How the Philippines and US can save the Visiting Forces Agreement (and keep China at bay)
Ties between long-standing allies the Philippines and the United States have been strained by a disagreement over a two-decade old military pact that has enhanced defence and security interoperability and allowed the United States to maintain a presence in a region where China has become more assertive.
Last week, President Rodrigo Duterte demanded that the US provide more funding to Manila to keep the Visiting Forces Agreement intact, after members of his cabinet agreed with their American counterparts on its importance. Duterte had said last year that he would cancel the VFA after one of his political allies was denied a visa to visit the US over human rights concerns. The termination, however, was put on hold twice, with officials from both sides scrambling to save the pact.
When Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jnr spoke to US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in late January, both stressed the relevance of the alliance in maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific. Locsin suggested that the two sides would meet to discuss the VFA later this month.
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Last week, Philippine Defence Secretary Delfin Lorenzana and his US counterpart, Lloyd Austin, held phone talks, with Austin affirming his country's commitment to the alliance and both officials recognising the importance of modernising the Philippine military and bolstering military interoperability through joint activities.
The VFA is anchored on the seven-decade-old Mutual Defence Treaty, which requires that both countries come to each other's defence in case of an armed attack. Another pact, the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which was signed in 2014, provides US access to Philippine military bases. Duterte has railed against both the VFA and EDCA for increasing the risks of his country getting caught in a US-China conflict over the South China Sea.
There are two ways Washington can send a strong signal that it is keen to move past this rough patch and keep these military agreements, which give shape and form to the alliance. The first is to schedule high-level talks with the Philippines and the second is to make significant diplomatic appointments that underscore the importance of Manila to Washington. In all this, the US should be mindful that pressuring the Duterte government over democracy and human rights concerns will continue to cause tensions and could disrupt the VFA and EDCA anew.
Filipino activists and opposition leaders march to protest the presence of Chinese vessels in the South China Sea at the Chinese Embassy in Makati City, Philippines, in April 2019. Photo: Reuters
The timing of any discussions on the VFA is in Washington's favour. Recent developments in the South China Sea - such as China's controversial new coastguard law, which it says gives it the right to fire on any foreign vessels in waters it claims - may provide the Philippines with the impetus for keeping robust security ties amid a fluid geopolitical environment.
Compared with the previous administration of Benigno Aquino Jnr, under whose watch strategic dialogues were established with the US and held each year from 2011 to 2016, the Duterte administration has held just two such senior-level meetings - in 2017 and 2019.
Furthermore, with just over a year remaining in his presidential term, Duterte has yet to visit the US, while he has already made six trips to China. Holding the ninth iteration of the bilateral strategic dialogue could be key to making headway in brokering better ties with Washington.
Given the rapidly evolving great power game in the South China Sea, the US cannot afford to hope and wait for a friendlier Philippine administration after next year's election. It has to start engaging the current government in Manila even if it has low expectations of improving ties, because Duterte's popularity remains immense and he may still be a factor in next year's election based on his endorsement power alone.
In Manila, there have been political disagreements over how to shape a more equitable alliance for the Philippines. Duterte wants Washington to increase non-military aid, but even those in favour of reviewing the VFA say it is not right to hold the alliance hostage in order to obtain US-made Covid-19 vaccines or ask US forces to pay rent to use Philippine military bases.
Kim also played a key role in providing critical US military support in the ousting of radical militants from Marawi in Mindanao island, which they had captured after raiding the city in 2017.
These achievements were not lost on Duterte, who gave the outgoing Kim the Philippines' highest award for a foreign diplomat before his return home in September 2020, on top of granting an absolute pardon to convicted US Marine Joseph Scott Pemberton on the same day Kim made his farewell call to the Presidential Palace.
Pemberton, who was among the thousands of American soldiers taking part in regular military exercises with their Filipino counterparts, was convicted of killing a Filipina transgender woman he met at a local bar in 2014.
The appointment of Filipino-American Gloria Steele as acting administrator of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) may also be seen by Manila as a positive development. USAID and the new US International Development Finance Corporation are expected to work alongside the Asian Development Bank, which is based in Metro Manila, and Japan to provide a counterweight to Beijing's infrastructure funding in the region.
Finally, the most urgent task for the US is to appoint a seasoned career diplomat as its ambassador to the Philippines.
China has shown it is keenly aware of the importance of such a move, having appointed Huang Xilian as its ambassador to the country. Huang, Beijing's former top envoy to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, has since become active in burnishing Beijing's reputation in the Philippines through media, government and social circles.
This article originally appeared on the South China Morning Post (SCMP).
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