Will the Ukraine war distract the US from its Indo-Pacific plan to counter China?

Weeks after the United States unveiled its Indo-Pacific strategy outlining its diplomatic and security engagements in the region, Beijing accused Washington of trying to establish an Indo-Pacific version of Nato, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization military alliance of European and North American countries.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, speaking last week at an annual press conference on the sidelines of China's National People's Congress in Beijing, said the US' "geopolitical game" aimed at curbing China's rise would "create trouble for regional stability".

Announced last month, the Indo-Pacific blueprint highlighted Washington's commitment to sustaining diplomatic and security engagement in the region to counter what it views as China's aggressive and coercive behaviour in the East and South China seas, as well as towards Taiwan.

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The plan came amid an increased focus by the US on its Quad security pact with India, Japan and Australia, and the formation of the Aukus alliance with Australia and Britain, widely seen as a means to counter Beijing.

But only days after the strategy's launch, Russia invaded Ukraine, prompting some analysts to wonder if the ongoing war could force the US to prioritise security in Europe over its engagements with the Indo-Pacific.

In an article published earlier this month, analysts Ian Storey and William Choong from the Singapore-based ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute said that in the short term, Europe would take up much of Washington's strategic attention.

"This will reinforce long-standing concerns in Asia that despite America's intention to 're-pivot' to the region, it will periodically be distracted by events in Europe," the authors wrote.

They added that even though there was no indication that US diplomats and senior officials would devote less attention to the Indo-Pacific, some Southeast Asian countries would "require reassurances of America's commitment to regional security which was undermined to some degree during the [Donald] Trump administration".

President Joe Biden will be expected to give those reassurances at a face-to-face summit between the US and Asean, initially scheduled at the end of this month.

Current Asean chair Cambodia said last week that the meeting had been postponed due to scheduling reasons, but Indonesia, which is acting as a coordinator between the Southeast Asian bloc and the US, had not formally confirmed the postponement.

Marty Natalegawa, Indonesia's foreign minister from 2009 to 2014, said the summit's delay could lead to a perception that the region would lose relevance for the US and its Western allies.

These views had occurred in the past whenever the US became embroiled in conflicts, such as in Syria or Afghanistan, Natalegawa said, even though Washington had still been able to sustain its engagements in spite of its commitments elsewhere.

But instead of declining US interest in the region, Natalegawa said he was more concerned about the possibility of an "overcorrection", or what he called "the inclination to impose or project the dynamics currently in Europe onto the Indo-Pacific".

"I think it is very easy for one to overcorrect and to be overzealous in trying to signal that they are still here in the region," Natalegawa said, adding that such moves might take the form of military readiness or deployment of military assets in the region, which in turn could increase the risks of miscalculation.

If this happened, Natalegawa said, one of the risks would be the problem of deciphering intent, much like nations trying to figure out Russia's aim when it amassed its troops along the borders of Ukraine in the days leading up to the invasion.

As for Asean, it has a role in coming up with "concrete implementable" ideas on managing geopolitical tensions between the major powers, said Natalegawa, author of the book Does Asean Matter?: A View from Within.

Southeast Asia has three opportunities this year to "be part of the solution", Natalegawa noted, pointing to Indonesia's chairing of the G20 in October, Thailand's hosting of the Apec economic leaders' meeting in November, and Cambodia chairing the East Asia summit this year - forums which all include the US, Russia and China as participants.

"Countries of Southeast Asia must rid themselves of the notion that these events are too far away and of no direct importance and relevance to them," said Natalegawa, adding that the outcome of the Ukraine war was global and would affect Asean's economic and political security.

While most Southeast Asian states supported the UN General Assembly resolution reprimanding Moscow for its invasion, the regional bloc's overall response was "widely criticised for being bland and insipid", wrote Storey and Choong from the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.

Indonesia's G20 co-sherpa Dian Triansyah Djani said that the Ukraine conflict should be kept off the grouping's agenda as it was better to focus on G20's three priorities: global health architecture, digital transformation and sustainable energy transition.

The view was echoed by Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian who said last Tuesday that the G20 was the main forum for international economic cooperation and wasn't an "appropriate venue" to discuss the Ukraine issue.

Chan Heng Chee, a political scientist and former Singapore ambassador to the US, said despite the Russian invasion, the Indo-Pacific would not become less relevant for Washington as "the rise of China and the competition for influence is a constant".

Chan noted that in the Ukraine war, "the Europeans are doing the heavy lifting, but the US provides the indispensable presence which gives weight to Nato".

European countries, including Britain, France, Germany and the Netherlands, plus Finland, Sweden and Denmark, have sent arms to Ukraine as fighting continues. Later this week, Biden will travel to Brussels to take part in an extraordinary Nato summit to discuss the West's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

However, Chan said the US would have to work out details of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, Washington's signature trade policy priority for Asia - which the Biden administration hopes will bridge the economic engagement gap that emerged in the region after former President Donald Trump in 2017 withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

"Trade and trade agreements will remain a difficult issue for the US domestically," Chan said, referring to the US' aversion since 2016 towards striking trade deals out of fear it would hurt domestic manufacturing.

Joshua Kurlantzick, senior Southeast Asia fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, said that in the long term, the Indo-Pacific would remain relevant to the US as many of its allies, including Japan, Australia and South Korea, were in the region.

"The Indo-Pacific remains critical to global trade and is the central line of tension between the US and China," Kurlantzick said.

Ryan Hass, a senior fellow and the Michael H Armacost chair in the foreign policy programme at Brookings Institution, said the Biden administration had deliberately released the Indo-Pacific strategy before Russia invaded Ukraine so that US agencies would have "clear guidance for carrying out the strategy in the event of conflict in Ukraine".

Even as war rages in Ukraine, Hass said the Biden administration was maintaining a fairly "high tempo of engagement in Asia".

"President Biden spoke with his Quad counterparts virtually, he will soon travel to Asia, his team is in regular contact with their counterparts in the region, and his administration is strengthening cohesion of effort with partners across the region," said Hass, who also served as China, Taiwan and Mongolia director at the National Security Council during the Obama administration.

"In the near term, the Biden administration will need to devote more resources and focus to security in Europe. Over time, though, European countries will likely respond to Russia's threats by increasing defence spending, which could result in a more capable and energised trans-Atlantic defence capability," Hass added.

George Yeo, Singapore's former foreign minister, said that in the near term, the crisis in Ukraine would greatly strengthen Nato and its allies, and this would to some extent "draw American heat away from China in the Pacific".

But as China becomes more important to countries in the region, Yeo said "the more these countries will want the US around".

"Provided the US does not force a choice, its increased presence will be welcomed by everyone," said Yeo, who is now a visiting scholar at the National University of Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy.

Rafiq Dossani, director of the US-based RAND Centre for Asia-Pacific Policy, described the Indo-Pacific Strategy as ambitious but lacking in details, adding that the effectiveness of the strategy was always going to be hard to figure out regardless of the Ukraine war.

"Its underlying message, which is clear, is that 'America is back in Asia'. That is what we should assess in the new environment," said Dossani, adding that if the US succeeded in helping Ukraine oust Russia, it could energise the American foreign policy establishment and strengthen its involvement in Asia.

"A negative outcome could have the opposite effect, much as the Middle East has witnessed following the Afghanistan outcomes," Doosani said, referring to the two-decade war, the longest in American history, which ended in the recapturing of the country by the Taliban.

As for the Quad, analysts said the grouping's involvement in the region was unlikely to be weakened, even though unlike the US, Australia and Japan, India had not criticised Russia over the invasion of Ukraine due to Moscow's status as its largest supplier of defence equipment.

Bonnie Glaser from the German Marshall Fund of the United States said India's position should not be viewed as "a bellwether of its commitment to the Quad", noting that in the past year, there had been one in-person Quad leaders' meeting, and two virtual leaders' meetings, while another in-person Quad meeting was scheduled for spring.

"All four countries are deeply invested in the Quad and view it as an important mechanism for cooperation and for delivering public goods," Glaser said.

In recent months, Quad countries have significantly ramped up the supply of Covid-19 vaccines to the Indo-Pacific, part of a goal of donating over 1.2 billion doses globally by the end of this year.

Richard Maude, executive director of the Asia Society Australia, wrote last month that the impetus for delivering public goods was "not solely altruistic" as the Quad "recognises that the best way to compete with China in the Indo-Pacific is to respond to the region's needs".

Political scientist Chan said that India's position on Ukraine was due to its historical relationship with Russia, while "Quad for India was always about China".

For almost two years, India has been locked in a stand-off with China at their shared border in the Himalayas.

"Japan and Australia are not embroiled in Ukraine. I expect the US would want Quad to step up its activities given the new strategic context globally," Chan added.

Doosani from RAND said that while India's position and the diversion of discussion to Ukraine issues may have weakened the Quad, this is likely to be temporary.

"India's interest in the Quad comes from its interest in managing China, not Russia or anything else," Doosani said. "The US is learning this lesson the hard way through India's unexpected stance, but once it does, the Quad will be back on track."

This article originally appeared on the South China Morning Post (SCMP).

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