Is the Philippines doomed to be dragged into a US-China conflict over Taiwan?

President Joe Biden's recent remarks that the United States will commit troops to defend Taiwan fired up debate on whether Washington's view towards the island is shifting away from a long-standing policy of "strategic ambiguity" to a more clear approach.

This reiteration of previous impromptu statements he made on the matter sent made waves among allies who may be on the frontline should the US respond to a Taiwan contingency.

The Philippines, its former colony and long-time ally in Asia, comes to mind. Its geographical proximity, and existing US military access to several sites across the archipelago make it an ideal staging ground for American forces.

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As the Southeast Asian country most likely to welcome US overtures, Washington is expected to double down on courting its ally. But consenting to an expanded US troop and arms presence, especially short to medium-range missiles that can hit Chinese targets in the South China Sea or on the mainland, may beset Manila's relations with Beijing, its largest trade partner.

If the past can teach us anything about the future, there is reason to be wary. During World War II, the Philippines, then a US Commonwealth and forward military base, suffered the most among Southeast Asian countries, as the presence of American bases made it a legitimate target for Japan.

Nine hours after Pearl Harbour was attacked, Japanese planes bombed and strafed US airfields in the country, signalling the start of an invasion. Despite being declared an open city - not to be bombed under international law - Manila was devastated, earning the nickname "Warsaw of the East".

The battle to liberate the capital from Japanese forces was among the worst urban fighting campaigns in the Pacific theatre.

As a former colony transitioning to independence, the country had little say on US bases in the Philippines back then. But even after securing independence, a 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty and subsequent military pacts continue to tether Manila to Washington.

The Philippines took part in numerous American-led wars over the decades, from Korea to Vietnam, as well as the Persian Gulf and Iraq wars. Hence, concern about getting entangled in a potential conflict between the US and its rivals has long bedevilled the country.

Fast forward to the present, the Philippines worries that granting expanded US military access may embroil it in a possible US-China showdown over the self-ruled island of Taiwan.

In the 37th US-Philippines Balikatan military exercises that concluded on April 8 this year, four Patriot missile batteries were inserted for the first time. Four HIMARS rocket launchers, which first featured in the annual joint drills in 2016, were also present.

That gave rise to speculation of possible dress rehearsals for eventual future deployment in the country. The April exercises were among the largest conducted in recent years, with 9,000 troops from both sides taking part, along with an Australian contingent. Exercise areas included Cagayan province in northern Luzon facing Taiwan and Palawan facing the South China Sea, unmistakably sending a message to Beijing.

US-China resentment continues to deepen. A miscalculation, if not an accident, in flashpoints like the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait may potentially spark actual hostility. Manila, Beijing and Taipei are among the disputants in the semi-enclosed sea, but hostility between China and the US has also intensified as Beijing began to physically challenge transits, overflights and reconnaissance missions by American and allied vessels and aircraft in the strategic waterway.

Cross-strait tensions soured further following US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan last month. Beijing responded with several countermeasures, including unprecedented live-fire military exercises around the self-governing island.

Of the six exclusion areas set up, two overlap with the exclusive economic zones of US allies Japan and the Philippines.

Some Chinese ballistic missiles also landed in Japan's exclusive economic zone, leading to diplomatic protests from Tokyo. China's move may be seen as a choreographed ploy to warn its neighbours against involvement in the hotspot.

In recent years, Beijing, with its new-found wherewithal, has come down hard on attempts to undermine its security or core interests. After a failed US attempt to end a stand-off over the Scarborough Shoal in 2012, China took control of the disputed territory, denied access to Filipino fishing boats and curbed tourism to and banana imports from the Philippines.

When Manila took its neighbour to arbitration the year after, China began building massive artificial islands in the South China Sea while the case was under way.

When Seoul, another US ally, allowed the deployment of THAAD missiles on its soil in 2017, China curtailed trade and tourism, adversely affecting the South Korean economy. In the aftermath of Pelosi's Taipei stop, some Taiwanese agricultural goods were denied entry to the mainland.

Beijing also disavowed the legal status of Taiwan's offshore islands, repudiated the median line that long served as an informal cross-strait boundary and normalised patrols in waters and airspace around the self-ruled island.

Indeed, junior allies and partners disproportionately take the brunt of Chinese retaliatory actions against the US. The Philippines forms part of the so-called First Island Chain that runs from the Kurils and Japanese archipelago in the north to the Ryukyus and Taiwan to as far south as Borneo.

So, the future for this Southeast Asian island chain is now contingent on what potential chain of events occurs, and the agency of actors within the chain of command.

Lucio Blanco Pitlo III is a research fellow at the Asia-Pacific Pathways to Progress Foundation

This article originally appeared on the South China Morning Post (SCMP).

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