentially philosophical in approach, the work undertakes a conceptual critique of terms and ideas commonly found in scientific literature. The viewpoint adopted always remains from the outside of those various disciplines, rather than one which enters the fray of the contemporary scientific community’s problem solving discussions. Overall, Alpha’s philosophical style resembles more a pre-modern one, although it’s unlikely traditionalists would concur with the end results. Thus the work’s subtitle, “Musings on a Philosophy of Nature,” which returns to an expression such as natural philosophy to indicate the topic rather than the more contemporary philosophy of science.
Basically in two parts, the first one concentrates upon exploring a philosophy of mind in general, what minds are, what they can and cannot do. Can minds be typed or classified according to qualitative differences, or are they all the same basic kind of thing with varying capabilities? How might different types of minds see the world and relate to each other? After considering these kinds of topics, the work moves to the second major part, Applications. There, Alpha explores the implications such a philosophy of mind would have upon certain disciplines and endeavors. Once might fairly characterize all of this as rather intensive.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Max Morgan
• Release date: Nov 23, 2013
• ISBN: 9781310186820

Max Morgan

Worked as go-fer, mortician's assistant, business consultant, teacher, head hunter, fund raiser, (and a few other nondescript things) but not in any particular order. Fondness for long hikes and communing with nature. Interested in the kind of philosophy no one reads outside of university philosophy departments. Would prefer to live in the eighteenth century, if I weren't a peasant (as a blacksmith would be nice). Non-technological (don't own a cell phone). I think my TV set has tubes but I never looked. Trying to find a good typewriter. Can be reached at [e-mail]

Book preview

ALPHA:

MUSINGS ON A PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

Second Edition

by

Max Morgan

Copyright 2014 Max Morgan

Smashwords Edition

License Notes

This ebook is licensed for your personal enjoyment only. This ebook may not be re-sold or given away to other people. If you would like to share this book with another person, please purchase an additional copy for each recipient. If you’re reading this book and did not purchase it, or it was not purchased for your use only, then please return to Smashwords.com and purchase your own copy. Thank you for respecting the hard work of this author.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

NOTE: Only major section headings of this Table of Contents are navigable. The remaining entries are meant to inform the reader as to what's contained under the navigable headings. Links in the body of the work labeled "TOC" and found under the major headings will return to this Table of Contents.

PREFACE

PART ONE: MIND

I MIND ITSELF

A. Mental Operations

I–100.00 Mind’s Existence

I–110.00 Mind’s Self-awareness

I–120.00 The Existence of Other Minds

I–120.10 Similarities Among Minds

I–120.20 The Robot Problem

I–130.00 Mind’s Data Gathering Mechanisms

I–140.00 Comprehension of Reality

I–150.00 Perception Considered

I–150.10 Utility of Perception

I–150.20 Perception and Interpretation

I–150.201 Perception as Hypothesis

I–150.21 Perception and Causation

I–150.30 Images

I–150.31 Reality-based Images

I–150.32 Mind-based Images

I–150.40 Concepts Considered

I–150.41 The Causal Connection of Concepts to the World

I–150.42 Possession of Concepts

I–150.43 The Representational Role of Concepts

I–150.44 The Communication of Concepts

I–150.50 The Relation of Signs, Concepts, and Images

I–160.00 Mind’s Basic Perceptivity

I–160.10 Thought as a Basic Perception

I–170.00 Basic Perception Vs. Ipse Dixit

I–180.00 The Relation of Percepts and Concepts

I–190.00 Attending and Perceiving

I–190.10 Perceptual Plasticity

I–200.00 Extrasensory Perception

B. Mental Structure

I–210.00 Mind’s Singularity

I–220.00 Perception of Mental Structures and Operations

I–220.10 Mind’s Rule Structure

I–230.00 Mind’s Components

I–240.00 Minimum Requirements for Mind

I–240.10 Machines

I–250.00 Data Processing and Mind

I–250.10 Data Processing

I–250.20 Mind’s Data Processing Capability

I–250.30 Data and Consciousness

I–260.00 Awareness Considered

I–260.01 Consciousness as Sensory Control Mechanism

I–260.05 Evolutionary Advantage of Awareness/Consciousness

I–260.10 Importance of Awareness to Mentality

I–260.15 Awareness Function and Learning

I–260.20 Rationality and Intentionality

I–260.21 Nonrational Intentionality

I–260.30 Intentionality, Awareness, and Meaning

I–260.31 Meaningfulness

I–270.00 Motivation and its Relation to Awareness

I–270.10 Motivators as Intelligence

I–280.00 Abstraction/Analysis/Synthesis as a Unit

I–290.00 Holistic Integration Defined

I–300.00 Mental Structure and Intelligence Considered

I–300.50 Measuring Intelligence

C. Mental Typology

I–310.00 Typology of Mind

I–320.00 Type 1 Mind: Data Processing + Awareness/Consciousness + Motivation

I–330.00 Type 2 Mind: Abstraction Comprehension + Type 1

I–340.00 Type 3 Mind: Abstraction Generation/Analysis/Synthesis plus Type 1 and 2

I–340.10 Type 3 Mind Development Capability

I–350.00 Type 4 Mind: Holistic Integration plus Types 1, 2, and 3

I–360.00 Type 5+: Unknown

I–360.50 Relationship of Type and Awareness Capability

I–360.70 Computer Enhanced Mental Evolution

I–370.00 Deities Considered

I–380.00 Mental Type and Concept Acquisition

I–390.00 Mental Type and Brain Size

I–390.10 Mind’s Evolutionary Process

I–390.30 The Reality of Species

I–400.00 Intra-mental Type Similarities

I–410.00 Testing or Assessing Mental Type

I–410.10 The Turing Test Considered

I–410.20 The Chinese Box Considered

I–420.00 Mind as a Necessarily Biological Entity

I–420.10 Machine Vs. Human Mentality

I–420.15 Machine Instantiation of Qualia

I–420.20 Mind as Parallel Processor

D. Meta-structure and Language

I–430.00 Meta-structure and Language Considered

I–440.00 Role of Meta-structure and Language

I–440.10 Words

I–440.20 Language as Communication

I–450.00 Language’s Relation to Mind

I–460.00 Language, Meta-structure, and Thought

I–460.10 Language and Behaviorism

I–470.00 Conceptualization and Language

I–470.10 Necessity of Language and Language-based Conceptualization

I–470.20 Conceptual and Language Systemics

I–480.00 Origin of Language

I–480.10 Language as Basic Psychological Skill

I–490.00 Language and Mental Type

I–490.10 Language’s Augmentation of Mind

E. Semantics and Meta-structure

SEMANTICS CONSIDERED

I–500.00 Semantic Relationships

I–500.10 Universal Semantic Vs. Universal Grammar

I–500.20 Necessity Considered

I–510.00 Conceptual Quality

STRUCTURAL ISSUES

I–520.00 Semantic and Meta Structures: Their Relationship

I–520.10 The Semantic Structure

I–520.20 The Meta-structure Reviewed and Further Elaborated

I–520.21 Alternate View of Semantic Structure’s Status

I–520.30 Structural Interaction

I–530.00 Mental Type Vis-à-vis the Semantic and Meta Structures

II LOGIC

A. Operating Characteristics

II–100.00 Logic Considered

II–100.10 Syntax and Semantics

II–110.00 The a priori and the a posteriori

II–120.00 Origin of Logic

II–120.10 Animal ‘Logic’

II–130.00 Logic and Thought

II–140.00 Logic’s Compatibility With Nature

II–140.10 Logic as Invention

II–150.00 Logic and Prediction

II–150.10 Correct Premises Vs. Correct Prediction

II–160.00 Logic’s Operation

II–170.00 The ‘Illogical’ Considered

II–170.10 Alogical

II–180.00 Justification and Logic

II–190.00 Variability of Logic

II–190.10 Reversibility of Mind

II–200.00 Logic Invariant by Mental Type

II–210.00 Logic’s Organic Nature

II–220.00 Alternate Logics

B. Propositional Logic

II–240.00 Approaches to Propositional Logic

II–240.01 Traditional

II–240.02 Contextual

II–240.03 Combination

II–240.04 Schemas

II–240.05 Causality vs. Inference

II–240.10 Deduction

II–240.11 ‘Ideal’ Deductive Systems

II–240.20 Induction

II–240.30 Logical Error

II–250.00 Logic Vs. Insight

II–250.10 Deduction and Insight

II–250.20 Induction and Insight

II–250.30 Semantic/Logic Interface

II–260.00 Abstractions Vs. Logic

C. Problems in Logic

II–270.00 The Argument from Ignorance

II–280.00 Paradox

II–290.00 Occam’s Razor

D. Epistemological Concerns

II–300.00 Knowledge and Belief Considered

II–300.10 Knowledge

II–300.11 Innate Knowledge

II–300.12 Knowledge Structure and Its Validation

II–300.13 Knowledge and Prediction

II–300.20 Belief

II–300.21 Categories of Belief

II–300.22 Justification of Belief

II–300.23 Objectivity

II–310.00 Truth

II–310.10 Philosophy and Truth

II–320.00 The Validation Requirement

II–320.10 Extra-logical Nature of Validation Requirement

II–330.00 Validation and Observation

II–340.00 Certainty

II–340.10 Skepticism

II–340.20 Proving General and Existential Negativity

E. Mathematics

II–350.00 Mathematics Considered

II–350.10 Mathematics and Science

II–360.00 Mathematics and Semantics

II–370.00 Mathematical Variability and Utility

II–370.10 Mathematics and Reification

II–380.00 Mathematics and Reality

II–390.00 Culture-free Nature of Mathematics

II–400.00 Mathematics as Necessary and Indispensable: A Summary

PART TWO: REALITY

III MIND WITHIN REALITY

A. Knowledge of Reality

III–100.00 Mind’s Relationship to Reality

III–100.10 Alternate Systemic Perceptual Perspectives

III–110.00 Mind’s Capabilities vis-à-vis Reality

III–110.10 Mind’s Limitations: An Illustration

III–110.20 Natural Kinds

III–120.00 Mind’s Status in Reality

III–120.10 Mind’s Tenuousness

III–130.00 Mind’s Conceptualizations of Reality

III–130.10 The Utility of Mental Constructs

III–130.20 Potential Dysfunctionality of Mental Constructs

III–140.00 Origin and Cause of Concepts

III–140.10 Percepts and Concepts

III–140.20 Objects and Percepts

III–150.00 Material Vs. Immaterial

III–150.10 Supervenience

III–160.00 Physical Continuity

III–160.10 Issues in Mental Continuity

B. Free Will Vs. Determinism

III–200.00 Free Will Vs. Causation

III–210.00 Existence of Free Will

III–220.00 Free Will and Goal-setting Behavior

III–230.00 Some Approaches to Free Will

III–230.10 Modified Self-causation of Free Will

III–230.20 Determinism as Cause of Free Will

III–235.00 Mental Type and Free Will

C. Attribution and Measurement

III–240.00 Attributes

III–240.10 Explaining Qualia

III–250.00 Attributes and Concepts

III–260.00 Attributes and Scientific Measurement Processes

III–270.00 Status of Measurement Concepts

III–280.00 Absolute Vs. Relative Measurement

III–300.00 Role of Measurement Technology

III–300.10 Measurement Devices

III–310.00 Measurement and Reality

III–310.10 Measurement as Creator of Reality

III–320.00 Impact of Measurement upon Reality

III–330.00 Purpose of Measurement

IV REALITY ITSELF

A. Characteristics of Reality

IV–100.00 Knowledge of Reality

IV–100.10 The Anthropic Principle

IV–110.00 Reality’s Ontological Status

IV–110.10 Reality as ‘Communicator’

IV–110.20 The ‘Black Box’ of Unobservables

IV–120.00 Structure and Reality

IV–130.00 Kinds of Reality

IV–140.00 Explaining Reality

IV–145.00 Natural Law and Regularities

IV–145.10 Laws and Necessity

B. Spatiality and Infinity

SPATIALITY

IV–150.00 Spatiality and Dimensionality

IV–150.10 The Void

IV–160.00 Dimensionality as an Explanatory Factor

INFINITY

IV–170.00 Reality as Boundless

IV–170.10 The Universe as a Local Event

IV–180.00 Infinitude

IV–180.10 Qualitative and Spatial Infinity

IV–180.20 Concept of Infinite Deity

IV–180.30 Quantitative Infinity

IV–180.31 Other Implications of Quantitative Infinity

IV–180.40 Conceptual Problems of Quantitative Infinity

C. Time, Order, Causality

TIME

IV–190.00 Time Considered

IV–190.10 Psychology of Time

IV–190.20 Time Within Reality

IV–190.30 Relativity

IV–190.50 Universal Time

IV–192.00 Periodic Processes and Time

IV–195.00 Eternalism and Presentism

ORDER

IV–200.00 Order Considered

IV–200.10 Types of Order

IV–200.20 Disorder

IV–210.00 Principles of Unitary and Pluralistic Orders

IV–210.10 Unitarianism

IV–210.20 Pluralism

IV–210.30 Combined Operation of Unitarian and Pluralism Principles

IV–220.00 Purpose in Reality

IV–220.10 The Design Problem

CAUSALITY

IV–230.00 Causality

IV–230.10 Causal Direction

IV–230.15 Entropy and the Past Hypothesis

IV–230.20 Foundations of Causality

IV–230.21 Causality as observable

IV–230.22 Causality as logically derivable

IV–230.23 ‘Ultimate’ Causation

IV–230.24 Practical Necessity of Causality

IV–230.25 Measuring Causality

IV–230.30 Contra Causality

PART THREE: MANAGING REALITY

V MIND’S TOOLS

A. Theories and Models

MIND AND THEORY

V–100.00 Mind’s Dependency Upon Theories and Models

V–100.10 The Role of Logic in Theories and Models

V–110.00 Mind’s Utilization of Theories and Models

V–110.10 Good Theory

V–120.00 Paradigms

V–120.10 Evaluating Paradigms

V–120.2 Paradigms Vs. Rational Reconstruction

V–120.3 Contra Paradigms; Contra Rational Reconstruction; Contra Rules

TECHNIQUES OF THEORY

V–130.00 Theory

V–130.10 Validation’s Foundation in Mind

V–130.20 Prediction Vs. Understanding

V–130.30 Relativity of Correct Theory

V–140.00 Theoretically Indispensable Concepts

V–150.00 Inadequacy of Theories and Models

V–160.00 Aesthetic Standards Applied to Theories and Models

V–170.00 The Ultimate Model

OBSERVATION

V–180.00 Role and Content of Observation

V–180.10 The Necessity of Observation

V–180.30 Limitations of Observational Verification

B. Science

SCIENTIFIC SCOPE

V–190.00 The Scientific Domain

V–200.00 Science and Nonscience: The Demarcation Problem

V–200.10 Falsifiability and Demarcation

V–200.20 Science and Naïve Realism

V–200.30 Scientific Realism

V–210.00 Empiricism and Metaphysics

V–215.00 Constructive Empiricism

V–220.00 ‘Higher Level’ Realities

V–230.00 The Inter-mental Nature of Science

REDUCTION

V–240.00 Views on Reduction

V–250.00 Alpha and Reduction

V–250.10 Reduction as Model

V–250.20 Reduction of Mind

V–250.21 Type Identity Theory

SCIENTIFIC METHOD

V–260.00 Scientific Method: Hypotheses and Inductions

V–270.00 Codifiability of Scientific Method

V–270.10 Rationalism as Foundational

V–270.30 Science Vs. Philosophy

EXPLANATION

V–280.00 The Concept of Explanation

V–280.10 Mathematics and Explanation

V–280.20 Probability/Statistical Explanation

V–280.30 Cause as Explanation

V–290.00 Justifying Explanation Through ‘Success’

VI MIND AND BEHAVIOR

A. Mind in This World

BEHAVIOR: UNITARIANISM VS. PLURALISM

VI–100.00 Mental Species

VI–100.10 Behavior and Genotype

VI–110.00 Unitarian Behavior and Mental Type

VI–110.10 Collective Mind

VI–120.00 Nature and the Principle of Unitary Order

VI–130.00 Behavior and the Principle of Unitary Order

VI–130.10 Mind’s Survivability Under Unitary Order

VI–140.00 Freedom/Liberty as Pluralistic

VI–150.00 Characteristics of Pluralistic Social Systems

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

VI–160.00 Social Structuring

VI–160.10 Culture and Codification

VI–170.00 Factors Affecting Social Organization

VI–170.10 Positioning on a Social Order Spectrum

VI–170.20 Social Orders and Mental Structures

VI–180.00 Governmental Forms as Social Organization

VI–180.10 Government and Freedom

VI–180.20 States as Corporate Consumer Service Entities

B. Values

VI–190.00 Value Structures and Mental Structures

VI–200.00 Values Considered

VI–200.10 ‘Moral’ Imperatives

VI–200.11 Good and Evil

VI–200.20 Rights

VI–200.30 Ethics in Perspective

VI–200.40 Law

VI–210.00 Value Hierarchies

VI–210.10 Value Generation

VI–220.00 Value Systems and Survival

VI–230.00 Mind and Values

VI–230.10 ‘True’ Values

VI–230.20 Inherent Value

VI–230.21 Valuations Ascribed to Artificial Vs. Natural Dichotomies

VI–230.30 Statistical Norms and Value Prescriptions

RELIGION

VI–240.00 Religion Considered

VI–250.00 Religion and Science

VI–250.10 Religious Paradigms

VI–260.00 Alphan Religion

APPLICATIONS: Considerations of Various Topics Within the Alphan Framework

A-1 Brain Modules

A-2 Folk Psychology Vs. Folk Scientism

The Theory Neutrality of Folk Observation

Psychology and Instrumentalism

A-3 Function and Functionalism

Functional Explanations in Biology

Functional Approaches to Mind

A-4 The Game of Philosophy

A-5 Genetics Vs. Environment

A-6 Intelligent Design

A-7 Relativity Theory

1. Motion

2. Reference Frames

3. Light Speed Invariability; Spacetime Variability

4. Gravity and Spacetime

5. The Predictive Power of Relativity Theory

A-8 Quantum Reality

1. Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle

2. The Copenhagen Interpretation

Schrödinger’s Cat in the Box

3. Quantum Particle Entanglement

4. Electromagnetism and Waves

5. Materiality and Physicality

6. A Reordered Quantum World

A-9 Cosmology

1. Space

2. The Cosmological Principle

3. Cosmic Origin

4. Cosmic Expansion

The Big Bang Singularity

Universe’s Center Point and Space Creation

5. Alphan Cosmology

Energy and Force in Alpha: The Cosmic Drivers

6. The Universe’s Shape: An Afterthought

A-10 Entropy

1. Overview

2. Low Entropy and the Past Hypothesis

3. Paths to Low Entropy

4. Entropy and Time

5. Time Reversal

A-11 Symmetry

A-12 Energy, Mass, and Mass/Energy Equivalence.

A-13 String Theory

A-14 Theses

GLOSSARY

INDEX

PREFACE

Although it might not appear to be so, Alpha is an intellectual diary, ideas the author jotted down while reading different works. The formatting was a way of grouping and keeping track of various notions. Originally, no thought was given to its publication, i.e., until a number of people suggested that it should be. So the diary was edited and this Preface created in an attempt to summarize the theme that seemed to run through all the material. And so we begin.

* * *

The most incomprehensible thing about the universe is that it is comprehensible. Albert Einstein

The most comprehensible thing about the universe is that it is incomprehensible. Alpha

The above statements capture the thrust of the emphasis throughout this work: that contemporary science, despite its protestations of modesty in approaching the great unknowns of life, believes itself to have mastered the necessary basic foundations of knowledge. Alpha’s simple message: Not so. This denial shouldn’t lead to a belief this work promotes the anti-scientific for the opposite is true. Indeed, it finds no current alternatives to the scientific method for gaining theoretical and practical knowledge about Reality. But with this comes the caveat that many writers in awe of contemporary science sometimes make unwarranted pronouncements and build too many intellectual edifices on what seems a rather weak foundation. The upshot: if people feel overwhelmed by the complexity of Reality, Alpha proclaims the situation worse than imagined, although one can always hope.

A related secondary theme runs through Alpha, one having to do with conceptual development. Much attention has been given to the evolution of scientific thinking over the centuries; much less to the evolution of myths and other reifications and conceptualizations unwarrantedly imputed to Nature. These latter moved in tandem with science, adapted to changing circumstances, and insinuated themselves into mainstream thought in virus-like fashion. By the twenty-first century the intellectual descendants of chimera, succubae, ghosts, nymphs and such still remained, albeit in an evolved form and clothed in more scientistic garb.

Begun in 1980 as an intellectual diary and expanded/updated over the years, the work consists of personal reflections, general musings (thus the subtitle), and an outline or framework for viewing certain theoretical issues. The content consists mainly of observations and fundamental theory, making no attempt at an intensive exposition of a kind expected in a formal, professional, philosophical treatise devoted to the comprehensive examination of concepts and their implications. Any apparent ‘system’ was imposed after the fact by force-fitting random thoughts into various categories. Written last, this Preface provides an attempt to identify a unifying theme such as might be found or construed rather than an explanation of the thoughts guiding the work’s original construction. The bulk of this Preface originated as a cover letter accompanying the work when sent to some acquaintances.

Somewhat of a hybrid, Alpha is simultaneously avant-garde and Neolithic. Twentieth-century scholarship moved away from older philosophical perspectives which considered Mind as an ‘entity in space’ and sought to position ‘Mind in society,’ the feeling being that people best achieve their destinies when seen in their totality as emotive, logical, social, and moral beings. Alpha returns to a more ancient view and believes Mind can be best understood from a stance which considers it as an independent free-floating entity. Mind is approached as the centerpiece of Reality so as to determine what can be known and how, and what this might portend for knowledge of Reality in general. One can’t understand the universe or Reality without an appreciation of how Mind conceptualizes things and knows the limits to what it can do.

NOTE: The capitalization of Mind and other key terms throughout this work reflects its focus upon the concept of mind in an abstract sense and is not meant to convey an absolute idealist or singular interpretation. In fact, the entire thrust of Alpha is upon the physicality and diversity of minds.

For the most part, science concentrates upon observables in its attempt to develop knowledge of the world. Alpha focuses upon the observer in the hope of determining exactly what he does (or doesn’t) observe and what this might portend when it comes to creating knowledge of Reality. This, in turn, reverberates back upon the scientific enterprise and whatever it is we think we’re doing.

The thrust of the work involves Mind in general, in the abstract, and universally. Certainly our experience on this planet predisposes one to think first in terms of human Mind and then incidentally to consider other animal life with which we are familiar. However, Alpha attempts to move beyond those limitations and undertake a review of what might be said of Minds in general, whether here or elsewhere in time and space, god-like or rudimentary, operating in biological or other media.

In pursuing an understanding of things mental, the work develops a typology of Mind and examines the implications of such a scheme with regard to knowledge of the external world. Along the way, Alpha provides a model for looking at the Mind/Reality interface which positions certain philosophical and scientific issues in a somewhat different light. The presentation of material does not follow a linear plan with a deductive flow running from beginning to end, so certain issues in the earlier sections cannot be fully clarified without the context provided by the whole of Alpha.

No one school of thought predominates, the name Alpha being chosen primarily for its neutrality and to provide a word by which to refer to this conceptual collection. The work follows a rather eclectic and personalized approach which incorporates observations from a variety of positions, which means a diverse mixture of seemingly contrary views finds a home here—hopefully in a coherent fashion. In this regard, Alpha is one mind’s attempt at positioning itself in reality, a statement which will have more meaning after a reading of the work. With some exceptions, references to the positions or statements of specific individuals and schools of thought are avoided. This is a purposeful attempt to sidestep becoming involved in disputations concerning whether a given person or school actually subscribed to a certain position as specifically stated herein: the emphasis being upon concepts rather than their proponents.

Alpha might be seen as consisting of two major sections, i.e., the main body and some applications. The body of the work constructs a paradigm or global model, while the applications look at the implications of that model for a number of disciplines.

The Index provides references to section numbers.

PART ONE: MIND

TOC

I

MIND ITSELF

A. MENTAL OPERATIONS

I–100 Mind’s Existence

Minds exist and are aware of themselves. Self-existence is a Basic Perception of Mind, such perception being an alogical capability generated simultaneously with the emergence of Mind. Mind need not infer its self-existence via logic but can validate itself through direct observation, making knowledge of self pre-logical.

NOTE: The alogical being neither logical nor illogical. It can be a factual statement, an observation independent of logic, or an element to which logic gets inferentially applied.

I–110 Mind’s Self-awareness

Awareness of self qua self involves more than awareness of simple self-existence. Being aware of itself as self, Mind perceives its distinctness from other specific entities in the environment and the total environment itself. Although not automatic for Mind, a capability of self-awareness arises immediately upon Mind’s coming into existence.

Two separate issues arise here. One, the belief individual Minds somehow participate as aspects of some broader universal MIND, requires logically overriding a Basic Perception and so this position directly contradicts experience. The second relates to the concern a Mind might never know if it were the captive of a demon controlling all of the Mind’s sensory inputs and thus unaware of the true external world. However, though a Mind might be fooled about its environment, it would still perceive its own distinctness.

Some thought experiments propose a variant on the above mentioned universal MIND which imagines a social order much like a hymenopteran community. Although containing thousands of individual members, all share a common Mind as they go about their regular tasks. Such a situation would not contradict the above statement that a Mind perceives its distinctiveness. In the present instance, this community Mind would be a singularity possessed of but one consciousness operating through a distributed processing network.

I–120 The Existence of Other Minds

Belief in the existence of other Mind’s comes from an observation arising in sensory evidence. A contrary position (the nonexistence of other minds) seems no more provable than attempting to demonstrate that senses such as sight and hearing don’t exist. Though we have inferential grounds for acknowledging the existence of other Minds, such logical approaches seem unnecessary because other Minds declare themselves overtly through word and deed. Thus the existence of other Minds is known through direct observation.

NOTE: Some might wrongly argue this still constitutes an inference. See the sections on Logic.

If one prefers the logical route to determining the existence of other Minds, then some options are (1) deductive inference from another’s behavior and (2) inference by inductive analogy from one’s own thought processes. Practically, people infer the existence of other Minds through a combination of both inference types. Of course, one might choose to become more ‘scientific’ and say other Minds are known through explanatory hypotheses. This way Mind attempts to provide explanation and prediction of an individual’s continuing behavior. But this latter really consists of hypotheses generated through the first two types of inferences which are more than sufficient for most nonscientific purposes. In any event, a failure to accept the rationale for believing in other Minds offers no proof for their nonexistence and must leave an extreme skeptic in an agnostic position.

NOTE: Observe the lack of any claim regarding certitude in Alpha. See the sections on Logic.

Many explanatory hypotheses go wrong in the attribution of one’s (or one’s group’s) personal motivations and mental states to another. However, they often go right for the same reason. In any event, inaccuracy regarding the attribution of specific motivations to other Minds cannot be used to claim the nonexistence of those Minds. This has implications with respect to the most fundamental issue of whether one can know other Minds exist at all, i.e., other than one’s own, and whether other types of Minds exist. Attributing one’s personal motivation patterns to other types of Minds yields a highly inaccurate guide to deducing the existence and capabilities of different types of Minds. Such issues are taken up in later discussions of anthropocentrism.

I–120.1 Similarities Among Minds

All Minds do not necessarily experience equivalent mental states and so have no certitude with respect to sharing equivalent private events among themselves. We cannot know whether mental experiences are exactly shared among Minds as though they were duplicate copies of each other. Minds do, however, share classes or categories of experiences allowing them to communicate with each other.

I–120.2 The Robot Problem

Alpha states other Minds are known in a direct, noninferential, way because they declare themselves. How does one know he’s not confronting a robot programmed to respond appropriately to questions? Asking such a question means one has already accepted the distinction implicit in the question, i.e., an entity with a real Mind versus one without. In such an event, can we also find a robot able to originate conversations yet still have no mental life? Is this really a problem? Might it not be a robot with a real mind which has become aware and has all the parameters necessary to qualify for having a mind? If a robot, and upon examination shown to be an artifact (mindless or otherwise), then we are one or more removes from the Mind who created it and so another Mind has declared itself, albeit inferentially and not directly. Inferences can be wrong, but then so too observations. If a person says he has a Mind we accept this as direct (not inferential) evidence. It may turn out we are wrong, just the same way as we might be wrong if concluding (inferentially) he has a Mind based upon his activities. Either way we have both direct and inferential means for determining Minds other than our own exist. As already indicated, Alpha does not pursue certitude.

I–130 Mind’s Data Gathering Mechanisms

Mind receives data concerning itself and the environment via internally and externally oriented sensory arrays Its total sensory array includes, but is not limited to, the traditional five senses. Some data processing machines are structured so as to report on their internal operations as well as to obtain data from input mechanisms which may be scattered worldwide. So, too, Mind receives ‘reports’ on its internal operations as well as data from the outside world communicated via its five external senses. Within information science, no attempt is made to prove data generated outside of the core processor is superior to data generated inside the processor. All data are equally valuable (or worthless) depending upon the use made of it. Mind’s sensing and perception of its own internal operations is as valid an observational technique as relying upon the senses of sight or sound.

I–140 Comprehension of Reality

Mind’s understanding of Reality depends upon perceptions produced by interactions among the brain’s various components (i.e., its sensory array and other processing elements). All recognize the inherent limitations of the existing perception apparatus and Mind’s dependency upon it. Although being the only connection to Reality available to Mind, it permits some means for the verification of knowledge and propositions.

I–150 Perception Considered

To perceive means to become aware of some aspect of mental or nonmental Reality. What Mind directly perceives is a percept, a product resulting from the interaction of the brain and its sensory array and which later becomes a basic component in the formation of concepts. The term perception can refer either to the process of percept formation or to the percept itself.

These definitions differ from the standard English usage in which the term perception might have a combined meaning involving both physical and interpretive (or judgmental) elements. Some would say the physical elements include the action of the sensory mechanisms and central nervous system, while the interpretive element entails those aspects of perception learned through experience. Compared to that usage, here we have a nonjudgmental supplemental component providing an integral but ‘add-on’ element of perception—one engaged only to the extent to which the perception process lacks sufficient relevant sensory data. Perceptual enhancement serves as a potential complement and/or supplement required to make up for a lack of sensory data and to integrate percepts with other concepts. As a process, perception is fundamental and comes ‘hardwired’ or ‘built into’ the mental mechanism, working in an operationally ‘prescribed’ (albeit variable) manner.

Physico-chemical activity in the neural system generates a condition at the mental terminus in a form which Mind perceives and becomes aware of as a percept (or synonymously, ‘sense data’). So far this process cannot be explained except for some rudimentary descriptions of neural circuitry. However, in some way the brain, interacting with sense data, provides for a prepackaged percept, some aspects of which are causally determined by nonmental events. In the absence of sufficient sense data the brain tends to fill in the ‘gaps’ with complementary or supplementary data. What engages this supplementary process is the Mind’s need to categorize or understand a percept. Given sufficient sensory information, the brain does not need to go through a sensory enhancement process but can immediately relate sensory stimuli to an existing concept, or form a new concept given a novel sensory stimulus. Without sufficient sensory data, Mind experiences a kind of ‘discomfort’ which causes the brain to engage its supplementary mechanisms and fill in nonexistent sensory details on its own and so become satisfied it has a clear percept. Whether the perceptual mechanism’s ‘guesswork’ is as efficient at filling in the perceptual gaps within the microworld of quantum physics is a highly debatable issue for it seems human Mind evolved attuned to the ‘macro-’ but not the ‘microworld’, which in any case are Mind-created imputations based upon inherent structural constraints This can lead to error but, considering evolution, this capability probably proves more helpful than harmful. The supplementary interpretive process seems more likely to ‘guess’ right than wrong and so ends up providing a survival benefit to the organism.

NOTE 1: There is a temptation to speak of perceptual mechanisms being the result of evolutionary ‘selection’ processes at this point. But Alpha avoids use of the term selection as applied to evolutionary matters, as in ‘nature selects for’ this or that characteristic or trait. The term selection implies a conscious decision-making process thereby imputing Mind to Nature.

NOTE 2: Whether the perceptual mechanism’s ‘guesswork’ is as efficient at filling in the perceptual gaps within the microworld of quantum physics is a highly debatable issue for it seems human Mind evolved attuned to the ‘macro-’ but not the ‘microworld’, which in any case are Mind-created imputations based upon inherent structural constraints

This process has an implication for the way in which Mind develops its classification schemes for handling Reality. Classes or categories are built upon resemblances rather than so-called universals inherently existing ‘out there’ in Reality, although external ‘similarities’ could prompt the idea of resemblances. ‘Universals’ are creatures of Mind, though not less real for being so. The extent to which certain features of a gestalt resemble some ‘thing’ affects the extent to which Mind classifies a given gestalt and associates that ‘thing’ as a particular item or member of a group or category.

A critical fact presents itself when reviewing the details of the perception process: the brain is a physiological ‘device’ which ‘creates’ Reality based upon its structure and function. The implications of this are not always fully appreciated. In this vein, consider words used in science like matter, observation, or phenomena. One must question the extent to which the workings of the physiological ‘device’ provide a sufficient foundation for a comprehensive knowledge of Reality. Science itself creates instruments and devices in its quest to understand the universe. However, such devices are in turn merely adjuncts to the human mind, itself a special-purpose device. Such considerations appear in elsewhere in Alpha, especially in the sections on science.

I–150.1 Utility of Perception

Perception (and its various mechanisms) adequately meets Mind’s needs and purposes when it comes to the task of interpreting and acting upon many aspects of Reality. It must or both Mind and its housing organism would have had little if any survival value. However, this doesn’t offer a blanket endorsement of Mind’s perceptual processes as some guaranteed foundational bedrock for ‘truth’. Rather, it simply acknowledges perception works within limited bounds and may be the only validation tool available upon which to construct knowledge.

I–150.2 Perception and Interpretation

Many of a ‘realist’ orientation believe experience begins with the reception of sensory data possessing constant qualities which either reflect corresponding attributes belonging to the perceived external objects, or are uniquely correlated with such attributes of the physical world: these sensory data forming the raw material which Mind accumulates and learns to arrange in various manners. Those of an ‘idealist’ persuasion often view the forms of any possible sense experiences as predetermined by Mind’s apparatus of classification with perception being an interpretation involving the placing of something into one of several classes of objects. Proponents of this school further hold one can never perceive the unique properties of individual objects apart from the categories of this classification apparatus. And since all we know about the world from sense experience is of the nature of an interpretation or theory, there must be a part of knowledge that cannot be controlled by experience or contradicted by it. Some holding this view question whether scientific theories can be conclusively tested, that is, either confirmed or falsified, by experience.

Given such a viewpoint, can one say that perception is a judgmental process per se or merely involves judgment to a greater or lesser degree? The answer is extremely important for man’s knowledge of Reality because should perception be a totally judgmental process then there cannot be any purely empirical validation of beliefs. So-called empirical verification would consist in either an infinite regression or a circular series of judgments.

A case can be made that many perceptions require some kind of interpretation. For example, most people have seen drawings designed to illustrate how one’s perceptions can alter depending upon perspective: equal length lines appearing to be of different lengths; a drawing of an old lady which, looked at differently, is a young lady; a drawing of a vase which could also be two faces staring at each other nose-to-nose, etc. When presented with a hairy lump of stimuli someone might say it’s a cat; a similar lump of hairy stimuli one thinks a cat may be something else. Perhaps infants, before their minds are completely formed, may pass through a phase where they really don’t see things as adults see them and have to learn ‘correct’ perception. Of course, even if infants do not perceive what adults do, that wouldn’t necessarily mean the organism enjoys total flexibility in its development. Minds might not be free to learn different ways of actually perceiving a cat—learning expectations of cats, yes, but not actually how a cat is basically perceived. As already mentioned, the standard usage of the term perception often mixes the senses in which that word is used.

NOTE: A snarling lion may be said to be perceived as a threat, but such a use of perceived is synonymous with judged or interpreted. The accurate statement in Alpha would be that one perceives a lion and, based upon learning or experience, judges it to be a threat.

Although often possible to interpret some sense data so as to develop different perceptions of an object, this does not seem overridingly important. There’s no warrant to believe Mind’s perceptive processes are inherently deceptive, merely that occasionally the stimuli can be ambiguous. On such a foundation it won’t do to construct a mental edifice purporting all perception to be basically judgmental and interpretive. Some clumps of stimuli may be sufficiently similar to cause confusion and perhaps categorized as different things, e.g., the vase which might be two faces and other similar tricks. Of course, many of these tricks require sensory deprivation to pull off. Few people in real life confuse a vase with two people looking eye-to-eye because they generally have all their senses in operation, although people do ‘misperceive’ actual events. Yet even in these situations, as more and more physical stimuli are presented concerning an object, people’s perceptions tend to merge. Interpretation often acts as a means of filling in lacking details. As more details become available, interpretative components diminish.

NOTE: Perception and/or sensation are not to be taken as equivalent to thought itself. Certainly sensory data are inputs into the thought process, but they are readily distinguishable as something which Mind operates upon—an issue discussed later.

For the validation of belief statements, this means a two part verification process is required: first, of percepts themselves; and second, of the original belief statement being verified. This, of course, is what the scientific method purports to do when it requires independent replication of experiments. Independent observations are taken not only to verify the predictions of a theory, such additional observations also concurrently verify that different experimenters experience the same percepts.

Alpha’s position regarding perception reflects the idealists’ view, but diverges from it in important ways. Some ‘perceptions’ as defined in standard usage may be said to have interpretive components, but to call perception an interpretation, and then to develop an argument based on the notion perception is identical to interpretation can be misleading. Furthermore, to continue the argument by claiming there must then be a part of knowledge that cannot be controlled or contradicted by experience is a non sequitur. In any event, any unconscious massaging of sensory data by the brain in the act of generating a percept can be accounted for without requiring a higher order interpretive component.

However, the biggest departure here from certain idealists stems from Alpha’s seeing perception as fixed—part of the structural makeup of the brain. Of course, percepts themselves eventually become subject to the Mind’s interpretation and the interactive effects of judgmental and perceptive processes are quite complex so it may be difficult to separate them in many instances. Nevertheless, Basic Perceptions are not interpretive. Perception/observation has ‘theory-neutrality’ but not ‘organic-neutrality’, being both constrained and restrained by its organic structure and operation.

I–150.201 Perception as Hypothesis

Many subscribe to the idea that perceptions are a kind of hypothesis, i.e., conclusions drawn from unconscious inferences, whereas scientific hypotheses stem from a conscious inferential process. According to this scenario, certain sensations repeated over a period of time generate specific meanings via an inductive process. However, our perceptual conclusions can sometimes be tricked, thereby leading to illusions which some consider to be a matter of wrongful interpretation by the perceptual process. This makes perceptual processes ‘active’ in contrast to what often had been seen as ‘passive’, basically stimulus-response types of mechanism. The latter approach saw perception as a more deterministic affair with the nervous system simply accepting sensory input and generating a given output. However, those favoring a more active approach for perceptual networks believe perceptions result from a ‘top-down’ process in which sensory data is ‘read’ and categorized according to what the brain determines to be the ‘best fitting’ perception matching the data. Thus, perceptions become a kind of hypothesis regarding what the sensory input means, i.e., what the perceiver believes he is perceiving.

How strongly should one press this notion? Is it identical to the formation of a scientific hypothesis, somewhat similar, or weakly analogical? Many say it’s a rather weak analogy given that we cannot physically analyze the workings of an unconscious perceptual inductive process the same way as the formation and testing of a scientific hypothesis. So, granting that the hypothetical processes are not equivalent, how can a determination be made as to just how analogous the perceptual hypothetical process is to the scientific kind?

One can begin the argument by saying the perceptual process cannot be a simple stimulus-response mechanism as this is too primitive and simplistic. Perceptions are utilized for predictions because based upon our identification of an object we then determine how to react to and utilize the object. Likewise in science, we base predictions upon hypotheses. Of course, there is a difference in the time element: perceptions work almost instantaneously and must often be immediately accurate to ensure the survival of the perceiver in a dangerous situation. Nevertheless, the processes are essentially the same.

Another consideration in support of the hypothesis analogy arises from the fact that scientific hypotheses not only arise from a data set, they also, in turn, influence the further selection and interpretation of data. The same is said to hold true of perception as when data receptors focus more intently upon gathering additional sensory input to round out or generate an appropriate perceptual image. Additionally, examples can be shown in which the perceptual processes work to reinforce what ‘should’ be perceived given the perceptual hypothesis being favored at the moment. This further supports the ‘top-down’ model of an ‘active’ process.

For these and other comparable reasons, many conclude that a strong similarity exists between perceptual and scientific hypotheses, albeit not a precise equivalency. However, much of this argumentation illustrates the point emphasized in Alpha that there seems to be a common tendency to embed mental processes into the universe at large as if to demonstrate (unintentionally) the existence of some form of pantheism. So the issue becomes whether perceptual processes can be reduced to a model less dependent upon mental processes to account for the results they produce. Mental models of reality have been the most favored since time immemorial as when various spirits and demons were hypothesized to account for whatever activities occurred in nature. This is, of course, a very tempting model to employ given that it provides for an easy explanation. However, since spirits of some sort have lost favor as explanans, the emphasis has been upon embedding the functionality of demons/spirits into nature by alternative means.

What prompted the creation of comparisons between scientific hypotheses and perceptual processes was the belief that perceptions had to arise from more than primitive stimulus-response mechanisms because they engage in the types of activities described above. Of course, this prompts us to inquire regarding exactly how ‘primitive’ stimulus-response mechanisms might be. Could one not have ‘complex’ stimulus-response mechanisms? Use of words like primitive, simple and complex while useful in many contexts has the unfortunate downside of leading to word games in others. The point being, all of the characteristics found in perceptual mechanisms can be accounted for by deterministic, mechanistic, stimulus-response processes—somewhat more intricate ones than found in some other life processes but more comparable to those than to intellectual processes. However, this in turn raises the consideration of whether the process of generating scientific hypotheses is also an instance of an intricate but basic stimulus response mechanism. The answers to such questions partially depends upon whether one wishes to scale the models ‘up’ or ‘down’. Alpha prefers scaling models down. On this view, the only difference between perceptual and scientific hypotheses is that the latter might be slightly more intricate, time-consuming, and conscious. If so, isn’t this where the entire line of argumentation began, with the assertion that perceptual and scientific processes were similarly hypothetical? Isn’t this a return to that view?

The answer, of course, is No. The alternative approach abandons the notion of a ‘top-down’ selection (or decision-making) process in favor of a more mechanistic, ‘bottom-up’ stimulus/response-like model and further extends it to the process of developing scientific hypotheses. The advantage of this might be tied to Occam’s Razor for it removes the need for an ‘intelligence model’ as a foundation for both perceptual and scientific processes. More precisely, it means that scientific thinking might be more analogous to the ‘primitive’ mechanistic activities found in perceptual processes than vice versa. This could be a dismaying thought for some but shouldn’t be. As one might expect from evolutionary considerations, it bases what some consider as a ‘higher’ thought process firmly upon historical biophysical developments. Given this thrust, it means that one should not be referring to perceptual activities as hypothetical in nature. Talk of hypotheses should not occur until one reaches the conscious (Awareness) level where what emerges as hypotheses are under conscious control. What is consciousness (Awareness) controlling?—the way in which the output of an essentially mechanistic process gets handled. Such a view reverses the way in which this topic is sometimes treated.

I–150.21 Perception and Causation

Perceptions are causally dependent. Natural ‘things’ cause perceptions in Mind which are then attributed as being intrinsic properties of those things. A problem arises if one takes the view all components of a perception are generated by the intrinsic properties of an external object, especially when the complete perception is a Mind-made entity. The view here is more limited, viz., an external object has the power to engage Mind’s perception-generating processes (which makes perception the end result of a causal process, some of the causes being external to Mind).

Some believe Mind alone is totally accountable for the perceptions generated and any external causation may be an inference or attribution. Now, a substantial proportion of Mind’s activities involve attributions of one sort or another, but the main ingredients of its ‘reality testing’ procedures are made possible by its causal involvement and interaction with the external world at key points in the perceptual process.

NOTE: Attribute in the verb form involves the Mind assigning or ascribing characteristics or properties. Mind assigns the attributes (used as noun).

Also, one must distinguish between the words inference and attribution, although in some instances they can be used almost synonymously. For example, consider a person who says That attorney always wins his cases because of his in-depth knowledge of the law. Here the lawyer’s success is attributed to his knowledge, i.e., an inferred cause-effect relationship between knowledge and success. Alpha, however, mostly uses attribution in a different sense such that certain attributes (properties) of things are automatically Mind-generated but not logically inferred. These two different senses have nothing to do with each other and care needs to be exercised so as not to confuse them.

Finally, a comment about Mind’s perceptions of external entities (those having ontological status) and perceptions it experiences of its own mentalities: the same principles apply to both internally and externally generated perceptions. Mind’s perceptions of external things are the end products of mental processes which have been stimulated into action by external causes; Mind’s perceptions of things mental are the end products resulting from internal causes. In the latter case the triggering mechanisms lie within the organism rather than outside of it, but they still are causative elements which engage the Mind’s perception-generating operations.

I–150.3 Images

Images are mental projections or characterizations of something unreal or not currently sensed. They are distinguishable from concepts and percepts and operate in a kind of intermediary position between these other types of mental entities. There are two broad categories of images: (1) Reality-based; and (2) Mind-based, although both exist within Mind.

I–150.31 Reality-based Images

Reality-based images originate from external causes producing an effect upon the brain (neural system) thereby generating percepts. Percepts are a physico-chemical product which Mind does not totally control. It is the percept which Mind actually experiences when in the presence of a real ontologically existent entity. This percept becomes encoded in the brain as a concept which allows one to think about the existential entity when not present to Mind. Further, the concept need not be ‘visualized’ (imagined or ‘imaged’) for consideration by Mind. However, it’s often necessary for Mind to recall past percepts, to ‘visualize’ what it’s talking about to itself or for others. In most real world situations an image should represent exactly as possible the external referent. When walking in the jungle, an image of a predator like a lion should be reasonably precise to recognize the danger. It won’t do to work with a conjured stylized representation of a predator in one’s mind when potentially threatened by the beast. To work practically in the world on a daily basis, Mind requires a reasonably accurate Reality-based imaging capability. However, images cannot be considered akin to pictures as the former lack much specific detail. Nevertheless, they do serve to facilitate recognition and appropriate response.

NOTE 1: The ability to handle certain types of representations is a fundamental prerequisite for every kind of mental life. A first order conceptualization serves as a representation which does just that—represents some other entity. This distinguishes it from an abstraction (a secondary or higher order conceptualization) which can represent basic concepts, other abstract concepts, or itself. Words, of course, along with other signs and symbols may be used to represent all manner of conceptualizations whether first order or higher. Being signs, words are first order conceptualizations even when denoting abstractions.

NOTE 2: It’s an empirical question whether percepts are stored in the brain as distinct images which can later be recalled or in a conceptual form which allows Mind to reconstruct an image to greater and lesser degrees of accuracy. If the latter, it would account for the high degree of variability in images over time because Mind’s concepts are often revised by experience. Furthermore, as a concept, what was a percept can now be processed directly with abstract concepts to create new analyses and syntheses.

The same considerations hold true concerning other images of things existing in the world. A physical representation (e.g., a picture) also has a necessary connection with its referent irrespective of whether the creator of that picture understood the reference. For example, if a natural rock formation in the wilderness looks exactly like a family member, Mind’s physico-chemical mechanism will necessarily react upon seeing it. The necessity lies in Mind, not in the creator, i.e., nature. Of course, if one sets out to create a similar likeness of a family member, then one has very little choice in how to make that representation appear. We enjoy more flexibility in creating an abstract artistic representation of family members, but then the audience should know what these relatives look like or they won’t understand the representation. They certainly wouldn’t recognize a person in real life if all they ever saw was an abstract drawing. Abstract conceptualizations don’t have perceptions of external entities as their immediate reference points but are based instead upon conceptualizations developed from such perceptions.

I–150.32 Mind-based Images

Mind-based images are those devised by Mind for whatever purposes suit it. One may recall the Reality-based image of a horse and other types of animal body parts and imagine a fictional creature like a griffin or concoct images to put on canvas to represent abstract concepts. There seems to be no apparent limit to the kinds of innovative Mind-based images one can devise. Working with concepts Mind can create and revise images—if the concepts relate to concrete things. But if the concepts relate to abstract things and Mind attempts to say they have ontological referents, or otherwise imputes them to Reality, then error results. This introduces a theme of importance within other contexts in the following pages.

NOTE: Ontological (also ontic) is here generally used to indicate something has existence independent of Mind.

I–150. 4 Concepts Considered

I–150.41 The Causal Connection of Concepts to the World

The causal sequence leading to conceptualization runs as follows: external physical elements affect the sensory array; output from the sensory array gets massaged by the brain to produce perceptions; Mind (a function/process of the brain) generates/develops concepts related to the perceptions. These processes constitute the Mind/Reality interface and provide Mind with an ability to survive. So although concepts are Mind-created, crucial aspects of them are causally connected to (influenced by) the outside world. Another way to consider the same process is to say certain properties of entities as identified by Mind can result from elements in the external world or in Mind itself (in the case of perception of mental events) which, through action upon the sensory systems, activate Mind to produce what it perceives. This means Mind both generates and interprets the same product, though not simultaneously.

NOTE: Sensory systems are not limited to the traditional five senses.

In categorizing and defining perceptions, Mind attempts to identify key or critical properties (aspects) of percepts which can serve to distinguish a concept or representation from all others. For example, based upon the various aspects of the perceptibles associated with an individual man, Mind develops a concept of ‘man’. In attempting to articulate how this concept differs from others, some have referred to man as a ‘rational animal’ and, in a humorous vein, a ‘featherless biped’. Now it can be seen all four properties are shared by man—rationality (not unique to humans), animality, featherlessness, and bipedalism. But because these same properties are also displayed by other creatures, they are not definitive in a strong, exclusive sense. They do, however, serve to distinguish man from fish, elephants, trees, rocks, and a host of other concepts and so narrow the range of possibilities. In many instances, a narrowing of possibilities may give Mind a sufficient command of Reality for survival purposes.

One benefit when dealing with perceptibles emanating from Reality arises from sensory mechanisms’ provision of a more or less objective (See Note) means for validating basic concepts relating to perceptibles. Once people agree to call a certain creature an elephant, it offers ways to validate whether an animal is one. There would still be a problem if there existed elephant-like creatures difficult to distinguish from the original, much like there are creatures whose sex is difficult to distinguish even by experts. Nevertheless, the mental systems provided by evolution work well enough for survival purposes—though Nature never could have anticipated the kind of tasks and challenges human Minds would impose upon these rudimentary systems.

NOTE: Being a Mind-created standard, the concept of objectivity in its ideal formulation is incapable of implementation. Thus, Alpha accepts the position that, practically speaking, objectivity is intersubjectivity.

I–150.42 Possession of Concepts

One can be said to possess or understand a concept when he acquires a working knowledge of it. He can discuss the concept with others, convey his meaning, and point out examples of it as appropriate. Note it’s not necessary for him to know the appropriate word (sign) for the concept though there may be one. (It might be a brand new concept for him though not for others who may already know the concept.)

On the other hand, someone may know the name of a concept but not understand it. If someone doesn’t know what an elm tree (or a beech, or maple, etc.) looks like and can’t point one out, he does not have a concept of an elm tree. What he does have is a concept of trees, and concepts of different kinds of trees (the ones he recognizes). He may know an elm tree looks something like an oak because it has leaves (is deciduous) and is not like a fir tree, which he also recognizes, though he may not have concepts of the specific kinds of fir trees either. So although possessing a great many relevant and related concepts, he doesn’t know the one stated in the example, viz., a working concept of elm trees. As can be seen, it’s quite possible for someone to talk at great length, appear knowledgeable, and have little or no understanding of the concepts being utilized.

I–150.43 The Representational Role of Concepts

One role of basic concepts is to serve as first-order representations of perceptions, while abstractions provide for second-order representations of simple concepts and/or other abstractions. Concepts dealing with second-order representations (abstractions) can quickly expand by association far beyond the original representation thus pooling, linking, or relating many other first- and/or second-order representations.

The word representation presents some difficulties when considering the entire chain linking the external world to the final stages of the conceptual process. As earlier noted, percepts are creations of the brain, so it becomes problematic to treat these as representations of elements in Reality. Nor should one consider percepts to be ‘interpretations’ as this presumes an awareness of a different external Reality which one then interprets in order to provide the Mind with a ‘re-presentation’ of what’s ‘really’ out there. However, one might still utilize the term representation when speaking of the relationship of percept to external ‘object’ if we bear in mind the caveat that the connection is a weak and possibly misleading one. What we perceive is a mental creation; what’s independently there is possibly radically different. However, there’s no such difficulty with the term representation when discussing the role of concepts as these relate to percepts.

The representational utility of concepts is extremely important to the life of Mind, but not the only conceptual task. A basic concept of an ontologically existent entity remains in the Mind after the object has disappeared from immediate perceptibility and becomes what Mind relies upon when handling intellectual tasks. Such creative reworking can become something entirely new, unique, and self-referential at some point in the process. This becomes especially true when dealing with creative abstractions which entail more than the sum of their parts, i.e., not simply combinations of the original representations.

Mathematics also has its analogously concrete elements and first order representations. In Alpha the workings of logic are observed (See Note) much in the same manner as Mind considers phenomena external to itself. Here first order representational conceptualizations refer to what might be considered syntactical units (e.g., concepts of number). From these fundamental representations, second order abstract ones are generated. This makes mathematics at its foundations a non-abstract concrete activity, one based upon observation of mental rather than external processes.

NOTE: In Alpha, observation is not limited to perceptions involving sight but more closely allied to the term perception. To make an observation, therefore, is be aware of a string or series of perceptions which may be visual or otherwise, perceptions being a product of the brain.

Abstract concepts are not always merely sets with a collection of elements (or properties) and so can do more than simply refer to a list of included items. True, one can make an effort at itemizing such a list and further identify those elements or properties which are ‘key’ and distinguish a concept from all others. But there remains the theoretical possibility one could have two separate concepts containing the same elements which are not synonymous. Their difference would be accounted for by the quality of the structural interaction of the elements. So while concepts can be distinguished by the items they contain, there remains also the factor of their elemental interaction. This provides for a self-referential aspect to abstract concepts when processed by Mind.

This self-reference is consistent with those sections of this work which state all mentallizations for dealing with external Reality are essentially models. The concepts comprising these models never correspond on a one-to-one basis with Reality. It’s true there’s a causal relationship with Reality (Mind being affected by and in turn able to affect external Reality), but all of the important mental work (as opposed to the purely sensory) deals with conceptualizations and only incidentally with externalities.

This latter statement may sound overly philosophically idealistic and appear to trivialize the importance of external realities. However, here it’s accepted as a truism that survival depends upon a fully effective causal relationship between Mind and the external world. Yet regardless of this position, conceptualization processes are heavily Mind-centered and self-referential. This being the case, Mind always lives in danger of falling into an unreal egocentric domain and must constantly validate its conclusions and findings against feedback from the external world.

I–150.44 The Communication of Concepts

Individual Minds do not work from identical concepts and representations when discussing and disputing the ‘true’ meaning of different concepts. Of course, it’s possible for individuals to share one or more critical meanings for every concept, so making communication possible. Certainly, individuals can most often agree on observational data, i.e., on information provided by the senses. But most often isn’t always and a group of people can often disagree about their observations of a concrete object which they’re all simultaneously viewing. Nevertheless, such differences are for the most part minor and even when they occur are hardly an impediment to the survival of the species.

Beyond straightforward observation of a concrete object, associational meanings come to be attached to most all concepts, some of which are more important than others in social discourse. In order to understand a word’s meaning in a social context its references must be similar to those used by the people to whom one speaks, otherwise there’s no communication. This requires an overlap of meanings on critical points to permit communication. More specifically, given the social aspect of language, concepts must have a working overlap among communicators so they can interact and understand each other. It is common to talk of shared identity of concepts among speakers, but such an identity cannot be validated. It can be validated that conceptualizations are similar enough to allow pragmatic working arrangements. Language, however, serves more than a social role as it also helps a Mind communicate with itself, to phrase issues and concepts for itself in useful and creative ways, and to clarify its beliefs.

NOTE: Mathematics would seem to be one exception because all the evidence indicates quite precise cross-mental agreement on principles and conclusions thus giving rise to the traditional view it’s the ideal and objective discipline. One reason accounting for this ideal situation is the Meta-structure shared by most all species on this planet having a Mind. Mathematics being a form of logic, and logic being the articulation of some aspects of the Meta-structure, it’s inevitable all species on Earth having a Mind would generate the same mathematics. The all species on Earth is speculative as there may be Minds on a different evolutionary path not sharing the same Meta-structure. Minds on other planets may have drastically different Meta-structures and not possess something that can be called mathematics or else so different